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	<title>woman Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
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	<title>woman Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
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		<title>Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/reproductive-life-concentrated-into-ever-shorter-windows/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Spoorenberg]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 08:20:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10938</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Demographers have long tracked how many children women have and when. But how widely fertility is spread across reproductive ages has received comparatively little attention. Thomas Spoorenberg introduces a simple ... <a title="Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/reproductive-life-concentrated-into-ever-shorter-windows/" aria-label="Read more about Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/reproductive-life-concentrated-into-ever-shorter-windows/">Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Demographers have long tracked how many children women have and when. But how widely fertility is spread across reproductive ages has received comparatively little attention. Thomas Spoorenberg introduces a simple percentile-based measure to fill this gap, the childbearing span, and applies it to seven decades of global data.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Across most of the world, women today are having fewer children than their mothers or grandmothers did. This much is well known. Less examined is how the timing of those births has shifted: not just when women start having children, but how compressed or spread-out childbearing has become across the reproductive years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since 1950, the median total fertility rate has fallen from nearly six births per woman to under two (United Nations 2024). As fertility levels converged worldwide, so too did the analytical toolkit used to monitor them: the total fertility rate (TFR) summarizes the quantum of fertility, and the mean age at childbearing (MAC) captures its central timing. Both indicators are indispensable, but both reduce a complex distributional process to a single number. They cannot reveal whether births cluster tightly around the mean age or spread across the full reproductive lifespan. Two countries can share identical TFR and MAC values yet exhibit very different fertility schedules: one concentrated between ages 25 and 35, another stretching from adolescence into the forties.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What existing approaches do and don&#8217;t capture</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Efforts to go beyond averages have a long history in demography. An influential line of research quantifies how concentrated reproduction is among women, i.e. what share of women account for what share of all births. Drawing on Lorenz-curve principles, Vaupel and Goodwin (1987) constructed such indices for the United States, and Lutz (1989) extended them globally; Shkolnikov et al. (2007) later applied similar tools to European and American cohorts. A separate strand examines the shape of the fertility age schedule through its mean and variance, though these parameters assume a symmetric distribution and struggle when fertility schedules are skewed or multi-peaked (Chandola et al. 1999). More recently, percentile-based metrics have proven their value in measuring inequality in ages at death (Shi et al. 2022), pointing toward an approach that is robust to irregular distributions and straightforward to interpret.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What has been missing is a measure focused on the temporal spread of fertility by age: not who bears children, but over how many reproductive years most births occur in a given population. This is the gap the childbearing span is designed to fill (Spoorenberg 2026). It offers a direct and globally comparable lens for tracking this distributional dimension of fertility.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The childbearing span: concept and intuition</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The childbearing span measures the number of years separating the age at which a population reaches 10% of its total fertility from the age at which it reaches 90%. It captures the width of the fertility schedule (i.e. how many years of reproductive life account for the bulk of childbearing) rather than simply its level or central timing. A span of 13 years, as observed in India today, means that 80% of births are concentrated into just 13 years. A span of 19 years, as in Peru, reflects a much more spread-out pattern. Both countries share nearly identical total fertility rates, yet their reproductive age distributions look strikingly different.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This distinction matters for several reasons. The spread of fertility affects demographic momentum, the overlap of generations, and intergenerational support structures. It is also closely tied to the social transformations, such as in education, employment, contraception, and gender norms, that reshape when and how reproduction is organized within societies.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A worldwide compression, unfolding unevenly</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Applying this approach to a global dataset from 1950 to 2025 reveals a clear global trend: childbearing has been compressed into steadily shorter reproductive windows over the past 75 years. The global average childbearing span declined from about 19 years in 1950 to under 17 years in 2025, meaning the world’s reproductive age distributions have narrowed by roughly two years on average (Figure 1).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10939" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-1-Trends-in-childbearing-spans-world-and-regions-1950–2025-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Behind this overall trend lie sharply divergent regional trajectories. Eastern and South-Eastern Asia underwent the most dramatic compression: spans fell from around 19.5 years in 1950 to approximately 13.5 years by the early 1990s, driven by rapid fertility transitions, strong government policies, and normative convergence around socially sanctioned ages for childbearing. Today, this region stands at the extreme end of concentration globally.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sub-Saharan Africa tells a different story. Despite substantial fertility decline from over six births per woman to around 4.3, the region’s childbearing spans have remained consistently broad, barely narrowing over seven decades. This persistence suggests that wide age distributions are maintained by structural and cultural factors such as the continued social importance of motherhood, plural marriage systems that extend fertility into older ages and, possibly, risk-diversification strategies in high-mortality and high-uncertainty environments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Europe, Northern America, Australia, and New Zealand display yet another pattern. After early compression through the 1970s, spans temporarily widened between 1980 and 2010, when fertility postponement intensified, before narrowing again. This U-shaped trajectory illustrates how period measures are sensitive to ongoing timing shifts: when large numbers of women delay births simultaneously, fertility appears more dispersed in any given year than it actually is across cohorts.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Concentration is not simply a function of fertility level</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the most striking findings concerns the relationship between fertility levels and concentration patterns (Figure 2). In 1950, despite vast differences in how many children women had, the width of fertility schedules was remarkably similar across countries: most childbearing spanned an interval of between 45% and 55% of the 35-year reproductive period. By 2025, that uniformity has dissolved. Countries with identical total fertility rates of around two births per woman now display concentration shares ranging from 30% to 50%, representing a near two-fold difference in the proportion of reproductive life devoted to childbearing.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="753" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period-1024x753.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10940" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period-1024x753.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period-300x221.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period-768x564.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Figure-2.-Childbearing-span-as-a-proportion-of-the-total-reproductive-period.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This decoupling of level from distribution signals that fertility concentration has become an independent demographic dimension, shaped by cultural norms, institutional contexts, and socioeconomic structures that operate separately from the quantum of fertility. Understanding why countries at similar fertility levels have such different age distributions requires looking beyond the number of children to the social organization of reproduction itself.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A simple tool with broad analytical reach</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The childbearing span requires only standard age-specific fertility rates (i.e. data that are relatively easily available) and yields an immediately interpretable quantity: a number of years. It can be disaggregated by region, income group, or social subpopulation whenever data allow, and it can complement the total fertility rate and mean age at childbearing in routine demographic monitoring.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As fertility continues to decline globally, differences in concentration patterns may become increasingly consequential, reflecting distinct experiences of reproductive timing across populations and raising questions about equity, autonomy, and the conditions under which women make childbearing decisions. The childbearing span offers a straightforward entry point for tracking these distributional dynamics across time and place.  </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">* The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Reference</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chandola, T., Coleman, D.A. and Hiorns, R.W. 1999. “Recent European fertility patterns: Fitting curves to ‘distorted’ distributions.” <em>Population Studies 53(3): 317–329.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lutz, W. 1989. Distributional Aspects of Human Fertility: A Global Comparative Study. <em>Academic Press</em>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shi, J., Aburto, J., Martikainen, P., Tarkiainen, L. and van Raalte, A. 2022. “A distributional approach to measuring lifespan stratification.” <em>Population Studies</em> 77(1): 15–33.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shkolnikov, V.M., Andreev, E.M., Houle, R. and Vaupel, J.W. 2007. “The concentration of reproduction in cohorts of women in Europe and the United States.” <em>Population and Development Review</em> 33(1): 67–100.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Spoorenberg, T. 2026. “Global trends in the compression of childbearing spans, 1950–2025: A new approach to the age distribution of fertility.” <em>Journal of Population Research</em> 43:12. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12546-026-09420-6">https://doi.org/10.1007/s12546-026-09420-6</a> </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">United Nations. 2024. World Population Prospects 2024. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, <em>Population Division</em>. <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/">https://population.un.org/wpp/</a> </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vaupel, J.W. and Goodwin, D.G. 1987. “The concentration of reproduction among U.S. women, 1917-1980.” <em>Population and Development Review</em> 13(4): 723–730.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/reproductive-life-concentrated-into-ever-shorter-windows/">Reproductive life concentrated into ever-shorter windows*</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Did you know?</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-39/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[N-IUSSP]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2025 08:54:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Graphics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fecondity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10418</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In 2024, nearly 78 per cent of women aged 15–49 who wanted to avoid pregnancy used modern contraceptive methods. Despite this progress, more than 250 million women of reproductive age ... <a title="Did you know?" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-39/" aria-label="Read more about Did you know?">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-39/">Did you know?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">In 2024, nearly 78 per cent of women aged 15–49 who wanted to avoid pregnancy used modern contraceptive methods. Despite this progress, more than 250 million women of reproductive age still do not use modern contraception.<br>Source: United Nations (2024), Estimates and Projections of Family Planning Indicators 2024. Available at: <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/data/family-planning-indicators" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">www.un.org/development/desa/pd/ data/family-planning-indicato</a><a href="http://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/ data/family-planning-indicators" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">rs</a>.<br>Note: Oceania excludes Australia and New Zealand.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-39/">Did you know?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>South Korea’s Radical Solution to Asia’s Birth Rate Crisis</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/video/south-koreas-radical-solution-to-asias-birth-rate-crisis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[N-IUSSP]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2025 08:36:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Video]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[birth rate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10426</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>South Korea is facing a demographic time bomb. The nation is grappling with the world’s lowest fertility rate and a rapidly aging population, which threaten its very future. The unfolding ... <a title="South Korea’s Radical Solution to Asia’s Birth Rate Crisis" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/video/south-koreas-radical-solution-to-asias-birth-rate-crisis/" aria-label="Read more about South Korea’s Radical Solution to Asia’s Birth Rate Crisis">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/video/south-koreas-radical-solution-to-asias-birth-rate-crisis/">South Korea’s Radical Solution to Asia’s Birth Rate Crisis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">South Korea is facing a demographic time bomb. The nation is grappling with the world’s lowest fertility rate and a rapidly aging population, which threaten its very future. The unfolding crisis mirrors a global trend that’s hitting East Asia hardest, forcing a reckoning between tradition and modern day realities for women. The choices South Korea makes now might provide a path for others to follow.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/video/south-koreas-radical-solution-to-asias-birth-rate-crisis/">South Korea’s Radical Solution to Asia’s Birth Rate Crisis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Is there a strong two-child norm among U.S. women?</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/is-there-a-strong-two-child-norm-among-u-s-women/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Julia Behrman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2025 10:12:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Families and households]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[family planning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10185</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For decades, the majority of Americans have reported ideal family sizes of two children, yet actual birth rates are falling well below reported ideals. Julia Behrman, Emily Marshall, and Florian ... <a title="Is there a strong two-child norm among U.S. women?" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/is-there-a-strong-two-child-norm-among-u-s-women/" aria-label="Read more about Is there a strong two-child norm among U.S. women?">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/is-there-a-strong-two-child-norm-among-u-s-women/">Is there a strong two-child norm among U.S. women?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>For decades, the majority of Americans have reported ideal family sizes of two children, yet actual birth rates are falling well below reported ideals. Julia Behrman, Emily Marshall, and Florian Keusch’s survey experiment shows that once competing work, financial, and family demands are taken into account, a two-child family is not a strong preference for young American women.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">For more than 50 years, people in the U.S. have reported that their ideal family size is about 2.5 children (Behrman 2024; Hagewen and Morgan 2005). The large share of Americans reporting ideal family sizes of two children points to the persistence of a widespread “two-child norm” in American family life. Yet, since 2010, the average number of children born per woman in the U.S. has dropped below two and the decline is ongoing (Osterman et al. 2025).&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The persistence and puzzle of the two-child norm</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This gap between the number of children Americans say is ideal and the number of children they have is puzzling. For decades, the U.S. showed close alignment between ideal family size and actual fertility, unlike many European countries where this gap has been long-standing (Hagewen and Morgan 2005). The growing disconnect between ideal family size and actual childbearing raises questions about the strength of the two-child norm in the contemporary U.S.<br>Standard surveys ask people about their ideal family size without considering the complex realities of life today. Factors like financial stress, work demands, partnership status, and caregiving responsibilities can influence whether having two children is truly a top priority. To understand how strong preferences for two children really are, we need to look at the choices people make when juggling multiple competing demands.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Measuring the strength of preference for two children</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We conducted a nationally representative online survey of 1,785 American women of childbearing ages (18-35) using a method called a “conjoint survey experiment” (Behrman, Marshall, and Keusch 2025). Instead of asking for a single ideal number of children, this method presents participants with different family scenarios that vary in terms of number of children and other life factors such as financial status, relationship status, work hours, family policies and so on. Respondents choose which scenario they prefer, revealing the importance of each factor when forced to make trade-offs.<br>This approach lets us answer two key questions:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1) Do young women prefer two children when considering other family, financial, and work demands?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2) How does preference for two children compare to preference for other factors of family life such as relationship status or financial stability?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our study found that preference for two children was not significantly stronger than preference for zero, one, or three children when competing work, financial, and family demands were taken into account (Figure 1). However, women clearly preferred families with two children over those with four, thus suggesting preference away from very large families.&nbsp;</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1-Effect-of-different-family-factors-on-the-predicted-probability-of-preferring-alternative-family-scenarios.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="590" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1-Effect-of-different-family-factors-on-the-predicted-probability-of-preferring-alternative-family-scenarios-1024x590.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10188" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1-Effect-of-different-family-factors-on-the-predicted-probability-of-preferring-alternative-family-scenarios-1024x590.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1-Effect-of-different-family-factors-on-the-predicted-probability-of-preferring-alternative-family-scenarios-300x173.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1-Effect-of-different-family-factors-on-the-predicted-probability-of-preferring-alternative-family-scenarios-768x442.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-1-Effect-of-different-family-factors-on-the-predicted-probability-of-preferring-alternative-family-scenarios.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We also found that factors such as relationship status, financial security, work hours, and the availability of family-friendly policies had a stronger influence on family preferences than the number of children. For example, being married (rather than single or living with someone) and having enough money to pay household bills (rather than financially struggling) mattered more for family preferences than whether the family had two children. These results indicate that preference for two children is weak compared to preferences about other dimensions of family life.&nbsp;<br>Interestingly, younger women aged 18 to 25 showed a notably higher preference for having no children compared to older women in the sample (Figure 2). This could be because childbearing is less central to the life goals of young Americans. Other studies support this, showing that young adults often place more importance on career fulfillment and social relationships than on having children (Parker and Minkin 2023). Alternatively, this finding could be driven by the younger ages of these respondents who may change their minds about childbearing as they grow older and consider starting families more seriously.&nbsp;</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-2-Predicted-probabilities-of-preferring-a-family-scenario-by-number-of-children-in-scenario-and-respondents-age-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="563" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-2-Predicted-probabilities-of-preferring-a-family-scenario-by-number-of-children-in-scenario-and-respondents-age--1024x563.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-10189" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-2-Predicted-probabilities-of-preferring-a-family-scenario-by-number-of-children-in-scenario-and-respondents-age--1024x563.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-2-Predicted-probabilities-of-preferring-a-family-scenario-by-number-of-children-in-scenario-and-respondents-age--300x165.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-2-Predicted-probabilities-of-preferring-a-family-scenario-by-number-of-children-in-scenario-and-respondents-age--768x422.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Figure-2-Predicted-probabilities-of-preferring-a-family-scenario-by-number-of-children-in-scenario-and-respondents-age-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>
</div>


<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What does this mean for U.S. fertility?&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our results help make sense of why U.S. fertility rates are falling even though the two-child ideal remains common in surveys. They indicate that having two children is not a strong preference for many young American women when faced with competing work, family, and financial pressures. Instead, preferences for family size appear less important than other life priorities such as achieving financial stability or finding a long-term partner. While the two-child norm may remain an important cultural reference point, achieving the two-child ideal does not appear to be one of the highest priorities for many American women of reproductive ages.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Behrman, Julia A. 2024. “Ideal Family Size and Reproductive Orientations: An Exploration of Change Over Time in the United States.” <em>Demography</em> 61(5):1535–57. doi:10.1215/00703370-11577510.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Behrman, Julia, Emily A. Marshall, and Florian Keusch. 2025. “An Experimental Approach to Assessing Young Women’s Childbearing Preferences: A Research Note on the United States.” <em>Demography</em> 11962185. doi:10.1215/00703370-11962185.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Hagewen, Kellie J., and S. Philip Morgan. 2005. “Intended and Ideal Family Size in the United States, 1970-2002.” <em>Population and Development Review</em> 31(3):507–27. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2005.00081.x.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Osterman, M. J. K., B. E. Hamilton, J. A. Martin, A. K. Driscoll, and C. P. Valenzuela. 2025. <em>Births: Final Data for 2023</em>. vol 74, no 1. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Parker, Kim, and Rachel Minkin. 2023.“<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2023/09/14/what-makes-for-a-fulfilling-life/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">What Makes for a Fulfilling Life</a>?” .</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/is-there-a-strong-two-child-norm-among-u-s-women/">Is there a strong two-child norm among U.S. women?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Emily Marshall]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Keusch]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Intimate partner violence and low birth weight in Colombia</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/intimate-partner-violence-and-low-birth-weight-in-colombia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stefania Molina]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2025 09:24:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Families and households]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[colombia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9816</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Stefania Molina’s research reveals that, in Colombia, separated and cohabiting mothers experience higher levels of intimate partner violence during pregnancy than married mothers. Disparities in low birth weight across partnership ... <a title="Intimate partner violence and low birth weight in Colombia" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/intimate-partner-violence-and-low-birth-weight-in-colombia/" aria-label="Read more about Intimate partner violence and low birth weight in Colombia">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/intimate-partner-violence-and-low-birth-weight-in-colombia/">Intimate partner violence and low birth weight in Colombia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em><em>Stefania Molina’s research reveals that, in Colombia, separated and cohabiting mothers experience higher levels of intimate partner violence during pregnancy than married mothers. Disparities in low birth weight across partnership statuses are primarily linked to maternal characteristics and differences in access to antenatal care.</em></em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Family life is changing rapidly around the world, and Colombia is no exception. Over the past few decades, marriage has become less common, with more mothers raising their children within cohabiting relationships (living with a partner and not married) or on their own. This shift reflects deeper social transformations and has sparked interest in understanding how different family forms influence the lives of mothers and their children.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Unmarried mothers often face greater social and economic challenges than their married counterparts. These include limited access to resources, fewer opportunities for support, and increased stress, all of which can negatively affect maternal well-being and the development of their children. Studies suggest that such factors play a key role in poorer health outcomes for children (Brown, 2010), including low birth weight (LBW, below 2,500 grams), an important indicator of infant health.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another factor shaping this dynamic is intimate partner violence (IPV), which is common during pregnancy in many parts of the world, including Colombia. IPV during pregnancy not only endangers the mother but may also harm the unborn child through increased stress, trauma, or reduced access to prenatal care. Furthermore, IPV levels are not evenly distributed across family forms. Women in less stable or non-marital partnerships are often at greater risk (Friedemann-Sanchez and Lovatón, 2012), raising important questions about how family dynamics influence experiences of IPV and the health of both mothers and their children.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent study (Molina, 2025), I investigated the implications of Colombia’s shifting family forms for infant health, focusing on IPV and its relationship to maternal partnership status. The study draws on data from the Colombian Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) conducted in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Cohabitation: the norm for mothers in Colombia</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Unmarried motherhood is rising globally, but Colombia offers a unique case. In 2015, 65.8% of mothers with children aged 0-1 were cohabiting, while only 22.3% were married (Figure 1). This trend reflects Colombia&#8217;s history, where consensual unions have long been a significant part of family life due to cultural and historical influences (De Vos, 2000). Today, cohabitation has become the leading family form, extending beyond less advantaged groups to include highly educated mothers.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-1.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year.jpg" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="588" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-1.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year-1024x588.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9819" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-1.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year-1024x588.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-1.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year-300x172.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-1.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year-768x441.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-1.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Intimate partner violence during pregnancy</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">IPV during pregnancy remains a severe public health problem with widespread consequences for maternal and child well-being (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006). In my study, I found that separated and cohabiting mothers report notably higher IPV levels than married mothers.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">From 2000, reported levels of IPV among cohabiting mothers declined over time, while separated mothers continued to report high levels. This decline could be attributed to changes in the composition of cohabiting mothers, as this family form includes women from increasingly diverse social and educational backgrounds. By 2015, however, 17.5% of separated mothers and 5.8% of cohabiting mothers with children aged 0–1 were still reporting experience of IPV during pregnancy, compared to just 3.7% of married mothers (Figure 2).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-2.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-who-reported-experiencing-IPV-during-pregnancy-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year-.jpg" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="588" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-2.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-who-reported-experiencing-IPV-during-pregnancy-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year--1024x588.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9820" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-2.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-who-reported-experiencing-IPV-during-pregnancy-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year--1024x588.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-2.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-who-reported-experiencing-IPV-during-pregnancy-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year--300x172.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-2.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-who-reported-experiencing-IPV-during-pregnancy-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year--768x441.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Figure-2.-Share-of-mothers-with-children-aged-0–1-who-reported-experiencing-IPV-during-pregnancy-by-partnership-status-and-calendar-year-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Additionally, IPV itself might influence family transitions, with violence potentially contributing to separation. As societal acceptance of separation following IPV grows, the higher IPV levels among separated mothers may reflect this evolving social norm.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Intimate partner violence and infant health&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The relationship between IPV and infant health is complex and multifaceted. While unmarried mothers are more likely to have infants with LBW, much of this disparity stems from differences in maternal characteristics, such as education and age, and inequities in antenatal care. For example, compared to cohabiting or separated mothers, married mothers are significantly more likely to attend the recommended eight or more antenatal visits, which have a considerable impact on reducing LBW risks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Surprisingly, IPV during pregnancy was not found to have a direct association with LBW. This could reflect the complexity of examining LBW – which is influenced by multiple factors beyond IPV – as a health outcome. Moreover, the relatively low prevalence of LBW in the data adds to the challenge of detecting such relationships. Additional analysis revealed that IPV during pregnancy is closely linked to an increased likelihood of pregnancy loss, suggesting that its most profound effects might actually occur before birth.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These findings reveal a complex interaction between changing family forms, intimate partner violence, and maternal and child health in Colombia. The increase in cohabitation and separation reflects shifting social norms, but these changes also highlight enduring gender inequalities. Mothers who are separated or in cohabiting unions face unique challenges, including higher rates of IPV and reduced access to healthcare, which affect child health outcomes such as LBW.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To improve maternal and child health outcomes, Colombia must strengthen healthcare services for unmarried mothers, ensuring equitable access to antenatal care. At the same time, addressing IPV requires a multifaceted approach that considers the varying risks across different partnership statuses. Finally, tackling the broader social and economic inequalities that exacerbate IPV and family instability will be critical to fostering healthier outcomes for mothers and their children.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Brown, S. (2010). Marriage and child well-being: Research and policy perspectives. <em>Journal of Marriage and Family</em> 72(5): 1059–1077.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">De Vos, S. (2000). Nuptiality in Latin America: The view of a sociologist and family demographer. In: Browning, S.L. and Miller, R.R. (eds.). <em>Till death do us part: A multicultural anthology on marriage</em>. Stanford: JAI Press: 219–243.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Friedemann-Sanchez, G., and Lovatón, R. (2012). Intimate partner violence in Colombia: Who is at risk? <em>Social Forces</em> 91(2): 663–688.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Garcia-Moreno, C., Jansen, H.A., Ellsberg, M., Heise, L., and Watts, C.H. (2006). Prevalence of intimate partner violence: Findings from the WHO multi-country study on women’s health and domestic violence. <em>The Lancet</em> 368(9543): 1260–1269.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Molina, S. (2025). Unmarried motherhood and infant health: The role of intimate partner violence in Colombia. <em>Demographic Research</em>, 52(6), 141–178.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/family-and-households/intimate-partner-violence-and-low-birth-weight-in-colombia/">Intimate partner violence and low birth weight in Colombia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Leisure and fertility nexus among first-time mothers in Australia</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/leisure-and-fertility-nexus-among-first-time-mothers-in-australia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ewa Jarosz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2024 09:25:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9116</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In Australia, according to Ewa Jarosz, Anna Matysiak and Beata Osiewalska, mothers of one child are more likely to have a second birth if certain conditions are met, and notably ... <a title="Leisure and fertility nexus among first-time mothers in Australia" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/leisure-and-fertility-nexus-among-first-time-mothers-in-australia/" aria-label="Read more about Leisure and fertility nexus among first-time mothers in Australia">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/leisure-and-fertility-nexus-among-first-time-mothers-in-australia/">Leisure and fertility nexus among first-time mothers in Australia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>In Australia, according to Ewa Jarosz, Anna Matysiak and Beata Osiewalska, mothers of one child are more likely to have a second birth if certain conditions are met, and notably when they are satisfied with how much leisure time they have. Lower-educated mothers, in particular, may delay or forego second births if they often feel exhausted by the demands of parenting.&nbsp;</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Mothers of young children are an especially time-poor category (Milkie, Raley, and Bianchi 2009). They face multiple constraints to their leisure, and even when they have time to attend to their own needs, interruptions for domestic tasks and childcare are frequent (Chatzitheochari and Arber 2012). Maternal leisure, or lack of it, is a common focus of research in the field of time-use studies. In demographic literature, however, it has not received much attention. While the work-family conflict and its role in fertility decisions is widely recognized, the “family” part of this story resembles a black box containing everything and anything that is not paid work, and deserves further investigation.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The tired mother</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shortage of time and tiredness among mothers are often seen as an unavoidable side-effect of having a young child at home. And indeed, mothers of young children are most likely to report often feeling tired, especially those with little free time and those who work part-time (but not full-time), compared to mothers not in paid employment. Overall, it seems that within the work-family axis, the “family” element or the private lives of mothers is just as exhausting as paid work, for mothers of young children in particular.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>How could leisure be linked with fertility?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are two main reasons why maternal leisure could matter for fertility. The first is biological: the fundamental need for time off to rest and recover. Evolutionary studies show that mothers are more likely to have children in circumstances where the personal costs of childbearing are lower (Coall et al. 2016; Raybould and Sear 2021). Conversely, if a mother is under high physical stress – due to tiredness and lack of rest, for example – she is more likely to prioritize her health and delay or forego childbearing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second possible reason derives from the concept of the second demographic transition, or SDT (Lesthaeghe 2010). In this perspective, maternal free time is a resource that allows a woman to pursue her personal goals. Consequently, mothers who feel they have too little free time may be unwilling to take on additional commitments, such as having another child. In line with the SDT assumption, this motivation might be more relevant for tertiary-educated women.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Mothers’ free time and progression to the second birth</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent study, using the data from the 2001-2020 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, we investigated whether maternal free time is associated with (subsequent) progression to second birth (Jarosz, Matysiak and Osiewalska 2023).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Free time was measured as the total free time remaining after deducting all paid and unpaid working hours (such as housework and errands) from the total time available in a week. A subjective measure of mothers’ satisfaction with their amount of free time was also included, together with maternal tiredness (represented by an item worded as: “I often feel tired/ exhausted by the demands of parenting”) as a proxy for physical or mental exhaustion, corresponding to the “biological” role of free time as time for recovery and necessary self-care. With regard to the other possible pathway between leisure and fertility, we included the frequency of meeting with friends and the frequency of doing sports as proxies for activities dedicated to pursuing (other) personal objectives and hobbies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The results of the study indicate that an Australian mother’s free time is indeed associated with her risk of progression to the second birth. An association was found between objectively measured free time (time remaining after deducting paid and unpaid work hours) and second birth probability. The probability was highest for mothers who had relatively more time free from paid and unpaid work but otherwise spent sufficient time playing with their child (which is suggestive of self-selection). Net of this result, for mothers who expressed higher levels of satisfaction with their amount of leisure time, the probability of second birth transition rose in parallel with an increase in satisfaction with their leisure time.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Probably the most interesting findings, however, concern educational differences. Interaction terms were used to explore which type of motivation (biological/evolutionary vs satisfying lifestyle needs) would be more important for tertiary- and lower-educated mothers, with the latter category representing over 60% of the sample. The study found that maternal tiredness was negatively associated with fertility but only for lower-educated women. Their exhaustion seems to be a significant barrier to progression to second birth. Conversely, tertiary-educated women were generally resilient in this regard (Figure 1).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-1.-Relative-probability-of-maternal-tiredness-and-its-covariates-cross-sectional.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="513" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-1.-Relative-probability-of-maternal-tiredness-and-its-covariates-cross-sectional.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--1024x513.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9122" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-1.-Relative-probability-of-maternal-tiredness-and-its-covariates-cross-sectional.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--1024x513.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-1.-Relative-probability-of-maternal-tiredness-and-its-covariates-cross-sectional.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-1.-Relative-probability-of-maternal-tiredness-and-its-covariates-cross-sectional.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--768x385.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-1.-Relative-probability-of-maternal-tiredness-and-its-covariates-cross-sectional.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-2.-Association-between-tiredness-and-second-birth-probability-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="559" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-2.-Association-between-tiredness-and-second-birth-probability-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--1024x559.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9124" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-2.-Association-between-tiredness-and-second-birth-probability-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--1024x559.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-2.-Association-between-tiredness-and-second-birth-probability-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--300x164.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-2.-Association-between-tiredness-and-second-birth-probability-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--768x419.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-2.-Association-between-tiredness-and-second-birth-probability-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our analyses also showed that the association between participation in selected leisure activities and the probability of second birth was moderated by maternal education. Lower-educated mothers were more likely to proceed to a subsequent birth if they engaged in physical activity on a regular basis, while no such association emerges for tertiary-educated mothers. However, the latter were more likely to have another child if they socialized with their friends on a regular basis.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-3.-Association-between-leisure-activities-and-second-birth-probabilities-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="559" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-3.-Association-between-leisure-activities-and-second-birth-probabilities-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--1024x559.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9125" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-3.-Association-between-leisure-activities-and-second-birth-probabilities-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--1024x559.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-3.-Association-between-leisure-activities-and-second-birth-probabilities-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--300x164.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-3.-Association-between-leisure-activities-and-second-birth-probabilities-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.--768x419.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Fig-3.-Association-between-leisure-activities-and-second-birth-probabilities-by-maternal-level-of-education.-Australian-mothers-of-one-child-2001-2020.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our study on Australian data points to the importance of exploring the relationship between mothers’ lifestyle practices, their physical activity and childbearing. Maternal free time and leisure seem to be important factors underlying fertility choices, and they should be considered more attentively by demographers, taking social disparities into account. Physical factors seem to matter more for further childbearing among lower-educated individuals, at least in Australia, whereas among their highly-educated counterparts, social relations with their peers, more than physical activity, are associated with a higher probability of further childbearing.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chatzitheochari, S. and Arber, S. (2012). Class, gender and time poverty: a time-use analysis of British workers’ free time resources. <em>The British Journal of</em> Sociology 63(3):451–471. doi:10.1111/j.1468-4446.2012.01419.x.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Coall, D.A., Tickner, M., McAllister, L., and Sheppard, P. (2016). Developmental influences on fertility decisions by women: an evolutionary perspective. <em>Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences</em> 371(1692):20150146. doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0146.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jarosz, E., Matysiak A., Osiewalska B. (2023) Maternal Free Time: A Missing Element in Fertility Studies, <em>Population and Development Review</em>, online first. doi:10.1111/padr.12589</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lesthaeghe, R. (2010). The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition. <em>Population and Development Review</em> 36(2):211–251. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00328.x.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Milkie, M.A., Raley, S.B., and Bianchi, S.M. (2009). Taking on the Second Shift: Time Allocations and Time Pressures of U.S. Parents with Preschoolers. <em>Social Forces</em> 88(2):487–517. doi:10.1353/sof.0.0268.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Raybould, A. and Sear, R. (2021). Children of the (gender) revolution: A theoretical and empirical synthesis of how gendered division of labour influences fertility.<em> Population Studie</em>s 75(2):169–190. doi:10.1080/00324728.2020.1851748.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/leisure-and-fertility-nexus-among-first-time-mothers-in-australia/">Leisure and fertility nexus among first-time mothers in Australia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Matysiak]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Beata Osiewalska]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Occupational characteristics and the gender wage gap among parents in Europe</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/occupational-characteristics-and-the-gender-wage-gap-among-parents-in-europe/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alícia Adserà]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Feb 2024 08:20:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Education, work, economy (socio-economic differences)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gender equality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gender gap]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9033</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The gender wage gap persists, especially among mothers. Alícia Adserà and Federica Querin show that despite low wages in predominantly male occupations that depend on heavy machinery, women (and chiefly ... <a title="Occupational characteristics and the gender wage gap among parents in Europe" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/occupational-characteristics-and-the-gender-wage-gap-among-parents-in-europe/" aria-label="Read more about Occupational characteristics and the gender wage gap among parents in Europe">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/occupational-characteristics-and-the-gender-wage-gap-among-parents-in-europe/">Occupational characteristics and the gender wage gap among parents in Europe</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>The gender wage gap persists, especially among mothers. Alícia Adserà and Federica Querin show that despite low wages in predominantly male occupations that depend on heavy machinery, women (and chiefly mothers) are penalized by holding fewer jobs with leadership roles and more jobs that require frequent contact with others.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Despite important advances in closing the gender wage gap in most advanced countries over the last decades, progress has slowed or stalled during recent years. As women’s educational attainment now often surpasses that of men, explanations for the persistence of this gap point to gender-based differential sorting into sectors, and sorting on occupational characteristics within each sector (Goldin 2014; Blau and Khan 2017). Gendered occupational sorting increases in saliency for parents, who must juggle work and family demands.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recently published paper, we used data across 14 countries from the Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), collected by the OECD in 2012, to examine the degree of sorting on occupational characteristics and its implications for the gender wage gap, with a focus on parents (Adserà and Querin 2023). For each individual, we matched occupational characteristics at 4-digit ISCO-08 codes with information from the <a href="https://www.onetonline.org/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">O*NET database</a> on the requirements and work content of occupations. We examined five occupational characteristics relating to the importance of interpersonal relationships in the job, the worker’s autonomy, and a time component. Each index is normalized to have mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Prevalence of occupational characteristics is gendered</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>•</strong> The first occupational characteristic is <em>contact with others</em>, which is defined by frequent interactions with peers such as colleagues, clients, and the public. It is closely linked with flexibility and ability to work from home, occupational characteristics that increased in relevance during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>•</strong> The second, <em>leadership</em>, captures vertical hierarchical work relationships and involves guiding, directing, and coordinating other workers. Unlike contact with peers, leadership is associated with higher wages and, in general, tends to be male-dominated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>•</strong> Third, <em>autonomy</em> is defined as having a job characterized by control on the decision-making process. It is juxtaposed with <em>machine-dependency</em>, which involves the direct operation of machinery and vehicles that require the worker’s physical presence at the workplace. These latter occupations are frequently performed by men but, unlike most predominantly male occupations, often do not reap high wage returns.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>•</strong> Lastly, <em>time pressure</em> and high frequency of deadlines captures the time squeeze that may be especially binding for parents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1 shows that the gender differences (in standard deviations) in prevalence for the five occupational characteristics align with expectations. Only contact with others is, on average, more prevalent in jobs held by women, while machine use and leadership are much more prevalent in men’s jobs. In general, when we restrict the sample to parents, gender differences amplify. This is particularly evident in the increased gap between mothers and fathers in occupations with more autonomy and leadership. For example, mothers’ occupations are associated with 0.30 standard deviations fewer leadership requirements than fathers, while this difference increases to 0.36 standard deviations fewer among childless individuals.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-the-prevalence-of-occupational-characteristics-by-parenthood-status-in-14-European-countries-2012.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="563" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-the-prevalence-of-occupational-characteristics-by-parenthood-status-in-14-European-countries-2012.--1024x563.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9037" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-the-prevalence-of-occupational-characteristics-by-parenthood-status-in-14-European-countries-2012.--1024x563.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-the-prevalence-of-occupational-characteristics-by-parenthood-status-in-14-European-countries-2012.--300x165.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-the-prevalence-of-occupational-characteristics-by-parenthood-status-in-14-European-countries-2012.--768x422.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-the-prevalence-of-occupational-characteristics-by-parenthood-status-in-14-European-countries-2012.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While there is no difference in machine use between fathers and childless men, it is fathers who most frequently hold leadership roles, in line with previous research on the existence of both a glass ceiling for women and a fatherhood premium. The sizable autonomy of fathers might be consistent with their jobs being more associated with managerial positions than those of younger (childless) workers. Interestingly, mothers less frequently work in high contact occupations than childless women (even though they do so more than fathers), indicating a shift towards occupations that allow for greater flexibility.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Geographical differences</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To account for substantial labor markets differences within Europe, we group countries in our sample according to the Eurofound classification that captures industrial relations in the EU and that nicely aligns with differences in welfare systems and gender norms across Europe. These groups are Continental Europe (Belgium, Germany, France, The Netherlands), Southern Europe (Spain, Greece, Italy), Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia), with the UK representing Anglo-Saxon countries, and Denmark Nordic countries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While prevalence results hold in all countries, the gender gap in leadership is particularly large in Southern Europe and between mothers and fathers in Eastern and Continental Europe. Southern and Eastern Europe also display gender gaps in autonomy. Taken together, the prevalence findings are indicative of more gender-based occupational sorting in Eastern and Southern Europe.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>High wages for leadership and autonomy contribute to the gender wage gap</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two main factors pulling in opposite directions emerge when estimating the contributions of occupational characteristics to the gender wage gap. On the one hand, occupations involving more contact with others are generally less well paid. This increases the gender wage gap as we show that contact is more prevalent in women’s occupations (Figure 1). On the other hand, the fact that male-dominated machine-dependent occupations are poorly paid partially closes the gender wage gap. However, women who work in machine-dependent occupations are paid even less than their male counterparts, while men who work in contact with others are not penalized. This, in combination with a wage premium for (male) leadership and autonomy, tips the balance for a persisting gender wage gap.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Gender wage gaps persist after adjusting for occupational characteristics</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 2 shows that in all countries, except those in Continental Europe, adjusted gender wage differences (measured in log gross hourly earnings) are still significant even after controlling for demographic and employment characteristics such as education and whether respondents work in the public sector or on temporary contracts, as well as for the five above-mentioned occupational characteristics and their interactions with gender.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Eastern Europe shows the largest gender wage gap (and Denmark the lowest) both for all workers and for parents. Restricting the sample to parents leads to a widening of the adjusted gap, especially in Southern Europe, where reconciling work and family is especially complicated for women.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thus, even accounting for a sizable occupational sorting and for differential wage returns to occupational characteristics, Figure 2 clearly shows a persistent gender wage gap that calls for further research.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-2-Gender-wage-gap-by-parenthood-and-country-groups-adjusted-by-occupational-characteristics-in-14-European-countries-2012.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="563" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-2-Gender-wage-gap-by-parenthood-and-country-groups-adjusted-by-occupational-characteristics-in-14-European-countries-2012.--1024x563.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9038" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-2-Gender-wage-gap-by-parenthood-and-country-groups-adjusted-by-occupational-characteristics-in-14-European-countries-2012.--1024x563.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-2-Gender-wage-gap-by-parenthood-and-country-groups-adjusted-by-occupational-characteristics-in-14-European-countries-2012.--300x165.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-2-Gender-wage-gap-by-parenthood-and-country-groups-adjusted-by-occupational-characteristics-in-14-European-countries-2012.--768x422.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Figure-2-Gender-wage-gap-by-parenthood-and-country-groups-adjusted-by-occupational-characteristics-in-14-European-countries-2012.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Adserà, A., &amp; Querin, F. (2023). The Gender Wage Gap and Parenthood: Occupational Characteristics Across European Countries.&nbsp;<em>European Journal of Population</em>,&nbsp;39(1), 34.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Blau, F.D., and Kahn, L.M. (2017). The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations. <em>Journal of Economic Literature</em> 55(3):789–865.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Goldin, C. (2014). A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter. <em>American Economic Review</em> 104(4):1091–1119.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/occupational-characteristics-and-the-gender-wage-gap-among-parents-in-europe/">Occupational characteristics and the gender wage gap among parents in Europe</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Federica Querin]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
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		<title>How retirement policies and demographic change influence China&#8217;s gender labor force gap </title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/gender-issues/how-retirement-policies-and-demographic-change-influence-chinas-gender-labor-force-gap/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Feng Kai]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2023 07:50:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Gender issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8869</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The gender gap in labor force participation is expanding in China, for various reasons, among which scarcity of affordable public childcare and growing discrimination against women in the labor market. ... <a title="How retirement policies and demographic change influence China&#8217;s gender labor force gap " class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/gender-issues/how-retirement-policies-and-demographic-change-influence-chinas-gender-labor-force-gap/" aria-label="Read more about How retirement policies and demographic change influence China&#8217;s gender labor force gap ">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/gender-issues/how-retirement-policies-and-demographic-change-influence-chinas-gender-labor-force-gap/">How retirement policies and demographic change influence China&#8217;s gender labor force gap </a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>The gender gap in labor force participation is expanding in China, for various reasons, among which scarcity of affordable public childcare and growing discrimination against women in the labor market. Part of the explanation, Kai Feng argues, lies in the rigidities and discrimination of the Chinese pension system, which forces women to retire earlier than men.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China, once renowned for its high women&#8217;s labor force participation, is now experiencing an unexpected downturn. While the gender gap in labor force involvement is narrowing at global level, it is expanding in China (Figure 1)</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During Mao&#8217;s era, the labor force participation rate for women was exceptionally high, driven by the radical ideology that &#8220;women hold up half the sky&#8221; and by massive social mobilization to promote female employment. The planned economy of the time also meant that both women and men had little choice but to work for a living. With the advent of market reforms in 1978, not working became a viable option for many. In addition, subsequent institutional shifts have erected significant barriers for women seeking to join or stay in the workforce. </p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-labor-force-participation-rate.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="387" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-labor-force-participation-rate-1024x387.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8874" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-labor-force-participation-rate-1024x387.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-labor-force-participation-rate-300x113.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-labor-force-participation-rate-768x290.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-1-Gender-gap-in-labor-force-participation-rate.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why has the gender gap in labor force participation widened in China?&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Numerous studies, as summarized in Ji et al (2017), suggest that the reduction in affordable public childcare —previously widely available — combined with escalating discrimination against women since the economic reforms, are contributing to this widening gap. Drawing from these findings, researchers recommend policies to enhance access to cost-effective childcare, to curb workplace discrimination against women, and ensure equal rights for women and men, irrespective of women&#8217;s fertility behaviors or intentions.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent study (Feng 2023) I highlight an often-overlooked factor: China&#8217;s gender-based retirement policy. Under this policy, established in the 1950s with the intention of “protecting” female workers (some argue it was a legacy of the Soviet model), women are expected to retire at either age 50 or 55, depending on their occupations, while men retire at 60. This policy has remained untouched, even as women&#8217;s life expectancy has risen and their presence in higher education and the workforce has significantly expanded.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Increased women’s labor force participation after age 50, but composition effects prevail&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A significant factor contributing to the observations is the shift in population age composition. As a larger portion of the population reaches retirement age, a higher number of women than men exit the workforce (Figure 2). </p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-2-Age-pyramids-by-labor-force-participation-status-in-1990-2010-2030.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="954" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-2-Age-pyramids-by-labor-force-participation-status-in-1990-2010-2030-1024x954.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8875" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-2-Age-pyramids-by-labor-force-participation-status-in-1990-2010-2030-1024x954.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-2-Age-pyramids-by-labor-force-participation-status-in-1990-2010-2030-300x280.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-2-Age-pyramids-by-labor-force-participation-status-in-1990-2010-2030-768x716.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-2-Age-pyramids-by-labor-force-participation-status-in-1990-2010-2030.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Women’s labor force participation rate above age 50 actually increased between 1990 and 2010, (as shown by the percentage on the top of the bar), together with the population aged 50 and over. In 1990, the majority of the working-age population consisted of younger age groups, with women aged between 50 to 64 represented only 19% of the entire workforce (ages 20 to 64). This percentage grew to 24.5% in 2010 and is anticipated to reach 37.2% by 2030.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These demographic shifts are expanding the gender gap in labor force participation over the years. If labor force participation rates remain consistent with the 2010 data, the projected age structure for 2030 suggests an even more pronounced gender disparity in labor force participation.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This study does not necessarily contradict previous findings, however. Figure 3 presents the contribution of caregiving and retirement to the change in women&#8217;s labor force participation between 1990 and 2010. </p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-3-Decomposition-of-the-contributions-of-caregiving-and-retirement-to-the-change-in-womens-labor-market-participation-between-1990-and-2010-for-working-age.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="547" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-3-Decomposition-of-the-contributions-of-caregiving-and-retirement-to-the-change-in-womens-labor-market-participation-between-1990-and-2010-for-working-age-1024x547.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8876" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-3-Decomposition-of-the-contributions-of-caregiving-and-retirement-to-the-change-in-womens-labor-market-participation-between-1990-and-2010-for-working-age-1024x547.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-3-Decomposition-of-the-contributions-of-caregiving-and-retirement-to-the-change-in-womens-labor-market-participation-between-1990-and-2010-for-working-age-300x160.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-3-Decomposition-of-the-contributions-of-caregiving-and-retirement-to-the-change-in-womens-labor-market-participation-between-1990-and-2010-for-working-age-768x410.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Figure-3-Decomposition-of-the-contributions-of-caregiving-and-retirement-to-the-change-in-womens-labor-market-participation-between-1990-and-2010-for-working-age.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Among younger women, the rate of non-participation in the labor force due to caregiving rose, aligning with the explanations of increased work-family conflict and gender discrimination. Compared to 1990, the rise in caregiving rates among younger women in 2010 was offset by a decrease among older age groups. However, this does not imply that women undertake fewer caregiving responsibilities in their older years now than in the past. Rather, women now are more likely to cite retirement as their reason for not participating in the labor force.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Is early statutory retirement age a good thing for women?&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The topic of women&#8217;s early retirement is hotly debated in China. While many men argue that the system is unfair because men are required to work for more years than women before they can retire, the question remains: is an early statutory retirement age truly beneficial for women?&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the surface, early retirement may seem advantageous, but being able to retire with financial independence is another story: the gender-based retirement system contributes to a gender pension gap, with women receiving fewer pension benefits (Giles et al 2023). An institutionalized policy that requires women to retire earlier than men may further hinder women from advancing to senior positions on the professional ladder.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Within a household, men and women often pool resources, including pensions, savings, housing, and assistance from their children. However, as singlehood and childlessness rates increase, early retirement may put single and childless women in precarious financial situations. Moreover, as the population continues to age, there are growing concerns about the long-term sustainability of the current pension system (Cai, Wang, Shen 2018). The upcoming generation might not receive the same pension benefits as their parents. Consequently, for many people, labor earnings might emerge as a more reliable income source than a pension. Thus, ensuring equal labor rights for women and men at older ages is becoming imperative.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Rising retirement age</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Discussion on retirement age should distinguish between effective retirement age and statutory retirement age. Even with a new pension system that includes rural residents, the retirement age holds minimal weight for millions of low-skilled migrant workers, as many will continue working as long as they physically can. The pension disparity between urban <em>hukou </em>holders and their rural counterparts is huge (Giles et al., 2023). Still, a static and gender-based retirement age could place additional strain on these workers. The current retirement system might leave many workers above retirement age, especially a higher proportion of women, vulnerable due to inadequate labor protections, such as accident and injury insurance. This could also make employers hesitant to hire older individuals due to associated risks.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For years, raising the retirement age has been considered a policy strategy to boost the workforce and, more importantly, to address the looming pension deficit. Considering that, after years of economic development, China currently has the most educated and healthiest population in its history (Wang 2023), the country appears well-positioned to enact this policy. However, alongside the widely discussed urban-rural divide, it is important to integrate a gender perspective into ongoing discussions about retirement and pension reform to avoid maintaining or even exacerbating the inequality in middle and later life stages.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cai, Y., Wang, F., &amp; Shen, K. (2018). Fiscal implications of population aging and social sector expenditure in China. <em>Population and Development Review,</em> 811-831.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Feng, K. (2023). Unequal Duties and Unequal Retirement: Decomposing the Women&#8217;s Labor Force Decline in Postreform China. <em>Demography</em>, 60(5), 1309-1333.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Giles, J., Lei, X., Wang, G., Wang, Y., &amp; Zhao, Y. (2023). One country, two systems: evidence on retirement patterns in China.<em> </em>J<em>ournal of pension economics &amp; finance</em>, 22(2), 188-210.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ji, Y., Wu, X., Sun, S., &amp; He, G. (2017). Unequal care, unequal work: Toward a more comprehensive understanding of gender inequality in post-reform urban China. <em>Sex Roles</em>, 77, 765-778.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Wang, F, 2023, Should or should not China be afraid of population decline?, <em>Neodemos</em></p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-wp-embed is-provider-n-iussp wp-block-embed-n-iussp"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="qh3lcuJYE3"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/individual-and-population-ageing/should-or-should-not-china-be-afraid-of-population-decline/">Should or should not China be afraid of population decline?</a></blockquote><iframe loading="lazy" class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted"  title="&#8220;Should or should not China be afraid of population decline?&#8221; &#8212; N-IUSSP" src="https://www.niussp.org/individual-and-population-ageing/should-or-should-not-china-be-afraid-of-population-decline/embed/#?secret=5pretZMXZt#?secret=qh3lcuJYE3" data-secret="qh3lcuJYE3" width="600" height="338" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe>
</div></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Source Figure 1 &#8211; <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/gender-gap-labor-force-participation-widening-china-while-narrowing-other" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/gender-issues/how-retirement-policies-and-demographic-change-influence-chinas-gender-labor-force-gap/">How retirement policies and demographic change influence China&#8217;s gender labor force gap </a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>How migration affects sex ratios at subnational level</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/how-migration-affects-sex-ratios-at-subnational-level/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michał Gulczyński]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Oct 2023 07:17:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gender issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Migration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sex-selection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8743</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Sex-selective migration leads to imbalances in local proportions of young women and men. In almost all European and American countries, substantially more women than men migrate from rural to urban ... <a title="How migration affects sex ratios at subnational level" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/how-migration-affects-sex-ratios-at-subnational-level/" aria-label="Read more about How migration affects sex ratios at subnational level">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/how-migration-affects-sex-ratios-at-subnational-level/">How migration affects sex ratios at subnational level</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Sex-selective migration leads to imbalances in local proportions of young women and men. In almost all European and American countries, substantially more women than men migrate from rural to urban areas, while in Africa, the opposite is true. Overall, observes Michał Gulczyński, this implies that many women and men may never find a suitable partner.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Declining marriage rates, and unpartnered living more generally, have been a growing concern in recent years. Causes are varied. Education, for instance, may have played a role, because there do not seem to be enough well-educated men for the increasing number of women with college degrees (Lichter et al. 2020). However, there may be an even more basic obstacle in the search for an opposite-sex partner: young women and men live in different places.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Obviously, this does not mean that they do not cross paths, but in local areas, sex ratios (young women divided by young men, where young means between 25 and 34 years of age) are unbalanced, which implies that there are not enough potential partners around. In a recent article (Gulczyński 2023), I show that the problem is more pervasive than commonly believed: in most countries of the world, both rural and urban sex ratios are frequently skewed.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Sex-selective migration leads to skewed subnational sex ratios all over the world</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1 shows the strong correlation between (log) population density and sex ratios among young adults in subnational (NUTS 3) regions of the European Union. The higher the population density, i.e., the more urban a region, the higher the proportion of young women who live there. For instance, in the Polish capital city, Warsaw, there are around 10% more young women than men. In contrast, there are five young men for every four young women in rural Greece.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Sex-selective-migration-leads-to-imbalances-in-local-proportions-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Sex-selective-migration-leads-to-imbalances-in-local-proportions--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8746" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Sex-selective-migration-leads-to-imbalances-in-local-proportions--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Sex-selective-migration-leads-to-imbalances-in-local-proportions--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Sex-selective-migration-leads-to-imbalances-in-local-proportions--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Sex-selective-migration-leads-to-imbalances-in-local-proportions-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The problem also affects Germany, for instance, where, after re-unification, many women migrated from East to West, distorting the sex ratio (Figure 2): in some East German regions there are almost 13 young men per 10 young women. Some observers believe this to be one of the reasons behind the support for the right-wing party <em>Alternative für Deutschland</em> among the men left behind (Bennhold 2018).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Figure-2.-Sex-ratios-in-NUTS3-regions.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Figure-2.-Sex-ratios-in-NUTS3-regions-1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8747" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Figure-2.-Sex-ratios-in-NUTS3-regions-1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Figure-2.-Sex-ratios-in-NUTS3-regions-300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Figure-2.-Sex-ratios-in-NUTS3-regions-768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Figure-2.-Sex-ratios-in-NUTS3-regions.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So far, the phenomenon of skewed sex ratios has been observed mainly in extreme contexts, for instance, when a war eliminates a large share of young men or when many more boys than girls are born (Chao et al. 2019) due to sex-selective abortion. The most striking example of prenatal sex selection on a massive scale is China, where it developed in response to the one-child policy combined with strong son-preference and access to ultrasound scans to learn a child’s sex before birth. In normal circumstances, only up to around 5–7% more boys than girls are born.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since both differential male and female mortality and abnormal sex ratios at birth are rather rare, the only other possible explanation of skewed sex ratios among young adults is sex-selective migration. In developed countries, women migrate to cities to study, work in services and take advantage of public services. Men are more likely to stay in rural areas. They are not necessarily farmers, but they commute more often and over longer distances. They also drop out of education earlier than women. However, there are also exceptions: in Africa, for instance, it is generally men who have a stronger tendency to migrate to urban areas.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Rural urban migration is gender selective</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The phenomenon of skewed sex ratios is not new. It was noticed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by Ernst Ravenstein (1885) who formulated one of his laws of migration as “woman is a greater migrant than man”. This was also recognized by the famous sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1962) in his “<em>Célibat et condition paysanne</em>”. Already back then, both prominent scholars noticed that men were more likely to stay in rural areas.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Even if the phenomenon is not new, it may lead to more serious consequences nowadays. Political competition is shaped, among other things, by the rural-urban divide. The topic of gender and gender identities has become much more salient with the increasing representation of women in politics, expanding gender equality policies, and new social movements, such as <em>#MeToo</em>. Also, women’s migration to cities is now linked to the increasing gender gap (in favour of women) in education, which is still a source of prestige.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Recent migration flows may have a different gender balance than in the recent past. While migrants coming to Europe in the last decade were mostly male, most current Ukrainian refugees are women and children. And recent research shows that people react negatively to migration if their sex is over-represented, both in their home region and among migrants (Dancygier et al. 2021, Krakowski and Sambanis 2023).&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is reasonable to argue that gender equality should include living in the same places, having access to similar public services, and getting similar education. Otherwise, the gender gaps in values, lifestyles and political preferences are likely to continue, and possibly even increase, potentially posing serious policy issues in the near future.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bennhold, Kathrin. 2018. “One Legacy of Merkel? Angry East German Men Fueling the Far Right.” <em>New York Times</em>. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/europe/merkel-east-germany-nationalists-populism.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/europe/merkel-east-germany-nationalists-populism</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bourdieu, Pierre. 1962. “Célibat et condition paysanne.” <em>Études rurales</em> 5, no. 1: 32–135. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3406/rural.1962.1011" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.3406/rural.1962.1011</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chao, Fengqing, Patrick Gerland, Alex R. Cook, and Leontine Alkema. 2019. “Systematic Assessment of the Sex Ratio at Birth for All Countries and Estimation of National Imbalances and Regional Reference Levels.” <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> 116, no. 19: 9303–11. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1812593116" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1812593116</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Dancygier, Rafaela, Naoki Egami, Amaney Jamal, and Ramona Rischke. 2021. ‘Hate Crimes and Gender Imbalances: Fears over Mate Competition and Violence against Refugees’. <em>American Journal of Political Science</em> n/a (n/a). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12595" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12595</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gulczyński, Michał. 2023. Migration and Skewed Subnational Sex Ratios among Young Adults. <em>Population and Development Review</em>, onlie first. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12577" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12577</a>.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Krakowski, Krzysztof, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2023. ‘Mating Market Competition Reduces Support for Ukrainian Refugees Among Polish Women’. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4404955" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4404955</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lichter, Daniel T., Joseph P. Price, and Jeffrey M. Swigert. 2020. ‘Mismatches in the Marriage Market’. <em>Journal of Marriage and Family</em> 82 (2): 796–809. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12603" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12603</a>.<br><br>Ravenstein, Ernst. 1885. “The Laws of Migration.” <em>Journal of the Statistical Society of London</em> 48, no. 2: 167–235. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2979181" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.2307/2979181</a>.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/how-migration-affects-sex-ratios-at-subnational-level/">How migration affects sex ratios at subnational level</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/reproductive-burden-and-womens-employment-in-india/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chhavi Tiwari]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2023 09:09:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Education, work, economy (socio-economic differences)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gender issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8217</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Low and declining female labour force participation in India has been a puzzle and a key policy question in the recent past. Chhavi Tiwari and Srinivas Goli argue that it ... <a title="Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/reproductive-burden-and-womens-employment-in-india/" aria-label="Read more about Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/reproductive-burden-and-womens-employment-in-india/">Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Low and declining female labour force participation in India has been a puzzle and a key policy question in the recent past. Chhavi Tiwari and Srinivas Goli argue that it depends on a particularly strong motherhood penalty. India needs more effective work</em>&#8211;<em>family reconciliation policies if female economic activity is to be sustained.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">India’s female labour-force participation (FLFP) is low and has declined over time. It was just 20% in 2019, down from 25% in 2011 and 32% in 2005 (ILO, 2022). This has negative consequences both at the individual level (e.g., for women’s autonomy and households’ wellbeing) and at the macro level, as it slows down economic growth and cancels out the potential advantages of India’s current favourable age structure (the demographic “window of opportunity”; James &amp; Goli, 2016; Goli et al., 2021).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lack of appropriate data has made it difficult for researchers to understand the complex dynamics of the labour market, and to solve the puzzle of the low and declining female participation. In a recent article (Tiwari, Goli and Rammohan 2022), we used a panel dataset covering seven years to better investigate the issue. We focused, in particular, on the number of children “at home”, aged 0-14 years, because caring responsibilities tend to fall disproportionately on women, in India as elsewhere (Francavilla and Giannelli, 2011).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>How do children influence women’s labour force participation?&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">FLFP in India has traditionally been higher among the poor, because women work out of necessity to contribute to household income. Things may be changing, however, as FLFP did not increase in this group between 2004–05 and 2011–12 (Figure 1). Conversely, it increased among non-poor women by 8%, reaching 28.1% in 2011–12. Across fertility levels, FLFP increased among childless women especially, from 19.6% to 35.5%, but much less among women with three or more children.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8222" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Children’s influence on FLFP can be better understood by relating women’s transition into and out of the labour market to their fertility transition. Having, and remaining at, a small number of children leads to greater labour market participation, as shown in Figure 1, with more women entering than leaving the labour market, both among the poor and the non-poor (Figure 2).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="532" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between-1024x532.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8223" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between-1024x532.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between-300x156.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between-768x399.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In our scientific article (Tiwari, Goli and Rammohan 2022), we estimated the net effect of the reproductive burden on labour market participation. Each (subsequent) child reduces the probability of working, but the effect is strongest for high parities, from the third child onwards. Note that this is not merely an association: there seems to be a truly causal effect of reproductive burden on labour market outcomes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the same analysis, we also found that living in larger household positively affects labour market participation among women with a large progeny, because other family members (especially elder women) can take care of young children. We also found that the motherhood penalty is highest for women belonging to Scheduled Castes / Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) and for women with no formal education.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In India, women’s entry into, or exit from, the labor market is sensitive to changes in the number of their offspring, which suggests the need for stronger work-family reconciliation policies. India’s 2017 Maternity (Amendment) Bill tried to address this problem, by increasing the length of paid maternity leave for working women from 12 weeks to 26 weeks. However, its effects are limited, because this provision only covers mothers who work in the formal labour market, while approximately 84% of the female labour force is in the informal sector, with no access to maternity leave provisions (Williams, 2017).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Several policies to sustain and improve women’s labour supply and reduce the motherhood penalty, are already in place. These include the <em>Anganwadi </em>set up under the<em> Integrated Child Development Services programme</em> launched in 1975, that provide free services such as basic health care and pre-school activities for children in rural areas (Maity, 2006). Such initiatives need to be expanded and extended to urban areas, where declining labor supply has been a concern among economists.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The question of paternity leaves must also be addressed, to promote gender balance in childcare responsibility. In short, India needs stronger and better “work-family” policies, to enable women to reconcile the tension between maternity/childcare and employment.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Foot note</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><sup>1</sup>These are people who live in “absolute poverty” (below the so-called Tendulkar poverty line), which is based on (purchasing-power-adjusted) monthly per-capita consumption expenditure, and varies across states (Desai et al., 2010).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Desai, S. B., Dubey, A., Joshi, B. L., Sen, M., Shariff, A., &amp; Vanneman, R. (2010). Human development in India. New York: Oxford University.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Francavilla, F., &amp; Giannelli, G. C. (2011). Does family planning help the employment of women? The case of India. Journal of Asian Economics, 22(5), 412–426.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Goli, S., James, K. S., Singh, D., Srinivasan, V., Mishra, R., Rana, M. J., &amp; Reddy, U. S. (2021). Economic returns of family planning and fertility decline in India, 1991–2061. Journal of Demographic Economics, 1–33. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2021.3" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2021.3</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT database. Data as of June 2022. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=IN%20" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=IN</a>&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">James, K. S., &amp; Goli, S. (2016). Demographic changes in India: Is the country prepared for the challenge.&nbsp;Brown J. World Aff.,&nbsp;23, 169.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Maity, B. (2016). Interstate Differences in the Performance of&#8221; Anganwadi&#8221; Centres under ICDS.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tiwari, C., Goli, S., &amp; Rammohan, A. (2022). Reproductive burden and its impact on female labor market outcomes in India: Evidence from longitudinal analyses.&nbsp;Population Research and Policy Review, 1–37. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-022-09730-6" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-022-09730-6</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Williams, C. C. (2017). Reclassifying economies by the degree and intensity of informalization: The implications for India. In&nbsp;Critical perspectives on work and employment in globalizing India&nbsp;(pp. 113–129). Springer, Singapore.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/reproductive-burden-and-womens-employment-in-india/">Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas Goli]]></dc:creator>
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