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	<title>immigration Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
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	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 05:53:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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	<title>immigration Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
	<link>https://www.niussp.org/tag/immigration/</link>
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	<item>
		<title>Longer lives, less healthy ageing? The Australian case</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/individual-and-population-ageing/longer-lives-less-healthy-ageing-the-australian-case/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Guogui Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 05:53:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Individual and population ageing, age structure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ageing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Old age]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=11037</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Migrants in Australia live longer than the Australian-born population, but their health advantage fades with age. The gap is especially striking for migrant women. A longer life, Guogui Huang and ... <a title="Longer lives, less healthy ageing? The Australian case" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/individual-and-population-ageing/longer-lives-less-healthy-ageing-the-australian-case/" aria-label="Read more about Longer lives, less healthy ageing? The Australian case">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/individual-and-population-ageing/longer-lives-less-healthy-ageing-the-australian-case/">Longer lives, less healthy ageing? The Australian case</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Migrants in Australia live longer than the Australian-born population, but their health advantage fades with age. The gap is especially striking for migrant women. A longer life, Guogui Huang and Fei Guo conclude, does not always mean healthier ageing.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Australia is one of the world’s major migrant-receiving countries. More than three in ten residents were born overseas (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2025) and migration has, for decades, played a central role in shaping the country’s workforce, cities, families and cultural life. It has also influenced the health profile of the population. One of the widely documented findings in migration research is the so-called “healthy migrant effect”: migrants often arrive in their destination country in better health and tend to live longer than people born in the destination country (Anikeeva et al., 2010, Cunningham et al., 2008).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Healthy migrant? At first, yes</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Australia broadly fits this pattern, but only in part. In our recent study of life expectancy and healthy life expectancy among overseas-born and Australian-born populations, migrants exhibited a clear longevity advantage (Huang et al., 2026). In 2016, life expectancy at birth was 84.8 years for the overseas-born population, compared with 82.4 years for the Australian-born population (Table 1). Similar differences were evident in 2006 and 2011: Australia’s migrant population does indeed live longer than the Australian-born population.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Table-1.-Life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy-at-birth-in-Australia-by-place-of-birth-2016-1-1.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="351" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Table-1.-Life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy-at-birth-in-Australia-by-place-of-birth-2016-1-1-1024x351.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-11042" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Table-1.-Life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy-at-birth-in-Australia-by-place-of-birth-2016-1-1-1024x351.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Table-1.-Life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy-at-birth-in-Australia-by-place-of-birth-2016-1-1-300x103.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Table-1.-Life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy-at-birth-in-Australia-by-place-of-birth-2016-1-1-768x263.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Table-1.-Life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy-at-birth-in-Australia-by-place-of-birth-2016-1-1.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reasons for this advantage are not difficult to understand. Migration is often a selective process: healthier individuals are more likely to migrate, and Australia’s migration system has long incorporated health checks and, particularly in recent decades, a strong emphasis on skilled migration (Martinez et al., 2015). Part of the observed advantage may also reflect so-called “salmon bias”, whereby migrants in poor health return to their country of origin and are therefore less likely to be captured in destination-country statistics. In addition, many migrants bring with them protective health behaviours, family networks and community ties that can contribute to better health, particularly in the early years after arrival.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>When longer lives do not mean healthier lives</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Living longer does not necessarily mean living healthier. A person may live longer, but spend more of those years with disability, chronic illness or limitations in daily life. This is why healthy life expectancy matters, and this is where the story becomes more complex. In 2016, although overseas-born Australians enjoyed more healthy years at younger ages, this advantage diminished steadily through adulthood and reversed in later life. By ages 55–64, the overseas-born population had lower healthy life expectancy than the Australian-born population. At older ages, this produced a notable divergence: migrants retained a survival advantage yet experienced a disadvantage in health. Globally, immigrants spend a lower share of their life in good health: 91.7% vs 92.5% for natives (Table 1).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Between 2006 and 2016, life expectancy increased for both overseas-born and Australian-born Australians, but healthy life expectancy barely moved. Among overseas-born Australians, for instance, life expectancy at birth rose from 83.4 to 84.8 years, while healthy life expectancy increased only from 77.5 to 77.7 years, and, in comparative terms, things worsened for immigrants (Figure 1). Longer lives were not accompanied by equally large gains in healthy years.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Figure-1.-Age-differences-in-life-expectancy-healthy-life-expectancy.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="627" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Figure-1.-Age-differences-in-life-expectancy-healthy-life-expectancy-1024x627.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-11044" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Figure-1.-Age-differences-in-life-expectancy-healthy-life-expectancy-1024x627.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Figure-1.-Age-differences-in-life-expectancy-healthy-life-expectancy-300x184.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Figure-1.-Age-differences-in-life-expectancy-healthy-life-expectancy-768x470.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Figure-1.-Age-differences-in-life-expectancy-healthy-life-expectancy.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The gendered aspect of migrant ageing</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most striking differences were observed among women. Overseas-born women lived longer than overseas-born men, but they spent a smaller proportion of life in good health. Compared with Australian-born women, their healthy-life advantage disappeared earlier than it did for men. By age 35, overseas-born women had a lower healthy life expectancy than Australian-born women, while overseas-born men retained an advantage over Australian-born men across almost the whole life course.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This matters because migrant women may face a double burden (Donato et al., 2014). Some arrive through family rather than employment pathways, and may therefore be less positively selected in terms of health and labour market advantage. After arrival, they may experience language barriers, unpaid caregiving responsibilities, weaker labour-market attachment, limited social networks, and difficulties accessing culturally appropriate healthcare. These pressures may accumulate over time and become visible in health outcomes in later life.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Discussion</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our findings suggest that migrants’ longer lives should not be taken as evidence that their health is secure. In Australia, the central challenge is increasingly about healthspan, not just lifespan. A multicultural ageing society requires services that recognise the intersecting influences of language, culture, gender, migration history and social disadvantage. This includes culturally safe primary care, stronger efforts in chronic disease prevention, better support for older migrant women, and improved data to identify which migrant communities are most at risk.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The healthy migrant effect remains real, but it is neither permanent nor evenly distributed. Australia’s migrants live longer: the next task is to ensure that those longer lives are also lived in good health.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">ANIKEEVA, O., BI, P., HILLER, J. E., RYAN, P., RODER, D. &amp; HAN, G.-S. 2010. The health status of migrants in Australia: a review. <em>Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health,</em> 22<strong>,</strong> 159-193.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS. 2025. <em>Australia&#8217;s population by country of birth </em>[Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/australias-population-country-birth/latest-release" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/australias-population-country-birth/latest-release</a> [Accessed 4 June 2024].</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">CUNNINGHAM, S. A., RUBEN, J. D. &amp; NARAYAN, K. V. 2008. Health of foreign-born people in the United States: a review. <em>Health &amp; place,</em> 14<strong>,</strong> 623-635.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">DONATO, K. M., PIYA, B. &amp; JACOBS, A. 2014. The double disadvantage reconsidered: Gender, immigration, marital status, and global labor force participation in the 21st century. <em>International Migration Review,</em> 48<strong>,</strong> 335-376.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">HUANG, G., GUO, F., TAKSA, L., CHENG, Z., LIU, L., ZIMMERMANN, K. F., TANI, M. &amp; FRANKLIN, M. 2026. The ‘Healthy Migrant Effect’and Ageing: Life Expectancy and Healthy Life Expectancy of the Migrant and Native-born Populations in Australia. <em>Social Indicators Research,</em> 182<strong>,</strong> 38.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">MARTINEZ, J. N., AGUAYO-TELLEZ, E. &amp; RANGEL-GONZALEZ, E. 2015. Explaining the Mexican-American health paradox using selectivity effects. <em>International Migration Review,</em> 49<strong>,</strong> 878-906.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/individual-and-population-ageing/longer-lives-less-healthy-ageing-the-australian-case/">Longer lives, less healthy ageing? The Australian case</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Fei Guo]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The short-lived fertility upturn among Polish emigrants to the Netherlands</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/the-short-lived-fertility-upturn-among-polish-emigrants-to-the-netherlands/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Agnieszka Fihel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2025 07:48:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nederlands]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10384</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The European Union enlargements of the early 2000s were accompanied by intense emigration from the new member states. This was followed by an apparent increase in emigrants’ fertility, well above ... <a title="The short-lived fertility upturn among Polish emigrants to the Netherlands" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/the-short-lived-fertility-upturn-among-polish-emigrants-to-the-netherlands/" aria-label="Read more about The short-lived fertility upturn among Polish emigrants to the Netherlands">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/the-short-lived-fertility-upturn-among-polish-emigrants-to-the-netherlands/">The short-lived fertility upturn among Polish emigrants to the Netherlands</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>The European Union enlargements of the early 2000s were accompanied by intense emigration from the new member states. This was followed by an apparent increase in emigrants’ fertility, well above the levels in the countries of origin. Using the case of Polish women in the Netherlands, Agnieszka Fihel, Nasim Mondal, and Weronika Kloc-Nowak show that this increase was only temporary, and due to earlier postponement of childbearing.&nbsp;</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">When people move from one country to another, they may wait to have children because of the challenges they face in the new country. On the other hand, they might have their children sooner if they join a partner who has already moved there. The decision to have a child may also be brought forward if the destination country offers more favourable conditions for families. This last mechanism is what we could expect in the case of Polish migrants who moved to the Netherlands in search of better work and education opportunities. Large-scale arrivals started in 2007, when the Dutch labour market became fully accessible to nationals of the new EU member states. In the early 2020s, Poles became the largest immigrant group in the Netherlands, with nearly 200,000 persons registered as residents (Statistics Netherlands, 2024).&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Why do the childbearing behaviours of people who move to another country differ from those who stay behind? To address this question, migrants must be compared with people who stay, but this is rarely possible due to data limitations. Sometimes, however, these can be circumvented: the Dutch survey <em>Families of Poles in the Netherlands</em> (FPN), conducted in 2014 (Karpinska, et al., 2016), used the same methodology as the <em>Generations and Gender Survey </em>(GGS, wave 2014-2015) in Poland (Gauthier et al., 2018), giving us a unique opportunity to investigate the fertility of both migrants and stayers (Mondal et al., 2025).&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A temporary fertility increase&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A simple comparison of two groups indicates that, after controlling for differences in age, education, partnership status, and region of origin, the Polish who migrated to the Netherlands had fewer children, on average, than those who did not leave Poland (Figure 1). The migrants differed from the staying population in terms of sociodemographic characteristics: for instance, they were younger, on average, and more likely to have a low or intermediate level of education, but taking these characteristics into account does not explain the differences in fertility.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-of-Polish-women-in-the-Netherlands-and-in-the-home-country-around-2014-standardised-and-non-standardised-95-CI-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="613" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-of-Polish-women-in-the-Netherlands-and-in-the-home-country-around-2014-standardised-and-non-standardised-95-CI--1024x613.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10387" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-of-Polish-women-in-the-Netherlands-and-in-the-home-country-around-2014-standardised-and-non-standardised-95-CI--1024x613.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-of-Polish-women-in-the-Netherlands-and-in-the-home-country-around-2014-standardised-and-non-standardised-95-CI--300x180.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-of-Polish-women-in-the-Netherlands-and-in-the-home-country-around-2014-standardised-and-non-standardised-95-CI--768x460.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-of-Polish-women-in-the-Netherlands-and-in-the-home-country-around-2014-standardised-and-non-standardised-95-CI-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If the change in childbearing is due to migration itself, rather than migrant selectivity, looking at the timing of the migration can provide more insights. In the years preceding migration, the total fertility rate (TFR) calculated for Polish migrants was extremely low, at around 0.9 children per woman, much lower than the Polish average in the same period (1.3) (Figure 2). But within the first year of arrival, the migrants’ TFR increased considerably and remained at a similar level to the Dutch TFR for three consecutive years, before dropping below both the Dutch and the Polish levels in the fifth year after migration. Changes were particularly pronounced for migrants who moved for family reasons, which suggests a strong interrelation between childbearing and migration. Namely, Polish female migrants postponed their childbearing decisions around the time of migration, only to catch up during the first three to four years after arriving in the Netherlands.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>How will this story end?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To see if Polish migrants will end up with fewer children than the other groups (Polish stayers and Dutch), we would need to wait until they all reach the end of their reproductive lives at age 49. However, we can obtain some pointers by looking at the children already born. In our study, migrants born in the 1960s, who mostly had their children before moving, had an average number of children similar to their peers who stayed in Poland. Conversely, among females born in the 1970s and the early 1980s, who migrated at the age of most intense fertility, the average number of children was considerably lower than that of their peers who did not migrate. However, this effect disappears for the youngest generations, born in the late 1980s, whose fertility exceeds that of stayers in Poland. This leads us to a mixed conclusion: while not all Polish migrants will end up with fewer children, those who migrated in their late 20s and early 30s most likely will.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-2-TFR-in-Poland-and-the-Netherlands-average-2004–2014-and-for-migrants-from-Poland-to-the-Netherlands-by-year-since-migration-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="613" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-2-TFR-in-Poland-and-the-Netherlands-average-2004–2014-and-for-migrants-from-Poland-to-the-Netherlands-by-year-since-migration--1024x613.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10388" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-2-TFR-in-Poland-and-the-Netherlands-average-2004–2014-and-for-migrants-from-Poland-to-the-Netherlands-by-year-since-migration--1024x613.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-2-TFR-in-Poland-and-the-Netherlands-average-2004–2014-and-for-migrants-from-Poland-to-the-Netherlands-by-year-since-migration--300x180.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-2-TFR-in-Poland-and-the-Netherlands-average-2004–2014-and-for-migrants-from-Poland-to-the-Netherlands-by-year-since-migration--768x460.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Figure-2-TFR-in-Poland-and-the-Netherlands-average-2004–2014-and-for-migrants-from-Poland-to-the-Netherlands-by-year-since-migration-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The case of Polish migrants is special. Their migration took the form of an abrupt, but short-lived wave, and this increase in the migrant population raised the number of births in destination countries. But there was an additional mechanism at play: migrants experienced increased fertility in the first years after arrival, compensating for childbearing decisions they had previously postponed. Studies on Polish migration to other destinations provide similar evidence (Tønnessen &amp; Mussino, 2020). This sparked public debate in Poland about why emigrants have high fertility abroad, and successive Polish governments were blamed for creating adverse socio-economic conditions for young families (Janta, 2013). However, time has shown that the relatively high fertility of Polish emigrants was short-lived.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What this study means for demographic analysis&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This study suggests that, even with very good data, which are extremely rare for international migrants, appropriate measures must be used to investigate the evolution of fertility. First, migrants must be compared with the sending population to determine whether a particular group is more prone to both migrate and exhibit a distinct fertility pattern. Second, the total fertility rate describes changes in migrants’ fertility on an ongoing basis, but is subject to tempo fluctuations as family formation depends on mobility (Gołata, 2016; Robards &amp; Berrington, 2016). For this very reason, assessing migrant fertility based on the TFR may be misleading. Third, the average number of children in a generation can only be approximated by the number of offspring born so far. This study found that Polish women who settled in the Netherlands in their late 20s and early 30s have had fewer children than their peers in Poland; they are unlikely to make up for this shortfall over their reproductive lifetime.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Eurostat. (2024). <em>Fertility rates by age [DEMO_FRATE__custom_4286374]</em> [Dataset]. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_FRATE__custom_4286374/default/table</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gauthier, A. H., Cabaço, S. L. F., &amp; Emery, T. (2018). Generations and Gender Survey study profile. <em>Longitudinal and Life Course Studies</em>, <em>9</em>(4), Article 4. https://doi.org/10.14301/llcs.v9i4.500</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gołata, E. (2016). Estimation of fertility in Poland and of Polish born women in the United Kingdom. <em>Studia Demograficzne</em>, <em>1(169)</em>, Article 1(169). https://doi.org/10.33119/SD.2016.1.1</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Janta, B. (2013). <a href="https://journals.pan.pl/dlibra/publication/110526/edition/95844" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">„Polish migrants’ reproductive behaviour in the United Kingdom”</a>. <em>Studia Migracyjne &#8211; Przegląd Polonijny; 2013; No 3</em>. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Karpinska, K., Dykstra, P. A., &amp; Fokkema, T. (2016). <em>Families of Poles in the Netherlands (FPN) survey. Wave 1. DANS.</em> [Dataset]. http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/danszep-et7y</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mondal, N. A., Fihel, A., &amp; Kloc-Nowak, W. (2025). The distortion of fertility due to migration: A comparative analysis of migrants in the Netherlands and stayers in Poland. <em>Demographic Research</em>, <em>53</em>, 325–342. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2025.53.12</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Robards, J., &amp; Berrington, A. (2016). The fertility of recent migrants to England and Wales. <em>Demographic Research</em>, <em>34</em>(36), 1037–1052. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2016.34.36</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Statistics Netherlands. (2024). <em><a href="https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/03743/table?ts=1676025713966" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Population; sex, age and nationality on January 1;</a> 1995-2023</em> [Dataset]. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tønnessen, M., &amp; Mussino, E. (2020). Fertility patterns of migrants from low-fertility countries in Norway. <em>Demographic Research</em>, <em>42</em>(31), 859–874. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2020.42.31</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/the-short-lived-fertility-upturn-among-polish-emigrants-to-the-netherlands/">The short-lived fertility upturn among Polish emigrants to the Netherlands</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nasim Ahamed Mondal]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Weronika Kloc-Nowak]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>Immigrants’ cultural identity and employment chances in Italy</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/immigrants-cultural-identity-and-employment-chances-in-italy/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessio Buonomo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2025 08:40:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[italy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10372</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Drawing on data from ISTAT’s survey on the Social Condition and Integration of Foreign Citizens, Alessio Buonomo, Stefania Capecchi, Francesca Di Iorio and Salvatore Strozza examine the association between cultural ... <a title="Immigrants’ cultural identity and employment chances in Italy" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/immigrants-cultural-identity-and-employment-chances-in-italy/" aria-label="Read more about Immigrants’ cultural identity and employment chances in Italy">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/immigrants-cultural-identity-and-employment-chances-in-italy/">Immigrants’ cultural identity and employment chances in Italy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Drawing on data from ISTAT’s survey on the Social Condition and Integration of Foreign Citizens, Alessio Buonomo, Stefania Capecchi, Francesca Di Iorio and Salvatore Strozza examine the association between cultural identity and the probability of being employed. Their results show that immigrants who are both attached to their country of origin and identify with Italian society display the most favourable employment outcomes.&nbsp;</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">What helps, or hinders, access to work for people with a migratory background? This is a central question, especially during periods of economic crisis when opportunities shrink and the most vulnerable risk being left at the margins. Among the many factors studied in research on immigrants’ employment chances (such as age, gender, schooling and years of residence) one aspect has received relatively little attention: cultural identity, that is, how people position themselves in relation to both the country of origin and the destination country. We explored this dimension in a recent study (Buonomo et al 2025), using nationally representative SCIF data covering 2011-2012, during the peak of the Great Recession in Italy.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">A multidimensional approach: the Ethnosizer</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Direct questions of the type “What nationality defines you best?” may not suffice to capture cultural identity among people with a migratory background. Self-identification is important, but it can be affected by social desirability and personal interpretation. To address these possible sources of bias, we drew inspiration from the Ethnosizer, a multidimensional indicator proposed by Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann (2009), which combines self-perceptions with observable behaviours. In our study we adapted the Ethnosizer to the Italian context, considering five dimensions proposed by the original authors: knowledge of language, media use, sense of belonging, social networks and migration intentions. For each dimension, we assessed the strength of identification with both the country of origin (minority identity) and the destination country (majority identity).&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This approach distinguishes four profiles (Table 1):</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1)  <em>Integrated</em> individuals show strong ties to both their country of origin and to Italy.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2)  <em>Assimilated</em> individuals identify strongly with Italy and have weak ties to their country of origin.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">3)  <em>Separated</em> individuals maintain a strong attachment to their country of origin but a weak connection to Italy.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">4)  <em>Marginalised</em> individuals show weak identification with both cultures. </p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Tab.-1-The-four-states-of-cultural-identity-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Tab.-1-The-four-states-of-cultural-identity--1024x317.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10373" width="811" height="251" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Tab.-1-The-four-states-of-cultural-identity--1024x317.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Tab.-1-The-four-states-of-cultural-identity--300x93.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Tab.-1-The-four-states-of-cultural-identity--768x238.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Tab.-1-The-four-states-of-cultural-identity-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 811px) 100vw, 811px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Dual identity is the most advantageous</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Analyses based on Probit models show that cultural identity is significantly associated with the probability of being employed (Figure 1). Compared with assimilated immigrants (those who identify strongly with Italy but have weak ties to their country of origin), integrated immigrants (those who maintain strong identification with both Italy and their origin country) have a markedly higher probability of being employed. This configuration is therefore the most advantageous, suggesting that dual cultural belonging is associated with more favourable labour market outcomes. At the opposite extreme are marginalised immigrants, whose probability of being employed is significantly lower. Separated immigrants are also disadvantaged relative to assimilated immigrants, although less markedly so than marginalised immigrants. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The association between identity and employment is statistically significant and remains robust when controlling for a wide range of individual and family characteristics, including age, education, country of origin, time since migration, partnership status and number of children (Figure 1). A particularly important finding concerns origin identity, often perceived as an obstacle to integration. Our analyses show that maintaining a strong attachment to the country of origin is not associated with negative effects if accompanied by an equally solid identification with Italian society. The most favourable condition is that of a dual cultural identity, namely a strong link with the country of origin alongside strong identification with Italy.&nbsp;</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1-Probit-models-of-immigrants-probability-of-employment.-Italy-2011–2012.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="549" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1-Probit-models-of-immigrants-probability-of-employment.-Italy-2011–2012.--1024x549.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10374" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1-Probit-models-of-immigrants-probability-of-employment.-Italy-2011–2012.--1024x549.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1-Probit-models-of-immigrants-probability-of-employment.-Italy-2011–2012.--300x161.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1-Probit-models-of-immigrants-probability-of-employment.-Italy-2011–2012.--768x412.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Figure-1-Probit-models-of-immigrants-probability-of-employment.-Italy-2011–2012.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Territorial and gender differences</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Further analyses show that the positive role of integrated identity is more marked in northern Italy, where the labour market is more formal and structured. In the south, where informal employment and ethnic networks weigh more heavily, a separated identity can sometimes be positively associated with access to employment, in some cases even more so than the Italian-only (assimilated) profile. Gender differences are also relevant. The integrated profile has a stronger impact for women, plausibly because many women work in domestic and care roles where employment depends both on trust from Italian families and, at the same time, on access to migrant networks. For men, separated or marginalised identities are particularly disadvantageous.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Promoting dual belonging?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is important to stress that these results describe statistical associations rather than causal relationships. Although certain identity profiles are systematically associated with a higher or lower probability of employment, we cannot exclude bidirectional mechanisms. For example, being employed may in turn strengthen a sense of belonging to the host society or attenuate forms of marginalisation. In the absence of longitudinal data or specific instruments, a definitive causal link cannot be identified.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nevertheless, the results have concrete implications. In public debate, “integration” and “cultural rootedness” are often described as opposites, but our data suggest that no trade-off between the two is necessary. On the contrary, the combination of a sense of belonging to the country of origin and identification with Italian society appears to be the most advantageous configuration in employment terms. Accordingly, integration policies should not discourage the preservation of cultures of origin but rather promote dual belonging, enabling individuals to move with ease across multiple cultural worlds. This configuration is associated with higher levels of labour market inclusion and enhances the employment potential of people with a migratory background.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Buonomo, A., Capecchi, S., Di Iorio, F., &amp; Strozza, S. (2025). <em>Does cultural identity influence the probability of employment during economic crises?</em> <em>Journal of Population Economics</em>, 38(61). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-025-01116-0">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-025-01116-0</a>.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Constant, A. F., Gataullina, L., &amp; Zimmermann, K. F. (2009). <em>Ethnosizing immigrants.</em> <em>Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization</em>, 69(3), 274–287. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.005">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.005</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/immigrants-cultural-identity-and-employment-chances-in-italy/">Immigrants’ cultural identity and employment chances in Italy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stefania Capecchi]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Francesca Di Iorio]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Salvatore Strozza]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Does grit matter for migration? The case of South Africa 2018–2020</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/does-grit-matter-for-migration-the-case-of-south-africa-2018-2020/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael J. White]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2025 07:50:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10214</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Michael J. White, Tyler W. Myroniuk, Carren Ginsburg, and Chantel Pheiffer examine the question of whether migrants in the South African context (2018–2020, rural-to-urban migration) have more “grit”— perseverance in ... <a title="Does grit matter for migration? The case of South Africa 2018–2020" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/does-grit-matter-for-migration-the-case-of-south-africa-2018-2020/" aria-label="Read more about Does grit matter for migration? The case of South Africa 2018–2020">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/does-grit-matter-for-migration-the-case-of-south-africa-2018-2020/">Does grit matter for migration? The case of South Africa 2018–2020</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Michael J. White, Tyler W. Myroniuk, Carren Ginsburg, and Chantel Pheiffer examine the question of whether migrants in the South African context (2018–2020, rural-to-urban migration) have more “grit”— perseverance in the face of adversity—than those who do not move. Policies narrowly tailored to more limited demographic and skill indicators may underestimate the contributions of highly motivated individuals who succeed despite modest origins.&nbsp;</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">According to recent UN estimates, some 304 million individuals (about 3.7 percent of the world’s population) are international migrants, defined as people who live outside of their country of birth (United Nations, 2025). While this is a significant number, the most common form of migration globally in fact takes place within countries (Niva et al. 2023) and is referred to as internal migration. <br>Discourses on migration, whether internal or international, are often framed similarly: “migrants seek a better life for themselves and their children”; “migrants lift themselves by their bootstraps”, etc. The need to understand what factors drive voluntary migration may be especially acute in transitioning economies (Bell et al 2015). In these societies, migration is likely to grow in importance as fertility and mortality rates stabilize at lower levels and economic and social transformation generate rural-to-urban relocation.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>True grit</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent paper (White et al. 2024), we look at evidence on the question of whether migrants have more “grit”, i.e. motivation, wherewithal, and gumption than those who stay behind. This touches on an age-old demographic question of whether migrants are a select group of individuals, that is, whether those who migrate are different from those who do not in domains such as health, finances, and education. <br>In the last several years, demographic research on migration has expanded to include additional measures to shed light on migration motivation. Some of this work has suggested that aspects of personality may matter in taking the decision to migrate (Bernard 2022). Grit—irrespective of other seemingly success-linked characteristics such as education and occupational skills—may foreshadow who migrates and how well migrants do at destination. We argue that grit and its associated measures capture non-cognitive characteristics that affect motivation, risk assessment, and perseverance. With such measures in hand, multidisciplinary research can provide greater insight into migrant selectivity and subsequent socioeconomic outcomes.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why do we care? Policy&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This all matters because policies at the local, regional (provincial), and nation-state level often seek to attract or discourage migrants, even internal migrants. While much discourse focusses on international migrants (<em>Lancet</em> 2025), internal migration processes also face varying policy incentives and disincentives, ranging from distaste for rural influx in urban areas to programs subsidizing certain locations to make them more attractive to new arrivals. More tolerance toward migrants, even if not arriving from privileged geographic origins or social backgrounds, may make their arrival not such a bad gamble after all.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Empirical evidence</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We seek evidence on the influence of grit—here a measure of perseverance in the face of adversity—on internal migration behavior in South Africa. Using two waves of data from a longitudinal survey of a rural-origin population in South Africa (the Migrant Health Follow-Up Study, MHFUS), we test whether a composite psychosocial index of grit (Duckworth, et al 2007) predicts internal migration, net of conventional measures such as age, sex, and education. Simple bivariate correlations point to a strong association between migration and grit for both males and females. The question remains whether this relationship holds when adjusting for other conventional predictor variables. <br>We examine whether young adults are more likely to move out of their rural-origin community (hence “migration”), a district-sized area of about 100,000 persons within a former Bantustan (homeland) occupied by xi-Tsonga-speaking Black South Africans. Most who migrate head for the heavily urbanized Gauteng Province (containing the major cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria) or for intermediate small to medium towns. Our statistical models consider two distinct dependent variables:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1) whether the individual is a “migrant” and, separately,</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2) the number of reported places already lived.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both dependent variables are made a function of fixed variables and other personal characteristics (including the “grit index”) measured at an earlier point. We employ sequential regression models, adding other covariates to see how much the apparent influence of grit is altered by their addition. <br>Figure 1 summarizes how well grit predicts migration for males and females separately across the two migration outcomes, using four progressively more comprehensive models. When grit is the only predictor in the equation, it is highly significant for both men and women, and for both migration indicators. It still shows through—albeit to a lesser extent—when age and education (model 2), then also health and origin community (model 3) are added. Most interestingly, the progressive inclusion of these variables serves to reduce the grit effect more for males than females, even pressing the former to non-significance, when prior migration experience (already a migrant two years prior, model 4) is added.&nbsp;</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1.-Relative-strength-of-grit-index-coefficient-across-models-by-gender.-Rural-to-urban-migration-South-Africa-2018–2020.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1.-Relative-strength-of-grit-index-coefficient-across-models-by-gender.-Rural-to-urban-migration-South-Africa-2018–2020.--1024x597.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10216" width="867" height="506" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1.-Relative-strength-of-grit-index-coefficient-across-models-by-gender.-Rural-to-urban-migration-South-Africa-2018–2020.--1024x597.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1.-Relative-strength-of-grit-index-coefficient-across-models-by-gender.-Rural-to-urban-migration-South-Africa-2018–2020.--300x175.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1.-Relative-strength-of-grit-index-coefficient-across-models-by-gender.-Rural-to-urban-migration-South-Africa-2018–2020.--768x448.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1.-Relative-strength-of-grit-index-coefficient-across-models-by-gender.-Rural-to-urban-migration-South-Africa-2018–2020.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 867px) 100vw, 867px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What differs here is the interplay of the mix of characteristics and individual histories. Age, education (especially completing secondary school in this rural-origin population), and prior migration predict migration for both males and females, as is generally the case in migration studies. Yet, the influence of grit shows through more powerfully for women, albeit reduced appreciably in magnitude, in the presence of these other factors.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusion&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Where does this leave us? While conventional demographic models of internal migration continue to capture key elements of (voluntary) movement, there is room to expand our portfolio of characteristics understood to influence migration. Measurement will be a challenge, given the difficulty of assessing these typically unobserved variables and their potential fluctuation over the lifetime. Nevertheless, the importance of migration in redistributing labor and enabling socioeconomic advancement for individuals and their families argues for pushing harder in depth and breadth to understand personal and societal factors that spur or deter geographic movement. Policies narrowly tailored to manifest demographic and skill indicators may underestimate the contributions of other highly motivated individuals. <br>The gender differential we find deserves particular consideration. While scholarship has often emphasized male migration, even arguing its normative nature in some regions, the increasing attention to female participation in labor markets and migration warrants further examination. Perhaps female migrants are more selective along characteristics such as grit, as they face greater structural barriers and constraints (e.g. employment practices and family expectations). Expanding the view of the migratory process may help explain why some move while others stay behind.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Acknowledgments</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Funding for the underlying research was provided by the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NIH 1R01HD083374; NIH P2CHD041020). The MRC/Wits Rural Public Health and Health Transitions Research Unit (Agincourt) acknowledges funding from The Wellcome Trust, UK (grants 058893/Z/99/A, 069683/Z/02/Z, 085477/Z/08/Z, 085477/B/08/Z); the Medical Research Council, South Africa; and the South African Population Research Infrastructure Network hosted by the South African Medical Research Council.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bell, M., Charles-Edwards, E., Ueffing, P., Stillwell, J., Kupiszewski, M., &amp; Kupiszewska, D. (2015). Internal Migration and Development: Comparing Migration Intensities Around the World. <em>Population and Development Review</em>, <em>41</em>(1), 33–58. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00025.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00025.x</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bernard, A. (2022). Does the association between internal migration and personality traits hold in different countries? <em>Journal of Research in Personality</em>, <em>101</em>, 104300. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2022.104300">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2022.104300</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Duckworth, A., Peterson, C., Matthews, M., &amp; Kelly, D. (2007). Grit: Perseverance and passion for long-term goals. <em>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</em>, 92, 1087–1101. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.6.1087">https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.6.1087</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lancet. (2025). The uncertain future of migrant and refugee health. <em>The Lancet</em>, <em>405</em>(10495), 2103. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(25)01245-0">https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(25)01245-0</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Niva, V., Horton, A., Virkki, V., Heino, M., Kosonen, M., Kallio, M., et al. (2023). World’s human migration patterns in 2000–2019 unveiled by high-resolution data. <em>Nature Human Behaviour</em>, 7(11), 2023–2037.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">United Nations (Population Division) <em>International Migration</em>. (2025). <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migration-1">https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migration-1</a>. Accessed 30 May 2025</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">White, M. J., Myroniuk, T. W., Ginsburg, C., &amp; Pheiffer, C. (2024). Do Migrants Exhibit More Grit? A Research Note. <em>Demography</em>, <em>61</em>(5), 1309–1323. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-11577556">https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-11577556</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/does-grit-matter-for-migration-the-case-of-south-africa-2018-2020/">Does grit matter for migration? The case of South Africa 2018–2020</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tyler W. Myroniuk]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Carren Ginsburg]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chantel Pheiffer]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>America struggles with birthright citizenship</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/america-struggles-with-birthright-citizenship/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joseph Chamie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2025 07:32:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9953</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the United States, birthright citizenship is a constitutional right that dates back to 1868. However, following President Trump’s recently issued executive order, the new administration is seeking to deny ... <a title="America struggles with birthright citizenship" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/america-struggles-with-birthright-citizenship/" aria-label="Read more about America struggles with birthright citizenship">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/america-struggles-with-birthright-citizenship/">America struggles with birthright citizenship</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>In the United States, birthright citizenship is a constitutional right that dates back to 1868. However, following President Trump’s recently issued executive order, the new administration is seeking to deny US citizenship to the children born to unauthorized foreign-born migrants residing in the country. Joseph Chamie clarifies the most immediate demographic consequences of such a change.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">America is struggling with continuing its birthright citizenship, which was established by the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution in 1868. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment declares: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The struggle</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shortly after taking office on 20 January, President Trump issued an executive order restricting birthright citizenship, insisting that the 14th Amendment does not apply to the births of unauthorized migrants. Many have raised objections, pointing out that America has upheld birthright citizenship for more than 150 years and as US laws apply to unauthorized migrants, so the Constitution’s 14th Amendment should apply to them too.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The American Civil Liberties Union and several states have filed&nbsp;federal legal challenges&nbsp;to Trump&#8217;s executive order restricting birthright citizenship. The American Bar Association&nbsp;described it as an attack on a “constitutionally protected” right. Also, no less than four federal judges and a growing number of courts have blocked the order. How the US Supreme Court, where conservative justices form a supermajority, would interpret the 14th Amendment is not clear. The litigation over Trump’s executive order is likely to focus on what it means for someone to be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shortly after becoming president on January 20, Trump falsely claimed that “We are the only country in the world that does this with the birthright, as you know, and it’s just absolutely ridiculous.” Actually, at least 33 countries provide automatic citizenship to anyone born within their borders. Those countries, located mostly in the Western hemisphere, include America’s neighboring countries of Canada and Mexico.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Foreign-born population</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The number and proportion of foreign-born residents in America have varied considerably over the past several centuries (Table 1). In 1890, for example, they totaled nearly ten million and their proportion reached a high of 14.8%. Following World War II, their number declined to below 10 million and their proportion fell to a record low of 4.7% in 1970. The early 21st century saw a marked increase and their number rose to 31 million (11% of the total population). In 2024, the estimated 51.6 million foreign-born residents accounted for a record-breaking 15.6% of America’s population.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-1.-Number-and-percent-of-foreign-born-population-in-the-US-1850-2024.jpg" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-1.-Number-and-percent-of-foreign-born-population-in-the-US-1850-2024-1024x772.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9956" width="1024" height="772" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-1.-Number-and-percent-of-foreign-born-population-in-the-US-1850-2024-1024x772.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-1.-Number-and-percent-of-foreign-born-population-in-the-US-1850-2024-300x226.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-1.-Number-and-percent-of-foreign-born-population-in-the-US-1850-2024-768x579.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-1.-Number-and-percent-of-foreign-born-population-in-the-US-1850-2024.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Births to foreign-born mothers</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Over the period 2014-2024, the average number of births to foreign-born mothers in the US was 850,000, varying from a high of 910,000 in 2016 to a low of 780,000 in 2021. Their share of total births remained relatively stable at approximately 23% (Table 2) – greater than the proportion of foreign-born population in the same period (about 14%).</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-2.-Percent-of-foreign-born-residents-and-births-to-foreign-born-mothers-in-the-US-2014-2024-.jpg" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-2.-Percent-of-foreign-born-residents-and-births-to-foreign-born-mothers-in-the-US-2014-2024--1024x616.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9958" width="1024" height="616" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-2.-Percent-of-foreign-born-residents-and-births-to-foreign-born-mothers-in-the-US-2014-2024--1024x616.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-2.-Percent-of-foreign-born-residents-and-births-to-foreign-born-mothers-in-the-US-2014-2024--300x181.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-2.-Percent-of-foreign-born-residents-and-births-to-foreign-born-mothers-in-the-US-2014-2024--768x462.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Table-2.-Percent-of-foreign-born-residents-and-births-to-foreign-born-mothers-in-the-US-2014-2024-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The exact number of births to unauthorized foreign-born mothers is unknown. However, with a few reasonable assumptions (detailed in the footnotes to Table 2), an annual average total of around 213,000 can be estimated over the period, possibly ranging between 180,000 births in 2021 and a high of 245,000 in 2016.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those annual estimates also provide an indication of the distribution of births among native-born and foreign-born mothers. Over the past 11-year period, approximately 77% of the births in America were to native-born women and 23% were to foreign-born mothers, 17% to authorized foreign-born mothers and 6% to unauthorized foreign-born mothers (Figure 1).</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Average-percent-distribution-of-births-in-the-U.S.-to-native-and-foreign-born-mothers-2014-2024-.jpg" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Average-percent-distribution-of-births-in-the-U.S.-to-native-and-foreign-born-mothers-2014-2024--1024x587.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9959" width="1024" height="587" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Average-percent-distribution-of-births-in-the-U.S.-to-native-and-foreign-born-mothers-2014-2024--1024x587.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Average-percent-distribution-of-births-in-the-U.S.-to-native-and-foreign-born-mothers-2014-2024--300x172.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Average-percent-distribution-of-births-in-the-U.S.-to-native-and-foreign-born-mothers-2014-2024--768x440.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Average-percent-distribution-of-births-in-the-U.S.-to-native-and-foreign-born-mothers-2014-2024-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><br></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As a result of President Trump’s recent executive order, birthright citizenship has developed into a major political and legal struggle for America. The outcome of that struggle is now playing out in US courts. While the legal outcome is currently uncertain, its major demographic consequence is already clear.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If birthright citizenship is restricted, as President Trump has ordered, up to 225,000 children born to unauthorized foreign-born mothers each year – around 6% of America’s annual births – will not be granted US citizenship.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">American Civil Liberties Union (2025) “Immigrants’ Rights Advocates Sue Trump Administration Over Birthright Citizenship Executive Order”. January 20, ACLU, Washington, D.C.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Baker, Bryan and Robert Warren (2024) “<a href="https://ohss.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/2024_0418_ohss_estimates-of-the-unauthorized-immigrant-population-residing-in-the-united-states-january-2018%25E2%2580%2593january-2022.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2018-January 2022</a>”. April, US Office of Homeland Statistics, Washington, D.C.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bay, William (2025) “<a href="https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2025/02/aba-supports-the-rule-of-law/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The ABA supports the rule of law</a>”. February 10, American Bar Association (ABA), Chicago, Illinois.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Camarota, Steven and Karen Zeigler&nbsp; (2021) “<a href="https://cis.org/Report/Fertility-Among-Immigrants-and-NativeBorn-Americans" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Fertility Among Immigrants and Native-Born Americans</a>”. February 16, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Hussein, Mohamed A. (2025) “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/6/which-countries-other-than-the-us-offer-birthright-citizenship" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Which countries, other than the US, offer birthright citizenship</a>”. February 6, <em>Aljazeera</em>, Doha, Qatar.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jeyaretnam, Miranda (2025) “<a href="https://time.com/7209363/birthright-citizenship-compare-us-world-restrictions-trump-jus-soli-sanguinis/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">How Does Birthright Citizenship in the U.S. Compare to the Rest of the World?</a>”. January 23, <em>Time</em>, Washington, D.C.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moslimani, Mohamad and Jeffery S, Passel (2024) “<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/09/27/key-findings-about-us-immigrants/#h-hwdt" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">What the data says about immigrants in the U.S.</a>” September 24, Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Neufeld, Dorothy (2024) “<a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-foreign-born-share-of-the-u-s-population-1850-2024/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Charted: The Foreign-Born Share of the U.S. Population: (1850-2024)</a>”. October 30, <em>Visual Capitalist</em>, Vancouver, Canada.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Putterman, Samantha (2025) “<a href="https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2025/jan/21/donald-trump/donald-trumps-false-claim-that-the-us-is-the-only/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Donald Trump’s False claim that the US is the ‘only’ country with birthright citizenship</a>”. January 21, <em>PolitiFact,</em> The Poynter Institute, Washington, D.C.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Richwine, Jasion and Steven Camarota (2025) “<a href="https://cis.org/Richwine/Births-Illegal-Immigrants-and-LongTerm-Temporary-Visitors" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Births to Illegal Immigrants and Long-Term Temporary Visitors</a>”. February 14, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/america-struggles-with-birthright-citizenship/">America struggles with birthright citizenship</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>White immigrants to the U.S. are no longer what they used to be&#8230;</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/white-immigrants-to-the-u-s-are-no-longer-what-they-used-to-be/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jen’nan G. Read]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2025 07:16:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S.]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9941</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the U.S., white immigrants constitute nowadays almost 20% of total immigrants, but their origins of have changed considerably over time, with a minority coming from western Europe and most ... <a title="White immigrants to the U.S. are no longer what they used to be&#8230;" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/white-immigrants-to-the-u-s-are-no-longer-what-they-used-to-be/" aria-label="Read more about White immigrants to the U.S. are no longer what they used to be&#8230;">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/white-immigrants-to-the-u-s-are-no-longer-what-they-used-to-be/">White immigrants to the U.S. are no longer what they used to be&#8230;</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>In the U.S., white immigrants constitute nowadays almost 20% of total immigrants, but their origins of have changed considerably over time, with a minority coming from western Europe and most of them arriving from eastern Europe and the Middle East. These shifts have consequences for numerous social mobility outcomes in America, including health status, as Jen’nan Read and Fatima Fairfax document</em>.</p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Who counts as white in the U.S.? This has been a demographic puzzle since the 1790 Naturalization Act, when U.S. citizenship was first legally determined to be available only to “free white persons”. Over time, immigrants from different world regions began to comprise the white population, creating the numerical majority and widely-used reference category for measuring racial inequality. But what are the implications of diversity <em>within</em> the white category for social scientific research? In a recent study (Read &amp; Fairfax 2025), we leveraged nationally representative data to disaggregate white adults by their global region of birth and found considerable health variation that is hidden by the broad, white category.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Changes in the white immigrant population, 1960s to present</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Up until the 1960s, the ethnic origins of white immigrants&nbsp;–&nbsp;and thus their 2nd and 3rd generation offspring&nbsp;–&nbsp;were almost exclusively from western and northern Europe. Several changes in immigration policy since then have increased the number of white immigrants arriving from eastern Europe and the Middle East/North Africa, complicating who is classified as white. We explored immigration patterns over the past several decades to show the growing ethnic diversity of white immigrants to the U.S. and the differences in health outcomes for groups categorized as white.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In our deep dive into immigration trends, we analyzed data from the 1986-2022 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics alongside the 1960-2023 decennial census and the American Community Survey (ACS). Our findings reveal a shift in the demographics of white immigrants over the decades (Figure 1). In 1960, northern and western Europeans dominated the scene, constituting over half of the white immigrant population. In stark contrast, eastern Europeans and Middle Easterners together made up less than a third. Fast forward to 2023, and the landscape has changed considerably: eastern Europeans now account for about a third of white immigrants, surpassing their northern and western counterparts, while those from the Middle East have grown to represent a quarter of the white immigrant population.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Major-birth-regions-for-non-Hispanic-white-immigrants-to-the-U.S.-1960-2023-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="413" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Major-birth-regions-for-non-Hispanic-white-immigrants-to-the-U.S.-1960-2023--1024x413.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9945" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Major-birth-regions-for-non-Hispanic-white-immigrants-to-the-U.S.-1960-2023--1024x413.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Major-birth-regions-for-non-Hispanic-white-immigrants-to-the-U.S.-1960-2023--300x121.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Major-birth-regions-for-non-Hispanic-white-immigrants-to-the-U.S.-1960-2023--768x310.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-1.-Major-birth-regions-for-non-Hispanic-white-immigrants-to-the-U.S.-1960-2023-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The shifting global origins of white immigrants reflect pivotal events and conflicts over the past several decades, from the Fall of the Soviet Union to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Arab Spring, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These events have reshaped migration patterns, leading to growth in the number of white immigrants arriving as refugees and through family reunification, often with diverse socio-demographic backgrounds. The evolving profile of white immigrants has far-reaching implications for their lives in the U.S., particularly in terms of their health and well-being.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Health of white immigrants</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Immigrants to the U.S. often appear healthier than U.S-born peers in the same racial group, a phenomenon known as the “healthy immigrant effect” (Ro et al. 2016). While this has been explored granularly for many racial groups, less attention has been paid to the health of white immigrants – a group that makes up one in six of the U.S. foreign-born population (Vespa et al. 2020). We address this gap using nationally representative data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) from 2000-2018. Using logistic regression modeling, we show differences in self-rated health and hypertension (high blood pressure) between U.S.-born whites and foreign-born whites. We further disaggregate foreign-born whites by region of birth – Europe, Former Soviet Union, and the Middle East. This allows us to paint a more detailed picture of their health outcomes and compare these groups against each other to understand their relative health statuses.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We find that white immigrants from Europe and the Middle East have health outcomes that are on par with, or better than, those of U.S.-born whites. In contrast, white immigrants from the Former Soviet Union report significantly poorer health (Figure 2). A similar pattern exists when we focus exclusively on white immigrant groups: European and Middle Eastern immigrants exhibit similar health profiles, whereas those from the Former Soviet Union are in poorer health. Importantly, these disparities persist after controlling for differences in healthcare access, education, income, and citizenship status –&nbsp;factors typically used to explain health variation between groups (fully adjusted model in Figure 2).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-2.-Odds-ratios-of-poor-fair-self-rated-health-by-nativity-and-birth-region-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="413" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-2.-Odds-ratios-of-poor-fair-self-rated-health-by-nativity-and-birth-region--1024x413.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9946" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-2.-Odds-ratios-of-poor-fair-self-rated-health-by-nativity-and-birth-region--1024x413.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-2.-Odds-ratios-of-poor-fair-self-rated-health-by-nativity-and-birth-region--300x121.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-2.-Odds-ratios-of-poor-fair-self-rated-health-by-nativity-and-birth-region--768x310.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Figure-2.-Odds-ratios-of-poor-fair-self-rated-health-by-nativity-and-birth-region-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Implications for racial inequality</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our findings of within-group heterogeneity resonate with earlier work on diversity among U.S. whites (Read et. al 2020; Read 2024). While this body of work is small compared to the literature on Black, Asian, and Hispanic populations, it is similar in its critique of using broad, pre-defined U.S. Census categories to identify inequality. Previous research and advocacy to re-classify those from the Middle East and North Africa to reflect their different lived experience in the U.S. highlight the importance of disaggregating these preexisting racial categories (Abboud et al. 2019). In our study, we uncovered particularly poor health outcomes for immigrants from the former Soviet Union. This insight holds profound implications for healthcare professionals as they adapt to treat an increasing number of immigrants from these regions, driven by ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Russia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Beyond missing within-group disparities, the aggregate white category may also produce biased or misleading estimates of racial inequality between whites and other populations, especially when comparing trends over time. Trends assume relative stability in the composition of populations, which, as we have shown, is not the case for whites.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moving forward, we must pay more attention to the composition of the white category. While there has been considerable discussion and debate about the <em>size</em> of the white population, the question of who is in that category is equally important, especially if we continue to use it as a measuring stick to gauge racial gaps in health, wealth, and other social mobility outcomes.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Abboud, S., Chebli, P., &amp; Rabelais, E. (2019). The contested Whiteness of Arab identity in the United States: Implications for health disparities research. <em>American Journal of Public Health</em>, 109, 1580–1583. Budiman, A., Tamir, C., Mora, L., &amp; Noe-Bustamante, L. (2020). Facts on U.S. immigrants, 2018: Statistical portrait of the foreign-born population in the United States. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2020/08/20/facts-on-u-s-immigrants-current-data/</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Read, J. G. (2024). Does an immigrant health advantage exist among U.S. Whites? Evidence from a nationally-representative examination of mental and physical well-being. <em>Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health</em>, 26, 878–886.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Read, J.G., and F. Fairfax. (2025). Hidden Heterogeneity: How the White Racial Category Masks Interethnic Health Inequality. <em>Demography</em>, DOI 10.1215/00703370-11790429.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Read, J. G., Lynch, S. M., &amp; West, J. S. (2021). Disaggregating heterogeneity among non-Hispanic Whites: Evidence and implications for U.S. racial/ethnic health disparities. <em>Population Research and Policy Review</em>, 40, 9–31.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ro, A., Fleischer, N. L., &amp; Blebu, B. (2016). An examination of health selection among U.S. immigrants using multi-national data. <em>Social Science &amp; Medicine</em>, 158, 114–121.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vespa, J., Medina, L., &amp; Armstrong, D. M. (2020). Demographic turning points for the United States: Population projections for 2020 to 2060 (Current Population Reports, No. P25-1144). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/white-immigrants-to-the-u-s-are-no-longer-what-they-used-to-be/">White immigrants to the U.S. are no longer what they used to be&#8230;</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Fatima G. Fairfax]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>Are migrants healthier than non-migrants? The case of Albanians in Italy</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/are-migrants-healthier-than-non-migrants-the-case-of-albanians-in-italy/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Elisa Barbiano di Belgiojoso]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Sep 2024 07:18:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[albanian]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[italy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9519</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>With respect to other members of an origin population, migrants are selected on the basis of certain characteristics. This selection can affect economic prospects and education but also health. Elisa ... <a title="Are migrants healthier than non-migrants? The case of Albanians in Italy" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/are-migrants-healthier-than-non-migrants-the-case-of-albanians-in-italy/" aria-label="Read more about Are migrants healthier than non-migrants? The case of Albanians in Italy">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/are-migrants-healthier-than-non-migrants-the-case-of-albanians-in-italy/">Are migrants healthier than non-migrants? The case of Albanians in Italy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>With respect to other members of an origin population, migrants are selected on the basis of certain characteristics. This selection can affect economic prospects and education but also health. Elisa Barbiano di Belgiojoso, Eralba Cela, and Eleonora Trappolini provide valuable insights into this dynamic, focusing on Albanian migrants in Italy and their co-nationals in Albania.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Health is crucial for migrants’ successful integration. However, studying their health is complex, due to pre-arrival risks, including environmental and cultural factors, and access to preventive care. Moreover, the migration process itself can affect migrants’ physical, mental, and perceived health. Once in the destination country, economic conditions, working environment, and access to healthcare also become critical factors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The health of migrants has long been a topic of debate, particularly in relation to the “healthy migrant effect” (McDonald &amp; Kennedy, 2004), and is gaining renewed interest with the recent increase in migrant numbers. Typically, except for those migrating for humanitarian reasons, migrants arrive in better health and exhibit lower mortality rates than natives. This is partly due to positive selection in their home countries and possibly the re-migration of unhealthy individuals, a phenomenon known as the “salmon bias” (Trappolini &amp; Giudici 2021). However, their health can decline over time due to challenges in the new environment, a situation described as the “exhausted migrant effect” (Bollini &amp; Siem, 1995). This issue has significant social and health and policy implications in immigration countries, including Italy, which currently has some 5.3 million foreign residents (slightly less than 9% of the population).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Rethinking migrant health analysis: beyond native comparisons</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Most studies on migrant health compare the health of this population with that of the natives in the destination country, which can provide valuable insights about migrants’ adaptation and healthcare discrimination. But comparison with host country natives is not the most appropriate approach for assessing the effect of migration on health. A handful of studies have compared migrants with their co-nationals in their countries of origin, yielding mixed results.<br>In a recent study (Barbiano di Belgiojoso et al. 2024), we compared health differences between Albanian migrants in Italy and their co-nationals in Albania, also considering migrants’ length of stay. Focusing on individuals aged 18 and over, we used data from the Italian ‘Social Condition and Integration of Foreign Citizens&#8217; survey (2011–2012) (covering around 20,000 individuals, of whom 10.1% Albanians) and the Albanian &#8216;Living Standard Measurement Survey&#8217; (2012) (around 25,000 individuals). Multiple health outcomes were examined covering both subjective and objective dimensions of health: self-rated health (SRH), hospital stays, and acute and chronic illnesses. <br><br>Albanians living in Italy differ from those in Albania, being predominantly younger, male, and more educated. Most migrants have secondary education and higher employment rates than non-migrants, who often have only primary education. Migrant characteristics also vary by length of stay in Italy: recent migrants are younger, more often female, and less active in the labour market, whereas long-term migrants are typically male and employed.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Health outcomes</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Overall, the migration process significantly affects the health of Albanian migrants, who exhibit worse health outcomes than non-migrants. Medium- and long-term migrants (resident in Italy for 5 to 9 years, or 10+ years, respectively) have poorer SRH and a higher prevalence of acute illnesses than non-migrants (Figure 1). Conversely, length of stay does not seem to affect hospital stays or chronic illnesses.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Fig.1_predicted_probabilities_of_very_good_srh.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="635" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Fig.1_predicted_probabilities_of_very_good_srh-1024x635.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9520" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Fig.1_predicted_probabilities_of_very_good_srh-1024x635.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Fig.1_predicted_probabilities_of_very_good_srh-300x186.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Fig.1_predicted_probabilities_of_very_good_srh-768x476.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Fig.1_predicted_probabilities_of_very_good_srh.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Peculiarity of the Albanian case?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Why do Albanian migrants exhibit poorer health than their co-nationals? One explanation could be that our data reflect migrants&#8217; health at the time of the interview rather than at migration, suggesting they may have been healthy upon leaving Albania (indicating positive selection), and their health may have deteriorated over time due to challenges faced in the host country. <br>Additionally, the large scale and rapid pace of Albanian migration to Italy, especially in the 1990s, may have influenced health outcomes. Factors like geographic proximity and language proficiency likely reduced migration barriers, minimizing health-related selection among migrants. Furthermore, the Albanian healthcare system was relatively efficient in the Communist era, possibly decreasing the motivation for health-related migration during the 1990s.  Another explanation is that Italy&#8217;s regularization programs during the late 1990s and early 2000s facilitated family reunification, especially of women, who may not have been selected based on health criteria.  Finally, examining health differences by migrants&#8217; length of stay, our findings align with the “exhausted migrant effect” hypothesis, suggesting a decline in migrant health over time.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our study highlights that migration is a multifaceted process with significant impacts on individuals&#8217; lives, including their health. It also sheds light on the health trajectories of Albanian migrants in Italy, emphasizing the need for supportive measures to address the challenges they face. As migration increasingly shapes global societies, understanding these challenges is crucial for developing effective public health strategies and policies to mitigate the adverse health effects associated with migration.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Barbiano di Belgiojoso E., Cela E., Trappolini E. (2024).&nbsp; The effect of migration and time spent abroad on migrants’ health: A home/host country perspective. <em>Demographic Research</em>, 50(37), 1113-1150. <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2024.50.37" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://dx.doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2024.50.37</a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bollini, P. and Siem, H. (1995). No real progress towards equity: Health of migrants and ethnic minorities on the eve of the year 2000. <em>Social Science and Medicine</em>, 41(6): 819–828. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(94)00386-8" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(94)00386-8</a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">McDonald, J. T., and Kennedy, S. (2004). Insights into the ‘healthy immigrant effect’: health status and health service use of immigrants to Canada. <em>Social Science &amp; Medicine</em>, 59(8), 1613-1627. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.02.004" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.02.004</a>.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Trappolini, E., and Giudici, C. (2021). Gendering health differences between nonmigrants and migrants by duration of stay in Italy. <em>Demographic Research</em>, 45, 221-258. <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2021.45.7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://dx.doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2021.45.7</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/are-migrants-healthier-than-non-migrants-the-case-of-albanians-in-italy/">Are migrants healthier than non-migrants? The case of Albanians in Italy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eralba Cela]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eleonora Trappolini]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Return migrants: more children than migrants, fewer than nonmigrants</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/return-migrants-more-children-than-migrants-fewer-than-nonmigrants/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marine Haddad]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jul 2024 07:23:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9357</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Return migrants’ fertility is likely to differ from that of nonmigrants and migrants due to migration experiences, norms, adaptation, and socioeconomic factors, but knowledge of their fertility behavior is limited. ... <a title="Return migrants: more children than migrants, fewer than nonmigrants" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/return-migrants-more-children-than-migrants-fewer-than-nonmigrants/" aria-label="Read more about Return migrants: more children than migrants, fewer than nonmigrants">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/return-migrants-more-children-than-migrants-fewer-than-nonmigrants/">Return migrants: more children than migrants, fewer than nonmigrants</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Return migrants’ fertility is likely to differ from that of nonmigrants and migrants due to migration experiences, norms, adaptation, and socioeconomic factors, but knowledge of their fertility behavior is limited. A study of return migrants to overseas France was conducted to shed light on this question. The analyses carried out by Marine Haddad and Ariane Pailhé<strong> </strong>reveal differences in fertility timing and levels, with return migrants having more children than migrants, but fewer than nonmigrants.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Return migration to one’s country of origin accounts for approximately a quarter of international migration flows (Azose and Raftery 2019). We know more and more about this phenomenon, but mostly from an economic perspective, for instance in terms of employment (Bijwaard et al. 2014; King 2015). Information on the family dimension of returns, including fertility, is lacking, however. Many studies document migrants’ fertility behaviors while they are away, but not after they return (Kulu et al. 2017; Behrman and Weitzman 2022). Yet, return migrants’ profiles and trajectories are different from those of both migrants who remain at destination and nonmigrants (Lindström and Giorguli Saucedo 2007).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why should return migrants’ fertility be specific?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With their experience of different norms, practices and economic contexts, return migrants differ from nonmigrants. They also face the challenges of relocating and settling in new environments, a disruption to their life cycle that may temporarily reduce their fertility. Return migrants may also have socioeconomic backgrounds and positions, motivational traits and fertility preferences that predispose them to have fewer children than nonmigrants. Besides, the multiple migrations of return migrants expose them to additional disruptive events which might further delay childbearing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Migrants who return home tend to stay only temporarily at destination or remain for shorter periods than those who stay at destination. This may signal stronger social ties with people at origin or specific migration experiences, whether “failure” or “success”. Returnees might have fewer incentives to adapt their behaviors to the host country norms, which may well result in their fertility lying somewhere between that of nonmigrants and that of migrants. However, only a handful of studies actually compare return migrants to nonmigrants and migrants.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To fill this gap, in a recent study (Haddad and Pailhé 2024), we focused on four of the five French DOMs (<em>départements d’outre-mer</em>), Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, and Réunion Island, all former colonies which are now fully integrated into the French political system. We merged two representative biographical surveys conducted by INED:<br><em>a</em>)  <em>Trajectories and Origins</em> conducted in 2009 in metropolitan France, and<br><em>b</em>)  <em>Migration, Family and Ageing</em> conducted in 2010 the DOMs.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We compared the first-birth transition rates and completed fertility of three groups:&nbsp;<br><em>1</em>)  <em>nonmigrants </em>(women who never left their region of origin),&nbsp;<br><em>2</em>)  <em>migrants </em>(women continuing to reside in the destination country), and&nbsp;<br><em>3</em>)  <em>return migrants</em> (women who returned to their home region after migration).&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Migration and family in the French overseas departments</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Emigration and return migration are frequent in the DOMs, and most emigrants choose metropolitan France (mainland France and Corsica) for their destination. According to the 2014 French census, more than one in four individuals born in the French Caribbean resided in metropolitan France, compared with one in six for the French Guianese and one in seven for the Réunionese. The <em>Migration, Family and Ageing</em> survey found that nearly one third of natives currently living in these French overseas regions in 2010 had spent at least six months outside their DOM of birth. Given the political continuity and free movement between the DOMs and metropolitan France, DOM-mainland migration is defined as internal migration. However, given the thousands of kilometers that separate the DOMs and metropolitan France, their substantial differences in socioeconomic development and the racial hierarchies that characterize their populations, DOM-mainland migration is rather similar to international migration.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the final decades of the twentieth century, the fertility gap between mainland and overseas France narrowed. DOM fertility rates are now similar to those of metropolitan France (2.0 children per woman) in Martinique (2.0) and Guadeloupe (2.1), slightly higher in Réunion Island (2.4) and significantly higher in French Guiana (3.7). Disparities in age at first birth are larger, however, with women from the DOMs still experiencing first births at early ages.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Return migrants’ fertility: lower than nonmigrants but higher than settled migrants&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Return migrants initiate motherhood at the same age (26 years) as migrants living in metropolitan France and later than nonmigrants residing in the DOMs (24 years). They have more children by age 40 (2.4) than permanent migrants (2.1) but fewer than nonmigrants (2.7). These differences build over migrants’ life course (Figure 1). At any age, return migrants have fewer children than nonmigrants. Until age 30, their fertility levels are also lower than those of migrants, but they gradually catch up, and, by around age 35, eventually surpass them.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-ever-born-by-age-and-migration-experience-and-average-number-of-children-ever-born.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="554" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-ever-born-by-age-and-migration-experience-and-average-number-of-children-ever-born-1024x554.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9382" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-ever-born-by-age-and-migration-experience-and-average-number-of-children-ever-born-1024x554.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-ever-born-by-age-and-migration-experience-and-average-number-of-children-ever-born-300x162.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-ever-born-by-age-and-migration-experience-and-average-number-of-children-ever-born-768x415.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Figure-1-Average-number-of-children-ever-born-by-age-and-migration-experience-and-average-number-of-children-ever-born.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Compared to French women who have always lived in mainland France, migrants’ cumulative fertility is slightly higher at all ages, whereas return migrants initially lag behind, but later catch up.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When controlling for socioeconomic status and partnership history, no significant difference is observed between the first-birth transition rates of nonmigrants and return migrants: disruption appears to be a relevant factor for those who emigrate, but less consequential upon their return. However, migration intentions matter: prospective migrants have lower first-birth rates than nonmigrants in the DOMs, probably because they anticipate future disruption before migrating. Migration and return migration are also related to union formation and childbearing. Women planning to emigrate tend to postpone couple formation until after their migration, delaying their first childbirth. Among return migrants, union formation correlates more weakly with childbearing.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Differences across migrants, return migrants, and nonmigrants are larger for completed fertility than for first-birth timing. With controls for socioeconomic background and partnership history, return migrants display lower levels of completed fertility than nonmigrants, especially among longer-staying return migrants (Figure 2). Migrants residing in metropolitan France have, on average, 0.42 fewer children than nonmigrants in the DOMs. Return migrants also exhibit slightly lower levels of completed fertility than nonmigrants (–0.17, on average); this effect is driven primarily by those returning after five or more years who have significantly fewer children than nonmigrants. Although confidence intervals partially overlap, return migrants have more children than migrants at destination.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Fig.-2-Marginal-effect-of-the-migration-experience-on-completed-fertility.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="579" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Fig.-2-Marginal-effect-of-the-migration-experience-on-completed-fertility.--1024x579.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9383" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Fig.-2-Marginal-effect-of-the-migration-experience-on-completed-fertility.--1024x579.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Fig.-2-Marginal-effect-of-the-migration-experience-on-completed-fertility.--300x170.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Fig.-2-Marginal-effect-of-the-migration-experience-on-completed-fertility.--768x435.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Fig.-2-Marginal-effect-of-the-migration-experience-on-completed-fertility.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On average, completed fertility levels are lower among return migrants than nonmigrants but slightly higher among return migrants than migrants. Some of these differences can be attributed to selection into migration and return, although significant gaps persist among women with similar socioeconomic characteristics.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Azose J.J., Raftery A.E. 2019. Estimation of emigration, return migration, and transit migration between all pairs of countries. <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em>, <em>116</em>(1): 116–122.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Behrman J.A, Weitzman A. 2022. Point of Reference: A Multisited Exploration of African Migration and Fertility in France. <em>International Migration Review </em>56(3): 911–940.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bijwaard G., Schluter C., Wahba J. 2014. The impact of labour market dynamics on the return‐migration of immigrants. <em>Review of Economics and Statistics </em>96(3): 483–494&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Haddad M, Pailhé A. 2024. Return Migration and Fertility: French Overseas Emigrants, Returnees, and Nonmigrants at Origin and Destination. <em>Demography</em> 61(2): 569-593. doi: 10.1215/00703370-11235052. PMID: 38506316.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">King R. 2015. Return Migration and Regional Economic Development: An Overview. <em>Return migration and regional economic problems</em>, 1–37&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kulu H., Hannemann T., Pailhé A., Neels K., Krapf S., González-Ferrer A., Andersson G. 2017. Fertility by Birth Order among the Descendants of Immigrants in Selected European Countries. <em>Population and Development Review</em> 31–60.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lindström D.P., Giorguli Saucedo S. 2007. The Interrelationship between Fertility, Family Maintenance, and Mexico-U.S. Migration. <em>Demographic Research</em> 17: 821–58.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/return-migrants-more-children-than-migrants-fewer-than-nonmigrants/">Return migrants: more children than migrants, fewer than nonmigrants</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ariane Pailhé]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Remittances may redefine the demographic support ratio</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/remittances-may-redefine-the-demographic-support-ratio/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Tohoff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Jun 2024 08:16:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9335</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When measuring the demographic support ratio, including only the country’s residents may prove insufficient. Lukas Tohoff, Daji Landis, Letizia Mencarini, and Arnstein Aassve develop a novel demographic indicator to account ... <a title="Remittances may redefine the demographic support ratio" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/remittances-may-redefine-the-demographic-support-ratio/" aria-label="Read more about Remittances may redefine the demographic support ratio">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/remittances-may-redefine-the-demographic-support-ratio/">Remittances may redefine the demographic support ratio</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>When measuring the demographic support ratio, including only the country’s residents may prove insufficient. Lukas Tohoff, Daji Landis, Letizia Mencarini, and Arnstein Aassve develop a novel demographic indicator to account also for remittances, and show that, especially in middle-income countries, figures changes considerably</em>.</p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">It is much easier and cheaper to send money across national borders today because of new financial service providers such as Wise, Remitly, or WorldRemit, which have substantially reduced international financial transaction costs. These new financial service providers, as well as an earlier wave of improved access to banking, have massively promoted cross-country money transfers – even those of only small amount. As a result, total remittances sent to low- and middle-income countries have increased approximately twelvefold in the last 30 years and amounted to $626 billion in 2022. In fact, remittances have already outpaced other capital flows into developing countries, including foreign direct investment and official development assistance.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent publication (Tohoff et al. 2024), we examine the previously overlooked link between remittances and demographic support. Why do money transactions matter to demography? Because the interaction between the demographic composition of a country and its economy matters. As we know, during the period when a country transitions from high fertility and mortality rates to low ones, there are many working adults and relatively few dependent children and seniors. This advantageous ratio can pave the way for rapid growth, during this period and beyond. It can kickstart economic growth and poverty reduction. In other words, a country can fully cash in on its <em>demographic dividend</em>.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, if there are not enough jobs for the growing workforce, demographic transitions can go terribly wrong. High unemployment, coupled with large <em>youth bulges</em>, increases the risk of conflict, and can have a destabilizing effect on society. While emigration helps reduce population pressures, the demographic dividend has (historically) been lost with the exodus of workers. As we show, the burgeoning role of remittances is changing that paradigm.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A remittances-adjusted support ratio: RASR</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To account for the support offered through remittances, we developed a new demographic indicator: the remittances-adjusted support ratio (RASR). We incorporate remittances into the well-established support ratio (SR) by expressing them as worker equivalents. The support ratio is generally defined as the ratio of effective workers to effective consumers in a population. To express remittances (money) as effective workers (people), we divide net remittances by a country’s average per capita labour income. This yields what we call <em>effective shadow workers</em>. For example, if a country receives 1 million USD in remittances and the mean annual per capita labour income of this country is 10,000 USD, then this equates to 100 shadow workers. The money sent by migrants is equal to 100 average annual incomes back home or, in other words, the remittances are equivalent to the support of 100 average workers. To calculate the RASR, we simply add these shadow workers to the numerator of the established support ratio, thereby incorporating their supportive role into the indicator.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Adjusting for remittances may make a large difference</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our findings reveal significant differences between traditional support ratios and the remittances-adjusted support ratio, particularly in middle-income countries (Figure 1). Even as early as the 1990s, the remittances adjustment makes a clearly visible difference, and the gap between the two support ratios has steadily increased since then. Today, the remittance adjustment is particularly large in the Caribbean, Central America, Southern Asia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. In the Philippines, for instance, the RASR is more than 10 percent larger than the classical support ratio; in El Salvador it is more than 30 percent larger, underscoring the pivotal role of remittances in bolstering demographic support.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Figure-1-Classical-support-ratios-SR-and-remittances-adjusted-support-ratios-RASR-by-country-income-class-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="721" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Figure-1-Classical-support-ratios-SR-and-remittances-adjusted-support-ratios-RASR-by-country-income-class--1024x721.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9336" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Figure-1-Classical-support-ratios-SR-and-remittances-adjusted-support-ratios-RASR-by-country-income-class--1024x721.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Figure-1-Classical-support-ratios-SR-and-remittances-adjusted-support-ratios-RASR-by-country-income-class--300x211.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Figure-1-Classical-support-ratios-SR-and-remittances-adjusted-support-ratios-RASR-by-country-income-class--768x541.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Figure-1-Classical-support-ratios-SR-and-remittances-adjusted-support-ratios-RASR-by-country-income-class-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In high income countries, the RASR is not notably different from the classical support ratio, as (negative) net remittances divided by high average incomes yield a negligible number of (negative) shadow workers. In Germany, the US, or the UK, for instance, we see basically no effect of remittances on demographic support. When migrants work in these high-income countries, they might even play a dual supporting role. They support their host country by working and paying taxes and they support people in their country of origin via remittances.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Promoting migration while facilitating remittances may now be an attractive policy approach for countries facing a large youth bulge and too few employment opportunities. Such a solution is not equivalent to keeping and employing the youth at home, however. While remittances can be very valuable in supporting a country’s population in good times, they tend to make countries more dependent and vulnerable in times of global crises. Furthermore, the outflow of high-skilled workers is not in the long-term interest of developing countries, even if it leads to higher remittance inflows in the short to medium term.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is difficult to assess the extent to which countries are already exploiting remittances as part of their growth strategies. The identification of causal links between the RASR and economic growth is ambiguous. It is plausible that the additional support of remittances leads to more economic growth. However, in a country where the economy and wages are growing fast, there is little reason for its citizens to emigrate. So, a simple correlation coefficient between remittances and economic growth will not be particularly informative.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The RASR shows that demographic support in many countries is much higher than the classical support ratio would suggest. Remittances already play a critical role in economic and demographic support today. Once we take them into account, we can see that a country’s demographic composition matters – not just across age groups but also across national borders. Anyone who is concerned with the demographic composition of low- and middle-income countries should therefore look not just at the people who live in the country itself, but also at citizens abroad. Important demographic support comes from people who have left their homeland but continue to support their loved ones through the power of cheap and accessible remittances.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tohoff L., Landis D., Mencarini L., Aassve A. (2024) Remittances-Adjusted Support Ratio, <em>Population and Development Review</em> (online first),  <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12627" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12627</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/remittances-may-redefine-the-demographic-support-ratio/">Remittances may redefine the demographic support ratio</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daji Landis]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Letizia Mencarini]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arnstein Aassve]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy in the US Hispanic population</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-life-expectancy-in-the-us-hispanic-population/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Elizabeth Arias]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Nov 2023 08:55:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Education, work, economy (socio-economic differences)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[covid-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8818</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the United States, the Hispanic population was hit harder by the COVID-19 pandemic than the majority (non-Hispanic White) population. Elizabeth Arias and Betzaida Tejada-Vera investigate the matter and highlight ... <a title="The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy in the US Hispanic population" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-life-expectancy-in-the-us-hispanic-population/" aria-label="Read more about The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy in the US Hispanic population">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-life-expectancy-in-the-us-hispanic-population/">The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy in the US Hispanic population</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>In the United States, the Hispanic population was hit harder by the COVID-19 pandemic than the majority (non-Hispanic White) population. Elizabeth Arias and Betzaida Tejada-Vera investigate the matter and highlight a high, but often neglected level of heterogeneity.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">The COVID-19 pandemic had a major impact on life expectancy at birth in the United States. In 2020 it fell by 1.8 years, but the drop varied markedly by race and ethnicity, with the Hispanic/Latino (henceforth “Hispanic”) population losing substantially more than other race and ethnicity groups (Arias and Xu, 2022). Before the pandemic, the Hispanic population was characterized by better survival chances than the majority (non-Hispanic White) population, despite having lower levels of educational attainment, higher levels of poverty, and lower access to health insurance and quality care. This advantage, known as the “Hispanic Mortality Paradox”, was almost completely cancelled out by the pandemic, declining from 3.1 years in 2019 to 0.5 years in 2020 (Arias and Tejada-Vera, 2023).&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The terms “Hispanic” or “Latino” were created in the US to classify persons from Spanish speaking countries and, as a result, they mask the great diversity of this population (Arias, et al. 2020). Hispanic people have origins in countries representing diverse cultural, economic, social, and political characteristics, and have distinct histories of immigration and patterns of assimilation in the US. Prior to the pandemic this diversity was also evident in differences in life expectancy at birth by country of origin (Arias and Tejada-Vera, 2023). To better understand why the pandemic disproportionately affected the Hispanic population, we examined changes in life expectancy at birth between 2019 and 2020 and the impact of changes in age and cause-specific mortality in Hispanic sub-groups across different countries of origin.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Decline in life expectancy</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1 shows life expectancy at birth in 2019 and 2020 by Hispanic sub-group. The figure highlights differences in both levels and losses in the period, particularly among males. The overall loss of life expectancy among the Hispanic population was 4.5 years for males and 3.1 years for females, ranging from 0.6 (Other Hispanic) to 6.7 years (Central and South American) among males and from 0.6 (Other Hispanic) to 3.6 years (Mexican) among females.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-1-Life-expectancy-at-birth-by-Hispanic-subgroup-and-sex-2019-and-2020-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-1-Life-expectancy-at-birth-by-Hispanic-subgroup-and-sex-2019-and-2020--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8821" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-1-Life-expectancy-at-birth-by-Hispanic-subgroup-and-sex-2019-and-2020--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-1-Life-expectancy-at-birth-by-Hispanic-subgroup-and-sex-2019-and-2020--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-1-Life-expectancy-at-birth-by-Hispanic-subgroup-and-sex-2019-and-2020--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-1-Life-expectancy-at-birth-by-Hispanic-subgroup-and-sex-2019-and-2020-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Age-specific variation in the probability of dying</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The COVID-19 pandemic increased the age-specific probability of dying during 2020, compared to 2019, differently by age and across the Hispanic sub-groups (Figure 2). For example, Central and South American males experienced probabilities of dying up to 2.5 times greater in 2020 than in 2019, concentrated in the working ages (30 to 70 years), while Cuban females experienced increases close to two times greater, concentrated in the oldest ages (75 and older).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-2-Age-distribution-of-the-relative-increase-in-the-probability-of-dying-by-Hispanic-subgroup-2019–2020-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-2-Age-distribution-of-the-relative-increase-in-the-probability-of-dying-by-Hispanic-subgroup-2019–2020--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8822" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-2-Age-distribution-of-the-relative-increase-in-the-probability-of-dying-by-Hispanic-subgroup-2019–2020--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-2-Age-distribution-of-the-relative-increase-in-the-probability-of-dying-by-Hispanic-subgroup-2019–2020--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-2-Age-distribution-of-the-relative-increase-in-the-probability-of-dying-by-Hispanic-subgroup-2019–2020--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-2-Age-distribution-of-the-relative-increase-in-the-probability-of-dying-by-Hispanic-subgroup-2019–2020-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The impact of age and cause-specific changes in mortality on the decline in life expectancy</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We used a decomposition technique to explore the effects of changes in age-specific mortality on changes in life expectancy between 2019 and 2020 (see Arias and Tejada-Vera, 2023 for details). For all groups, the effects of increases in mortality below age 20 were minimal. The effects in working ages (20-69) were greater among males across all groups and, conversely, the effects in the oldest ages (70 and older) were greater among females in all groups. There were important differences across Hispanic sub-groups. Among males, increases in mortality at working ages (20-69) were largest for Mexicans (57.4%) and smallest for Cubans (39.5%). Conversely, increases at the oldest ages (70 and older) ranged from 41.3% for Mexicans to 58.4% for Cubans.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Among females, increases in mortality at working ages were smallest for Other Hispanics and Cubans (6.8% and 17.9%, respectively). The largest effects of increased mortality at the oldest ages occurred among Cubans and Other Hispanics (81.4% and 87.1%, respectively).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 3 presents the contributions of increases in the five causes of death with the largest impact on the decline in life expectancy between 2019 and 2020. For all groups, increases in mortality due to COVID-19 had the largest effect on life expectancy loss and its impact was greater among the Hispanic population than among the majority population. There was variation within the Hispanic population, however. The percent contributions of increases in mortality due to COVID-19 were smallest for Puerto Rican (53.6%) and Cuban (55.3%) males compared to Central and South American (74.2%) and Mexican (72.5%) males. Among females, the impact of COVID-19 mortality ranged from 41.8% among Cubans to 77.5% and 98.2% among Central and South Americans and Other Hispanics, respectively.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-3-Percent-contribution-of-increases-in-cause-specific-mortality-to-declines-in-life-expectancy-at-birth-between-2019-and-2020.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="548" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-3-Percent-contribution-of-increases-in-cause-specific-mortality-to-declines-in-life-expectancy-at-birth-between-2019-and-2020-1024x548.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8823" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-3-Percent-contribution-of-increases-in-cause-specific-mortality-to-declines-in-life-expectancy-at-birth-between-2019-and-2020-1024x548.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-3-Percent-contribution-of-increases-in-cause-specific-mortality-to-declines-in-life-expectancy-at-birth-between-2019-and-2020-300x161.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-3-Percent-contribution-of-increases-in-cause-specific-mortality-to-declines-in-life-expectancy-at-birth-between-2019-and-2020-768x411.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Figure-3-Percent-contribution-of-increases-in-cause-specific-mortality-to-declines-in-life-expectancy-at-birth-between-2019-and-2020.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy in the Hispanic population varied by country of origin and sex. This differential impact was also linked to differences in the age distribution of excess mortality due to COVID-19 and in the relative impact of COVID-19 in comparison to other causes of death. These results suggest that for some groups, the excess burden of COVID-19 mortality was an outcome of the over-representation of some Hispanic sub-groups in essential industries with higher risks of exposure to the virus (Riley et al., 2021). For other groups, it may have been the over representation of multigenerational households where older adults were at greater risk of intergenerational transmission of the virus (Riley et al., 2021). These results highlight the importance of population disaggregation in studies of the disproportionate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Hispanic population in the US.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Arias E, Johnson NJ, Tejada-Vera B (2020). Racial disparities in mortality in the adult Hispanic population. <em>SSM – Population Health</em> 11.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Arias E, Xu JQ (2022). United States life tables, 2020. <em>National Vital Statistics Reports</em> 71 (1). National Center for Health Statistics.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Arias E, Tejada-Vera B (2023). Differential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on excess mortality and life expectancy loss within the Hispanic population. <em>Demographic Research</em> 48, 339-352.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Do DP, Frank R. (2021). Using race- and age-specific COVID-19 case data to investigate the determinants of the excess COVID-19 mortality burden among Hispanic Americans. <em>Demographic Research</em> 44, 699-718.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Riley AR, Chen YH, Matthay EC, Glymour MM, Torres JM, Fernandez A, Bibbins-Domingo K (2021). Excess mortality among Latino people in California during the COVID-19 pandemic. <em>SSM-Population Health</em> 15</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-life-expectancy-in-the-us-hispanic-population/">The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy in the US Hispanic population</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Betzaida Tejada-Vera]]></dc:creator>
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