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	<title>Nicholas Gailey, Author at N-IUSSP</title>
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	<title>Nicholas Gailey, Author at N-IUSSP</title>
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		<title>The demographic dividend is driven by education, not changes in age structure</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/the-demographic-dividend-is-driven-by-education/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wolfgang Lutz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2019 08:34:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Education, work, economy (socio-economic differences)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Wolfgang Lutz, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, and Nicholas Gailey show that the “demographic dividend” does not result from the opening of “a window of opportunity” caused by a declining youth dependency ... <a title="The demographic dividend is driven by education, not changes in age structure" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/the-demographic-dividend-is-driven-by-education/" aria-label="Read more about The demographic dividend is driven by education, not changes in age structure">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/the-demographic-dividend-is-driven-by-education/">The demographic dividend is driven by education, not changes in age structure</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Wolfgang Lutz, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, and Nicholas Gailey show that the “demographic dividend” does not result from the opening of “a window of opportunity” caused by a declining youth dependency ratio; rather, it is initiated and significantly driven by improvements in education. This means that population ageing does not necessarily imply a closing of the window. Since changes in the educational composition of populations are also demographic changes, we can continue to speak of a demographic dividend.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">The notion of a demographic dividend (conventionally defined as the potential economic benefits derived from having a small share of economically dependent individuals) stands as the dominant paradigm for conceptualizing and communicating why population matters for development. The United Nations Population Fund, for instance, has prominently adopted such an approach, focusing on reproductive health services to alleviate unmet need for family planning and moderate fertility (UNFPA 2016).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, a new look at the demographic dividend (Lutz et al. 2019) shows that education improvement rather than a change in age structure is the gatekeeper for accessing economic growth. The econometric model that we used separates education from age-structure effects on development outcomes, finding that gains from a rising share of the working-age population are prevalent only when a relatively high share of the population is educated beyond primary schooling (Figure 1).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.28.34.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="771" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.28.34-1024x771.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4057" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.28.34-1024x771.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.28.34-300x226.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.28.34-768x578.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.28.34.png 1790w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Age-structural change in itself does not open a specific window of opportunity: it can help strengthen the dividend, but only when combined with an improvement in human capital, which is the primary agent of change in low-income countries. Development goals, especially for early demographic transition countries, should therefore set education as a priority from the beginning, as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) already postulate. Such a strategy also works in moderating fertility (Kebede et al 2019), which is a useful complement in the process of economic development.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What constitutes demographic change and its dividend?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While demographic change is sometimes narrowly viewed as only referring to changing age structure, both common usage and authoritative scientific definitions often take a broader view that includes changes in several demographic dimensions. For example, when the media write about the changing demographics of the USA in the context of voting behaviour, they refer to the changing proportions of Hispanics, changing proportions in urban, semi-urban and rural areas and changing education structures, among others. This broad usage is also in line with the definition used by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and key textbooks (Shryock et al 1973) as the scientific study of changing population size and structures, meaning multiple structures. In this sense, both changes, in the education structure and in the age structure, can be labelled “demographic”, and both can influence the demographic dividend. Which of these demographic structural changes is more important for economic growth is a matter of empirical assessment rather than ex ante assumptions.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A counterfactual: what if Nigeria had followed a South Korean path?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The coefficients estimated in (Lutz et al. 2019) can be used to simulate alternative paths of per capita GDP. To do this, we will take Nigeria as an example. We can model the country&#8217;s evolution by &#8220;inserting&#8221; aspects of the South Korean experience, characterized by marked fertility decline, rapid progress in education and economic growth (Table 1). Of course, these simulations are not to be taken at face value: they are meant solely to disentangle the drivers of development and ultimately show that paired together, age structure and progress in education produce the best results.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.29.51.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="398" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.29.51-1024x398.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4058" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.29.51-1024x398.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.29.51-300x117.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.29.51-768x299.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.29.51.png 1682w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 2 presents the results of these simulations as log-deviations from the observed path of per capita GDP in Nigeria, between 1970 and 2015. Zero means “no difference”, whereas positive (or negative) values indicate that the economic development in Nigeria would have been better (or worse) than it actually was.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.36.34.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="936" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.36.34-1024x936.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4059" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.36.34-1024x936.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.36.34-300x274.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.36.34-768x702.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schermata-2019-11-17-alle-12.36.34.png 1530w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We consider four scenarios. Scenario 1 simulates what would have happened in Nigeria, had education improved as fast as it did in South Korea. Scenario 2, instead, freezes Nigeria’s education at its 1970 level, letting other variables change. Comparison between the two unbroken lines gives an idea of the economic impact of educational progress.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under Scenario 3, the Korean education expansion is combined with the Korean age structure trend (traditional demographic “bonus”). Finally, Scenario 4 combines the actual education expansion of Nigeria with the very rapid increase in the working-age share of the population observed in Korea (an “education-free” demographic transition). The results of this scenario may appear surprising, but they are consistent with the parametric estimates shown in Figure 1. As the initial education level is very low in Nigeria (which is associated with negative parameters in Figure 1), a massive increase in the working-age share (same as in Korea) has a strong depressing effect on per capita GDP. Only after education increases beyond a critical point (which happens around 2000 in Nigeria) does the “traditional” demographic dividend turn positive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This same interaction between age structure and education also explains the cross-over of the two blue curves. In Scenario 3, a strong (Korean style) education expansion, which has a positive effect in itself (see Scenario 1), is initially partly cancelled out by the rapid age-structure change, which is unfavourable to economic growth when education levels are very low (see again Figure 1). It is only later, when education levels increase sufficiently, that the two trends (age structure and education transition) positively reinforce each other and lead to an economic take-off.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Implications</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The results underscore the importance of human capital accumulation for economic growth: a higher share of working-age population in itself is not enough, and it can even be detrimental when education levels are low. Admittedly, the causal path behind this remains unclear and is certainly worth investigating. A plausible conjecture is that young adults are not always employed productively, and this may lead to violence and conflict in the absence of the proper institutional settings (Cincotta 2011). Another explanation could be that recent strong declines in child mortality in some African countries, leading to relatively larger youth dependency ratios, have occurred in countries with strong economic growth, resulting in a positive association between youth dependency and GDP growth for least developed countries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Of course, a counterfactual simulation that isolates age structure and education trends must be interpreted with caution, since in reality the two are not independent of each other: for instance, a strong fertility decline is unlikely to take place in the absence of education. But this study leaves no doubt as to the importance of education for economic growth. A full and rapid implementation of Sustainable Development Goals 4 (universal high-quality primary and secondary education) and 3 (health including reproductive health) is therefore a development priority. Otherwise, missed opportunities for the demographic dividend will persist.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cincotta, R. P. (2011) Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy. Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kebede E., Goujon A., Lutz W., Gailey N. (2019) <a href="https://www.niussp.org/article/education-disruptions-in-the-1980s-contributed-to-the-stalled-fertility-decline-in-africa/#more-3524" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Education disruptions in the 1980s contributed to the stalled fertility decline in Africa around 2000</a>. N-IUSSP</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lutz, W., Crespo Cuaresma, J.,&nbsp;Kebede, E.,&nbsp;Prskawetz, A., Sanderson, W.,&nbsp;Striessnig E. 2019. “Education rather than age structure brings demographic dividend”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,&nbsp;116&nbsp;(26)&nbsp;12798-12803;&nbsp;DOI:&nbsp;10.1073/pnas.1820362116.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shryock, H. S., Siegel, J. S. and Larmon, E. A. (1973) The Methods and Materials of Demography. US Bureau of the Census.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">UNFPA (2016) <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/sowp/downloads/The_State_of_World_Population_2016_-_English.pdf">The State of the World Population Report 2016. United Nations Population Fund. New York.</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/the-demographic-dividend-is-driven-by-education/">The demographic dividend is driven by education, not changes in age structure</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jesus Crespo Cuaresma]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Gailey]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Education disruptions in the 1980s contributed to the stalled fertility decline in Africa around 2000</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/education-disruptions-in-the-1980s-contributed-to-the-stalled-fertility-decline-in-africa/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Endale Kebede]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Apr 2019 08:18:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Education]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=3524</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Masked by time, educational disruptions of the 1980s help explain why steady fertility declines came to a surprising halt in the 2000s in ten sub-Saharan African countries. The findings, according ... <a title="Education disruptions in the 1980s contributed to the stalled fertility decline in Africa around 2000" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/education-disruptions-in-the-1980s-contributed-to-the-stalled-fertility-decline-in-africa/" aria-label="Read more about Education disruptions in the 1980s contributed to the stalled fertility decline in Africa around 2000">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/education-disruptions-in-the-1980s-contributed-to-the-stalled-fertility-decline-in-africa/">Education disruptions in the 1980s contributed to the stalled fertility decline in Africa around 2000</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Masked by time, educational disruptions of the 1980s help explain why steady fertility declines came to a surprising halt in the 2000s in ten sub-Saharan African countries. The findings, according to Endale Kebede, Anne Goujon, Wolfgang Lutz and Nicholas Gailey, underscore how crucial it is for all relevant initiatives to recognize the role of education in moderating population growth and accelerating socio-economic development.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">The future pace of fertility decline in Sub-Saharan Africa will likely be the chief determinant of world population growth, with massive implications for Africa itself as well as the rest of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa stands out as the world’s last region to enter the demographic transition. It was only in the 1980s that birth rates started to fall in most Sub-Saharan African countries, and still, these declines have been uneven and have stalled at times. Particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s many of these countries experienced a slowdown of their fertility decline and in some cases even a reversal, the reasons for which have remained largely unexplained (Kebede, Goujon, Lutz 2019). Most existing studies try to link stalls in fertility decline to some specific factors, such as slower socio-economic development (Shapiro and Gebreselassie 2008), the low priority assigned to family planning programs at the beginning of the 21st century (Bongaarts 2008) and other factors related to public and reproductive health.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Fertility stalls echo earlier education stalls for some cohorts in sub-Saharan Africa</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In contrast to the above-mentioned explanations, Goujon, Lutz and Kc (2015) proposed another plausible explanation focusing on cohort effects. They linked the fertility stalls around 2000 to the fact that some cohorts of women were subjected to an education stall, possibly associated with post-independence economic and political turmoil as well as structural adjustment. To explore this hypothesis, we combined individual level data from Demographic and Health Surveys for 18 African countries – with and without fertility stalls – thus creating a pooled dataset of more than 2 million births to some 670,000 women born between 1950 and 1995 by level of education. Our results highlighted that disruptions in educational attainment among cohorts around the 1980s are consistent with populations having higher proportions of poorly educated women of childbearing ages in the late 1990s and early 2000s, than would otherwise have been the case, had educational improvements continued to progress. This phenomenon, coupled with the relatively higher vulnerability of less educated women to period effects, has likely contributed to stalls in the period fertility declines (Kebede, Goujon and Lutz 2019).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A two-decade delay, linking changes in education with fertility</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The post-independence period was a time of great expectations in Sub-Saharan Africa as most countries engaged in a process of expanding social services (Ezenwe 1993). However, the initial period of economic and social optimism was soon replaced by harsher times linked to the external shocks of oil price increases, declining terms of trade, and increasing government external debt (Elbadawi, Ghura and Uwujaren 1992). These changes resulted in austerity measures and massive cuts in government budgets &#8211; particularly in the social sectors of health and education &#8211; which were mostly in the framework of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) introduced in Africa by the Bretton Woods institutions. While it is impossible to say whether the SAP or initial dire situations are behind the slow-down in cohort educational improvement, the children of the 1980s were deprived of educational opportunities, with life-long consequences.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1 displays the proportions of women who never attended school from the cohorts born between 1950 and 1990 in two populous countries with stalls in their fertility declines (Kenya and Nigeria),. In both countries, the clear trend towards a declining cohort birth rate from 1950 to the 1970s was stopped (Nigeria) or even reversed (Kenya; Figure 2). Such education discontinuities were also observed in most other countries with fertility stalls.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.29.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="685" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.29-1024x685.png" alt="" class="wp-image-3527" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.29-1024x685.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.29-300x201.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.29-768x514.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.29.png 1468w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The fertility stalls in Sub-Saharan Africa have rarely, if ever, been linked to the slowdown in educational progress. Indeed, the two phenomena occurred almost two decades apart, which may have seemed too long for any direct causal effects. However, they may be linked by two mechanisms. First, given that education has a direct effect on lowering fertility, the cohorts of girls who were deprived of schooling had higher fertility than they would otherwise have had. Second, period effects on uneducated women around 2000 were more sizable because these women were more numerous than they would have been without the earlier education disruptions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To assess the combined effect of these two different forces, we compared actual fertility trends with a counterfactual, i.e., a hypothetical scenario of what would have happened without this educational stall. This scenario (blue dotted line) refers both to the proportion of women with no formal education (Figure 1) and to the period total fertility rate (Figure 2). The difference between the counterfactual TFRs and the observed ones lies only in the weights given to the three educational groups (no formal education, incomplete primary, and completed primary education or more).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.46.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="688" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.46-1024x688.png" alt="" class="wp-image-3528" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.46-1024x688.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.46-300x202.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.46-768x516.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Schermata-2019-04-04-alle-18.43.46.png 1458w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our simulation results show a sizable difference between the actual and counterfactual TFR around the year 2000 in the stalled-fertility countries. In absolute numbers for all ten stalled-fertility countries, between 1995 and 2010, this translates into about 13 million fewer births to women aged 15-34. For Nigeria alone, the difference is about 6.5 million births.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions and policy implications</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The delayed consequences of educational disruptions on fertility levels two decades later have gone largely unnoticed in the scientific literature about Sub-Saharan Africa. An under-appreciation of this connection – between girls’ education and fertility in the following years – could be ruinous for the societies in question, as they attempt to maintain their living standards amid growing demands from prolonged rapid population increases. Shifts toward sustainable fertility and development depend on the reliable expansion of quality education, and accordingly, all relevant initiatives should embrace this as a priority.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bongaarts J (2008) Fertility transitions in developing countries: Progress or stagnation? Studies in family planning, 39(2):105–110.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Elbadawi IA, Ghura D, Uwujaren G (1992) World Bank adjustment lending and economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s. Country Economics Department WPS, 1000.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ezenwe U (1993) The African debt crisis and the challenge of development. Intereconomics, 28(1):35–43.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Goujon A, Lutz W, Kc S (2015) Education stalls and subsequent stalls in African fertility: A descriptive overview. Demographic Research, 33:1281–1296.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kebede E, Goujon A, Lutz W (2019) Stalls in Africa’s fertility decline partly result from disruptions in female education. PNAS, Jan 30;201717288.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shapiro D, Gebreselassie T (2008) Fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa: falling and stalling. African Population Studies, 23(1).</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/education-disruptions-in-the-1980s-contributed-to-the-stalled-fertility-decline-in-africa/">Education disruptions in the 1980s contributed to the stalled fertility decline in Africa around 2000</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anne Goujon]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wolfgang Lutz]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholas Gailey]]></dc:creator>
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