Living arrangements can reveal much about a society, as they both reflect and determine wider societal trends. Throughout modern history, two broad forces have restructured the population composition of living arrangements: demographic change, which determines who is alive at the same time to potentially live with; and social change, which encompasses cultural, political and macroeconomic forces that shape preferences and needs for living apart or together.

Expected years of life by living arrangements is a useful measure for summarising historical change. Based on life expectancy at birth, it indicates the number of years a fictitious cohort would live if they experienced the same mortality and the same living arrangement profiles as those prevalent in the population in a given year. It provides a means to capture change over time and break it down into the contribution of different age groups. In our recent study (Floridi & Esteve, 2026), we summarise life expectancy at birth by living arrangement over 170 years with available census and register data (1850–2021) and complement this by looking at changes across cohorts of people born in the same decade. We focus on the United States, a country that has seen a doubling of life expectancy at birth since 1850 while undergoing radical economic, policy, and cultural shifts.

Three historical ages of living arrangements

Figure 1 shows life expectancy at birth for available census or population survey years between 1850 and 2021. Expected years of life are distributed across three broad categories and seven sub-categories: living alone (alone); living with primary kin (couple only, two-parent, and single-parent households); and living in an extended household (kin only, mixed, or nonkin only).

Based on this cross-sectional look and complementary analyses, we identify three historical ages of living arrangements in the United States.

The first is a large household system (1850–1940). During this phase, years spent living alone represent a negligible share of population life years, which are evenly split between primary kin and extended households. Primary kin living absorbs most of the increases in life expectancy over the period, which are largely attributable to improved infant survival. Years spent in extended households look stable over the period, but this masks substantial heterogeneity: extended kin households continue to expand until 1940, while mixed households (kin and nonkin) fall as a result of the decline in live-in servitude and lodgers. During this phase, household types where children are born into primary kin and extended kin households grow in line with life expectancy, with mortality decline among infants and children being the main driver of changes in living arrangements.

A second age of primary kin dominance follows (1940–1980). Living alone rises quickly, especially among older females, which can be attributed to women’s survival after adult children’s exit from the household and the death of a male partner. Years spent with primary kin increase faster than life expectancy, and for all age groups. Meanwhile, extended kin-only households decline for the first time. This period is marked by rapid social change, as all age groups shift from extended to primary-kin (or solo-living) arrangements, with changes outpacing mortality decline. It is interesting to note that while this represents a brief phase of rapid social change during the post-war period, it has led to so-called “nuclear” households being widely regarded as traditional and normative in the United States (Nicholson, 2016). 

1980 ushers in a new ongoing phase of diversification. We observe increases in living alone among younger age groups and males, with a stabilisation (and slight decline) in living alone for older females. Within the primary kin category, two-parent households with children decline in prevalence, while the share of couples without children, and single-parent households increases. Living in extended families returns to 1940s levels, with the rise concentrated among children and young adults. This has been attributed to racial/ethnic diversification of the population (Pilkauskas et al., 2020) and to economic constraints on economic independence (Ruggles, 2007). Again, it is worth emphasising that extended family households are common throughout the observation period, except for the relatively brief era of primary kin dominance.

Change across cohorts and future prospects

To complement our cross-sectional analysis, we select cohorts born in 1860–69, 1900–09, and 1940–49, and plot their living arrangements by age in Figure 2. 

The 1860s cohort is emblematic of the diversity in living arrangements that characterised the second part of the 19^th century. In the later cohorts, we observe a sharp decline in extended households, through the near disappearance of mixed households and the decline in extended family arrangements that characterised the early and mid-20^th century. The 1900s cohort (aged around 40 in 1940) displays the initial shift towards primary kin living, and a marked increase in living alone at older ages, especially among women, due to high male mortality in this cohort. The 1940s cohort reached age 20 during the “baby boom” of the 1960s. Life courses in this cohort are structured around primary kin living: most individuals go from living as a child with two parents (until age 20), to living as a parent with children (ages 20–45), followed by couple-only arrangements once children move out (45 onwards). Again, women are more likely to spend their older ages living alone than men, due to differential survival.

We cannot provide a picture for the birth cohorts who have not yet reached later life. However, our period analyses (Figure 1) suggest that things will look different for those born in the 1960s, 1980s, and beyond. As the United States enters a diversified era of living arrangements, successive cohorts will experience more years spent living alone and in extended arrangements, including with nonkin. Within primary kin households, couples without children will rise in prevalence and may become the dominant category, while single parenthood rates will also increase. More recent birth cohorts are thus likely to experience the decline in two-parent households that have misguidedly been represented as the historical norm in the United States.  

References

Floridi, G., & Esteve, A. (2026). 170 years of change in living arrangements in the United States using expected years of life: A research note. Demography. https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-12546633 

Nicholson, L. (1997). The myth of the traditional family. In Lindemann, H. Feminism and families (pp. 27-41). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203760413 

Pilkauskas, N. V., Amorim, M., & Dunifon, R. E. (2020). Historical trends in children living in multigenerational households in the United States: 1870–2018. Demography, 57, 2269–2296. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-020-00920-5 

Ruggles, S. (2007). The decline of intergenerational coresidence in the United States, 1850 to 2000. American Sociological Review, 72, 964–989. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240707200606 

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In parts of Asia, and especially Africa, the population is still growing rapidly – it is projected to rise from 1.4 billion today to 3.4 billion in 2100 according to UN’s latest World Population Prospects – and fertility remains high, at 4.1 births per woman (4.3 in sub-Saharan Africa).

Undernourishment has increased globally according to FAO and the State of Food Security and Nutrition. In Africa, for instance, 298 million people were undernourished in 2023, and 847 million were food insecure. Rapid population growth contributes to poverty, climate change and poor health services.

The perils of population growth

Rising global and African populations, and increasing per capita consumption in high- and middle-income countries, are major threats to food production, ecosystem functions and biodiversity (Dasgupta & Dasgupta 2024). In IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report in 2022, the two strongest identified drivers of CO₂ emissions were economic growth (GDP per capita) and population increase. Consumption in rich countries must decrease, and countries with high birth rates need to reduce their fertility.

Contraception, family planning programs, and social norms

From about 1960, global population growth and poverty motivated many family planning (FP) programs that improved life for women and children, helping to raise contraceptive use from 10 to 60 percent and reduce fertility from about 6 to 3 births per woman (Cleland et al. 2006, World Bank 2007, TOP 2024). Recent evidence from Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia and Rwanda show that these countries successfully increased family planning coverage between 1950 and 2023 (Hellwig et al. 2024). In short, excepting cases where violation of human rights occurred, such as China’s earlier one-child policy (started in 1979), India’s vasectomy campaign of 1975-76, and Peru’s sterilizations in 1996-97, such programs have a history of success.  

FP programs have played an important role in reducing fertility rates in developing countries (Figure 1), and they are still needed today, in Africa and some other regions.

In sub-Saharan Africa, contraceptive use has increased where longer education is combined with FP programs (Bongaarts & Hardee 2019, see Figure 2), two factors that are also major determinants of fertility decline (Bongaarts 2020).

Contraceptive use and family size also depend on culture, and what others are doing (Dasgupta & Dasgupta 2024). Africa seems partly trapped in unfortunate social norms of high fertility,and efforts to lower these norms are essential for reducing unsustainably high population growth. Policies should consider people’s overall situation, not only human rights, but also human responsibilities.

The UN reported that unmet female need for FP was as high as 37% in sub-Saharan Africa in 2022. A UN/UNFPA Summit in Nairobi 2019 celebrated 25 years since Cairo with a laudable goal of no unmet need for FP. Yet, review and revision of the Cairo program is needed, given the high fertility and population growth in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions.

Family planning programs can improve maternal health and reduce unintended pregnancies. FP services should promote longer female education, school teaching of safe contraceptive use, easy access to free contraceptives, and information about the need to slow population growth. Social legitimation of contraception lets individuals re-assess how many children they want. Improved status and empowerment of women as well as FP education of men are also crucial.

Smaller families improve living conditions and may also produce economic benefits at country level. According to government reports, FP programs are strongly needed in Africa. In 2015, 42 of 54 African nations reported to the UN a policy of “lower population growth”, and in 2017, 45 of these 54 nations reported the need for a “lower fertility level”, important information that was omitted in UNFPA (2023).

The role of the United Nation’s Population Fund

In a recent publication (Götmark et al. 2026) we evaluated the policy of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Since 1973, UNFPA has been mandated to promote awareness of population problems and to devise strategies to deal with them. But according to its current website, the goal since the 1994 UN population conference in Cairo has been to “ensure reproductive rights for all”. Its Executive Director regards concerns about population growth as “population alarmism” and has criticized focus on numbers (The Guardian, 18 October, 2022).

After the Cairo conference, FP programs were largely replaced by a focus on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), with reduced financial and other support for FP. With the exception of the FP2020 (now FP2030), supported by the Gates Foundation and partners, concerns about population growth waned. The Cairo program of action emphasized the rights of people “to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning”, and the need for countries to “contribute to the stabilization of the world population”. Yet, 10 years after Cairo, the global population had increased by almost one billion.

Current concerns about low fertility overshadow the worrying prospect of a 2 billion population increase by the end of this century, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite much scientific evidence (e.g., Cleland et al. 2006, World Bank 2007, Hellwig et al. 2024), UNFPA underrates the negative human effects of continued rapid population growth and the need for FP programs. In its State of the World Report (UNFPA 2023) it says that “population sizes are neither good nor bad”, which is of little help to policymakers. According to Bajaj et al. (2024), UNFPA’s “extreme reluctance to address the population factor has resulted in messaging that excludes the impact of demographic realities on women, girls, ecosystems and vulnerable human communities”. Such policy contrasts with insightful evaluation of population growth and FP by the UN in World Population Prospects 2024 (see, e.g. Summary in ch. IV).

According to its website, UNFPA is the world’s largest public-sector procurer of contraceptives. With insightful UNFPA leadership, SRHR and improved contraceptive use should be an integral part of complete FP programs where the positive humanitarian roles of fertility decline and population stabilization in Africa and elsewhere are emphasized. Strong commitment by political leaders is essential, and outreach and communication through the media can improve FP programs. Policies should also highlight the environmental benefits: saving more forests, savannahs, freshwater habitats and the Earth’s last populations of mega-fauna, which still remain viable in some African and other countries.

For many years, the United States were a major supporter of family planning. Unfortunately, many health programs supported by USAID were ended by President Trump in 2025, and their closure has also reduced FP services. African commentators point to opportunities for countries to reconsider aid programs, increase self-reliance, and reduce dependency on uncertain foreign donors. But international aid has, for instance, helped lower adolescent fertility rates in low-income countries, and it is still much needed. 

Conclusions

Voluntary family planning programs help increase contraceptive use, slow population growth, promote economic development and improve the lives of children, women and men, thereby facilitating several of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. The leadership of UNFPA should therefore emphasize and support FP programs and return to its historic mandate of improving human welfare through slower population growth. This is especially important for countries in Africa and elsewhere that are seeking to invest in such programs.

References

Bajaj, N., Crist, E. & Stade, K. (2024). Confronting the United Nations pro-growth agenda: A call to reverse overshoot. The Journal of Population and Sustainability 8, 15-44.

Bongaarts, J. (2020). Trends in fertility and fertility preferences in sub-Saharan Africa: the roles of education and family planning programs. Genus 76, 32.

Bongaarts, J. & Hardee, K. (2019). Trends in Contraceptive Prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Roles of Family Planning Programs and Education. African Journal of Reproductive Health 23, 96-105.

Cleland, J., Bernstein, S., Ezeh, A. et al (2006). Family planning: the unfinished agenda. Lancet, 368, 1810-27.

Dasgupta, A. & Dasgupta, P. (2024). Human population and the biosphere. Population and Development Review 51, 41-61.

Götmark F, AjaeroC, IslamMM, MundiR, Ugwu NH & Andersson M (2026). Downplaying reality: Is the UN Population Fund forgetting population growth and family planning? Reproductive Health, 23, 77.

Hellwig F, Moreira LR, Silviera, MF, et al. (2024) Impacts of policies for expanding family planning coverage: lessons from five successful countries. Front. Public Health 12, 1339725.

The World Bank (2007). The Global Family Planning Revolution (pdf). Robinson WC, Ross JA., Eds. Washington D.C.

TOP, The Overpopulation Project (2024). Responsible parenthood, family planning, and the United Nations. An interview with Carl Wahren – pioneer of family planning (video). Film, 2024.

UNFPA, State of the World Report 2023.

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In a 2025 N-IUSSP article, I showed that working mothers in Belgium who use formal childcare for their first child are more likely to have a second. While part of this link reflected differences in who manages to secure a childcare place, the experience of using childcare itself seemed to matter: it presumably helps mothers reconcile work and family life and makes the prospect of another child more manageable. But Belgium is just one case, and a relatively supportive one when it comes to childcare provision. This raises an important question: does the same relationship hold across Europe? Or does the link between childcare use and continued childbearing depend on national context?

In a new study (Wood 2025), I examine this question using comparable survey data from ten European countries. The results show that the answer is far from uniform. In some countries, using formal childcare is associated with a higher likelihood of having another child. In others, the association is negative. This cross-national variation suggests that formal childcare uptake can support continued fertility, but only under certain conditions.

Why childcare use might matter for fertility

Formal childcare is often seen as a key policy lever because it helps parents, especially mothers, remain in paid work by reducing the time and energy required for caregiving. At the macro level, countries with more extensive childcare systems tend to have higher fertility, yet research has repeatedly shown that the direct impact of family policies on birth rates is often modest, particularly in low-fertility settings. As Gauthier and Gietel-Basten (2025) state, this implies that explicitly pronatalist policies can easily become “hostages to fortune” if evaluated solely on their ability to raise birth rates. 

To date, little is known about whether individual parents who actually use formal childcare are more likely to have another child (Wood, 2025; Neyer and Andersson, 2008). The study presented here does not focus on explaining aggregate fertility trends, but on the possible individual-level life course link between formal childcare uptake and continued childbearing, to better understand how work, family, and policy interact in parents’ everyday lives.

From a life-course perspective, there are good reasons to expect such a link. Parents who have already used formal childcare may anticipate lower opportunity costs of another birth, feel less dependent on informal care, and experience less stress in combining work and family life. Using childcare may also shift norms, making the dual-earner, two-child family model feel more achievable. At the same time, childcare users are a selective group. They tend to be more educated, more strongly attached to the labour market, and more economically secure, and these are factors that also influence fertility decisions.

Studying ten countries with comparable data

To move beyond single-country studies, I used data from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), a large cross-national panel survey. The analysis covers ten European countries: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia.

I focused on working parents with at least one child and examined whether those who used formal childcare were more or less likely to have another child in the following years. To account for the fact that childcare users differ systematically from non-users, I combined propensity score matching with hazard models, allowing a more credible comparison between similar parents who did and did not use childcare. It should be noted that, in such a selection-on-observables strategy, remaining bias in the estimates might occur due to the omission of confounders form the matching criteria (Kreyenfeld, 2021).

Positive links in some countries, negative in others

The main finding is clear: the association between childcare use and subsequent childbearing varies strongly across countries. In five countries (France, Germany, Russia, Lithuania, and Hungary) formal childcare use among working parents is associated with a higher likelihood of having another child (Figure 1). These are also countries where childcare use is relatively common in the GGS data, suggesting that childcare is more accessible, socially accepted, or easier to integrate into everyday life. 

In contrast, Georgia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and Austria show predominantly negative associations (Figure 2). In these contexts, parents who use formal childcare are less likely to have another child than similar parents who do not. 

One potential explanation for such cross-national variation lies in how widespread and normalized formal childcare is. In contexts where many working parents use childcare, doing so may reduce stress, reinforce norms of work–family compatibility, and create a supportive environment for having another child. In such settings, childcare use may genuinely ease the path to continued childbearing. In countries where formal childcare is less common, using it may be more strongly associated with career-oriented parents who prioritize employment continuity. For these parents, childcare might facilitate deeper labour market attachment, which could in turn make additional childbearing more difficult later on. In such cases, a potential positive effect of childcare may be offset, or even reversed, by career dynamics.

Looking ahead

The results suggest that childcare policies matter not only in terms of availability, but also in how they shape parents’ everyday experiences. We speculate that if childcare is affordable, flexible, high-quality, and widely used, it can help parents feel that work and family life are compatible, and support continued childbearing. The same policy instrument may not have the same effect, however, if access is limited, socially contested, or tied to demanding work trajectories.

This study is one of the first to examine the link between formal childcare use and subsequent childbearing across a diverse set of European countries using comparable data. At the same time, it raises new questions. Future research should explore how specific design features (such as cost, opening hours, quality, and flexibility) shape the fertility effects of childcare uptake at the individual level. More recent data are also needed to assess whether these patterns have changed as childcare systems have continued to expand. What is clear, however, is that formal childcare is not a uniform fertility policy tool. Its effects depend on context, which could point to variation in policy design, norms, and lived experience. 

References

Gauthier AH and Gietel-Basten S. (2025) Family Policies in Low Fertility Countries: Evidence and Reflections. Population and Development Review 51: 125-161.

Kreyenfeld M. (2021) Causal Modelling in Fertility Research: A Review of the Literature and an Application to a Parental Leave Policy Reform. Comparative Population Studies 46.

Neyer G and Andersson G. (2008) Consequences of Family Policies on Childbearing Behavior: Effects or Artifacts? Population and Development Review 34: 699-724.

Wood J. (2025) Does Formal Childcare Uptake Stimulate Fertility? Formal Childcare Usage and Second Births. Population Research and Policy Review 44: 42.

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Marriage is no longer a given

For much of the late 20th century, marriage in South Korea was close to universal and marriage functioned as the unquestioned gateway to family life. Today, that assumption no longer holds.

A growing share of adults remain unmarried well into their 30s and 40s, and the decline shows little sign of reversal. This shift matters because South Korea remains a society in which marriage and childbearing are tightly linked. Fewer than 5% of births occur outside marriage, one of the lowest shares among high-income countries. As marriage recedes, its demographic implications extend far beyond the institution itself.

New demographic evidence tracing first-marriage patterns from 1993 to 2023 shows that Korea is not merely experiencing delayed marriage. Rather, it is undergoing a sustained retreat from marriage as a life-course institution, a transformation that began long before the COVID-19 pandemic and has continued beyond it.

Later marriage or fewer marriages?

At first glance, the decline appears to be driven by postponement. The average age at first marriage has risen sharply: women now marry for the first time at around age 31, up from 25 three decades ago, while men marry at nearly 34, compared with 28 in the early 1990s. From this perspective, marriage seems delayed rather than abandoned (Figure 1).

But focusing on timing alone obscures a deeper shift. When we examine the proportion of adults who would ever marry if current conditions persisted, a far more consequential pattern emerges. In the early 1990s, roughly 95% of Koreans could expect to marry at least once. By the early 2020s, that figure had fallen to around two-thirds for women and even lower for men.

The pandemic shock and its limits

The COVID-19 pandemic delivered a sharp but temporary shock to marriage behavior. First marriages fell abruptly in 2020 and 2021, followed by a modest rebound in 2022 and 2023. This raised the question of whether the pandemic marked a turning point in family formation.

The evidence suggests it did not. The pandemic primarily disrupted the timing of marriage rather than its underlying trajectory. Border closures caused international marriages—disproportionately involving older Korean men—to collapse almost overnight. As a result, the average age at first marriage among men temporarily stopped rising, but when restrictions eased, marriage timing resumed its previous path. 

The rebound did not reverse the long-term decline: instead, the pandemic revealed how fragile marriage has become. When marriage is no longer a default life step, even short-term disruptions can leave visible demographic traces. Similar timing shocks, followed by rapid normalization, were observed in other high-income countries during the pandemic period (Sobotka et al. 2024).

Why men are falling behind

One of the most striking features of Korea’s marriage decline is its growing gender divide. Throughout the past three decades, men have consistently been less likely than women to marry for the first time. Their marriage patterns also fluctuate more sharply from year to year as male marriage is more sensitive to timing shifts, economic uncertainty, and demographic shocks. 

For women, the decline is largely structural. Adjusting for later marriage timing changes little: more women are not marrying at all, rather than simply marrying later. Marriage has lost its near-universal status in the female life course (Figure 2).

This pattern echoes broader trends observed across East Asia, where men’s retreat from marriage has been especially pronounced, and men’s marriage rates have declined more steeply and unevenly than women’s (Raymo et al. 2015; Jones and Gu 2023).

Several forces likely contribute to this divergence. Economic insecurity among young and middle-aged men remains widespread, particularly outside stable employment tracks. High housing costs, long working hours, and persistent expectations surrounding the male breadwinner role further complicate marriage prospects. International marriage once offset some of these pressures, but that channel has largely dried up in recent years.

The result is a marriage landscape in which men’s entry into family life has become increasingly uncertain, while women’s retreat from marriage appears slower but no less enduring. 

Why this matters beyond marriage

The decline of marriage is not merely a cultural shift; it marks a demographic turning point. In South Korea, where childbearing still occurs overwhelmingly within marriage, population policies have often approached low fertility through the lens of marital formation. As marriage becomes less common, the demographic leverage of policies centered on marital formation weakens.

South Korea’s experience also offers lessons beyond its borders. Across East Asia, marriage remains institutionally central yet increasingly difficult to attain. When entry into marriage itself becomes less assured, family formation stalls, not simply through delayed parenthood, but also through a growing absence of children (Raymo et al. 2015).

The distinction between temporary delay and long-term retreat matters. In Korea’s case, the evidence points clearly to the latter. Marriage is no longer a near-universal institution, and the demographic consequences of that shift are already becoming visible.

References 

Jones, G., & Gu, X. (2023). Men’s marriage trends in Asia: Changes and continuities. Journal of Family Issues, 45(5), 1279–1304.

Raymo, J. M., Park, H., Xie, Y., & Yeung, W. J. (2015). Marriage and family in East Asia: Continuity and change. Annual Review of Sociology, 41, 471–492.

Sobotka, T., Zeman, K., Castro, R., & Brzozowska, Z. (2024). Pandemic roller-coaster? Birth trends in higher-income countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Population and Development Review, 50(1), 1–4.

Yoo, S. H. (2026). Tracking the decline of first marriage in South Korea: Timing, quantum decline, and pandemic disruptions. Demographic Research, 54(3), 71–86.

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Demographic changes are reshaping our kinship networks. Falling fertility not only affects the number of children people have, but also the number of siblings, cousins, and grandchildren available to future generations. Furthermore, population aging influences the number of years we share with parents and grandparents, as well as the caring responsibilities that come with them. Lastly, divorce, re-partnering, and subsequent multi-partner fertility introduce new types of kin into our networks, such as half-siblings and step-grandparents.

To gain a better understanding of these changes, it is essential to map kinship networks empirically (see e.g. Jiang 2025). However, data that allow us to do so are scarce. Kolk et al (2023) recently published a study in which they counted how many relatives Swedes have. We replicated their approach work using kinship network data from the Dutch population registers (Bel et al. 2025). In our study, we focus on three birth cohorts to anchor the comparison with Sweden: 1935 to represent the pre-WW2 cohort; 1955 to represent the baby-boom generation born in the years following WW2; and 1985 to represent the generation born after the onset of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT).

Figure 1 shows the number of kin Dutch people have by age. At first glance, this picture is quite similar to the one in Sweden. However, two remarkable differences can be observed: one related to the Dutch baby boom, the other to higher multi-partner fertility in Sweden.

Dutch baby boom

Table 1 shows the number of children, nieces and nephews, siblings, cousins, and aunts and uncles that people have. It presents these counts for individuals born in 1935, 1955, and 1985. The numbers for Sweden are taken from the Swedish study (Kolk et al., 2023), while the figures for the Netherlands are newly calculated. 

Dutch women born in 1935, representing the pre-WW2 cohort, had 2.3 children on average, and 16% had four or more children, compared to 9% in Sweden (not shown in Table 1). Swedish women in the same cohort had 2.0 children on average, or 15% fewer. 

People born in 1955, the baby-boom generation, have 2.7 living siblings and 5.5 living nieces and nephews on average, i.e. 42% more siblings and 34% more nieces and nephews than their Swedish counterparts. Looking at the next generation, born in 1985, allows us to observe what we interpret as a trickle-down effect of the Dutch baby boom: people born in 1985 have 38% more aunts and uncles (5.1) and cousins (11.2) than their Swedish peers.

Multi-partner fertility in Sweden

We also observe a reversal in the average number of siblings between the two countries. Dutch people from the 1955 cohort have 2.7 siblings on average, compared to 1.9 in Sweden, which amounts to a difference of 42%. However, Dutch people born 30 years later, in 1985, have an average of 1.8 siblings, compared to 2.2 in Sweden, which is 18% fewer.

As a result of higher divorce rates in Sweden than in the Netherlands (2.8 vs. 2.0 per 100 persons in 2013; Eurostat, 2024), multi-partner fertility and the presence of half-siblings became increasingly common from the mid-20th century onward (Turunen and Kolk 2017). Consequently, the 1985 Dutch cohort has just 0.1 paternal half-sibling and on average fewer than 0.1 maternal half-siblings, compared to 0.4 paternal and 0.3 maternal half-siblings in Sweden (not shown in Table 1).

Conclusion

Our study shows similarities between Dutch and Swedish kinship networks, but it also highlights two interesting differences. First, our results suggest that the Dutch baby boom has trickled down from one generation to the next, leading to larger numbers of aunts, uncles, and cousins for people born 30 years after the boom. Second, Dutch kinship networks show a lower number of half-siblings compared to Sweden, which can be explained by lower divorce rates in The Netherlands.

References

de Bel, V., Bokányi, E., Hank, K., & Leopold, T. (2025). A parallel kinship universe? A replication of Kolk et al. (2023) with Dutch register data on kinship networks. Demographic Research, 52, 915–938. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2025.52.28

Eurostat. (2024). Divorce indicators. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2908/DEMO_NDIVIND

Jiang, S. (2025) The kinship gap. When just a few years of difference make a difference, N-IUSSP, 17 November. https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/the-kinship-gap-when-just-a-few-years-of-difference-make-a-difference/

Kolk, M., Andersson, L., Pettersson, E., & Drefahl, S. (2023). The Swedish Kinship Universe: A Demographic Account of the Number of Children, Parents, Siblings, Grandchildren, Grandparents, Aunts/Uncles, Nieces/Nephews, and Cousins Using National Population Registers. Demography, 60(5), 1359–1385. https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-10955240

Turunen, J., & Kolk, M. (2017). The prevalence of half-siblings over the demographic transition in Northern Sweden 1750–2007. IUSSP International Population Conference.

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Marriage isn’t a guarantee of a “happily ever after,” even for older adults who have been married for decades. Rates of “gray divorce” – or divorce among people aged 50 and older – have risen dramatically throughout Europe and the United States over the past four decades. And it’s not just gray divorce that’s on the rise – older adults in long-term cohabiting unions also are ending their relationships in unprecedented numbers (Alderotti et al., 2022; Vignoli et al., 2025). But these “silver splits” don’t necessarily bring heartbreak and depression. Rather, new research shows that close ties with adult children can be the key to healing and guard against depression before, during, and after the union dissolves. But for the nearly 10 percent of older adults in Europe who are “disconnected” from their adult children – meaning that they’ve had no contact with at least one child in the past year – the emotional pain of the silver split can linger for years (Jessee & Carr, 2025a). 

What are “silver splits” and why are they so common?

• Ever-rising numbers of adults in their 50s, 60s, and 70s are leaving (or are being left by) their long-term romantic partners. Experts point to four main reasons behind this uptick in rates of “gray divorce” and “silver splits.” First, older adults are living longer than ever before; people in their 50s and 60s know that they have several decades ahead, and some are realizing that they don’t want to spend their “golden years” in a loveless or unfulfilling union.

• Second, at midlife, people often look back at their lives and decide to make a change – fixing those things that aren’t working and taking steps to find personal fulfillment and happiness in the future.

• Third, with the onset of health problems and caregiving demands in midlife and older age, some couples are seeing their marital quality dip under the stress. In the process, they discover that they may lack the love, understanding, or patience needed to grapple with the challenges that come with age.

• Finally, when children leave the family home and parents are left in their “empty nest,” some spouses or partners recognize that their children were the glue holding them together, and that their relationship has become distant, boring, or worse (Alderotti et al., 2022; Vignoli et al., 2025).

How parent-child relationships help (or hurt) couples

Besides spouses and partners, adult children are among the most important people in the lives of older adults. Just as the “empty nest” stage can hasten a break-up, close ties with adult children can provide a powerful emotional resource as older adults manage the strain of divorce. Yet the absence of ties with children can make coping with the divorce or split all the more difficult, as our recent research has shown (Jessee & Carr, 2025a).

We tracked more than 500 adults aged 50+ over time, and examined how their symptoms of depression (i.e., feeling sad, pessimistic, or despondent) changed before, during, and after the dissolution of their marriage or cohabiting union. What we found was surprising – and counters the widespread notion that depression is inevitable when romantic relationships end. We found that among older adults who had regular contact with one or more of their adult children, their number of depressive symptoms was low throughout the entire study period, either when married, when going through their break-up, or in the years that followed. Even more encouraging, their already low number of depression symptoms fell considerably in the longer term. Four years after their union ended, they showed an uptick in their emotional well-being, revealing the psychological resilience of those who end a potentially unsatisfying union, and who have emotional support from their children.

In stark contrast, a much less rosy picture emerged for the small yet rarely studied population of older adults who are “disconnected” from one child (or more), i.e., those who had a complete lack of contact with at least one adult child in the 12-months preceding their split. Researchers have shown that severely strained or distant ties with even one child (regardless of ties with other children) can be a critical source of stress and duress for older adults (Fingerman et al., 2012; Jessee & Carr, 2025b). Fortunately, disconnectedness is rare in Europe; only 10 percent of parents who experience a silver split are disconnected, with higher rates for men than women. 

Regardless of the reason for parent-child disconnectedness, these severed ties sting – and the sting is particularly painful for those who have recently ended a marriage, as our study shows. As Figure 1 illustrates, “silver splitters” disconnected from an adult child experienced a stark and steady increase in depressive symptoms during their split and in the following years. Their depressive symptoms jumped sharply upon dissolution, and were still increasing four years after the transition. Parents who were disconnected from one or more children had significantly more depressive symptoms than their connected counterparts at every stage of the dissolution process, an observation that likely reflects the added strain and lack of support at the core of disconnectedness.

Conclusions

Divorce and silver splits don’t need to be stressful. Older adults should feel encouraged to end unions that are unsatisfying or distressing. Those who have sufficient emotional support can withstand the transition without adverse effects on their mental health. However, we need to pay attention to those growing old with strained or distant intergenerational social ties. Older men and women who are disconnected from a child are more vulnerable to the emotional pains of silver splits and other stressors, and also may lack the practical support needed to manage the challenges of aging – especially as their health worsens. We encourage practitioners to talk to their midlife and older patients about the sources of support they can rely on, rather than presuming that merely having adult children or a former spouse is protective. With the proper support from trusted family or friends, older adults will be better equipped to manage the inevitable ups and downs of life.

References

Alderotti, G., Tomassini, C., & Vignoli, D. (2022). ‘Silver splits’ in Europe. Demographic Research, 46, 619-652.

Fingerman, K. L., Cheng, Y. P., Birditt, K., & Zarit, S. (2012). Only as happy as the least happy child: multiple grown children’s problems and successes and middle-aged parents’ well-being. Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 67(2), 184-193.

Jessee, L., & Carr, D. (2025a). Silver Splits and Parent–Child Disconnectedness: Mental Health Consequences for European Older Adults. European Journal of Population, 41(1), 1-20.

Jessee, L., & Carr, D. (2025b). Parent–Child Disconnectedness and Older European Adults’ Mental Health: Do Patterns Differ by Marital Status and Gender?. The Journals of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 80(6), gbaf024.

Vignoli, D., Alderotti, G., & Tomassini, C. (2025). Partners’ health and silver splits in Europe: A gendered pattern?. Journal of Marriage and Family, 87(4), 1639-1663.

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Female early marriage remains widespread in many developing countries. Although global child marriage rates have been declining, the numbers remain high. Worldwide each year, around 12 million girls (about one in five) marry before the age of 18, and more than 650 million women alive today were married as children (UNICEF, 2018). In Pakistan, progress in this respect has been uneven. The Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS 2017–18) shows that 39 percent of women of childbearing age were married before turning 18, down from 50 percent in 1990–91. Despite this improvement, the rate remains far higher than the world average.

Drivers and consequences of early marriage

Early marriage is shaped by deep-rooted social and economic factors. In many communities, younger brides are considered more fertile, more obedient, and easier to control. For parents, marrying daughters early may be seen as a way to reduce household costs, protect family honour, and lower the dowry burden. Such perceptions persist even as education and urbanization are slowly transforming gender norms (Allendorf et al., 2017).

The consequences, however, are severe. Women who marry early tend to have more children, earlier first births, and shorter birth intervals, exposing them to greater health risks (Koski et al., 2017). Their children are more likely to experience poor birth outcomes, such as low birth weight and higher rates of infant or child mortality (Chari et al., 2017). Early marriage can also limit women’s economic empowerment and the education outcomes of their children (Yount et al., 2018).

The sooner, the worse

In a recent study we employed pooled data from four Pakistan Demographic and Health Surveys (PDHS; 1990–1991, 2006–2007, 2012–2013, and 2017–2018) to examine whether, and to what extent, the incidence of early marriage shapes married women’s perspectives on reported or revealed gender preferences associated with reproduction (Mughal et al., 2023). In this article, we deal only with the latter and measure them in terms of “likelihood of stopping behaviour”, i.e. the probability that a mother will not have an additional child when she already has n daughters, but no sons. As the likelihood of bearing sons does not depend on age at marriage, or on previous births, we assume that any significant variation in this probability reflects the woman’s desire for sons. This, in turn, depends on a series of covariates (age, age difference with husband, education, employment status, etc.) and early or later marriage, i.e. before or after her 18th birthday, the focus of our research.

Table 1 reports a selection of results for the association between mothers’ early marriage and their child-stopping behaviour in situations where all the existing children are girls. Columns 1 to 8 alternately show results of Probit estimations, with and without controls, and region- and time-fixed effects, for the likelihood of stopping childbearing after the first, second, third and fourth birth respectively. 

The parameters for early marriage are negative and statistically significant at all the birth orders. This suggests that young mothers’ desire for at least one son is greater among those who marry young. At the first birth order, for instance, an early-marrying woman with a daughter is 7.7% less likely to stop childbearing than a later-marrying woman, and this (marginal) effect increases to 10.5% after controlling for covariates. This effect increases at higher birth orders, to reach about 12%.  

The divergent trend seems to be stronger in the most recent post-2000 cohorts, reflecting increasing social pressures associated with demographic transition. Women’s schooling appears to be the most important channel through which these gender-specific reproductive effects are mediated. 

Policy implications

These son-preference norms, which also emerge among early-married men (not discussed here), have non-negligible social and demographic consequences, starting with a worsening of sex ratios at last birth. This may lead to an aggravation of existing gender gaps in children’s anthropometric, health and development outcomes. Tackling these traps requires policy interventions aimed at empowering women. While raising the minimum female marriage age to 18 years could be one option, merely passing laws against child marriage is not sufficient to end the practice in developing countries. It is equally important to provide parents with better incentives, leading to higher school enrolment and labour participation of their daughters. The incidence of female early marriage in Pakistan has decreased over time and the age at first marriage has risen, but this transition owes less to any sustained policy initiative or public awareness campaign and more to socioeconomic pressures related to urbanization, improved girls’ education and increased female participation in the labour market. 

Investing in girls’ education remains one of the most effective strategies for reducing gender disparities and delaying marriage. Such investments not only empower young women but also contribute to healthier families and more equitable societies.

References

Allendorf, K., Thornton, A., Mitchell, C., Young-DeMarco, L., & Ghimire, D. J. (2017). Early Women, Late Men: Timing Attitudes and Gender Differences in Marriage. Journal of Marriage and Family, 79(5), 1478–1496. https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12426

Chari, A. V., Heath, R., Maertens, A., & Fatima, F. (2017). The causal effect of maternal age at marriage on child wellbeing: Evidence from India. Journal of Development Economics, 127, 42–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.02.002

Koski, A., Clark, S., & Nandi, A. (2017). Has Child Marriage Declined in sub-Saharan Africa? An Analysis of Trends in 31 Countries. Population and Development Review, 43(1), 7–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12035

Mughal, M., Javed, R., & Lorey, T. (2023). Female Early Marriage and Son Preference in Pakistan. Journal of Development Studies, 59(10), 1549–1569. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2023.2217997

PDHS. (2018). NIPS. Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2017-18.

UNICEF. Child Marriage: Latest trends and future prospects [Internet]. 2018 [cited 2020 Jun 5]. Available from: https://data.unicef.org/resources/child-marriage-latest-trends-and-future-prospects/.

Yount, K. M., Crandall, A. A., & Cheong, Y. F. (2018). Women’s Age at First Marriage and Long-Term Economic Empowerment in Egypt. World Development, 102, 124–134. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.09.013

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Low fertility continues to be a policy concern across high-income countries. While public debate often focuses on whether women choose to have children at all, much of the variation in fertility today actually lies in the decision to have a second child. Since the 1970s, third and higher-order births have become increasingly rare in many European countries. As a result, understanding what encourages – or discourages – progression to a second birth has become central to explaining fertility trends.

Low fertility and formal childcare 

In this context, formal childcare is widely seen as a key mechanism for reconciling work and family life, particularly in dual-earner societies (Gauthier, 2007; Neyer & Andersson, 2008). By reducing the time and energy burden of caregiving, formal childcare may help parents – especially mothers – balance paid work with their desire to expand their family. Yet most research has focused on whether childcare is available, not whether it is actually used by individual mothers (Neyer & Andersson, 2008; Wood & Neels, 2019). In the context of the increasing availability of longitudinal microdata, I aim to contribute to the documentation of individual-level linkages between the uptake of family policy and childbearing (Kreyenfeld, 2021).

In a recent study based on administrative data from Belgium (Wood 2025), I tested whether using formal childcare for a first child increases the hazard of having a second child in the near future. The Belgian case is instructive. It combines relatively high levels of childcare provision with clear signs of unmet demand. Formal childcare is available from 3 months of age and is commonly used before children enter free pre-primary education at age 2.5 years. However, waiting lists and shortages remain widespread. Parents are often advised to begin searching for a spot as soon as they know the woman is pregnant.

Higher second birth hazards for formal childcare users

This constrained setting reveals a sharp divide between families who manage to secure a formal childcare place and those who do not. The uptake of formal childcare by working mothers appears to be shaped by a range of socio-demographic, economic, regional, and familial factors. Before accounting for selection effects, mothers who began using formal childcare and their partners tended to be older, higher educated, more likely to be employed, and had higher individual incomes, particularly among mothers. They also exhibited greater housing stability and material resources, such as homeownership and more spacious living arrangements. Regionally, users were less likely to live in Wallonia (i.e. the southern French and German speaking region) and more likely to live in wealthier municipalities. Additionally, users of formal childcare were also less likely to co-reside with non-working adults or live near grandparents. 

After accounting for such selection into formal childcare uptake, working mothers who use formal childcare for their firstborn are significantly more likely to have a second child within the next few years. Importantly, this is not only because such mothers tend to be more educated or affluent: even when comparing mothers with similar backgrounds, childcare use itself seems to be linked to higher second birth hazards. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the second birth hazards, in terms of predicted hazards (Panel A) and the ratio between the hazards for childcare users and their matched control groups (Panel B). Regardless of the year since the first birth considered, second birth hazards are higher for childcare users, ranging from 43% to 6% higher second birth hazards. The effect is particularly strong in the first two years after the birth of the first child – a period when work-family tensions are often most acute. Shorter birth intervals among childcare users suggest that access to formal care helps mothers feel confident in having a second child sooner. Finally, additional calculations (not shown here) indicate that – given the differential second birth hazards presented in figure 1 – the percentage of one-child mothers who progress to a second birth is 77% for childcare users, versus 72% for the matched control group. 

Although I did not directly test the potential causal mechanisms driving this positive linkage between formal childcare uptake and the transition to a second birth, several pathways are likely to be responsible for the identified effect. On a practical level, the ability to outsource some caregiving allows mothers to maintain their position in the labour market, reducing the financial and career-related costs of childbearing. This can make a second child feel more attainable, particularly for families with two working parents.

On a deeper level, using formal childcare may also change how mothers experience the balance between societal expectations around motherhood and employment. In contexts where both the two-child family and dual-earner model are seen as norms, formal childcare can ease the tension between being both a “good mother” and a working professional. Experiencing formal childcare for a first child may give mothers the reassurance that these roles are compatible.

Improving individual access to formal childcare

These findings offer a new lens on the childcare–fertility relationship. While many studies have shown that availability of childcare at the national or regional level is associated with higher fertility, this study indicates that actual uptake plays a distinct role. In other words, it is not only whether formal childcare exists – but whether families can and do use it – that shapes reproductive decisions.

Policy efforts to expand childcare availability remain essential, particularly in settings where demand for formal childcare exceeds supply. To fully support families, policies must also address barriers to uptake, including affordability, accessibility, and administrative complexity.

Not all families have equal access to formal childcare. In Belgium, use is strongly patterned, for instance by education, income, housing, and region. If childcare use supports continued fertility, unequal access may contribute to social disparities in family formation.

References

Gauthier, A. H. (2007). The impact of family policies on fertility in industrialized countries: a review of the literature. Population Research and Policy Review, 26(3), 323-346. 

Kreyenfeld, M. (2021). Causal Modelling in Fertility Research: A Review of the Literature and an Application to a Parental Leave Policy Reform. Comparative Population Studies, 46. doi:10.12765/CPoS-2021-10

Neyer, G., & Andersson, G. (2008). Consequences of Family Policies on Childbearing Behavior: Effects or Artifacts? Population and Development Review, 34(4), 699-724. 

Wood, J., & Neels, K. (2019). Local Childcare Availability and Dual-Earner Fertility: Variation in Childcare Coverage and Birth Hazards Over Place and Time. European Journal of Population, 35(5), 913-937. doi:10.1007/s10680-018-9510-4

Wood, J. (2025) Does Formal Childcare Uptake Stimulate Fertility? Formal Childcare Usage and Second Births. Popul Res Policy Rev 44, 42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-025-09963-1.

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Belgian birth records show that 15,000 to 17,000 children have been born yearly to single women in recent years, i.e. some 12% to 14% of all births (Statbel, n.d.). The dominant stereotype of women who have a child while single is that of a young mother who got pregnant by accident. Yet among children born to single mothers, the share born to women aged 35+ increased from 19% in 2011 to 24% in 2022. This reflects the diversity of situations leading to single motherhood – unintended pregnancies, breakups, death of a partner – that may happen at different points in life. Several studies have investigated the small but growing number of women who decided to have a child on their own, often in their late 30s to early 40s, becoming “solo mothers” or “single mothers by choice”. 

Education, income, and the timing of single motherhood

In a recent study, using Belgian population registers, we tracked childless women aged 25 and over from 2005 to 2015 during times when they were single, and we found that the links between becoming a single mother, education, and income were not the same for younger and older single women (Musni and Schnor 2025).

At young ages (25 to 29), women are most likely to have a child while single if they have low education and low income. Yet this association appears to reverse with age. At later ages, the likelihood is highest among highly educated, high income single women (Figure 1).

What about single, childless women in their mid-30s with declining fecundity? We find that the more educated a woman is, the higher her likelihood of having a child while single at ages 35 and older. The links between income and single motherhood at later ages seem to depend on educational level. The risk of single motherhood declines with increasing income for most women. However, a positive relationship between income and later-age single motherhood is observed for women with university degrees or longer periods of study.

The privilege of choice

At younger ages, advantaged women can afford to delay childbearing to focus on other life goals. Meanwhile, women with less education and income may perceive limited options for improving their socioeconomic situation and hence be more accepting of unplanned pregnancies. In Belgium, these women also face taller hurdles if they wish to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. If they exceed the 12-week post-conception abortion limit they are obliged to travel abroad (often to the Netherlands) for expensive procedures. 

At later ages, some single women may prefer to have a child on their own rather than risk never becoming a mother. We found that this is especially the case for highly educated women, even at lower income levels. This implies that higher education brings resources beyond income that make solo motherhood more feasible: flexible or part-time work or a network of more advantaged family and friends. 

Interestingly, high income makes single motherhood at later ages more likely, but only for highly educated women. Even if tertiary education is becoming more accessible, it appears that women with university degrees tend to behave differently from those with other forms of higher education. This may reflect class-based differences in the type of higher education people pursue.

Our results mirror studies on solo mothers who are both highly educated and financially stable (Golombok, 2015; Jadva et al., 2009; Volgsten & Schmidt, 2021). Higher education is often linked to being more open to non-traditional pathways towards family formation, while high income enables the realization of fertility intentions. High income also allows access to medically assisted reproduction (MAR) – the most common conception method for single women. In Belgium, these women have legal access to MAR and the state covers around 80% of treatment fees. Yet the costs of donor sperm, co-payments, and the possibility of needing multiple cycles may be too expensive for some. Fertility clinics (and adoption services) may also favour women with stable finances when screening prospective solo mothers (e.g., Hertogs et al., 2021). 

On the flipside, it appears that low-educated women who remain single and childless at later ages are the most at risk of never bearing children. This suggests that parenthood is increasingly becoming a privilege that many are unable to experience.

If postponement is characteristic of highly educated women, why are some less educated women still single and childless in their mid-30s? It is important to recognize that less educated women also face challenges. For one, they have more limited access to social and leisure activities where they might meet potential partners with whom to have a child (de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003). Also, it would be amiss to assume that economic factors do not influence the childbearing decisions of older less-educated women: a temporary break in the labour market due to a birth may have irreparable negative consequences on earnings and future employment.

Conclusions

These results highlight how socioeconomic inequalities influence who becomes a mother and when. Although structural changes are necessary to ensure that people have equal opportunities to form the families they want, governments could begin tackling family-formation barriers by ensuring livable wages, stable work-life balance with good leave benefits and adaptable working hours, and affordable childcare. Parents-to-be and current parents must be able to adjust work arrangements to accommodate domestic needs without fearing negative economic consequences.

References

de Graaf, P. M., & Kalmijn, M. (2003). Alternative Routes in the Remarriage Market: Competing-Risk Analyses of Union Formation after Divorce. Social Forces, 81(4), 1459–1498. https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2003.0052

Golombok, S. (2015). Solo mother families. In Modern families: Parents and children in new family forms (pp. 138–162). Cambridge University Press.

Hertogs, P., Van Gasse, D., Spikic, S., & Mortelmans, D. (2021). Fertility Practitioners’ Coping Strategies When Faced with Intra-Role Conflict from Screening Aspiring Single Mothers by Choice. Social Sciences, 10(11), 438. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10110438

Jadva, V., Badger, S., Morrissette, M., & Golombok, S. (2009). ‘Mom by choice, single by life’s circumstance…’ Findings from a large scale survey of the experiences of single mothers by choice. Human Fertility, 12(4), 175–184. https://doi.org/10.3109/14647270903373867

Musni, D. B., & Schnor, C. (2025). The Changing Links Between Socioeconomic Status and Single Women’s Entry Into Parenthood. Journal of Marriage and Family. https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.70006

Statbel. (n.d.). Statistique des naissances et de la fécondité 2011-2022 (datasets). https://statbel.fgov.be/en/themes/population/births-and-fertility#figures

Volgsten, H., & Schmidt, L. (2021). Motherhood through medically assisted reproduction – characteristics and motivations of Swedish single mothers by choice. Human Fertility, 24(3), 219–225. https://doi.org/10.1080/14647273.2019.1606457

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Childhood migration and the loss of social networks

Childhood migration is consistently associated with adverse life outcomes (Anderson et al. 2014), and the leading explanation is the disruption of social networks. In a recent study (Bernard, McMullin and Vidal 2025), we tested this hypothesis by using loneliness as a proxy for the loss of social ties. Three key findings emerge:

1. Number of moves: The more times children move, the higher the likelihood of reporting loneliness during their school years (Figure 1a).

2. Duration of residence: Loneliness decreases with the length of stay of children in the same place, suggesting that they gradually rebuild social networks at destination (Figure 1b).

3. Chronic migration: The protective effect of residential stability weakens with repeated moves, highlighting the social risks of chronic mobility (Figure 1c).

The moderating role of family structures

Family members are an important source of social support. We therefore tested whether family structure protects against migration-induced loneliness. Results show that living with both parents and having siblings both reduce the likelihood of feeling lonely, by around 30% and 20% respectively. Crucially, siblings moderate the effect of migration: movers without siblings report an 11.2% predicted probability of being often lonely, compared with 6.7% among movers with siblings (Figure 2). In contrast, living with both parents does not buffer the negative impact of migration.

The societal context: individualism versus collectivism

Cultural values shape the experience of loneliness (Barreto et al. 2021). 

Two patterns stand out (Figure 3):

• Absolute levels: Collectivist societies, where tighter family-based networks are the norm (southern and eastern Europe), display consistently lower overall loneliness than individualist ones, where independence and self-reliance are emphasised (northern and western Europe);

• Relative impact: The association between number of moves and loneliness is comparatively stronger in collectivist societies. This may reflect higher social needs and a greater gap between expected and realised relationships among repeat movers (Johnson and Mullins 1987). In individualist countries, by contrast, children may develop better coping strategies when moving (Tamis‐LeMonda et al. 2008), but still report higher baseline levels of loneliness.

Policy implications

By considering how the association between internal migration and loneliness varies by frequency, and by unpacking the moderating role of family structures and cultural values, we can identify the groups most at risk. These are children without siblings living in highly individualist and highly mobile societies, such as France, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden.

Two broader demographic trends are likely to intensify risks: the rise of single-child families and the global spread of individualist orientations, even if relative differences between countries remain stable (Beugelsdijk, Maseland, and Van Hoorn 2015). As a result, the impact of internal migration on loneliness may be greater for today’s children than for earlier cohorts. In Europe, the spatial gradient of higher mobility in the North and West versus lower mobility in the South and East mirrors the cultural gradient in individualism. Together, these patterns suggest that migration-induced loneliness will remain a pressing issue, particularly in northern and western Europe. At the same time, falling levels of internal migration in some countries (Alvarez, Bernard, and Lieske 2021) have lowered aggregate exposure to migration but have not attenuated risks among childhood movers. Rather, the decline in migration is likely to have shifted the risk of mobility-induced loneliness toward a smaller group of children with higher needs.

In summary, a single childhood migration may have limited effects on loneliness and can even foster valuable skills through learning how to leave and enter new social contexts (Bernard 2023). Conversely, children who move often are at a higher risk of more adverse consequences. It is therefore essential to identify and support those children most at risk of isolation in their new location, particularly in countries with individualist orientations.

References

Alvarez, M., A.  Bernard, and S. N. Lieske. 2021. ‘Understanding internal migration trends in OECD countries’, Population, Space and Place, e2451.

Anderson, Sara, Tama Leventhal, Sandra Newman, and Veronique Dupéré. 2014. ‘Residential mobility among children: A framework for child and family policy’, Cityscape, 16: 5-36.

Barreto, Manuela, Christina Victor, Claudia Hammond, Alice Eccles, Matt T Richins, and Pamela Qualter. 2021. ‘Loneliness around the world: Age, gender, and cultural differences in loneliness’, Personality and Individual Differences, 169: 110066.

Bernard, Aude. 2023. ‘Does Internal Migration Contribute to the Intergenerational Transmission of Socioeconomic Inequalities? The Role of Childhood Migration’, Demography: 10826486-86.

Bernard, Aude, Patricia McMullin, and Sergi Vidal. 2025. ‘Internal Migration and Loneliness in Childhood: The Moderating Role of Family Structure and Cultural Individualism’, European Journal of Population, 41: 1-33.

Beugelsdijk, Sjoerd, Robbert Maseland, and André Van Hoorn. 2015. ‘Are scores on H ofstede’s dimensions of national culture stable over time? A Cohort Analysis’, Global Strategy Journal, 5: 223-40.

Johnson, D Paul, and Larry C Mullins. 1987. ‘Growing old and lonely in different societies: Toward a comparative perspective’, Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology, 2: 257-75.

Tamis‐LeMonda, Catherine S, Niobe Way, Diane Hughes, Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Ronit Kahana Kalman, and Erika Y Niwa. 2008. ‘Parents’ goals for children: The dynamic coexistence of individualism and collectivism in cultures and individuals’, Social development, 17: 183-209.

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