Trends in mean maternal ages at childbirth in western Europe have evolved along a U-shaped curve over the last 150 years. From rather high levels in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries, they declined to low levels during the so-called “golden age” of marriage in the 1950s and 1960s, before rising again in subsequent decades.

Current mean paternal ages at childbirth are not exceptionally high

For fathers, it is much more difficult to study such trend patterns as only a few countries provide long-term time series on paternal ages at childbirth. This likely explains the current lack of data collection and of comprehensive comparative studies. We addressed this gap by identifying and harmonizing the existing data based on state-of-the-art demographic methodological standards and integrating them into the LPAC database (long-term trends in paternal ages at childbirth; https://lpac-database.shinyapps.io/Data/). To our knowledge, this is by far the biggest global database ever created to document and compare trends in mean and advanced (>45 years) paternal ages at childbirth (MPAC and APAC, respectively). The LPAC database currently contains data from 4,172 country-year observations for 140 countries. For some countries, the database covers more than a century. We complemented this free access database with an R-Shiny-App for visualization, including data tables and supplementary information.

Our research on long-term MPAC trends indicates that the current high paternal ages at childbirth are not unprecedented (Willführ and Klüsener, 2024). In all study populations for which long time series are available, MPAC and APAC exhibit virtually the same U-shaped pattern, with current levels comparable to those about a century ago (a selection of countries with long time series is shown in Figure 1). This trend in MPAC is related to major changes in family structures and fertility patterns and is well-documented for Europe and North America (Lesthaeghe, 1980; Hajnal, 1965; Lam, 2011; Ruggles 2015). However, our global comparison shows that U-shaped MPAC patterns are also observed in other parts of the world, such as in Chile, Japan, and Australia. Also, the share of “late fathers” in historical populations does not substantially differ from that in contemporary ones. Finally, it is worth noting that in many contemporary populations of sub-Saharan Africa north of the equator, MPAC often exceeds current western levels by many years (Schoumaker, 2019).

Should we be concerned? At individual level…

The fact that today’s MPAC and APAC levels are comparable to those of the early 20^th century is not automatically a reason to be less concerned. Scientists from various disciplines, including epidemiologists, medical researchers, and psychologists, have expressed worries about the possible consequences of high paternal age at childbirth (e.g., Bray et al., 2006 and many more). These concerns are further fueled by demographic evidence showing that maternal age at childbirth has also increased considerably in recent decades (see the Human Fertility Database). 

At individual level, the association between paternal age and offspring’s health is well-documented. To a certain degree, it is influenced by genetic mechanisms: for instance, the number of de-novo-mutations in sperm cells increases with fathers’ age (Kong et al., 2012). However, it is not clear to what extent changes in MPAC affect health and human cognitive development at the population level or if, and to what extent, biological disadvantages related to paternal age may be counterbalanced (or amplified) by individual-level factors. One reason for this knowledge gap is the lack of exchange between researchers and disciplines focused on individual-level mechanisms and those investigating population-level phenomena and implications. Some of these important knowledge gaps are highlighted below (for a more detailed discussion, see Willführ and Klüsener, 2024).

At the individual level, biological disadvantages related to paternal age may be counterbalanced by social resource accumulation. In many studies on the effects of parental age, the role of social resources in offspring health is ignored. Further, it is important to note that the epidemiological transition has not only increased life expectancy but has also significantly affected biological processes and the speed of aging in the human body. To our knowledge, no study has investigated whether this also affects age-related patterns like the aforementioned accumulation of de-novo-mutations. Further, slower attritional processes in the body due to better standards of living could have changed the meaning of having older parents. 

… and population level

At population level, it is not well understood how individual-level effects are linked to population-level outcomes. The offspring of older fathers exhibited higher mortality in historical populations and have fewer children in contemporary ones, which tends to dilute the consequences of these cases at population level (Arslan et al., 2017). However, the extent to which this selection affects genetic health at population level, especially in modern societies, is largely unknown (Billari, 2015). Besides, improvements in medical care and assistive technologies have not only increased the likelihood of survival, but also enabled people with special needs to participate in society in a way that was unknown in the past. In addition, technical advances in prenatal diagnostics and medical care might have relevant beneficial effects at population level (Wilkinson, 2015). Later-life pregnancies often receive increased medical attention due to the higher health risks involved, thus improving the chances of detecting fetal impairments. In addition, medically indicated abortions because of fetal impairment and disability are today common in most high-income countries. 

Conclusion 

MPAC and APAC are on the increase, but current levels are not unprecedented, as our newly collected data show. Although not new, the current levels and potential further increases may be a cause of concern for their possible health consequences on future generations, but current knowledge is still too limited to substantiate these fears.

References

The LPAC Database – Long-term Trends in Paternal Age at Childbirth

Arslan RC, Willführ KP, Frans EM, Verweij KJH, Bürkner P-C, Myrskylä M, Voland E, Almqvist C, Zietsch BP, Penke L (2017). Older fathers’ children have lower evolutionary fitness across four centuries and in four populations. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 284: 20171562.

Billari FC (2015). Integrating macro- and micro-level approaches in the explanation of population change. Population Studies 69: S11-S20.

Bray I, Gunnell D, Davey Smith G (2006). Advanced paternal age: How old is too old? Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 60: 851-853.

Hajnal J (1965). European marriage patterns in perspective. In Glass D, Eversley D (eds.) Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography (pp. 101-143). Arnold, London.

Kong A, Frigge ML, Masson G, Besenbacher S, Sulem P, Magnusson G, Gudjonsson SA, Sigurdsson A, Jonasdottir A, Jonasdottir A et al. (2012). Rate of de novo mutations and the importance of father’s age to disease risk. Nature 488: 471-475.

Lam D (2011). How the world survived the population bomb: Lessons from 50 years of extraordinary demographic history. Demography 48: 1231-1262.

Lesthaeghe R (1980). On the social control of human reproduction. Population and Development Review 6: 527-548.

Ruggles S (2015). Patriarchy, power, and pay: The transformation of American families, 1800–2015. Demography 52: 1797-1823.

Schoumaker B (2019). Male fertility around the world and over time: How different is it from female fertility? Population and Development Review 45: 459-487.

Willführ KP, Klüsener S (2024). The current ‘dramatically’ high paternal ages at childbirth are not unprecedented. Human Reproduction 39: 1161-1166.

Source figure 1 – https://lpac-database.shinyapps.io/Data/

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Germany is aging

The German population is among the oldest in the world and is aging rapidly. Projections of the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2022) indicate that in 2050 around 26% of the population will be over age 67, which will be the statutory retirement age by 2031. As the number of retirees increases and the workforce shrinks (Fuchs et al. 2018), this rapid population aging will be a challenge for the German social security system, and for the German pension system in particular. 

Extending the length of working life has been proposed as a remedy, as it increases the size of the workforce while reducing the number of retirees. Several institutions, such as the European Commission and the OECD, have been advocating for this shift (e.g., European Commission, 2010; OECD 2015). Meanwhile, many countries, including Germany, have implemented reforms with the major goal of prolonging working life. For instance, the statutory retirement age in Germany is currently being increased from 65 to 67.

Inequalities in the length of working life

Policies aimed at extending working life often follow a one-size-fits-all approach. As these policies are frequently applied with few or no exceptions, or are aimed at workers in stable employment (e.g., Phillipson 2019), they might have negative effects on more economically insecure and vulnerable groups. For instance, increasing the retirement age for almost everyone, as is currently the case in Germany, may increase the duration of working life for highly educated men with high employment rates, while low educated individuals face a high risk of unemployment during the additional years they are forced to stay in the labor market.

A series of studies in several countries have revealed substantial socioeconomic inequalities in the length of working life (e.g., Dudel & Myrskylä 2017). In a recent paper (Dudel et al. 2023), we provide new evidence of such inequalities for older workers in Germany, and focus on several dimensions of inequality: gender, occupation, education, and region (distinguishing between the former socialist eastern Germany and western Germany). Below we provide an overview of some of the key findings, focusing on general trends and inequalities by education.

General trends in Germany 

Our key indicator is working life expectancy (WLE₅₅), defined as the average remaining lifetime spent in work. It is measured in years and, for our study, we computed it between ages 55 and 64, adjusting it for working hours. This means that our results are based not only on whether individuals are or are not gainfully employed, but also on whether they are working full- or part-time. We used data from the German Microcensus for the years 1996 to 2019, and calculated WLE₅₅ for the cohorts born between 1941 and 1955 (Fig. 1). 

For instance, the number of additional years western German men could expect to remain employed at age 55 rose from 5.5 years for those born in 1941 to 7.4 years for those born in 1955. For all groups, WLE₅₅ increased by around 2.0 to 2.5 years over the observed birth cohorts. This shift is likely attributable to several factors, including pension reforms aimed at extending working life and better health among younger cohorts. 

In both western and eastern Germany, men worked for longer than women. However, the gender gap was always smaller in the east than in the west, and it decreased somewhat in eastern Germany, while remaining roughly constant in western Germany. Similarly, eastern German women worked longer than their western German counterparts. Among men, by contrast, the opposite pattern is observed, with western German men working longer. These regional and gender differences are legacies of eastern Germany’s socialist past and the unification process. When the east was socialist, policies aimed at integrating women into the labor market led to higher female employment rates in eastern Germany than in the west. This pattern continued after German unification, even during periods when unemployment rates in eastern Germany were high.

Educational inequalities in Germany

Employment in late adult life depends also on education, for which, in our paper, we considered three levels:
• low (equivalent to ISCED levels 0 to 2), 
• medium (ISCED levels 3 to 4), and 
• high (ISCED levels 5 to 6). 

Results are displayed in Figure 2. When interpreting them, it is important to keep in mind that the lowest educational group is smaller and more selective in eastern than in western Germany, as less than 10% of the population aged 55 to 64 in eastern Germany have low educational attainment.

On average, WLE₅₅ increased for all educational groups, but with considerable heterogeneity in both level and pace. For instance, beyond age 55, low-educated eastern German women worked, on average, only three additional years, while highly educated western German men worked almost nine. Moreover, in eastern Germany, the increase in WLE₅₅ was notably smaller for low-educated individuals than for the other educational groups. For example, the gap between highly educated and low-educated eastern German men increased from roughly three to four years.

Conclusions

In summary, the length of late working life has been steadily increasing in Germany for all the socioeconomic groups we considered. This trend is in line with the aim of many recent policy reforms to increase retirement age. However, our findings show that there are substantial and increasing socioeconomic inequalities in the length of working life after age 55 among older workers. Researchers and policymakers should focus more on these inequalities, as they might be outcomes of systematic social disadvantages among specific groups of older workers. To help us better understand inequalities in WLE₅₅, we are currently extending our calculations of WLE to cover all working ages. If, for instance, low-educated workers start working at earlier ages than highly educated workers, inequalities in total WLE might be smaller than inequalities in just WLE₅₅, i.e. among older workers only.

References

Dudel, C., Myrskylä, M. (2017): Working Life Expectancy at Age 50 in the US and the Impact of the Great Recession. Demography 54: 2101-2123.

Dudel, C., Loichinger, E., Klüsener, S., Sulak, H., Myrskylä, M. (2023): The extension of late working life in Germany: trends, inequalities, and the East-West divide. Demography. https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-10850040 

European Commission (2010): Annual growth survey: Advancing the EU’s comprehensive response to the crisis.

Fuchs J., Söhnlein D., Weber B., Weber E. (2018). Stochastic forecasting of labor supply and population: an integrated model. Population Research and Policy Review, 37, 33-58.

OECD. (2015): Pensions at a glance 2015. Available at OCED.

Phillipson C. (2019). “Fuller” or “extended” working lives? Critical perspectives on changing transitions from work to retirement. Ageing & Society, 39, 629-650.

Statistisches Bundesamt, 2022: 15. koordinierte Bevölkerungsvorausberechnung – Deutschland. Available online.

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