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	<title>Thomas Spoorenberg, Author at N-IUSSP</title>
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	<title>Thomas Spoorenberg, Author at N-IUSSP</title>
	<link>https://www.niussp.org/author/spoorenberg/</link>
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		<title>Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/reproductive-life-concentrated-into-ever-shorter-windows/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Spoorenberg]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 08:20:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10938</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Demographers have long tracked how many children women have and when. But how widely fertility is spread across reproductive ages has received comparatively little attention. Thomas Spoorenberg introduces a simple ... <a title="Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/reproductive-life-concentrated-into-ever-shorter-windows/" aria-label="Read more about Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/reproductive-life-concentrated-into-ever-shorter-windows/">Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Demographers have long tracked how many children women have and when. But how widely fertility is spread across reproductive ages has received comparatively little attention. Thomas Spoorenberg introduces a simple percentile-based measure to fill this gap, the childbearing span, and applies it to seven decades of global data.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Across most of the world, women today are having fewer children than their mothers or grandmothers did. This much is well known. Less examined is how the timing of those births has shifted: not just when women start having children, but how compressed or spread-out childbearing has become across the reproductive years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since 1950, the median total fertility rate has fallen from nearly six births per woman to under two (United Nations 2024). As fertility levels converged worldwide, so too did the analytical toolkit used to monitor them: the total fertility rate (TFR) summarizes the quantum of fertility, and the mean age at childbearing (MAC) captures its central timing. Both indicators are indispensable, but both reduce a complex distributional process to a single number. They cannot reveal whether births cluster tightly around the mean age or spread across the full reproductive lifespan. Two countries can share identical TFR and MAC values yet exhibit very different fertility schedules: one concentrated between ages 25 and 35, another stretching from adolescence into the forties.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What existing approaches do and don&#8217;t capture</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Efforts to go beyond averages have a long history in demography. An influential line of research quantifies how concentrated reproduction is among women, i.e. what share of women account for what share of all births. Drawing on Lorenz-curve principles, Vaupel and Goodwin (1987) constructed such indices for the United States, and Lutz (1989) extended them globally; Shkolnikov et al. (2007) later applied similar tools to European and American cohorts. A separate strand examines the shape of the fertility age schedule through its mean and variance, though these parameters assume a symmetric distribution and struggle when fertility schedules are skewed or multi-peaked (Chandola et al. 1999). More recently, percentile-based metrics have proven their value in measuring inequality in ages at death (Shi et al. 2022), pointing toward an approach that is robust to irregular distributions and straightforward to interpret.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What has been missing is a measure focused on the temporal spread of fertility by age: not who bears children, but over how many reproductive years most births occur in a given population. This is the gap the childbearing span is designed to fill (Spoorenberg 2026). It offers a direct and globally comparable lens for tracking this distributional dimension of fertility.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The childbearing span: concept and intuition</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The childbearing span measures the number of years separating the age at which a population reaches 10% of its total fertility from the age at which it reaches 90%. It captures the width of the fertility schedule (i.e. how many years of reproductive life account for the bulk of childbearing) rather than simply its level or central timing. A span of 13 years, as observed in India today, means that 80% of births are concentrated into just 13 years. A span of 19 years, as in Peru, reflects a much more spread-out pattern. Both countries share nearly identical total fertility rates, yet their reproductive age distributions look strikingly different.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This distinction matters for several reasons. The spread of fertility affects demographic momentum, the overlap of generations, and intergenerational support structures. It is also closely tied to the social transformations, such as in education, employment, contraception, and gender norms, that reshape when and how reproduction is organized within societies.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A worldwide compression, unfolding unevenly</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Applying this approach to a global dataset from 1950 to 2025 reveals a clear global trend: childbearing has been compressed into steadily shorter reproductive windows over the past 75 years. The global average childbearing span declined from about 19 years in 1950 to under 17 years in 2025, meaning the world’s reproductive age distributions have narrowed by roughly two years on average (Figure 1).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10939" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Behind this overall trend lie sharply divergent regional trajectories. Eastern and South-Eastern Asia underwent the most dramatic compression: spans fell from around 19.5 years in 1950 to approximately 13.5 years by the early 1990s, driven by rapid fertility transitions, strong government policies, and normative convergence around socially sanctioned ages for childbearing. Today, this region stands at the extreme end of concentration globally.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sub-Saharan Africa tells a different story. Despite substantial fertility decline from over six births per woman to around 4.3, the region’s childbearing spans have remained consistently broad, barely narrowing over seven decades. This persistence suggests that wide age distributions are maintained by structural and cultural factors such as the continued social importance of motherhood, plural marriage systems that extend fertility into older ages and, possibly, risk-diversification strategies in high-mortality and high-uncertainty environments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Europe, Northern America, Australia, and New Zealand display yet another pattern. After early compression through the 1970s, spans temporarily widened between 1980 and 2010, when fertility postponement intensified, before narrowing again. This U-shaped trajectory illustrates how period measures are sensitive to ongoing timing shifts: when large numbers of women delay births simultaneously, fertility appears more dispersed in any given year than it actually is across cohorts.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Concentration is not simply a function of fertility level</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the most striking findings concerns the relationship between fertility levels and concentration patterns (Figure 2). In 1950, despite vast differences in how many children women had, the width of fertility schedules was remarkably similar across countries: most childbearing spanned an interval of between 45% and 55% of the 35-year reproductive period. By 2025, that uniformity has dissolved. Countries with identical total fertility rates of around two births per woman now display concentration shares ranging from 30% to 50%, representing a near two-fold difference in the proportion of reproductive life devoted to childbearing.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="753" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period-1024x753.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10940" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period-1024x753.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period-300x221.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period-768x564.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This decoupling of level from distribution signals that fertility concentration has become an independent demographic dimension, shaped by cultural norms, institutional contexts, and socioeconomic structures that operate separately from the quantum of fertility. Understanding why countries at similar fertility levels have such different age distributions requires looking beyond the number of children to the social organization of reproduction itself.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A simple tool with broad analytical reach</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The childbearing span requires only standard age-specific fertility rates (i.e. data that are relatively easily available) and yields an immediately interpretable quantity: a number of years. It can be disaggregated by region, income group, or social subpopulation whenever data allow, and it can complement the total fertility rate and mean age at childbearing in routine demographic monitoring.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As fertility continues to decline globally, differences in concentration patterns may become increasingly consequential, reflecting distinct experiences of reproductive timing across populations and raising questions about equity, autonomy, and the conditions under which women make childbearing decisions. The childbearing span offers a straightforward entry point for tracking these distributional dynamics across time and place.  </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">* The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Reference</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chandola, T., Coleman, D.A. and Hiorns, R.W. 1999. “Recent European fertility patterns: Fitting curves to ‘distorted’ distributions.” <em>Population Studies 53(3): 317–329.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lutz, W. 1989. Distributional Aspects of Human Fertility: A Global Comparative Study. <em>Academic Press</em>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shi, J., Aburto, J., Martikainen, P., Tarkiainen, L. and van Raalte, A. 2022. “A distributional approach to measuring lifespan stratification.” <em>Population Studies</em> 77(1): 15–33.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shkolnikov, V.M., Andreev, E.M., Houle, R. and Vaupel, J.W. 2007. “The concentration of reproduction in cohorts of women in Europe and the United States.” <em>Population and Development Review</em> 33(1): 67–100.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Spoorenberg, T. 2026. “Global trends in the compression of childbearing spans, 1950–2025: A new approach to the age distribution of fertility.” <em>Journal of Population Research</em> 43:12. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12546-026-09420-6">https://doi.org/10.1007/s12546-026-09420-6</a> </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">United Nations. 2024. World Population Prospects 2024. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, <em>Population Division</em>. <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/">https://population.un.org/wpp/</a> </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vaupel, J.W. and Goodwin, D.G. 1987. “The concentration of reproduction among U.S. women, 1917-1980.” <em>Population and Development Review</em> 13(4): 723–730.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/reproductive-life-concentrated-into-ever-shorter-windows/">Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Fertility postponement is not a universal correlate of fertility decline</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/fertility-postponement-is-not-a-universal-correlate-of-fertility-decline/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Spoorenberg]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 08:45:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10586</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Worldwide, the path leading to delayed fertility is more complex than it may appear at first sight. Thomas Spoorenberg and Vegard Skirbekk offer a few keys to better interpret current ... <a title="Fertility postponement is not a universal correlate of fertility decline" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/fertility-postponement-is-not-a-universal-correlate-of-fertility-decline/" aria-label="Read more about Fertility postponement is not a universal correlate of fertility decline">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/fertility-postponement-is-not-a-universal-correlate-of-fertility-decline/">Fertility postponement is not a universal correlate of fertility decline</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Worldwide, the path leading to delayed fertility is more complex than it may appear at first sight. Thomas Spoorenberg and Vegard Skirbekk offer a few keys to better interpret current trends.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Across the world, the timing of childbearing is changing rapidly. In 2023, more than one in three births occurred to women aged 30 or older, up from one in four in 1990.&nbsp;Using data from the World Population Prospects 2024 and long-term historical fertility series, it is possible to follow the evolution of late (ages 30+) and very late (ages 35+) fertility from 1950 to 2040 worldwide, for 11 countries since 1850 (Spoorenberg and Skirbekk 2025). It emerges that the recent concentration of fertility to later ages is primarily a feature of developed regions (Europe, Northern America, Australia and New Zealand, and Eastern Asia) while in much of the developing world, the timing of reproduction remains relatively stable, even amid fertility decline.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Late fertility is rising globally, but unevenly</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Globally, total births declined from 143 million in 1990 to 132 million in 2023. Yet births to women aged 30 or older increased from 36 to nearly 48 million. Among them, births at ages 35 and above rose from 14 to 20 million, now representing over 40% of all late births.<br>Overall increase masks striking regional disparities. In Europe, Northern America, Australia, and New Zealand, 57% of all births in 2023 occurred to women aged 30 or older, up from 29% in 1990. Eastern Asia shows similar trends, with late fertility rising from 19% to 44%. These regions have experienced a pronounced shift toward later childbearing coinciding with ultra-low fertility levels.<br>In contrast, many developing regions maintain earlier childbearing patterns despite significant fertility declines. Central and Southern Asia recorded only 29% of births after age 30 in 2023, while sub-Saharan Africa remained stable at 33%. Remarkably, South-Eastern Asia shows stable timing patterns despite total fertility declining from well above replacement in 1950 to below replacement today. In short, fertility postponement is not a universal correlate of fertility decline.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The link between fertility decline and late fertility</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The relationship between total fertility and late fertility is clear but non-linear (figure 1).&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-1.-Late-fertility-proportion-of-total-fertility-rate-TFR.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="494" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-1.-Late-fertility-proportion-of-total-fertility-rate-TFR-1024x494.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10588" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-1.-Late-fertility-proportion-of-total-fertility-rate-TFR-1024x494.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-1.-Late-fertility-proportion-of-total-fertility-rate-TFR-300x145.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-1.-Late-fertility-proportion-of-total-fertility-rate-TFR-768x371.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-1.-Late-fertility-proportion-of-total-fertility-rate-TFR.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In high-fertility contexts such as sub-Saharan Africa, late fertility contributes about 35-45% of total fertility. During early stages of the fertility transition, reproduction tends to be compressed into younger ages. Only at very low fertility levels does childbearing become strongly concentrated at older ages, with 60% or more of births occurring after age 30, driving late fertility upward again. This pattern indicates that fertility postponement emerges primarily in advanced stages of demographic transition, when small family norms combine with delayed marriage, prolonged education, and economic uncertainty.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>&#8220;Very late&#8221; fertility follows a different trajectory</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While late fertility rises as overall fertility declines, very late fertility (ages 35+) does not follow the same trajectory. In 2023, very late births accounted for 42% of late fertility worldwide, down from over 50% in the early 1970s, with births now increasingly concentrated in the early 30s.<br>In high-fertility settings like sub-Saharan Africa, 50-60% of late births occur at ages 35+, reflecting extended reproductive careers, while in low-fertility Europe and Eastern Asia, this share drops to 35-45%. This narrowing reproductive window heightens the biological and social pressures of delayed parenthood and increases demand for fertility support services.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Historical perspective: not entirely new</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Historical data for 11 countries reveal that today&#8217;s levels of late fertility are not unprecedented (figure 2). In European countries, during the 19th century, births at ages 35+ often constituted over 50% of late fertility, reflecting extended reproductive careers in pre-transitional regimes. Sweden and Norway maintained late fertility shares above 60% throughout much of the 1800s, levels only now being approached again.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-2.-Long-term-trends-in-the-share-of-late-fertility.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-2.-Long-term-trends-in-the-share-of-late-fertility-1024x494.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10589" width="929" height="448" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-2.-Long-term-trends-in-the-share-of-late-fertility-1024x494.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-2.-Long-term-trends-in-the-share-of-late-fertility-300x145.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-2.-Long-term-trends-in-the-share-of-late-fertility-768x371.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Figure-2.-Long-term-trends-in-the-share-of-late-fertility.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 929px) 100vw, 929px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This reveals a distinctive U-shaped trajectory: high late fertility in pre-industrial periods, decline during the mid-20th century demographic transition, and resurgence since the 1980s.&nbsp;<br>Contemporary fertility postponement in Europe represents not an entirely new phenomenon but a return to pre-transitional reproductive patterns, though under very different circumstances. Historically, late fertility reflected continued childbearing within large families; today, it reflects delayed entry into parenthood and smaller completed family sizes. The current rise in very late fertility, however, exceeds historical levels in most countries, enabled partly by medical advances and assisted reproductive technologies.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Implications and outlook</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The shift of reproduction to later ages represents one of the most consequential demographic transformations observed since the late 20th century, affecting fertility rates, population ageing, maternal and child health, and intergenerational transfers.<br>Yet this shift is far from uniform. As low fertility spreads globally, monitoring whether other regions will replicate the European trajectory becomes crucial. In countries like Iran, Vietnam, and Thailand, which experienced rapid fertility declines to below-replacement levels, late fertility shares have remained relatively stable or increased only modestly, contrasting sharply with European patterns.<br>Understanding these divergent pathways is essential for projecting future demographic trends and developing appropriate health, social, and demographic policies. Policymakers should anticipate the reproductive health implications of postponed childbearing, especially the growing need for fertility support and maternal care at older ages.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Reference</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Spoorenberg, Th. and Skirbekk V. 2025. “A concentration of reproduction to later ages? A worldwide assessment of trends in fertility timing.” <em>Population and Development Review</em> Online First Article. http://doi.org/10.1111/padr.70036</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/fertility-postponement-is-not-a-universal-correlate-of-fertility-decline/">Fertility postponement is not a universal correlate of fertility decline</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vegard Skirbekk]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The role of mortality in fertility transition studies</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/the-role-of-mortality-in-fertility-transition-studies/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vegard Skirbekk]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2025 07:26:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mortality]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10325</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Vegard Skirbekk and Thomas Spoorenberg* advocate the combined use of fertility and mortality information, or net reproduction, when discussing fertility levels and trends, both in developing and in developed countries. ... <a title="The role of mortality in fertility transition studies" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/the-role-of-mortality-in-fertility-transition-studies/" aria-label="Read more about The role of mortality in fertility transition studies">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/the-role-of-mortality-in-fertility-transition-studies/">The role of mortality in fertility transition studies</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Vegard Skirbekk and Thomas Spoorenberg<em>*</em> advocate the combined use of fertility and mortality information, or net reproduction, when discussing fertility levels and trends, both in developing and in developed countries.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">For decades, demographers have relied primarily on the total fertility rate (TFR) to understand when and how fertility transitions occur across the globe. This measure, representing the average number of children a woman would bear under current fertility conditions, has become the gold standard for tracking demographic change. However, a critical component has been largely overlooked: mortality.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent paper (Skirbekk and Spoorenberg 2025), we argue that this narrow focus on gross fertility measures provides an incomplete and potentially misleading picture of demographic change. Our comprehensive analysis of 236 countries from 1950 to 2023 reveals that when mortality is incorporated through net reproduction measures, our understanding of global fertility changes dramatically.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The missing piece: mortality&#8217;s role in reproduction</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We advocate for the systematic use of the 2-Sex Net Reproductive Rate (2SNRR) (Keilman et al 2014) which accounts for both fertility and mortality by measuring how many children actually survive to reproductive age, and which can be approximated as TFR multiplied by the probability of survival to mean age of childbearing. Unlike the TFR, which assumes that all births contribute equally to future generations regardless of survival prospects, the 2SNRR reflects the biological reality that only children who reach adulthood can reproduce. This means that in high-mortality contexts, the effective reproductive contribution of births is substantially lower than raw birth numbers indicate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The implications of this methodological shift are profound. Globally, fertility peaked in 1963 at 4.1 “effective” children per woman using the 2SNRR framework, compared to 5.3 using TFR measures. While both indicators show the same timing for the onset of decline at the global level, the magnitude of historical fertility levels appears significantly lower when mortality is considered.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These differences become even more pronounced at regional levels. In Middle Africa, TFR data suggest that fertility peaked in 1987 and has since declined, while 2SNRR measurements indicate that fertility has yet to decline at all in this region. Similar discrepancies appear across Southern Asia and parts of Northern and Eastern Africa, where 2SNRR-based fertility transitions occur later, peak at lower levels, and decline more gradually than TFR-based assessments suggest.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The laggard countries: where fertility transitions haven&#8217;t begun</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Perhaps most striking is the identification of seven countries where, according to 2SNRR measures, fertility transitions have yet to begin as of 2023: Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia. These countries, representing 3% of the world&#8217;s population, challenge the conventional wisdom that fertility decline is universal and inevitable (figure 1).</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rate-TFR-and-2-sex-net-reproductive-rate-2SNRR-countries-where-2SNRR-declined-by-less-than-10-from-peak-value.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rate-TFR-and-2-sex-net-reproductive-rate-2SNRR-countries-where-2SNRR-declined-by-less-than-10-from-peak-value-1024x670.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10329" width="1061" height="694" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rate-TFR-and-2-sex-net-reproductive-rate-2SNRR-countries-where-2SNRR-declined-by-less-than-10-from-peak-value-1024x670.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rate-TFR-and-2-sex-net-reproductive-rate-2SNRR-countries-where-2SNRR-declined-by-less-than-10-from-peak-value-300x196.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rate-TFR-and-2-sex-net-reproductive-rate-2SNRR-countries-where-2SNRR-declined-by-less-than-10-from-peak-value-768x502.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rate-TFR-and-2-sex-net-reproductive-rate-2SNRR-countries-where-2SNRR-declined-by-less-than-10-from-peak-value.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1061px) 100vw, 1061px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For these nations, declining mortality rates have resulted in stable or even increasing net reproduction, despite changes in gross fertility rates. In other words, improvements in survival have offset declines in birth rates, meaning these populations have not yet reached the point where reproduction begins to fall towards replacement levels.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Decomposing the effects: mortality versus fertility</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In our scientific paper, through counterfactual analysis, we show how mortality and fertility improvements have contributed differently to changes in net reproduction since 1950. Globally, if fertility had remained constant at 1950 levels, declining mortality alone would have caused an increase in the 2SNRR by 1.23 births per woman through 2023 (figure 2). However, fertility declines have more than counterbalanced these mortality improvements, resulting in an overall decline in global 2SNRR from 3.36 to 2.13 births per woman.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-2.-Change-in-2SNRR-since-1950-due-to-mortality-and-fertility-World-1950-2023-_2-1.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="529" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-2.-Change-in-2SNRR-since-1950-due-to-mortality-and-fertility-World-1950-2023-_2-1-1024x529.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10328" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-2.-Change-in-2SNRR-since-1950-due-to-mortality-and-fertility-World-1950-2023-_2-1-1024x529.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-2.-Change-in-2SNRR-since-1950-due-to-mortality-and-fertility-World-1950-2023-_2-1-300x155.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-2.-Change-in-2SNRR-since-1950-due-to-mortality-and-fertility-World-1950-2023-_2-1-768x397.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-2.-Change-in-2SNRR-since-1950-due-to-mortality-and-fertility-World-1950-2023-_2-1.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The timing of when fertility becomes more important than mortality for reproductive outcomes varies significantly across regions. Western and Eastern Europe experienced this shift earlier due to their earlier demographic transitions, with TFR and 2SNRR converging by the early 1980s as mortality ceased to be a major factor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By contrast, in Central Asia, Northern Africa, and Latin America, this convergence occurred more gradually through the late 20th and early 21st centuries. While TFR levels reached maximums of 7 or more children per woman in regions like Central America and Eastern Africa, 2SNRR peaked at levels only slightly above 5 children per woman. Middle Africa and Western Africa remain the only regions where mortality improvements still outweigh fertility effects in driving changes to net reproduction.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Policy implications&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The choice between TFR and 2SNRR measures has significant implications for understanding population growth dynamics. Because 2SNRR-based fertility transitions typically occur later than TFR-based transitions, populations often grow larger before fertility begins declining. For example, taking 1950 as a starting point, Angola&#8217;s population increased by less than 1.5 times before reaching its TFR peak, but by more than 5 times when considering the 2SNRR peak. These differences have profound implications for resource planning, infrastructure development, and economic policy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our research also provides new perspectives on contemporary low fertility concerns in developed countries. Current fertility levels in high-income countries, typically ranging between 1.2 and 1.8 births per woman, represent only a 25% reduction below replacement fertility when viewed through the 2SNRR framework.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This suggests that current low fertility represents a less dramatic departure from historical norms than TFR-based analyses indicate. This perspective could help shift policy discussions away from &#8220;fatalistic concerns&#8221; about both high and low fertility, recognizing that current levels may not be as extreme as commonly perceived.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Even in low-mortality settings, mortality considerations remain important. Some developed countries experience excess premature adult mortality among specific population groups, and recent reversals in survival gains in countries like the United States demonstrate that mortality cannot be ignored even in affluent societies.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A call for methodological integration</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This research represents more than a technical adjustment to demographic measurement. It calls for fundamental reconsideration of how we conceptualize and study fertility transitions. By bringing mortality back into the analytical framework, demographers can develop more nuanced understandings of reproductive change that better reflect the biological and social realities of human reproduction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For policymakers and researchers working on population issues, these insights underscore the importance of considering both components of demographic change. Only by accounting for mortality alongside fertility can we develop a comprehensive understanding of how human reproduction actually evolves across different contexts and time periods.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">*<em>The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.</em></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Keilman, Nico, Krzysztof Tymicki and Vegard Skirbekk. 2014. “Measures for human reproduction should be linked to both men and women.” International Journal of Population Research 2014, 908385, 10 pages. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/908385" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/908385Skirbekk</a> </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Skirbekk, Vegard  and Thomas Spoorenberg (2025), “Bringing mortality back into our understanding of fertility change: Revisiting the onset of fertility transitions using net reproduction measures”, Journal of Population Research, 42, 45. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12546-025-09394-x" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1007/s12546-025-09394-x</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/the-role-of-mortality-in-fertility-transition-studies/">The role of mortality in fertility transition studies</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Spoorenberg]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Concentration of reproduction in developing countries </title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/concentration-of-reproduction-in-developing-countries/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Spoorenberg]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jan 2025 09:54:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reproduction]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9752</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Thomas Spoorenberg* updates earlier studies on the increased concentration of reproduction as fertility declines, a trend that is now also apparent in developing countries. When discussing population trends, demographers often ... <a title="Concentration of reproduction in developing countries " class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/concentration-of-reproduction-in-developing-countries/" aria-label="Read more about Concentration of reproduction in developing countries ">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/concentration-of-reproduction-in-developing-countries/">Concentration of reproduction in developing countries </a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Thomas Spoorenberg* updates earlier studies on the increased concentration of reproduction as fertility declines, a trend that is now also apparent in developing countries.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">When discussing population trends, demographers often still focus on average measures such as the total fertility rate (TFR) or the average number of children ever born per woman. But averages can obscure critical differences within populations, so looking beyond questions such as “how many children are born?” provides a more nuanced picture of population dynamics. Among the dimensions rarely investigated is the question of “who bears the children” within a population. Considering the concentration of reproduction among women within a population, or the proportion of women who contribute to childbearing, advances our understanding of demographic change and its far-reaching implications.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why look beyond fertility averages?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Let’s consider two hypothetical populations, each with an average of two children per woman. In one, half the women remain childless while the other half have four children each. In the other, every woman has two children. Although TFRs of these populations are identical, the distribution of reproduction differs greatly. In the first, reproduction is highly concentrated: half of the women account for all of the children. Conversely, in the second, reproduction is equally distributed. These differences affect family structures, future kin networks, and societal dynamics. For example, children in the first population grow up with more siblings, while parents in the second population have fewer children to support them in old age. Societal impacts also include unequal child-rearing burdens, healthcare risks, and shifts in demand for housing, education, and goods.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One way of studying changes in how reproduction is distributed among women within a population is to look at “have” statistics, especially the “have-half” statistic, i.e. the minimum proportion of women who give birth to half of the children in a population (Vaupel and Goodwin 1987). Other measures like the Gini coefficient or “half-have” (the proportion of children born to half the women) can also be used, yielding virtually the same results, as they correlate strongly with the have-half measure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A couple of studies have examined the concentration of reproduction in developed countries, showing that the lower the fertility, the smaller the minimum proportion of women who contribute to bearing half of the children (Lutz 1989; Skolnikov et al. 2007). Evidence from developing countries has remained more limited, mainly due to data limitations: long time series are still scarce and/or geographic coverage is partial (Lutz 1989; Giroux et al. 2008). A recent study re-examined the shifts in the concentration of reproduction during the fertility transition by extending the observation period by several decades, considering a larger range of fertility levels, and expanding the geographic coverage to include more countries from all regions of the world (Spoorenberg 2024).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Patterns in developing countries</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Data on completed fertility collected in 350 sample surveys from 87 developing countries, revealed a consistent pattern of change across four decades in the concentration of reproduction. Figure 1 shows that the proportion of women who “produce” half of the children—the “have-half”—follows a general pattern of decline by level of completed fertility (Figure 1). At higher fertility levels (e.g., eight children per woman), a larger proportion of women contributes to “producing” half of the children than at lower fertility levels. In other words, the lower the fertility level, the more concentrated the reproduction. The decline in fertility also reduces high-order births, shifting the distribution towards smaller family sizes, and is accompanied by an increase in childlessness.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Thomas-Spoorenberg-updates-earlier-studies-on-the-increased-concentration-of-reproduction-as-fertility-declines-a-trend-that-is-now-also-apparent-in-developing-countries.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="561" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Thomas-Spoorenberg-updates-earlier-studies-on-the-increased-concentration-of-reproduction-as-fertility-declines-a-trend-that-is-now-also-apparent-in-developing-countries.--1024x561.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9754" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Thomas-Spoorenberg-updates-earlier-studies-on-the-increased-concentration-of-reproduction-as-fertility-declines-a-trend-that-is-now-also-apparent-in-developing-countries.--1024x561.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Thomas-Spoorenberg-updates-earlier-studies-on-the-increased-concentration-of-reproduction-as-fertility-declines-a-trend-that-is-now-also-apparent-in-developing-countries.--300x165.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Thomas-Spoorenberg-updates-earlier-studies-on-the-increased-concentration-of-reproduction-as-fertility-declines-a-trend-that-is-now-also-apparent-in-developing-countries.--768x421.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Thomas-Spoorenberg-updates-earlier-studies-on-the-increased-concentration-of-reproduction-as-fertility-declines-a-trend-that-is-now-also-apparent-in-developing-countries.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1 also distinguishes data points by region. Variations across countries and regions are observed, depending on where countries stand in their path towards lower fertility and their specific sociocultural contexts. In general, sub-Saharan African countries cluster around completed fertility levels of at least 6 children per woman, and countries in Europe and Western Asia at levels below 3. Countries in other regions are spread between these two extremes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Countries are also clustered more closely around the global trend at higher levels of completed fertility than at lower levels, indicating that the minimum proportion of women having half of the children is more homogenous across countries when fertility is high, as for instance in sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, Asian countries present the largest variations in their “have-half” statistics. These patterns suggest that, behind the global trend of a higher concentration of reproduction associated with lower fertility levels, there are multiple paths towards lower fertility.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Implications for policy and society</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Understanding the concentration of reproduction adds nuance to how we interpret fertility transitions. Unequal distribution of childbearing can exacerbate social inequalities, as fewer women bear the physical, emotional, and financial costs of raising children. It also affects intergenerational dynamics, such as the availability of future kin support for older adults. Policymakers could use this information to design more equitable social policies, such as support systems for child-rearing or targeted investments in maternal health.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The experience from developing countries complements earlier studies from developed regions, showing that the relationship between fertility levels and reproductive concentration is a global phenomenon with local variations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Looking at the concentration of reproduction offers a valuable lens to explore demographic changes and their broader implications. Focusing on who bears children—not just how many are born—underscores the importance of diversity in understanding population dynamics. As fertility continues to decline worldwide, paying attention to reproductive concentration will be crucial for anticipating social, economic, and demographic challenges.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Giroux, S.C., P.M. Eloundou-Enyegue, D.T. Lichter (2008), “Reproductive inequality in sub-Saharan Africa: Differentials versus concentration,” <em>Studies in Family Planning</em> 39(3): 187-198. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4465.2008.166.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4465.2008.166.x</a>&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lutz, W. (1989), <em>Distributional Aspects of Human Fertility. A Global Comparative Study</em>. London: Academic Press</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shkolnikov, V.M., E.M. Andreev, R. Houle, J.W. Vaupel (2007), “The concentration of reproduction in cohorts of women in Europe and the United States,” <em>Population and Development Review</em> 33(1): 67-100. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2007.00159.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2007.00159.x</a>&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Spoorenberg, T. (2024), “The concentration of reproduction during the fertility transition in developing countries,” <em>Population and Development Review</em> 50(4): 1353–1368,&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12659" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12659</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vaupel, J.W., D.G. Goodwin (1987), “The concentration of reproduction among US women, 1917-80,” <em>Population and Development Review </em>13(4): 723-730. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1973030">https://doi.org/10.2307/1973030</a> </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">*<em>The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/concentration-of-reproduction-in-developing-countries/">Concentration of reproduction in developing countries </a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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