The World Health Organization recognizes the highest possible standard of health as a fundamental human right. Health disparities should therefore be studied and addressed to ensure that everyone, at all levels of society, has the same opportunities to enjoy good health and a long life. Individuals with higher levels of education tend to have better health, and the benefits of education may also spill over to the health of close others, such as spouses or partners. So, is having a highly educated partner associated with lower mortality? Has this association changed across generations? And does the distinction between marriage and cohabitation matter? 

The answers to these questions are particularly timely given the major societal changes over the past century, which underscore the importance of considering the educational resources of both partners in a couple. Women’s educational attainment and workforce participation have increased, while traditional marriage has ceded ground to more informal living arrangements, such as cohabitation. As a result, more couples now share similar educational backgrounds, and a growing number are choosing to live together without marrying (Schwartz 2013).

The Finnish case

In a recent study (Potente, Palumbo and Jalovaara 2025) we assessed how patterns of individual and partner educational attainment relate to mortality among men and women in Finland, and whether these relationships differ between married and cohabiting couples over time. Our analysis is based on Finland’s comprehensive population data, covering individuals born since 1932. We focused on heterosexual couples aged 50 and above, born between 1932 and 1970, and compared outcomes across various combinations of partners’ educational attainment. Finland stands out for its high rates of women’s education and full-time employment, as well as its pioneering embrace of non-marital cohabitation, although this form of partnership remains less associated with affluence and stability than marriage.

Why living with a partner can boost survival

Individuals in coresidential partnerships, whether married or not, tend to have longer survival rates than single individuals, whether previously partnered or never partnered. A key theoretical framework for understanding this phenomenon is the life-course theory, especially the “linked lives” principle, which highlights the interdependence of individual life paths (Carr 2018). People’s lives are shaped through their social ties, especially close family relationships such as partners, children, and siblings. 

In a coresidential partnership, partners exchange support and share resources and stresses, meaning that one partner’s socioeconomic resources, such as education, can also shape the other partner’s survival chances. This makes mortality risk partly relational rather than just individual. However, both coresidential partnership and individual experience may change such expected relationships, given the different levels of commitment and financial participation of each partner (Lindmarker, 2025). Marriage is likely to be more strongly associated with male-breadwinner equilibria than cohabitation, although these differences would have been more pronounced among earlier birth cohorts.  

The educational composition of couples and men’s and women’s mortality 

Our findings reveal that higher levels of education, both of ego and of his/her partner, are linked to lower mortality. Couples where both partners are in the high (tertiary) education group enjoy the greatest longevity, while those comprising two low-educated partners (both having only elementary schooling) fare the worst. Mixed-education couples fall somewhere in between.

Gender plays an important role. Men do best in terms of survival when both partners are highly educated and worst when both are low educated, with mixed-education couples in between. For women, the picture is more complex and varies by birth cohort. Among those born before 1950, longevity is similar for both low- and highly educated women, provided their male partners are highly educated. Surprisingly, we find a similar pattern for married and cohabiting women in the oldest cohort: in both union types, women partnered with a highly educated man have survival levels close to those of women in couples where both partners are highly educated, even when the woman’s own education is low. For women born after 1950, survival differences vary according to the couple’s educational makeup, increasingly resembling the pattern observed among men.

Couple mortality disparities have increased over time

Our study highlights how the gap in survival between high- and low-educated couples has grown wider across generations. 
Longevity has increased particularly among married couples where both partners are highly educated (Figure 1). By contrast, those with low levels of education have missed out on these gains and, in many cases, have fallen further behind, among cohabiting couples especially (Figure 2). As a result, the health divide linked to education is increasingly apparent, not only among individuals but also between different types of couples, with the least educated emerging as the most vulnerable group. These trends could reflect changes in how education, including the resources and opportunities it brings, is distributed within relationships, as well as changes in who chooses to marry or cohabit.

Takeaway message

Our research highlights that the biggest risks show up in particular types of couples, especially low-educated married and cohabiting couples. The results suggest that prevention and support need to better reach low-educated couples, who seem less likely to benefit from the improvements over time seen among highly educated married couples. These are important findings to consider in order to prevent a further widening of longevity gaps at the couple level , and a worsening of health inequalities.

References

Carr, D. (2018). The Linked Lives Principle in Life Course Studies: Classic Approaches and Contemporary Advances. In D. F. Alwin, D. H. Felmlee, & D. A. Kreager (Eds.), Social Networks and the Life Course (pp. 41–63). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71544-5_3

Lindmarker, J., Kolk, M., & Drefahl, S. (2025). Cohabitation and mortality across the life course: A longitudinal cohort study with Swedish register-based sibling comparisons. European Journal of Population, 41(1), 2. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-024-09722-6

Potente, C., Palumbo, L., & Jalovaara, M. (2025). Partner’s Education and Mortality in Finland: A Study of Married and Cohabiting Unions Among Cohorts Born Between 1932 and 1970. European Journal of Population, 41(1), 29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-025-09752-8

Schwartz, C. R. (2013). Trends and variation in assortative mating: causes and consequences. Annual Review of Sociology, 39(1), 451–470. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145544

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As marriage declines and divorce increases, partnership trends and household composition become increasingly determined by trends in the formation and dissolution of non-marital cohabiting unions. Marika Jalovaara and Linus Andersson show that in Finland, the decline in marriage is not offset by an equivalent increase in cohabitation, and educational disparities in the prevalence of unions have increased somewhat from already-high levels in 1990. These patterns are remarkably similar for men and women.

The decline in marriage and the increase in divorce have continued well beyond the turn of the millennium in the Nordic countries and elsewhere. But does that mean that fewer people live with a partner? And are trends similar across gender and educational levels? To evaluate the trends in partnerships and the educational gradients therein, in a recent paper we analysed both marital and non-marital forms of (coresidential) partnership formation and dissolution from 1990 to 2019 in Finland (Jalovaara and Andersson 2023).

Trends in cohabitation and marriage

One of the major changes in family behaviour of the 20th century was that fewer people married and among those who did, more divorced. Family demographers have long pointed out that trends in marriage and divorce rates are consequential for both childbearing and well-being. Yet, non-marital partnerships have to some extent replaced marital ones, maintaining a balance in the share of the population living with a partner. However, this “compensating” effect may be only partial, in part because of sheer numbers, and in part because, while all forms of partnership are critical for individuals’ childbearing and household economy, marriage remains a stronger predictor of fertility and (relational and financial) stability than simple cohabitation.

The picture is further complicated by disparate evidence suggesting that trends in marital and non-marital partnerships differ for men and women, even when they have comparable educational levels. Finally, quality data on non-marital partnership formation and dissolution over time are generally scant. 

This is not the case in Finland, however, where we could access population register data that include the dates of marriage and divorce as well as the dates of non-marital cohabitation and dissolution for the entire population from 1990 to 2019. We focused on the age groups from 18 to 45 years because these are the ages when partnership formation is most common (and relevant for childbearing). We found that marriage prevalence (the share of the population who are married) declined in Finland across all educational groups among both men and women (Figure 1). In total, the share of married persons declined from 48% to 28% for all men from 53% to 33% for all women, with levels that are lower, the younger the age group.

We then considered partnership prevalence as a status of being either married or in a non-marital cohabiting union (Figure 2). If non-marital partnerships have indeed replaced marital partnerships, we would expect stability in total partnership prevalence from 1990 to 2019. Instead, we found a decline in total union prevalence. This is particularly the case among the group without upper secondary education, among whom the prevalence has fallen by more than 20 percentage points for men and almost 30 percentage points for women. Among individuals with medium levels of education, total union prevalence has decreased by three to eight percentage points over the past three decades. In contrast, we found a slight increase in total partnership prevalence among men and women with high education, although not for all age groups. 

Further analyses of the formation and dissolution of non-marital unions led us to conclude that non-marital unions were not sufficiently numerous and durable to fully compensate for the decline in marriage. Rates of separation (the share of partnered individuals who separate) have increased steadily over time across all types of union, while total partnering rates (the share of those who marry or enter a cohabiting union among the population not married or cohabiting) have been declining since around 2010 (Table 1).

Implications 

The decline in marriage and the increase in divorce are key features in the changing picture of the demography of the family. Yet, this is only half of the story: non-marital cohabitation has replaced marital unions but only to a limited extent. Forming a partnership and having children are fundamentally related. A higher share of non-marital cohabiting unions – more prone to partnership break-up than marriages – in combination with a lower total partnering rate during childbearing ages, can have negative consequences for childbearing. 

A reversed, or different, causal chain is also possible. The partnership trends we observe in Finland may be driven by a decreased desire for childbearing, or there may be common underlying forces that depress childbearing and partnerships. Be as it may, a trend away from partnerships is, in itself, likely to depress fertility.

Moreover, trends toward fewer and less stable couple households have implications for welfare policies. The household is a core economic unit and often protects against financial risks (e.g. unemployment). In countries where redistributive policy is adapted to dual-earner households in particular, trends towards fewer partnerships should be taken into consideration.

Finally, these trends are largely uniform across gender, even at comparable levels of education. While substantial differences exist, these are matters of degree rather than kind. Other studies (Kolk 2022, Andersson 2022) also show that educational and socioeconomic differences in family dynamics are similar in gender-egalitarian Nordic countries such as Finland, where women and men now have quite similar social and economic roles.

References

Andersson, Linus. ‘The Contribution of Partnership Contexts of Births to Cohort Fertility Rates’. SocArXiv, 3 January 2023. .

Jalovaara Marika, Andersson Linus (2023). A register-based account of period trends in union prevalence, entries, and exits by educational level for men and women in Finland. Demographic Research, 48 [14], 373–386. 10.4054/DemRes.2023.48.14

Kolk, M. (2022). The relationship between life-course accumulated income and childbearing of Swedish men and women born 1940–70. Population Studies, 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2022.2134578

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The expansion of non-marital childbearing

Why is it important to study whether children are born to married or unmarried parents? First, because being born to unmarried parents increases a child’s likelihood of living in a single-parent family (Andersson et al. 2002, 2017). Some children are born to single mothers. However, most children born outside marriage are born to cohabiting parents who did not marry before the child was born (Kiernan 2001). Parental separation is much more common and tends to occur sooner when parents are not married. Many single-parent families are doing fine, but at population level, the risk of poverty, for instance, is much higher in single-parent families than in two-parent families (Eurostat 2016). Second, because non-marital childbearing has become extremely common in most European countries, mainly because parents increasingly live together without being married (Kiernan 2001). Ideational and structural changes have contributed to the tremendous increase in childbirth outside marriage.

The Nordic countries were forerunners in this development (Figure 1). In the 1970s and 1980s, they were European outliers in this respect.

In Finland, the proportion of non-marital births has been smaller than in the other Nordic countries. One reason is that views on marriage are more conservative. While in the 1960s the vast majority (~95%) of children in Finland were still born within marriage (Figure 1), today, about 45% of all births are to unmarried parents. The percentages are even higher for first children, because some parents marry after the first birth. Since the mid-1990s, the majority of first children have been born to unmarried mothers (compared with a tiny minority in the 1970s).

A matter of education

In Finland, as elsewhere (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010), non-marital childbearing has increased substantially for parents of all educational categories, but, as Figure 2 shows, the increase has been inversely proportional to the parents’ educational level.

However, to better interpret Figure 2, structural changes must be taken into account. The average level of education has increased in recent decades and in many countries, the largest segment of the population currently has a “medium” level of education. Since the 1980s, this is also the case for first-time mothers and fathers in Finland (Figure 3). However, the situation is still evolving, and more and more parents, especially mothers, now have a tertiary degree. Among mothers of children born in the new millennium, almost half had completed either lower or higher tertiary level education.

A break-down exercise

In a recent study, we evaluated how parents with different levels of education contributed to the overall increase in non-marital first childbearing (Schnor and Jalovaara 2019). We considered changes in the parents’ educational profiles and changes in marriage behaviour.

Figure 4 shows how the educational segments contributed to the percentage-point increase in non-marital first childbearing across the decades. The increase is mainly attributable to increases in non-marital childbearing rates in the medium-educated population. While the prevalence of non-marital first-time childbearing was still highest among the low-educated, their overall contribution was small or even negative due to diminishing group size. The contribution of the upper tertiary-educated to non-marital childbearing remained relatively low.

Among mothers, the lower tertiary-educated also made a significant contribution. If lower- and upper tertiary-educated women are taken together, they account for approximately half of the increase in non-marital first childbirths in recent decades.

How educational expansion ties in with the rise in non-marital childbearing

During educational expansion, the ideational climate changed, making childbearing outside marriage socially acceptable. The largest increase in non-marital first childbearing occurred from the 1980s to the 1990s. At the same time, many countries underwent an economic recession. In response to the uncertainty and loss of opportunity, the medium and lower tertiary-educated may have preferred unmarried cohabitation or decided to postpone marriage. The medium-educated group is quantitatively large and may affect population trends, but research has not paid much attention to them, because of the focus on comparing the highest and lowest educated.

Of course, it remains important to investigate the living situations of low educated parents because they cumulate different disadvantages. At the same time, however, we need to consider the context in which the majority of children live. Non-marital childbearing has become common among the medium-educated and increasingly also among the high-educated. We should be sensitive to the implications that this change may bring for family instability and its consequences in terms of social and economic inequalities.

Acknowledgements

The research was funded by the Academy of Finland (decisions 275030, 321264, and 320162).

References

Andersson G (2002) Children’s experience of family disruption and family formation: Evidence from 16 FFS countries. Demographic Research 7(7): 343–364.

Andersson G, Thomson E and Duntava A (2017). Life-table representations of family dynamics in the 21st century. Demographic Research 37: 1081–1230.

Eurostat (2016a) Europe 2020 indicators – poverty and social exclusion. Available:  (Accessed: 11 December 2019)

Kiernan K (2001) European perspectives on nonmarital childbearing. In: L.Wu & B. Wolfe (eds.), Out of Wedlock: Causes and Consequences of Non-marital Fertility. New York: Russell Sage Foundation: 77–108.

Perelli-Harris B, Lappegård T, Keizer R and Berghammer C (2010) The educational gradient of childbearing within cohabitation in Europe. Population and Development Review 36(4): 775–801. Schnor Christine & Jalovaara Marika (2019): The spread of non-marital childbearing and its link to educational expansion. Acta Sociologica. 

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In a recent study (Jalovaara and Andersson 2018) we examined family forms and family transitions in Finland, from the perspective of children. We studied socio-economic differences in terms of both the type of family children are born into, and subsequent experiences of family events, such as parental separation and stepfamily formation. Our analyses are based on register data on the childbearing and union histories of women in Finland and on the family events that 64,162 children of these women experienced during their childhood (0–15 years) in 2003–2009. We present separate calculations for children of mothers with different levels of education. Our study shows that there are remarkable disparities in family forms and family transitions for different groups of children.

Family forms, at birth and later

Family situations already differ widely when children are born. Compared to children of highly educated mothers, children of mothers with low levels of education are almost twice as likely to be born to a cohabiting mother and four times as likely to be born to a lone mother, with no father living in the household (Figure 1). Most children of highly educated mothers are born in marriage. Moreover, if a highly educated mother is cohabiting when the child is born, she is more likely to marry later on.

Children of low-educated mothers are also much more likely to experience further changes in their family structure as they grow up. This holds for parental separation in particular. Of all children born into a household with a mother and father, 41% see their parents separate before their fifteenth birthday. Family dissolution rates are lower for children born to two married parents. Among children born in marriage, one-third see their parents separate before turning fifteen, as compared to half of children born to cohabiting parents. However, the disparities in outcomes by mother’s education are much more striking than those related to the parents’ marital status. Differences in outcomes are particularly stark at the youngest child ages (Figure 2). Children of low-educated mothers are much more prone to experience parental separation, and separations occur faster and at younger ages than for children of mothers with more education. For instance, 43 percent of children with low-educated mothers experience parental separation by age six, and two-thirds by age fifteen. Among children of highly educated mothers, these proportions are 12 and 29 percent, respectively.

Figure 3 shows a summary of the proportion of time that children in Finland spend in different family forms as they grow up. On average, children of low-educated mothers spend just half of their childhood years with both parents, whereas those of high-educated mothers spend four-fifths of their childhood with both parents (Figure 3). Besides, the children of low-educated mothers tend to live in a lone-parent family more often than others.

Outlook

A well-known argument from the literature claims that socioeconomic differentials in children’s family forms have become increasingly important in shaping child outcomes and the resources that are available to children in developed societies (McLanahan 2004; McLanahan and Jacobsen 2015). Children of low-educated mothers are increasingly likely to experience family changes and situations associated with a loss of resources, including early parental family formation outside marriage, parental separation, lower levels of paternal involvement, and weaker parental labour market attachment. The opposite holds for children born to highly educated parents. These unevenly distributed family experiences of children born into disadvantaged and advantaged families have the potential to increase differences in children’s well-being and life chances, and thus to contribute to the accumulation of advantage or disadvantage across the life course and across generations.

Many agree that welfare states could and should reduce inequalities in children’s opportunities. McLanahan (2004; see also McLanahan and Jacobsen 2015) claims that income-tested benefits to single parents, widely used in the United States, discourage marriage and employment among low-educated women and thereby contribute to wider socioeconomic disparities. One may expect a weaker link between maternal education and childhood family structure in the Nordic welfare regime, where many policies are targeted at promoting social and gender equality, and social policies are guided by the principle of universalism. In our study, we show that this link is anything but weak in Finland, where large proportions of children grow up in families that are headed by a lone mother with low education and, in many cases, a precarious labour market position.

Based on the Gini index, the Nordic countries are still among the most economically equal nations in the world (World Bank 2019), and social policies support parents and children regardless of family type. Still, our study provides little evidence of Nordic equalities in terms of family demographic outcomes. Of course, modern welfare states cannot impose a predefined family demographic behaviour. But a realistic aim for policymakers could be to reduce any detrimental consequences of differential family dynamics on children and their life chances (Cohen 2015). Our findings highlight how critical it is to maintain the institutions and practices that help compensate for the losses of resources related to the family arrangement that children experience in their early years.

References

Cohen P.N. (2015). Divergent responses to family inequality. In Families in an era of increasing inequality (pp. 25–33). New York: Springer.

Jalovaara M. & Andersson G. (2018). Disparities in children’s family experiences by mother’s education: The case of Finland. Population Research and Policy Review.

McLanahan S. (2004). Diverging destinies: How children are faring under the second demographic transition. Demography, 41(4), 607–627.

McLanahan S. & Jacobsen W. (2015). Diverging destinies revisited. In Families in an Era of Increasing Inequality, pp. 3–23. Springer International Publishing.

World Bank (2019). The World Bank Indicators. Retrieved March 1, 2019 from.

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In a recent study (Jalovaara et al. 2018), we and our colleagues compared the education and fertility of women and men born between 1940 and 1970/74 (women) or 1965–67/69 (men) in four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. We focused on two aspects of fertility:

• completed cohort fertility, or cohort total fertility, CTF, i.e. the mean number of children born to women by age 40 or to men by age 45, and
• levels of ultimate childlessness, i.e. the proportion of women and men who have remained childless up to this age.

We used longitudinal individual-level data drawn from the national population registers of the four Nordic countries and looked at the development of education, completed fertility and childlessness over time.

Completed cohort fertility and childlessness

We observed fairly similar developments of completed cohort fertility in the Nordic countries. As Figure 1 shows, the CTFs of women declined slightly in the oldest cohorts, but remained fairly stable thereafter. In all four countries, CTFs stayed consistently close to the replacement level. The ‘roller-coaster’ period fertility that all Nordic countries experienced to some extent (see Figure 2) had no major effect on the CTFs. This is partly because cohort fertility is more robust to changes in the timing of childbearing; it also reflects the recuperation of fertility at older ages that is characteristic of the Nordic childbearing pattern.

The levels of ultimate childlessness initially increased, but plateaued among the cohorts born since the late 1950s, except in Finland where childlessness continued to increase (Figure 3). In Finland, childlessness levels in the youngest cohorts are quite substantial: 22% for women and 27% for men compared to 12–14% for women and 19–24% for men in the other three countries.

The overall stability and development of completed cohort fertility and of ultimate childlessness masks the remarkable changes in childbearing patterns that have occurred among women with different levels of educational attainment. These changes and the persistence of educational disparities in fertility among men have fundamentally altered the gender and social pattern of fertility and childlessness among different educational groups in the Nordic countries. To provide background for assessing the transformation of educational differentials in fertility development, we briefly describe the educational developments in each country.

Developments in educational attainment

With the general increase in education, the numbers of men and women in the lowest-educated stratum have fallen in all four countries. Among the oldest female cohorts, 36–51% of women have only basic education; among the most recent cohort, the proportions vary between 6% and 13% (men: 11–21%). Among men, upper-secondary education is now the most common level attained, whereas among women, tertiary education has expanded substantially. Between 43% and 55% of women born in the early 1970s hold a tertiary educational degree compared to 15–21% of women born in 1940–44. Among men, the increases in high educational attainment are rather modest (+8 to 9 percentage points) or very small (+2 percentage points in Sweden). These gendered developments have led to a reversal of the educational gender gap to women’s advantage.

Fertility differentials by education

Consistent with previous studies in Europe, we find that low-educated men have lower completed cohort fertility and higher childlessness than medium and highly educated men. These disparities persist across cohorts. To give an example, Figure 4 shows the childlessness levels by education for men in the four countries. The levels among men with only basic education in the most recent cohorts are striking (Figure 4). More than a third of low-educated men born in 1965–69 in Denmark and Finland and more than a quarter of those born in Norway and Sweden over the same period were childless at age 45.

In contrast to men, women’s educational fertility differentials have changed substantially in the Nordic countries. The oldest female cohorts display the pattern that is commonly reported in the literature, with the lowest educated women having the highest completed fertility, and the highly educated women, the lowest. In Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, a remarkable convergence has occurred across cohorts and the differences between educational segments have practically disappeared.

In women’s childlessness, we observed an intriguing change in educational disparities (Figure 5). Among women in the oldest cohorts in all four countries, childlessness is clearly highest among the highly educated. However, childlessness among low-educated women has increased almost continually, while levels among medium and highly educated women have plateaued. As a result, the patterns have changed entirely across the cohorts: in the most recent female cohorts, childlessness levels are highest among the least educated.

Conclusion

In sum, we find persistent (among men) and new (among women) educational disparities in childbearing in the Nordic region.

The developments in women’s and men’s educational fertility differentials have brought about a new pattern of gender similarity in the Nordic region. While in the oldest cohorts, childlessness levels were highest for low-educated men and high-educated women, in the recent cohorts, childlessness is highest for the low educated regardless of gender.

An often-presented argument is that, owing to their greater earning potential, highly educated women have higher opportunity costs and therefore lower probabilities of childbearing than low-educated women. This is clearly not in line with the Nordic patterns. One possibility is that the Nordic countries have succeeded in reducing opportunity costs by institutionally supporting the work-life balance through, for example, affordable, high-quality day care for children and gender-egalitarian parental leave policies. What was not foreseen were the obstacles to family formation for women and men with a low educational level. The fertility behaviour of the youngest cohorts may well indicate that social inequality is intensifying in that lower educated persons, of both genders, are increasingly left behind in family formation. This, of course, goes hand in hand with the rapidly shrinking sizes of the low educated strata in these countries.

Other research suggests that the convergences and reversals we find in women’s education and fertility patterns are unique to the Nordic countries. In other European countries, childlessness levels are still highest for highly educated women and low-educated women continue to have the highest fertility (see Neyer et al. 2017; Sobotka et al. 2017). Thus, recent Nordic developments challenge established knowledge on socioeconomic fertility differentials and mechanisms of family formation. The Nordic countries are often seen as forerunners of family change and advances in social and gender equality (Goldscheider et al. 2015). The future will tell if these countries are also pioneering a more comprehensive gender, education and fertility transition across developed societies.

References

Goldscheider, F, Bernhardt, E, & Lappegård, T (2015). The gender revolution: A framework for understanding changing family and demographic behavior. Population and Development Review, 41(2), 207–239.

Jalovaara M, Neyer G, Andersson G, Dahlberg J, Dommermuth L, Fallesen P & Lappegård T (2018). Education, gender and cohort fertility in the Nordic countries.European Journal of Population,

Neyer G, Hoem JM & Andersson G (2017). Education and childlessness: The influence of educational field and educational level on childlessness among Swedish and Austrian women. In Childlessness in Europe: Contexts, Causes, and Consequences. Springer, Cham. Pp. 183–207.

Sobotka T, Beaujouan E & Van Bavel J (2017). Introduction: education and fertility in low-fertility settings. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, 2017(15), 1–16.

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