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	<title>Jolene Tan, Author at N-IUSSP</title>
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	<link>https://www.niussp.org/author/tan/</link>
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	<title>Jolene Tan, Author at N-IUSSP</title>
	<link>https://www.niussp.org/author/tan/</link>
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		<title>More equitable sharing of housework facilitates childbearing among dual-income couples</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/more-equitable-sharing-of-housework-facilitates-childbearing-among-dual-income-couples/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jolene Tan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Oct 2022 08:34:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[childbearing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Couples]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Household]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[taiwan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8013</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As female labour force participation continues to rise in Taiwan, more women are faced with the dual burden of employment and household responsibilities. Jolene Tan highlights the impact of a ... <a title="More equitable sharing of housework facilitates childbearing among dual-income couples" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/more-equitable-sharing-of-housework-facilitates-childbearing-among-dual-income-couples/" aria-label="Read more about More equitable sharing of housework facilitates childbearing among dual-income couples">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/more-equitable-sharing-of-housework-facilitates-childbearing-among-dual-income-couples/">More equitable sharing of housework facilitates childbearing among dual-income couples</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>As female labour force participation continues to rise in Taiwan, more women are faced with the dual burden of employment and household responsibilities. Jolene Tan highlights the impact of a more equal division of labour on childbearing, as egalitarian couples are more likely to give birth than inegalitarian couples.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">In most societies, women typically spend more time on domestic labour than men. Consequently, women bear the greater burden of balancing work and family duties as they become more engaged in paid employment. This conflict between work and family may increase their stress and decrease their desire for having children, resulting in lower overall fertility rates.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Declining fertility and increasing female labour force participation in Taiwan</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Taiwan, with the increase in female labour force participation rates over the last two decades, fertility rates have declined (Figure 1). These trends reflect the first stage of the gender revolution in which progress in female education and employment outpaces progress in gender equity within households (Goldscheider, Bernhard &amp; Lappegård 2015). This dual burden of paid labour and household responsibilities for women leads to lower fertility. Conversely, the second stage of the gender revolution, when the male contribution to domestic chores increases, easing the burden on women, can go hand in hand with a somewhat higher fertility rate.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-TFR-and-female-labour-force-participation-rates-FLFPR-in-Taiwan-2000–2020-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-TFR-and-female-labour-force-participation-rates-FLFPR-in-Taiwan-2000–2020--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8016" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-TFR-and-female-labour-force-participation-rates-FLFPR-in-Taiwan-2000–2020--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-TFR-and-female-labour-force-participation-rates-FLFPR-in-Taiwan-2000–2020--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-TFR-and-female-labour-force-participation-rates-FLFPR-in-Taiwan-2000–2020--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-TFR-and-female-labour-force-participation-rates-FLFPR-in-Taiwan-2000–2020-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>More dual-earner than sole-earner families</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent study (Tan 2022), I investigated the impact of different configurations of paid and unpaid labour among couples on childbearing outcomes. I used data on 1,969 heterosexual, married or cohabiting couples with an average age of 31.1 years for female partners and 33.8 years for male partners at baseline. About 32% of the couples had no children when first observed, and 68% had children. The analysis controls for child parity and examines parity progression between observations. Given that the data come from a panel study (2003-2012), attrition may be an issue, as couples who dropped out of the study (488 couples) may have different characteristics from those who remained (1,969 couples). Indeed, the couples who dropped out are more likely to be younger, childless, dual earners with an equal division of labour, co-residing with their parents, not employing any domestic help, and residing in metropolitan areas. Given the association between the propensity of nonresponse and the observed data, full information maximum likelihood estimation was applied to account for the attrition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To provide an overview of the gendered landscape in Taiwan, let us first look at the range of labour arrangements that couples might deploy. Four indicators measuring couples’ employment status, proportion of income, proportion of time spent on paid work, and proportion of time spent on housework are jointly used to capture the division of labour within couples. The use of proportional contribution of labour demonstrates how much an individual contributes to paid and unpaid work relative to their partner.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For example, consider two dual-earner couples reporting similar paid work arrangements and relative income contributions. One reports that the male partner does not contribute to household chores, whereas the other reports that both partners contribute equally. The first case would indicate a more traditional division of domestic labour, and the second a more egalitarian arrangement. This example illustrates how different configurations of paid and unpaid labour among couples can provide important information on the varying degrees of gender equality within each couple. In another example, consider two dual-earner couples with an unequal division of domestic labour, where the female partner takes on a larger proportion of housework. One of them reports that the female partner contributes the larger share of household income, while the other reports that the female partner contributes only a small fraction of household income. In this instance, the female partner in the first case would likely have greater bargaining power to negotiate better sharing of domestic labour than the female partner in the second case.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Between 2003 and 2012, based on the nationally representative longitudinal survey, four main division of labour arrangements can be identified (Figure 2):</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1) traditional male breadwinner (30.3%),&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2) inegalitarian dual-earners (31.1%),&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">3) egalitarian dual-earners (32.2%), and&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">4) female breadwinner (6.4%).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is a higher proportion of dual-earner than sole-earner families in Taiwan, with roughly equal proportions of dual-earner couples adopting egalitarian or inegalitarian arrangements.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-2_Types-of-division-of-labour-arrangements-among-couples-in-Taiwan-2003–2012-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="554" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-2_Types-of-division-of-labour-arrangements-among-couples-in-Taiwan-2003–2012--1024x554.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8054" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-2_Types-of-division-of-labour-arrangements-among-couples-in-Taiwan-2003–2012--1024x554.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-2_Types-of-division-of-labour-arrangements-among-couples-in-Taiwan-2003–2012--300x162.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-2_Types-of-division-of-labour-arrangements-among-couples-in-Taiwan-2003–2012--768x415.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-2_Types-of-division-of-labour-arrangements-among-couples-in-Taiwan-2003–2012-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Division of labour arrangements and fertility</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As each couple-wave observation is assigned a division of labour type based on the highest probability of group membership, the labour division variable is time-varying. Tracking the same couples over time, I examined the association between the different division of labour arrangements and the likelihood of giving birth by the next observation, adjusting for all other covariates. The one-year lag between couples’ division of labour and the birth of a child allows for an examination of the influence of labour division on fertility.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the years 2003–2012, compared to couples who adopt the traditional male breadwinner arrangement, the odds of having a child are reduced by 28% for egalitarian dual-earner couples, 31% for inegalitarian dual-earner couples, and 47% for female-breadwinner couples. As the one-year lag between labour division and fertility may not be long enough for fertility to adapt, a two-year lag was also tested, leading basically to the same results (Figure 3). In the two-year lag model, the odds are reduced by 30%, 56% and 63%, respectively.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In short, among dual-earner couples, those with a more egalitarian division of labour are more likely to give birth compared to couples with a less egalitarian arrangement. The female breadwinner arrangement results in the lowest likelihood of childbearing. In fact, the fertility of full-time working women is probably even lower than it seems here, where I focused on couples, and on lasting ones on top of that. If women who are financially independent are less willing than others to form a partnership, or to remain partnered, they are not well represented in this panel, and their fertility is presumably very low, if not zero.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-3.-Odds-of-giving-birth-by-division-of-labour-2003–2012-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-3.-Odds-of-giving-birth-by-division-of-labour-2003–2012--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8019" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-3.-Odds-of-giving-birth-by-division-of-labour-2003–2012--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-3.-Odds-of-giving-birth-by-division-of-labour-2003–2012--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-3.-Odds-of-giving-birth-by-division-of-labour-2003–2012--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Figure-3.-Odds-of-giving-birth-by-division-of-labour-2003–2012-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Making a case for the second gender revolution</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While the male breadwinner arrangement leads to the highest likelihood of childbearing, it is important to improve gender equity in household responsibilities as the percentage of dual-earner families continues to rise. Taiwan has made great strides towards the first half of the gender revolution by welcoming women into the workplace, but it is now important to complete the second half of the revolution, improving women’s position in both the private and public spheres. More significant household contributions by men will not only alleviate women’s dual burden, they can also foster greater connection to the family and facilitate childbearing.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Goldscheider, F., Bernhardt, E., &amp; Lappegård, T. (2015). The Gender Revolution: A Framework for Understanding Changing Family and Demographic Behavior. <em>Population and Development Review</em> 41 (2): 207–239. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00045.x. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tan, J. (2022). Couples’ Division of Labour in Taiwan. <em>Chinese Sociological Review. </em>doi:10.1080/21620555.2022.2084066.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/more-equitable-sharing-of-housework-facilitates-childbearing-among-dual-income-couples/">More equitable sharing of housework facilitates childbearing among dual-income couples</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Fewer and later births in South Korea, especially among more educated women</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/fewer-and-later-births-in-south-korea-especially-among-more-educated-women/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jolene Tan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Sep 2022 07:02:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fertility decline]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fertility rate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[population]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=7914</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>With a total fertility rate of 0.81 in 2021, South Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world. Within a generally declining trend, and very low levels globally, Jolene ... <a title="Fewer and later births in South Korea, especially among more educated women" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/fewer-and-later-births-in-south-korea-especially-among-more-educated-women/" aria-label="Read more about Fewer and later births in South Korea, especially among more educated women">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/fewer-and-later-births-in-south-korea-especially-among-more-educated-women/">Fewer and later births in South Korea, especially among more educated women</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>With a total fertility rate of 0.81 in 2021, South Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world. Within a generally declining trend, and very low levels globally,</em> <em>Jolene Tan finds that patterns in the timing of childbearing and the number of children in this country depend strongly on women’s educational level. The implications may be unfavourable.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">South Korea ranks amongst the highest-achieving OECD member countries for women’s education: 76% of women between 25 and 34 years of age had a tertiary qualification in 2020, in comparison with just 64% among men (OECD 2022). This rate is higher than the average for OECD countries, where the proportions are 52% and 39%, respectively. The significantly higher educational level of women in South Korea has important implications for the demography of the country, as higher educational achievement is usually associated with lower fertility (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008).&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Fertility transition and educational expansion in South Korea</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the 1960s, the South Korean government launched programmes to curb fertility, encouraging the use of contraceptives and promoting a two-child norm. Consequently, South Korea’s total fertility rate declined rapidly between 1960 and 1985, from 6.1 to 1.7 children per woman. Meanwhile, compulsory primary education was established and the expansion of higher education gained pace in the early 1980s.&nbsp;<br>Figure 1 shows the evolution of education and fertility trends over the past 20 years, with the former increasing and the latter declining over time.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-and-proportion-of-women-aged-25–34-with-tertiary-education-2000–2020-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="585" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-and-proportion-of-women-aged-25–34-with-tertiary-education-2000–2020--1024x585.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7916" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-and-proportion-of-women-aged-25–34-with-tertiary-education-2000–2020--1024x585.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-and-proportion-of-women-aged-25–34-with-tertiary-education-2000–2020--300x172.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-and-proportion-of-women-aged-25–34-with-tertiary-education-2000–2020--768x439.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-1.-Total-fertility-rates-and-proportion-of-women-aged-25–34-with-tertiary-education-2000–2020-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Decline in fertility across birth cohorts</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nationally representative longitudinal data show that South Korean women in more recent birth cohorts are having fewer and later births. Focusing on first births (Figure 2), let us compare women born between 1960 and 1964 with those born 20 years later, between 1980 and 1984. Half of the former had their first child by 26 years of age, while among the latter group, this median age rises to 29 years. By age 38, 95% of the former had had at least one child, compared with only 68% of the latter.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-2.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="585" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-2.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort--1024x585.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7917" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-2.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort--1024x585.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-2.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort--300x172.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-2.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort--768x439.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-2.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Women with higher education are having fewer children and delaying childbirth</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Beyond declines in cohort fertility, there are also marked fertility differentials by education, as better-educated women tend to delay their first birth and have fewer children (Figure 3; Tan 2022). This is not surprising, as women with lower educational levels leave school and start family formation at an earlier stage. Education also improves women’s employment opportunities and potential income, and the increasing opportunity costs of child raising induce them to delay or reduce childbearing. Furthermore, highly educated women may prioritise individual aspirations and self-actualisation over having children. Consequently, South Korea’s low fertility rate may decrease further as women’s educational levels rise.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-3.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-education-level-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="585" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-3.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-education-level--1024x585.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7918" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-3.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-education-level--1024x585.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-3.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-education-level--300x172.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-3.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-education-level--768x439.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-3.-Predicted-cumulative-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-education-level-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Persistent and widening educational differentials in fertility</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Combining these trends, an increasing fertility gap by educational level emerges among women in the most recent birth cohorts (Figure 4). Note, however, that women with lower educational levels were once the majority, but they are increasingly becoming a minority among recent generations, and Figure 4 does not account for this structural shift in educational composition. After an initial fertility convergence, for the 1965–1969 and 1970–1974 birth cohorts, education–fertility differentials then become more pronounced. This emerging fertility divergence for younger women alerts us to prominent fertility disparities that may affect social stratification and reproduction.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-4.-Predicted-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort-and-education-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-3" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="585" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-4.-Predicted-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort-and-education--1024x585.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7919" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-4.-Predicted-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort-and-education--1024x585.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-4.-Predicted-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort-and-education--300x172.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-4.-Predicted-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort-and-education--768x439.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Figure-4.-Predicted-probabilities-of-the-transition-to-first-birth-by-birth-cohort-and-education-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Potential implications of fertility bifurcation</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Larger families have historically been associated with lower child education (Knodel et al. 1990). Better-educated women with low fertility rates can arguably invest more in their children’s education and provide them with additional resources to achieve higher educational and labour market outcomes. In contrast, less-educated women with more children may face greater resource constraints that may affect their children’s educational attainment and futures. This is the case in South Korea, where over 75% of middle- and high-school students receive private supplementary tutoring in addition to the regular school curriculum, and most of this additional educational spending is borne by parents (Anderson and Kohler 2013). Accordingly, South Korea’s distinctive education–fertility patterns may reinforce inequalities and aggravate the stratification process (Park 2007).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The future of fertility</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A moderate stratification in fertility rates may leave some room for advancement for those born in lower socio-economic strata. The gap may narrow as less advantaged groups adopt the behaviour of their more advantaged counterparts and eventually catch up. The government can facilitate narrowing of disparities by ensuring that children have sufficient resources, particularly in terms of education access and quality. Moreover, fertility differentials are not the only concern. Global fertility levels are also important, as they should not diverge too much from the replacement target of two children per woman. As more women are able to attain higher educational levels, fertility delay and childlessness may become more common. If education (and, arguably, the ensuing labour market competition) is indeed an obstacle to childbearing, the future of fertility may rest upon the continuation and support of policies to facilitate younger generations in establishing families and realising their ideal family size.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Anderson, Thomas, and Hans-Peter Kohler. 2013. ‘Education Fever and the East Asian Fertility Puzzle: A Case Study of Low Fertility in South Korea’. <em>Asian Population Studies</em> 9, no. 2: 196–215. doi:10.1080/17441730.2013.797293.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Knodel, John, Napaporn Havanon and Werasit Sittitrai. 1990. ‘Family Size and the Education of Children in the Context of Rapid Fertility Decline’. <em>Population and Development Review</em> 16, no. 1: 31–62. doi:10.2307/1972528.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kravdal, Øystein, and Ronald R. Rindfuss. 2008. ‘Changing Relationships Between Education and Fertility: A Study of Women and Men Born 1940 to 1964’. <em>American Sociological Review</em> 73, no. 5: 854–73. doi:10.1177/000312240807300508.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2022. ‘<a href="https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/population-with-tertiary-education.htm" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Population with Tertiary Education’</a>. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Park, Hyunjoon. 2007. ‘Inequality of Educational Opportunity in Korea by Gender, Socio-economic Background, and Family Structure’. <em>The International Journal of Human Rights</em> 11, no. 1–2: 179–97. doi:10.1080/13642980601176324.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Statistics Korea. 2022. <a href="http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/10/index.board" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">‘Birth and Death’</a>. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tan, Jolene. 2022. ‘Educational differentials on the transition to first birth in South Korea’. <em>Social Science Research</em> 105: 102728–102728. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2022.102728</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/fewer-and-later-births-in-south-korea-especially-among-more-educated-women/">Fewer and later births in South Korea, especially among more educated women</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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