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	<title>South Korea Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
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	<title>South Korea Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
	<link>https://www.niussp.org/tag/south-korea/</link>
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		<title>Working longer despite poorer health in South Korea</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/working-longer-despite-poorer-health-in-south-korea/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anastasia Lam]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 07:11:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Education, work, economy (socio-economic differences)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=11076</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>With increasing life expectancy, people are expected to work longer, but longer working lives are not inherently healthier. By estimating the years people spend working with chronic disease, Anastasia Lam ... <a title="Working longer despite poorer health in South Korea" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/working-longer-despite-poorer-health-in-south-korea/" aria-label="Read more about Working longer despite poorer health in South Korea">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/working-longer-despite-poorer-health-in-south-korea/">Working longer despite poorer health in South Korea</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>With increasing life expectancy, people are expected to work longer, but longer working lives are not inherently healthier. By estimating the years people spend working with chronic disease, Anastasia Lam and colleagues highlight that inequalities in who works longer and in good health are largely shaped by gender and urban-rural residence in South Korea.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">In countries where informal labour markets are widespread and public pensions fall short, stopping work at retirement age may not be an option. South Korea has among the highest life expectancies (83.5 years) and the highest rate of old-age employment among OECD countries; 57 per cent of 65–69-year-olds were employed in 2024 (OECD, 2025). But living and working longer doesn&#8217;t mean these extra years are spent in good health. This raises an important question: are people healthy enough to extend their working lives, or are they working longer despite poor health?</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Pensions in South Korea</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In South Korea the pension age is currently 63 years, expected to rise to 65 by 2033, but pension system covers fewer than half of older adults, which contributes to old-age poverty being among the highest in the OECD (OECD, 2018). As a result, many people need to work well into old age, whether to bridge the gap between retirement and pension, or to supplement the basic pension they do receive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent study (Lam et al., 2026), we estimated not just how long older South Koreans work, but how much of that time is spent with chronic disease, and looked for differences by gender, education, or urban-rural residence. We defined health using a count of nine chronic conditions, grouped into no disease, one disease, and two or more diseases (multimorbidity). By treating health as a gradient, rather than simply healthy and unhealthy, we get a fuller picture of the ageing process.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Who works longer, and in what state of health?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Three findings stand out. First, men work far longer than women. From age 50 they can expect to work for a further 16.9 years, compared to 9.9 for women (Figure 1). For both men and women, nearly half of those working years are lived with at least one chronic disease. This gender difference in working life expectancy reflects longstanding inequalities in the labour market. Women’s working lives have long been defined by highly gendered norms around labour force participation and caregiving roles, leading women to have more accumulated disadvantages across their life course (Brinton &amp; Oh, 2019). Conversely, men are more likely to face social pressure to continue as the family&#8217;s main provider and often stay more strongly attached to work (Lee &amp; Yeung, 2021).</p>



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<p class="has-text-align-left has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1. Weighted life expectancy from age 50 split by time spent in each state: Men and women, South Korea, 2006–22.&nbsp;</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
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<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Note: Coloured bars display the percentages of remaining life expectancy in each state; total weighted life expectancy in years is displayed at the top of each bar.<br>Source<em>: </em>Lam et al.<em> </em>(2026)</p>



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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, educational differences were minimal. However, people with less education may work longer than those with more education, in line with another study from South Korea (Yang et al., 2025), but contrary to what is usually seen in the United States and Europe (Feraldi &amp; Dudel, 2025; Sperlich et al., 2023).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, where people live seems to matter more than their education. Men living in rural areas work longer than any other group, more than four years longer than urban men, and keep working until around age 70 on average (Figure 2). They also spend about half their working lives with at least one chronic disease, and have more multimorbidity than men from urban areas. The same pattern of urban-rural inequality can be seen for women, with those living in rural areas working about six years beyond retirement age compared to urban dwelling women who withdraw from the labour market even before retirement age.&nbsp;</p>



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<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Figure 2. Weighted life expectancy from age 50 split by time spent in each state, men and women in South Korea, 2006–22, by place of residence.<br></p>


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<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Note: Coloured bars display the percentages of remaining life expectancy in each state; total weighted life expectancy in years is displayed at the top of each bar.<br>Source<em>: </em>Lam et al.<em> </em>(2026)</p>



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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While our study did not directly examine what might be driving the longer, unhealthier working life expectancy among people in rural areas, we expect it to be related to the structure of employment in rural areas and the history of rural-urban migration, compounded by unequal access to healthcare. Older adults living in rural areas are more often self-employed or working in agriculture, jobs less subject to mandatory retirement and rarely tied to an adequate pension. As younger generations migrated to cities for more education and work opportunities, the older generation who remained kept working, but whether through choice or necessity is unclear.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Beyond &#8220;longer is healthier&#8221;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our findings caution against assuming that longer working lives are inherently healthier, and that the findings from one context can be generalized to another. In South Korea, the people working longest are not always the most advantaged or the healthiest: those living in rural areas, and to a lesser extent those with low education, spend more time working despite poorer health compared to their urban and highly educated counterparts.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This matters for policies that encourage extended working lives. The capacity to work longer, and to do so in good health, is not shared equally: it depends on gender, place of residence, and the institutional and social context people live in.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For South Korea, that points to a need for policies that ease the pressure to work despite poor health, including better pension coverage for self-employed and informal workers and improved preventive care and healthcare access in rural areas. Behind South Korea&#8217;s high rates of old-age employment lies a gendered and geographic division of labour, one that decides not just who works longest, but who does so in poor health.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Brinton, M. C., &amp; Oh, E. (2019). Babies, Work, or Both? Highly Educated Women’s Employment and Fertility in East Asia. American Journal of Sociology, 125(1), 105–140. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/704369" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1086/704369</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Feraldi, A., &amp; Dudel, C. (2025). Healthy Working Life Expectancy: Measurements and Socio-Economic Inequalities. In E. di Bella, V. Gioia, C. Lagazio, &amp; S. Zaccarin (Eds.), Statistics for Innovation III (pp. 213–218). Springer Nature Switzerland. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-95995-0_36" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-95995-0_36</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lam, A., Keenan, K., Kulu, H., &amp; Myrskylä, M. (2026). Working longer despite poorer health? Inequalities in healthy and unhealthy working life expectancies in South Korea. Population Studies, 1–18. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2026.2625712" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2026.2625712</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lee, Y., &amp; Yeung, W.-J. J. (2021). The Country That Never Retires: The Gendered Pathways to Retirement in South Korea. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B, 76(3), 642–655. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbaa016" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbaa016</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">OECD. (2018). Working Better with Age: Korea. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264208261-en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264208261-en</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">OECD. (2025). Pensions at a Glance 2025: OECD and G20 Indicators. OECD Publishing. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/e40274c1-en">https://doi.org/10.1787/e40274c1-en</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sperlich, S., Beller, J., Epping, J., Geyer, S., &amp; Tetzlaff, J. (2023). Trends of healthy and unhealthy working life expectancy in Germany between 2001 and 2020 at ages 50 and 60: A question of educational level? J Epidemiol Community Health, 77(7), 430–439. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1136/jech-2023-220345">https://doi.org/10.1136/jech-2023-220345</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yang, M., Lee, J., Lynch, M., Wilkie, R., Tongeren, M. van, &amp; Kang, M.-Y. (2025). Educational and gender disparities in healthy working life expectancy among middle-aged and older adults in South Korea. Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 82(6), 293–299. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1136/oemed-2025-110239" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1136/oemed-2025-110239</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/working-longer-despite-poorer-health-in-south-korea/">Working longer despite poorer health in South Korea</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Too old to give blood? Not in South Korea</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/too-old-to-give-blood-not-in-south-korea/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kim Oh Seok]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 06:37:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Health and mortality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Health]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=11057</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As populations age across East Asia, blood banks face a double squeeze: fewer young donors and more elderly patients needing transfusions. South Korea, Oh Seok Kim notes, has promptly responded ... <a title="Too old to give blood? Not in South Korea" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/too-old-to-give-blood-not-in-south-korea/" aria-label="Read more about Too old to give blood? Not in South Korea">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/too-old-to-give-blood-not-in-south-korea/">Too old to give blood? Not in South Korea</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>As populations age across East Asia, blood banks face a double squeeze: fewer young donors and more elderly patients needing transfusions. South Korea, Oh Seok Kim notes, has promptly responded by raising its blood donation age cap. Other nations will soon have to follow its example.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Every time a patient goes into surgery, gives birth, or battles cancer, there is a good chance they will need someone else’s blood. Blood donors in South Korea are overwhelmingly in their teens, twenties, and thirties; blood recipients, instead, are typically in their seventies and eighties &#8211; and increasingly so, given population aging. The arithmetic, replicated country by country across East Asia, is unforgiving. Admittedly, this is just another example of the possible imbalances caused by population aging; however, its nature and the emotional impact of the topic seem to make it worth special consideration.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The arithmetic of aging and blood</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yu et al. (2020) were among the first to model what may happen to blood supply and demand in China between 2017 and 2036, as the country ages. Supply is projected to fall by 16 per cent while demand will rise by 33 per cent, leaving a potential shortfall of 21.2 million units by 2036, equivalent to more than a third of projected annual demand (a unit is approximately 450 ml, or a pint). The driving mechanism is straightforward: fewer people in the peak donating ages of 18–34, and far more in the heavy-transfusion-using ages of 70 and above, where blood use per person runs more than 25 times higher than among teenagers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Not surprisingly, the same trend can be observed also in other countries. In Taiwan, for instance, the pool of eligible blood donors, people aged 17 to 65, is expected to shrink from 16 million in 2025 to just 8.7 million by 2060. Blood demand is projected to exceed supply by around 2027, with the annual shortfall surpassing one million units by 2060 (Lin et al. 2026).&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The Korean case</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A similar problem will emerge in South Korea, one of the world’s fastest-aging societies (Kim and Kim 2020). In 2024, Korea’s blood donation rate (number of donations per 100 people) stood at 5.6% (Korean Redcross Blood Services 2025): higher than Japan’s 4.0% or France’s 3.9%, and among the highest globally. But that headline figure conceals a structural fragility: more than half of all donations come from people aged 16 to 29, a cohort shrinking rapidly as the country’s birth rate, already the world’s lowest, continues to fall (Figure 1).&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-1-Blood-donations-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="611" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-1-Blood-donations-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates--1024x611.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-11058" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-1-Blood-donations-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates--1024x611.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-1-Blood-donations-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates--300x179.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-1-Blood-donations-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates--768x458.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-1-Blood-donations-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the same time, elderly patients, who consume the most blood per person, are growing in number at a pace few health systems have had to manage before (Kim et al. 2024).&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-2-Blood-demand-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="611" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-2-Blood-demand-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates--1024x611.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-11059" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-2-Blood-demand-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates--1024x611.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-2-Blood-demand-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates--300x179.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-2-Blood-demand-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates--768x458.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Fig.-2-Blood-demand-in-Korea-in-2017-age-specific-numbers-and-rates-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>From research to legislation</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On 13 May 2026, South Korea’s Ministry of Health and Welfare announced the country’s <em>Second Blood Management Basic Plan</em>, covering 2026 to 2030. It is the most significant revision of blood donation rules in a decade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The centerpiece is an increase in the upper age limit for blood donation. Currently, whole-blood donation is permitted up to the age of 69, and, for people aged 65 to 69, only if they donated between the ages of 60 and 64. Under the new plan, that ceiling may rise by even more than five years, as officials have not ruled out scrapping the age limit altogether, replacing it with an individual health assessment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A second change abolishes a long-running chemical test on donated blood: the alanine aminotransferase test (ALT), which measures a liver enzyme. Introduced in the 1990s to guard against hepatitis, it was overtaken by more precise direct virus-detection methods but survived as a bureaucratic habit. Between 2020 and 2025, roughly 33% of donated blood (170 thousand units) was discarded because of ALT results alone, enough to fill hundreds of thousands of standard transfusion bags. That waste will now stop.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The plan also proposes practical incentives: streaming-service subscriptions as gifts for young donors, and regular blood donation buses in areas with no permanent blood bank.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The safety case for expanding the donor age is well supported. Older donors in good health produce blood that is as safe as that of younger donors, and several European countries, such as the UK and Italy, already permit donations beyond 65 under specific conditions (National Health Service (NHS) Blood and Transplant 2026; Ministero della Salute e Centro Nazionale Sangue 2026). The practical question is whether enough healthy older adults will come forward to make a meaningful difference. Korea’s experiment is likely to be watched closely.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>From science to policy</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Blood supply is also a demographic problem. Typically, donor eligibility rules were written for a young population, who also kept transfusion demand relatively low, and the system was in balance. But the world is rapidly changing: the sooner countries acknowledge the mismatch, and change their rules accordingly, the better placed they will be to keep their hospitals running.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The change in Korean law is a rare, clear example of research shaping policy, and quickly. Other aging societies would do well to read the evidence before the blood runs short.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yu X et al. Population-based projections of blood supply and demand, China, 2017–2036. <em>Bulletin of the World Health Organization</em>, 2020;98(1):10–18. doi:10.2471/BLT.19.233361</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kim KW and Kim OS. Super aging in South Korea unstoppable but mitigatable: A sub-national scale population projection for best policy planning. <em>Spatial Demography</em>, 2020; 8:155–173. doi: 10.1007/s40980-020-00061-8</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kim OS et al. Future blood debt: projecting blood supply and demand of Korea based on subnational population projections (2021–2050). <em>Journal of Korean Medical Science</em>, 2024;39:e168. doi:10.3346/jkms.2024.39.e168</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lin Y-M et al. Forecasting blood supply and demand under population aging: implications and challenges for healthcare resource allocation. <em>BMC Health Services Research</em>, 2026;26:369. doi:10.1186/s12913-026-14150-9</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ministero della Salute e Centro Nazionale Sangue.&nbsp; Accessed 15 June 2026. (In Italian) https://www.donailsangue.salute.gov.it/it/sangue-pagina/chi-puo-donare/</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">National Health Service (NHS) Blood and Transplant. Accessed 15 June 2026. https://www.blood.co.uk/who-can-give-blood/</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare. Second Blood Management Basic Plan 2026–2030. Announced 13 May 2026. (In Korean) https://www.mohw.go.kr/board.es?mid=a10503010100&amp;bid=0027&amp;act=view&amp;list_no=1490506&amp;tag=&amp;nPage=1</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Korean Redcross Blood Services. Blood Services Statistical Yearbook 2025. (In Korean) https://www.bloodinfo.net/knrcbs/na/ntt/selectNttList.do?mi=1158&amp;bbsId=1061&amp;nttSn=548750</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/too-old-to-give-blood-not-in-south-korea/">Too old to give blood? Not in South Korea</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Not just later: why marriage is disappearing in South Korea</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/not-just-later-why-marriage-is-disappearing-in-south-korea/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sam Hyun Yoo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 08:40:40 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Families and households]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marriage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>First marriage in South Korea has declined sharply over the past three decades. This is not simply a story of later marriage. Even after accounting for delayed timing, Sam Hyun ... <a title="Not just later: why marriage is disappearing in South Korea" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/not-just-later-why-marriage-is-disappearing-in-south-korea/" aria-label="Read more about Not just later: why marriage is disappearing in South Korea">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/not-just-later-why-marriage-is-disappearing-in-south-korea/">Not just later: why marriage is disappearing in South Korea</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>First marriage in South Korea has declined sharply over the past three decades. This is not simply a story of later marriage. Even after accounting for delayed timing, Sam Hyun Yoo observes, fewer people are marrying at all, especially men. Pandemic disruptions briefly altered patterns, but the long-term retreat from marriage remains firmly in place.</em></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Marriage is no longer a given</strong></h3>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">For much of the late 20th century, marriage in South Korea was close to universal and marriage functioned as the unquestioned gateway to family life. Today, that assumption no longer holds.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A growing share of adults remain unmarried well into their 30s and 40s, and the decline shows little sign of reversal. This shift matters because South Korea remains a society in which marriage and childbearing are tightly linked. Fewer than 5% of births occur outside marriage, one of the lowest shares among high-income countries. As marriage recedes, its demographic implications extend far beyond the institution itself.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New demographic evidence tracing first-marriage patterns from 1993 to 2023 shows that Korea is not merely experiencing delayed marriage. Rather, it is undergoing a sustained retreat from marriage as a life-course institution, a transformation that began long before the COVID-19 pandemic and has continued beyond it.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Later marriage or fewer marriages?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At first glance, the decline appears to be driven by postponement. The average age at first marriage has risen sharply: women now marry for the first time at around age 31, up from 25 three decades ago, while men marry at nearly 34, compared with 28 in the early 1990s. From this perspective, marriage seems delayed rather than abandoned (Figure 1).</p>


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<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-1.-Trends-in-total-first-marriage-rates-and-mean-age-at-first-marriage-in-South-Korea-1993–2023-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-1.-Trends-in-total-first-marriage-rates-and-mean-age-at-first-marriage-in-South-Korea-1993–2023--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10670" width="974" height="487" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-1.-Trends-in-total-first-marriage-rates-and-mean-age-at-first-marriage-in-South-Korea-1993–2023--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-1.-Trends-in-total-first-marriage-rates-and-mean-age-at-first-marriage-in-South-Korea-1993–2023--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-1.-Trends-in-total-first-marriage-rates-and-mean-age-at-first-marriage-in-South-Korea-1993–2023--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-1.-Trends-in-total-first-marriage-rates-and-mean-age-at-first-marriage-in-South-Korea-1993–2023-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 974px) 100vw, 974px" /></a></figure>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But focusing on timing alone obscures a deeper shift. When we examine the proportion of adults who would ever marry if current conditions persisted, a far more consequential pattern emerges. In the early 1990s, roughly 95% of Koreans could expect to marry at least once. By the early 2020s, that figure had fallen to around two-thirds for women and even lower for men.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The pandemic shock and its limits</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The COVID-19 pandemic delivered a sharp but temporary shock to marriage behavior. First marriages fell abruptly in 2020 and 2021, followed by a modest rebound in 2022 and 2023. This raised the question of whether the pandemic marked a turning point in family formation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The evidence suggests it did not. The pandemic primarily disrupted the <em>timing</em> of marriage rather than its underlying trajectory. Border closures caused international marriages—disproportionately involving older Korean men—to collapse almost overnight. As a result, the average age at first marriage among men temporarily stopped rising, but when restrictions eased, marriage timing resumed its previous path.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The rebound did not reverse the long-term decline: instead, the pandemic revealed how fragile marriage has become. When marriage is no longer a default life step, even short-term disruptions can leave visible demographic traces. Similar timing shocks, followed by rapid normalization, were observed in other high-income countries during the pandemic period (Sobotka et al. 2024).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why men are falling behind</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the most striking features of Korea’s marriage decline is its growing gender divide. Throughout the past three decades, men have consistently been less likely than women to marry for the first time. Their marriage patterns also fluctuate more sharply from year to year as male marriage is more sensitive to timing shifts, economic uncertainty, and demographic shocks.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For women, the decline is largely structural. Adjusting for later marriage timing changes little: more women are not marrying at all, rather than simply marrying later. Marriage has lost its near-universal status in the female life course (Figure 2).</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-2.-Trends-in-the-period-proportion-ever-married-and-its-tempo-adjusted-measure-in-South-Korea.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-2.-Trends-in-the-period-proportion-ever-married-and-its-tempo-adjusted-measure-in-South-Korea-1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10671" width="1048" height="524" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-2.-Trends-in-the-period-proportion-ever-married-and-its-tempo-adjusted-measure-in-South-Korea-1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-2.-Trends-in-the-period-proportion-ever-married-and-its-tempo-adjusted-measure-in-South-Korea-300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-2.-Trends-in-the-period-proportion-ever-married-and-its-tempo-adjusted-measure-in-South-Korea-768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Figure-2.-Trends-in-the-period-proportion-ever-married-and-its-tempo-adjusted-measure-in-South-Korea.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1048px) 100vw, 1048px" /></a></figure>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This pattern echoes broader trends observed across East Asia, where men’s retreat from marriage has been especially pronounced, and men’s marriage rates have declined more steeply and unevenly than women’s (Raymo et al. 2015; Jones and Gu 2023).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Several forces likely contribute to this divergence. Economic insecurity among young and middle-aged men remains widespread, particularly outside stable employment tracks. High housing costs, long working hours, and persistent expectations surrounding the male breadwinner role further complicate marriage prospects. International marriage once offset some of these pressures, but that channel has largely dried up in recent years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The result is a marriage landscape in which men’s entry into family life has become increasingly uncertain, while women’s retreat from marriage appears slower but no less enduring.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why this matters beyond marriage</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The decline of marriage is not merely a cultural shift; it marks a demographic turning point. In South Korea, where childbearing still occurs overwhelmingly within marriage, population policies have often approached low fertility through the lens of marital formation. As marriage becomes less common, the demographic leverage of policies centered on marital formation weakens.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">South Korea’s experience also offers lessons beyond its borders. Across East Asia, marriage remains institutionally central yet increasingly difficult to attain. When entry into marriage itself becomes less assured, family formation stalls, not simply through delayed parenthood, but also through a growing absence of children (Raymo et al. 2015).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The distinction between temporary delay and long-term retreat matters. In Korea’s case, the evidence points clearly to the latter. Marriage is no longer a near-universal institution, and the demographic consequences of that shift are already becoming visible.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jones, G., &amp; Gu, X. (2023). Men’s marriage trends in Asia: Changes and continuities<em>. Journal of Family Issues</em>, 45(5), 1279–1304.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Raymo, J. M., Park, H., Xie, Y., &amp; Yeung, W. J. (2015). Marriage and family in East Asia: Continuity and change. <em>Annual Review of Sociology</em>, 41, 471–492.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sobotka, T., Zeman, K., Castro, R., &amp; Brzozowska, Z. (2024). Pandemic roller-coaster? Birth trends in higher-income countries during the COVID-19 pandemic<em>.</em> <em>Population and Development Review</em>, 50(1), 1–4.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yoo, S. H. (2026). Tracking the decline of first marriage in South Korea: Timing, quantum decline, and pandemic disruptions<em>.</em> <em>Demographic Research</em>, 54(3), 71–86.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/not-just-later-why-marriage-is-disappearing-in-south-korea/">Not just later: why marriage is disappearing in South Korea</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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