America is struggling with continuing its birthright citizenship, which was established by the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution in 1868. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment declares: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”. 

The struggle

Shortly after taking office on 20 January, President Trump issued an executive order restricting birthright citizenship, insisting that the 14th Amendment does not apply to the births of unauthorized migrants. Many have raised objections, pointing out that America has upheld birthright citizenship for more than 150 years and as US laws apply to unauthorized migrants, so the Constitution’s 14th Amendment should apply to them too.

The American Civil Liberties Union and several states have filed federal legal challenges to Trump’s executive order restricting birthright citizenship. The American Bar Association described it as an attack on a “constitutionally protected” right. Also, no less than four federal judges and a growing number of courts have blocked the order. How the US Supreme Court, where conservative justices form a supermajority, would interpret the 14th Amendment is not clear. The litigation over Trump’s executive order is likely to focus on what it means for someone to be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.

Shortly after becoming president on January 20, Trump falsely claimed that “We are the only country in the world that does this with the birthright, as you know, and it’s just absolutely ridiculous.” Actually, at least 33 countries provide automatic citizenship to anyone born within their borders. Those countries, located mostly in the Western hemisphere, include America’s neighboring countries of Canada and Mexico.

Foreign-born population

The number and proportion of foreign-born residents in America have varied considerably over the past several centuries (Table 1). In 1890, for example, they totaled nearly ten million and their proportion reached a high of 14.8%. Following World War II, their number declined to below 10 million and their proportion fell to a record low of 4.7% in 1970. The early 21st century saw a marked increase and their number rose to 31 million (11% of the total population). In 2024, the estimated 51.6 million foreign-born residents accounted for a record-breaking 15.6% of America’s population.

Births to foreign-born mothers

Over the period 2014-2024, the average number of births to foreign-born mothers in the US was 850,000, varying from a high of 910,000 in 2016 to a low of 780,000 in 2021. Their share of total births remained relatively stable at approximately 23% (Table 2) – greater than the proportion of foreign-born population in the same period (about 14%).

The exact number of births to unauthorized foreign-born mothers is unknown. However, with a few reasonable assumptions (detailed in the footnotes to Table 2), an annual average total of around 213,000 can be estimated over the period, possibly ranging between 180,000 births in 2021 and a high of 245,000 in 2016.  

Those annual estimates also provide an indication of the distribution of births among native-born and foreign-born mothers. Over the past 11-year period, approximately 77% of the births in America were to native-born women and 23% were to foreign-born mothers, 17% to authorized foreign-born mothers and 6% to unauthorized foreign-born mothers (Figure 1).

Conclusions

As a result of President Trump’s recent executive order, birthright citizenship has developed into a major political and legal struggle for America. The outcome of that struggle is now playing out in US courts. While the legal outcome is currently uncertain, its major demographic consequence is already clear. 

If birthright citizenship is restricted, as President Trump has ordered, up to 225,000 children born to unauthorized foreign-born mothers each year – around 6% of America’s annual births – will not be granted US citizenship. 

References

American Civil Liberties Union (2025) “Immigrants’ Rights Advocates Sue Trump Administration Over Birthright Citizenship Executive Order”. January 20, ACLU, Washington, D.C.

Baker, Bryan and Robert Warren (2024) “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2018-January 2022”. April, US Office of Homeland Statistics, Washington, D.C. 

Bay, William (2025) “The ABA supports the rule of law”. February 10, American Bar Association (ABA), Chicago, Illinois.

Camarota, Steven and Karen Zeigler  (2021) “Fertility Among Immigrants and Native-Born Americans”. February 16, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.

Hussein, Mohamed A. (2025) “Which countries, other than the US, offer birthright citizenship”. February 6, Aljazeera, Doha, Qatar.

Jeyaretnam, Miranda (2025) “How Does Birthright Citizenship in the U.S. Compare to the Rest of the World?”. January 23, Time, Washington, D.C.

Moslimani, Mohamad and Jeffery S, Passel (2024) “What the data says about immigrants in the U.S.” September 24, Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.

Neufeld, Dorothy (2024) “Charted: The Foreign-Born Share of the U.S. Population: (1850-2024)”. October 30, Visual Capitalist, Vancouver, Canada.

Putterman, Samantha (2025) “Donald Trump’s False claim that the US is the ‘only’ country with birthright citizenship”. January 21, PolitiFact, The Poynter Institute, Washington, D.C.

Richwine, Jasion and Steven Camarota (2025) “Births to Illegal Immigrants and Long-Term Temporary Visitors”. February 14, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.

The post America struggles with birthright citizenship appeared first on N-IUSSP.

In 2023, nearly one in four children in America aged 0‒17 years, totaling about 19 million, were living in a household without their biological, step, or adoptive father, mostly with their mother (85% of cases). In fact, living in a single-parent households with a father absent is the second most common U.S. living arrangement, and the proportion of these households has doubled since 1970 (US Census Bureau, 2023). 
Single-parent households in the US are the result of various factors, including declining marriage rates, divorces, widowhood, non-married parents who split up and parents who are single by choice.

Levels 

According to a global survey of 130 countries conducted in 2019 (Kramer 2019), the US had the highest rate of children living in single-parent households of any nation in the world, at about 23%, or more than three times the worldwide level of 7% (Figure 1).

The prevalence of these cases was markedly lower in neighboring Canada and Mexico (15% and 7%, respectively), and much lower in developing countries, all below 5%.

Trends

For decades, the share of U.S. children living with a single parent has been rising, accompanied by a decline in marriage rates and a rise in births outside marriage (Livingston 2018). The percentage of US children living in single-parent households nearly tripled between 1960 and 2023, increasing from 9% to 25% (US Census Bureau 2023). In the same period, the share of households with fathers missing more than doubled, increasing from 11% to 25% (Figure 2). 

The proportions of children living in a father-absent household varies considerably among America’s three major social groups: in 2023, the shares were 20%, 29% and 50% among Whites Hispanics and Blacks, respectively, and in all three groups they are substantially higher than 50 years before (Figure 3). 

The rise in births to unmarried mothers has contributed strongly to the increase in households with missing fathers. While many unmarried women cohabit with a partner at the time of giving birth, these relationships fail at twice the rate of marriages (Brewer 2023). In 2022, 40% of all births in the US were to unmarried women, a four-fold increase since 1970. Again, there is notable variability across the major US social groups: 16% for Asians, 22% for Whites, 42% for Hispanics and 69% for Blacks (Osterman 2024).

Consequences and perspectives

Children who grow up in a household with only one biological parent are worse off, on average, than children who grow up with both of their biological parents, regardless of the parents’ race or educational background (McLanahan and Sandefur 1996). For instance, they are nearly four times more likely to live in poverty (Brewer 2023), have more trouble academically, scoring poorly on tests of reading and mathematics, and are more likely to drop out of school. 

Boys living in these conditions are more likely to engage in negative social behaviors (Kearney 2023) and girls often experience lack of confidence and struggle with decision-making (Rothwell 2023). 

Nearly half of US adults in a 2021 national survey – men especially (59% of men versus 37% of women; Hurst 2022) – said that raising children in a single-mother household is generally a bad thing for society. However, despite these widespread negative opinions, current trends in marriage, cohabitation and divorce, and social norms concerning non-marital births and family type, suggest that the situation is unlikely to change any time soon. The same holds for the resulting inequalities that will affect the future lives of these children. 

References

Brewer, Jack (2023)  “Fatherlessness and its effects on American society”. May 15, America First Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.

Hurst, Kiley (2022) “Rising share of Americans see women raising children on their own, cohabitation as bad for society”. March 11, Pew Research Center, Washington D.C.

Kearney, Melissa (2023) The Two-Parent Privilege. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois. 

Kramer, Stephanie (2019) “U.S. has world’s highest rate of children living in single-parent households”. December 12, Pew Research Center, Washington D.C.

Livingston, Gretchen (2018) “About one-third of U.S. children are living with an unmarried parent”. April 27, Pew Research Center, Washington D.C.

McLanahan, Sara and Gary Sandefur (1997) Growing Up with A Single Parent: What Hurts and What Helps. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Osterman, Michelle J. et al. (2024)  “Births: Final Data for 2022”.  April 4, National Vital Statistics Reports, CDC, Washington, D.C.

Rothwell, Jonathan (2023) “Parenting Is the Key to Adolescent Mental Health”. November 30, Gallup and The Institute for Family Studies, Charlottesville, Virginia.

US Census Bureau (2023) “Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present”. November, Washington, D.C.

The post America’s single-parent households and missing fathers  appeared first on N-IUSSP.

Child care in the the U.S. is both costly and scarce, and fails to meet the needs of children and parents. The country’s child care system is dominated by the private sector which receives very limited financial support: as a result, child care costs across America are untenable for most families (Landivar 2024). The U.S. Treasury Secretary has described child care in America as “a broken market”.

Costs

While the U.S. Department of Health considers that 7% of household income as an affordable benchmark for child care, in 2023, two-thirds of U.S. parents with young children spent 20% or more of their household income on child care, up from about half in 2022 (Solá 2023).  The average cost of child care for two children is higher than the average rent in all 50 states and the average mortgage payment in 45 states (Luhby 2024). Likewise, in about 40 states, the average annual price of infant care in a child care center exceeds annual, in-state university tuition costs. 

Child care expenses for parents are often more than $1,000 per month. In 2021, for example, preschool, infant care and day care cost between $14,000 and $24,000 annually for couples in the ten U.S. states with the highest annual child care expense (Figure 1). In addition to their high cost, child care services are often difficult to find. Approximately 75% of families report difficulties, and about 32% of children under the age of five cannot access a child care slot (Editorial Staff 2024). Moreover, since 2019, there has been a 12% decline in licensed family child care homes.

Child care providers are also struggling with limited space and staffing shortages, in part because wages in this sector are low, with a median hourly wage of $14.60 in May 2023 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2024). Due to the national shortage of workers and facilities, the costs of day care and preschool are rising at nearly twice the pace of inflation: the national average annual price of child care increased by 23% between 2017 and 2023 (Luhby 2024).

Consequences

The price tag for having two children in child care while working full-time is significantly higher in the U.S. than in most OECD countries (Figure 2). 

Many parents with young children in America are thus forced to choose between spending a significant portion of their income on child care, finding a cheaper, less desirable option, or leaving the workforce altogether to become full-time caregivers.  Child care issues are more likely to impact a mother’s than a father’s career. About half of mothers with young children are considering leaving the workforce due to inadequate childcare. The US has gone from leading its peers in women’s workforce participation rates in the 1990s to lagging dramatically behind them today. About one-fifth of mothers who do not currently work would look for a job if they had better access to quality child care, and about one-third of mothers unable to find affordable child care have already dropped out of the labor force. In 2023, 25% of  mothers were economically inactive, up from just 15% in 2022. Subsidized child care and preschool increase the likelihood that mothers will remain in work and pursue a career. Besides, child care helps children develop physically, mentally, socially and emotionally, thereby increasing their chances for lifelong success. Numerous studies about child care in the U.S. have indicated the benefits of early-childhood education (Wise 2024). 

Policies 

One of the major reasons why child care is more expensive in the US than in the rest of the developed world is that other countries devote a larger share of government spending to child care provision (Buchholz 2024).  America’s two major political parties have different views on the role of the federal government in this area. While Democratic elected officials have proposed more federal spending on child care, many Congressional Republicans argue against federal intervention and are opposed to federal tax increases for this purpose. The vast majority of U.S. voters feel a sense of urgency concerning the need for affordable, quality child care. Nearly 80% of voters support increased federal funding for states to expand their child care and early learning programs. That view among voters is evident across party lines and is felt strongly by parents and non-parents alike (Patrick 2024).

Conclusions 

Those opposed to subsidized child care tend to ignore the economic realities of modern America. In many households both parents want to work, and for a growing share of parents, being employed is simply not a choice. The U.S. Department of Labor has highlighted the need for greater federal investments in child care services. Businesses and policymakers are also paying close attention to America’s child care crisis because a good child care system that accommodates the needs of working parents contributes to a healthy workforce and economy.   In sum, child care in America is in crisis largely because it is costly and scarce. Increased federal support and funding would contribute significantly to improving child care affordability and availability .

References

Buchholz, Katharina (2024) “U.S. Childcare Cost Higher than In Other Developed Countries”. 10 September, Forbes.

Editorial Staff (2024) “This is how much child care costs in 2024” January 17, Care.Com. 

Grundy, Adam (2024) “Rising Cost of Child Care Services a Challenge for Working Parents”. January 9, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.

Landivar, Christin (2023) “New Childcare Data Shows Prices Are Untenable for Families”. January 24, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.

Luhby, Tami (2024) “Here’s where child care costs at least twice as much as rent”. May 15, CNN. 

Patrick, Stephen W. (2024) “Voter Support for Policies Associated With Child Health as National Campaign Priorities”. September 27,  JAMA Health Forum.

Shine, Ian (2023) “These countries have the highest childcare costs in the world”. July 19, World Economic Forum, Switzerland. 

Solá, Ana Teresa (2023) “Majority of parents spend 20% or more of household income on child care, report finds”. August 7, CNBC. 

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2024) “Occupational Outlook Handbook: Childcare Workers”. August 29, Washington, D.C. Wise, Jessica N. Wise,

Katarina Reyes, Sandra McKay (2024) “The Case for Early Childhood Education as Health and Economic Policy”. September 6, Baker Institute, Rice University, Houston, Texas, U.S.

The post Child care in America appeared first on N-IUSSP.

Introduction

Among advanced developed countries, the United States has the highest homicide rate: 7.8 per 100,000 population in 2020. Most others, including Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom, have homicide rates that are a fraction of this level (Figure 1). For example, the U.S. firearm homicide rate in 2019 was 22 times greater than the rate of the European Union. 

U.S. homicide rates

The U.S. homicide rate of 7.8 per 100,000 in 2020 is the highest since 1995 and represents a record increase of approximately 30 percent with respect to 2019. Possible explanations for this rise include the consequences of the COVID pandemic and the worsening relations between police and communities following the murder of George Floyd (25 May 2020). Often heard political explanations for the rise, such as “some are soft on crime”, are not supported by the data. Homicide rates have increased in both Democratic and Republican states, in cities controlled by Republican and Democratic mayors, and in the suburbs and rural areas.
Of the 139 mass shootings that occurred in developed countries between 1998 to 2019, 73 percent occurred in the United States and resulted in 816 deaths. France had the next highest number of mass shootings with 8, resulting in 179 deaths, including the Bataclan terrorist attack of November 2015 (90 deaths). America’s 2020 homicide rate, however, remains markedly lower than the rates in the 1970s and 1980s. Forty years ago, for example, the U.S. rate exceeded 10 homicides per 100,000. 
Homicide rates vary considerably across America’s 50 states. The highest are typically found in the south. For example, the three states with the highest rates in 2020 were Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama (21, 20 and 14 per 100,000 population, respectively). However, in 2020, Washington D.C. had an even higher homicide rate of approximately 25 murders per 100,000 residents.
In contrast, the lowest homicide rates are observed in northeastern states. The three states with the lowest rates are Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont (below 2 per 100,000).
Approximately 80 percent of U.S. homicides in 2020 involved firearms, most often handguns. In the 1960s, by contrast, handguns were used in approximately 50 percent of homicides. 

In terms of gun ownership, America is by far the world leader, at 120 guns per 100 population, with about 40 percent of Americans owning firearms. This is well above the proportions of the next four highest countries, i.e., Yemen at 53, Serbia and Montenegro at 39 and Canada at 35.

Homicide differentials

A noteworthy feature of homicide rates across America is that the male rate (12.8 per 100,000 in 2020) is many times higher than the female rate (2.9 per 100,000). This translates into approximately 80 percent of homicide victims being males.
Homicides rates also vary markedly by age. They increase through the teenage years and peak in the early twenties. As in recent years, gun homicide in 2020 was the leading cause of death among the under-25s, and people under age 30 were nearly 10 times more likely to die from a firearm than from COVID-19. 
In addition to significant differences by age and sex, wide gaps in homicide rates exist among America’s five major racial/ethnic groups as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
In 2020 the homicide rates for Black American males and females were the highest among the five groups, at 57 and 8 per 100,000, respectively. They were followed by Indian American males and females (24 and 6 per 100,000), Hispanic American males and females (11 and 2 per 100,000), and White American males and females (5 and 2 per 100,000). The lowest homicide rates were among Asian American males and females, at 3 and 1 per 100,000 (Figure 2). 

Those differences in homicide rates produce a striking distribution in the numbers of homicide victims among the groups. Black males accounted for 49 percent of homicide victims in 2020, followed by White males at 29 percent, White females at 11 percent, and Black females at 8 percent (Figure 3).

In 2018 homicide was the fifth leading cause of death among Black males, and the ninth leading cause among Hispanic and American Indian males. 

Addressing homicide rates

Over the years, various proposals and strategies have been recommended to address America’s high rate of homicides. Many emphasize the need for social and economic investments, long-term strategies and anti-crime measures focusing on education, jobs, housing, inequality, racism, outreach programs, drug treatment and gun control. 
Those investments require economic and social resources as well as political backing and it typically takes time for results to become visible. Faced with the rising number of homicides, and the high homicide rate, relatively few people are prepared to wait. 
A growing share of Americans − now at nearly half − want more spending on police in their neighborhoods to address violent crime. But increased police funding has also become a partisan issue. While 61 percent of Republicans believe spending on police should be increased, only about one-third of Democrats share that view.
Given the current state of affairs in the country with respect to police, guns and homicides, America’s high homicide rate is unlikely to decline any time soon to the low levels enjoyed by other advanced developed countries. 

References

Ax, Joseph (2022) “Analysis: Crime is a top concern for many Americans in midterm vote. How bad is it?”. Reuters, 1 November.

BBC News (2022) “Mass shootings: America’s challenge for gun control explained in seven charts”. 12 October. 

Beckett, Lois and Abene Clayton (2022) “An unspoken epidemic’: Homicide rate increase for Black women rivals that of Black men”. The Guardian, 25 June. 

Claudio, Andre (2021) “States With the Highest Homicide Rates”. Route Fifty, 30 November. 

Cooper, Alexia and Erica L. Smith (2011) “Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008”. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, November.

Council on Criminal Justice (2022) “Saving Lives: Ten Essential Actions Cities Can Take to Reduce Violence Now”. 12 January.

Eurostat (2022) “Crime Statistics”. Eurostat Statistics Explained. Luxembourg.

Murez, Cara (2022) “Gun Homicides Rose Sharply During Pandemic, Black Men Most Affected”. US News, 15 December.

Parker, Kim and Kiley Hurst (2021) “Growing share of Americans say they want more spending on police in their area”. Pew Research Center, 26 October.

Silva, Jason R. (2022) “Global mass shootings: comparing the United States against developed and developing countries”. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 21 March.

U.S. Center for Disease Control (2022) “Leading Causes of Death – Males and Females – United States, 2018”. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 3 March.

U.S. Center for Disease Control (2021) “New CDC/NCHS Data Confirm Largest One-Year Increase in U.S. Homicide Rate in 2020”. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 6 October.

The post America’s high homicide rate appeared first on N-IUSSP.

There have been nearly a million American deaths due to the COVID-19 coronavirus since February 2020. Following the vaccine rollout, in the fall of 2021, hospitals were filled mostly with unvaccinated COVID-19 patients and the death rate of the unvaccinated during December 2021 was many times higher than that of the vaccinated with a booster. Despite all these realities, many Americans choose to remain unvaccinated. 

Rather than remaining a public health issue, the U.S. coronavirus pandemic has been politicized and has morphed into a contentious political issue. With many Americans declining to take any of the widely available COVID-19 vaccines, the coronavirus pandemic has evolved into America’s pandemic of the unvaccinated. 

A high percentage unvaccinated

Although America represents about 4 percent of the world’s population, it accounts for 16 percent of all COVID-19 deaths and close to 20 percent of all COVID-19 cases since the start of pandemic, in March 2020.  Moreover, America’s COVID-19 cumulated death rate up to mid-February 2022 remains substantially higher than the rates of many other developed countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and Sweden (Figure 1).

Although declining, COVID-19 vaccine avoidance remains high in the U.S.A. Approximately 24 percent of America’s population are unvaccinated, with high variability across states (U.S. Center for Disease Control, 2022). For example, the percentages of state populations unvaccinated in February 2022 in the Northeast, such as Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, are relatively low, at around 5 percent (all ages included), while in states of the South and West, such as Wyoming, Mississippi and Louisiana, proportions are many times higher, at approximately 40 percent (Figure 2). 

The percentage unvaccinated also varies by educational level. In general, American adults with higher education are significantly less likely to remain unvaccinated and have few doubts about the safety and effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines. In contrast, it is estimated that among the unvaccinated American adults reporting strong vaccine hesitancy half have relatively low levels of education (high school or less), a proportion significantly higher than that observed in the general adult population (about 39 percent; Napolitano 2022).

The many Americans who have chosen to remain unvaccinated have a number of concerns. These include worries about side effects, a lack of confidence in the vaccines and distrust in the government. Besides, many don’t think they need a vaccine (Figure 3). 

Approximately 75 percent of America’s unvaccinated adults are not only skeptical of the vaccines, but also of COVID-19 itself (Hart 2021). The vast majority, about 90 percent, report that they are not worried about getting ill from COVID-19 and are not convinced that the available vaccines are effective. 

In addition, approximately one in five of the unvaccinated do not think the vaccines prevent death from COVID-19 and believe that vaccines do nothing to avoid serious illness, being hospitalized or becoming infected if exposed. Also, nearly half of unvaccinated adults are worried about the vaccine’s side effects even though the U.S. Center for Disease Control (2022) has found that reported side effects are minimal.

Politicized 

Largely to advance certain political, economic and cultural agendas, the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccines have been politicized across America. That politicization and partisanship have contributed to COVID-19 vaccine avoidance and shaped the concerns, beliefs and behavior of the unvaccinated. 

Partisanship has also resulted in significant differences in vaccine avoidance by political party affiliation (Wood and Brumfiel 2021). Whereas less than 10 percent of Democrats are unvaccinated, the proportion is four times higher among Republicans, at about 40 percent. Consequently, COVID death rates in October 2021 in Trump voting-counties in the 2020 election were three times as high as the rates in Biden-voting counties, i.e., 25 versus 8 per 100,000, respectively (Yang 2021).

For many Americans, remaining unvaccinated has become more of a political statement and less of a health concern. The previous administration downplayed the severity of the coronavirus pandemic, publicly compared it to the flu, labeled it a new hoax promoted by the administration’s opponents, suggested unproven therapies to treat COVID-19 and dismissed the use of face masks. 

In addition, besides receiving his first COVID-19 vaccination out of view of the press or official White House photographers before leaving office in January, the former president (Trump) chose not to participate in a COVID-19 public service announcement featuring all living former presidents. Furthermore, at a recent event held in Dallas, he was booed by many of his ardent supporters when he stated he had indeed received a COVID-19 booster. 

Some right-leaning media outlets have also suggested that COVID-19 was not a severe health threat, comparing it to normal flu and claiming that the reported seriousness of the coronavirus was misleading. While some claimed that it was a conspiracy by China to damage the American economy, other outlets saw it as a plot to hurt the former president’s chances of re-election in 2020.

Conclusions

The evidence regarding COVID vaccination is straightforward: remaining unvaccinated unequivocally results in higher rates of mortality and morbidity. In other words, those who choose to remain unvaccinated significantly increase their chances of becoming severely ill or dying from COVID-19. Many Americans decline to be vaccinated nonetheless.

Entering the third year of the coronavirus pandemic with vaccines and boosters widely available, COVID-19 has evolved into America’s pandemic of the unvaccinated. That evolution is largely due to the political polarization of the coronavirus pandemic, and its transition from a serious public health matter to a highly partisan political issue. Unfortunately, polarization has led to continuing high levels of mortality and morbidity among the unvaccinated, which in turn are contributing to declines in U.S. life expectancies and burdening local communities where large numbers choose to remain unvaccinated.

An insightful exception to the politicization of a disease and of vaccination in the U.S. was polio and the polio vaccine. In contrast to COVID-19, polio was not transformed into a political partisan issue but remained a public health concern with overwhelming public acceptance throughout the country. Americans could not get it fast enough. The contrasting experiences with polio and COVID-19 provide a valuable public policy lesson for America as well as for other countries.

References

Hart, Robert (2021) “By the Numbers: Who’s Refusing Covid Vaccinations – And Why?”. Forbes, September 25. 

Napolitano, Jo (2022) “New Research: Low Education Levels Strongly Tied to Being Unvaccinated, Major Contributor to Ongoing Hesitancy”.  The 74, January 25.

U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2022). “COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States” February

U.S. Census Bureau (2021). “Who Are the Adults Not Vaccinated Against COVID-19?”, December 28 

USAFacts (2022). “US Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker”, February 16.

Wood, Daniel and Geoff Brumfiel (2021) “Pro-Trump counties now have far higher COVID death rates. Misinformation is to blame” NPR, December 5. 

Worldometer (2022). “COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic”, February 25.

Yang, Maya (2021). “Over 91% Democrats vaccinated, while only 60% Republicans have taken one shot, data reveals”. The Guardian, December 17.

The post America’s pandemic of the unvaccinated appeared first on N-IUSSP.

The past

Results from the 2020 population censuses in the United States and China recently made headlines. But rather than recognizing the social, economic, environmental and climatic benefits of slower rates of population growth for the U.S., China and the planet, much of the print and broadcast media in the U.S. stressed the downsides of slower growth and chose to write about population collapse, baby bust and demographic decline.

The U.S. population increase of 7.4 percent from 2010 to 2020 was the second lowest rate of growth since the country’s first census in 1790, and half the typical growth rates since 1790. Only during the Great Depression of the 1930s did U.S. population grow more slowly, by 7.3 percent. Even slower rates of growth are expected in the coming decades (Figure 1).

China’s population grew 5.3 percent in the decade ending in 2020, the lowest decadal growth rate since the catastrophic famine of the late 1950s. India projects for 2011-2021 its lowest decadal rate of population growth, 12.5 percent, since its independence.

The present

Lopsided lamentations have focused on the downsides of slower population growth. For example, some commentators who favor more rapid U.S. population growth contend that Americans would like to have more children than they are presently having. However, while this is the case for some American couples, others want fewer children. In 2011 (the latest available year), of the 6.1 million pregnancies in the United States, 1.6 million (27 percent) were mistimed and 1.1 million (18 percent) were unwanted at any time. Of all U.S. pregnancies in 2011, 45 percent were not intended (Guttmacher Institute 2019).

Some public handwringers maintain that a large population size aids the United States’ competition for economic and geopolitical dominance with China. But the mercantilist view that there is strength in numbers alone is obsolete by centuries. A large or rapidly growing population is hardly necessary or sufficient for prosperity.

Finland, ranked the happiest country in the world, has a total fertility rate of 1.4, compared to 1.6 in the U.S., 0.8 in South Korea, 1.1 in Singapore, 1.3 in Italy, 1.4 in Japan, 1.5 in Norway and 1.7 in Denmark. Women in China currently have 1.3 children on average, markedly fewer than in the United States (Figure 2).

The future

Some advocates of more rapid population growth argue that it would permit more people who want to migrate to the U.S. to do so. About 158 million adults in other countries would like to move and settle permanently in the U.S., according to the Gallup poll in 2018 (Esipova, Pugliese and Ray 2018). Would the U.S. willingly accept many or most of these would-be migrants?

More rapid population growth, especially through increased immigration of working-age adults, would temporarily ease the pressures on pay-as-you-go public programs for the elderly, particularly Social Security and Medicare in the U.S., by broadening the country’s tax base. But there’s a catch: in the future, those additional workers would retire, requiring additional workers to broaden the tax base again for the retiring workers. This demographic expansion would need to continue indefinitely.

Public discussion in the U.S. has largely ignored the notable social, economic and environmental upsides of slower American population growth. Slower population growth increases economic opportunities for women and minority groups, and exerts upward pressures on wages, especially for unskilled labor. For a given rate of capital investment, slower population growth also raises capital per person, raising productivity. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grows more slowly, but GDP per person grows faster.

All else equal, slower population growth lessens America’s contributions to climate change, biodiversity loss, deforestation, and pollution from commercial, industrial, agricultural, and domestic activities, such as heating and cooling buildings and fueling transport. Slower population growth makes it easier for governments, schools, and civic and religious organizations to respond more fully to increasing demands.

Worries about impending demographic doom for the U.S. seem decidedly misplaced. The United Nations (2019) projects that the populations of 55 countries or areas will decrease by 1 percent or more between 2020 and 2050. China’s population is projected to fall by almost 3 percent, Italy’s by 10 percent and Japan’s by 16 percent (Figure 3). By contrast, the population of the United States, currently at 333 million, is projected to grow by nearly 14 percent, largely through immigration, to 379 million by 2050.

The world’s population growth rate peaked in the 1960s and is falling in most regions except sub-Saharan Africa, which is the last major region to go through the demographic transition from high rates of mortality and fertility to relatively low rates. Whereas the U.S. population increased nearly four-fold during the 20^th century, it is expected to increase by roughly 50 percent in the 21^st century.

Conclusions

The United States and many other countries, including China, face real population challenges, but not principally slower population growth or even gradual population decline. These include addressing the needs of a rapidly aging population, managing cities and economies in recognition of climate change and environmental degradation, regulating and responding to migration, enabling people to have the children they want through reproductive health care and child-care support, and maintaining competitive technological change with better investments in education and worker training.

As COVID-19 has clearly demonstrated worldwide, real population challenges include protecting people against future pandemics and raising the value placed on today’s children, who are tomorrow’s problem solvers. In 2021, 22 percent of all children under age 5 years were stunted from chronic undernutrition (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank Group 2021), despite record cereal production globally (FAO 2021).

The global slowdown in population growth rates is not a transitory demographic problem: it signals important durable successes. It has encouraging implications for climate change and the environment. Couples are having fewer children in an increasingly urbanized world while men and women pursue education, employment and careers and live longer than ever before.

It is time to recognize that slower population growth benefits America, China, and the Earth.

References

Agarwal, Kabir (2020) “India’s Population Will Be 1.52 Billion by 2036, With 70% of Increase in Urban Areas”.  13 August The Wire

Esipova, Neli, Anita Pugliese and Julie Ray (2018) “More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate if They Could”.  10 December Gallup Poll

FAO (2021) World Food Situation.

Finer, Lawrence B. and Zolna, Mia R. (2016) “Declines in unintended pregnancy in the United States, 2008–2011”.  New England Journal of Medicine 374:843-852.  DOI: 10.1056/NEJMsa1506575.

Guttmacher Institute (2019) “Unintended Pregnancy in the United States”.  January

Shetty, Sudhanva (2021) “China’s 2020 Census Shows Population Barely Growing, Staring at Decline”. 11 May TRANSFIN

U.S. Census Bureau (2021) “First 2020 Census Data Release”. 26 April

U.S. Census Bureau (2020) “A Changing Nation: Population Projections”.

U.S. Census Bureau (1975) “Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970”. Government Printing Office.

UN (2019) “World Population Prospects: 2019.” United Nations, Population Division. New York, NY.

UNICEF, WHO, World Bank Group (2021) Levels and trends in child malnutrition. Key findings.

The post Slower population growth signals successes and benefits appeared first on N-IUSSP.

“Retirement age for U.S. Social Security benefits set at 75 years.” No, that is not a news headline today. But it certainly could be in the not-too-distant future. With Social Security Trust Funds projected to be insolvent in 2035 (U.S. Congressional Research Service 2020), America is again facing its retirement riddle.

The past

When the Social Security Act was enacted in 1935, the minimum age for receiving retirement benefits was 65 years, which was higher than life expectancy at birth (60 years for men and 64 years for women). With 7 percent of the U.S. population aged 65 years or older at that time, the potential support ratio – the number of working-age people aged 15 to 64 years per person aged 65 or over – was more than 10 (Figure 1).

The present

Today, Social Security full retirement benefits are payable at age 67 years for anyone born in 1960 or later (U.S. Social Security Administration 2021), which is well below today’s life expectancy at birth of 76 years for men and 81 years for women (Arias et al 2021). Many, however, are choosing to retire as early as age 62, but doing so can result in a benefits reduction. Retirement can also be delayed up to age 70, with increased benefits (Brandon 2019).

While the retirement age for full benefits has increased by 2 years since the establishment of Social Security, life expectancies at birth have increased by 16 years. With nearly 17 percent of the population aged 65 years or older, the potential support ratio is now 4 and is projected to decline to 3 by 2033.

In the coming decades, America’s population will become older and Americans will live longer. In 50 years’ time, one quarter of the population is expected to be aged 65 years or older, with the potential support ratio declining to 2. Life expectancies at birth in 2070 are projected to be 84 years for men and 87 years for women, or nearly 25 years more than when the Social Security was established (UN 2019).

Faced with Social Security’s long-term financing problem, resolving America’s retirement riddle is a crucial issue (Burtless 1998). The Social Security Board of Trustees projects program costs to rise by 2035, which means that incoming tax revenue will be sufficient to pay only 79 percent of scheduled benefits (U.S. Congressional Research Service 2020).

The future

Congress can address Social Security’s financing problem by making adjustments in three critical variables: retirement benefits, payroll tax revenues and retirement age. The pension fund’s rate of return on its investments also affects its solvency, but given stock market risks, it is generally not open to adjustments by governmental policies (Burtless 1988).

Some mistakenly believe that increasing the number of immigrant workers, or replacement migration, would resolve America’s retirement riddle. Immigration can certainly increase the size of the labor force. However, it is not a solution to population aging as it can only prevent it at unprecedented, unsustainable and increasing levels of migration inflow (UN 2001, Coleman 2002).

Few Americans are in favor of reducing Social Security benefits, including through lower cost-of-living adjustments. They have come to rely heavily on Social Security benefits in their old age, especially as most have saved relatively little and lack employer-based pensions, which are headed for extinction.

Moreover, if Social Security benefits were reduced, the poverty rate among Americans aged 65 years and older, which has declined by 70 percent over the past five decades to about 9 percent in 2019, would likely increase (U.S. Congressional Research Service 2019).

Raising dedicated payroll and self-employment taxes above their current level of 12.4 percent, and increasing the maximum taxable level ($142,800 in 2021) to cover Social Security’s rising costs are unsavory options for most elected government officials, business owners and the self-employed. Although Americans overwhelmingly support Social Security, raising taxes is politically unappealing and not fondly remembered by voters on election day.

That leaves the third critical variable: retirement age. Raising the retirement age reduces the number of beneficiaries, thereby lowering the costs of the program. Raising the future retirement age, while not a popular proposition, entails less political risk than reducing retirement benefits or increasing taxes.

To return to the 1940s potential support ratio of 10 would require raising Social Security’s retirement age by 8 years, up to age 75. The over-75s currently represents about 7 percent of the American population, about the same proportion as the over-65s in 1935.

In contrast to 1935 when the U.S. retirement age of 65 was higher than men’s and women’s life expectancies at birth, a retirement age of 75 would be lower than today’s life expectancies at birth. Also, importantly, the expected years in retirement for men and women at age 75 today and in 2035 are approximately the same as they were for people who retired at age 65 when Social Security was established, i.e., 12 years for men and 14 years for women (Figure 2).

Some, including university academics, career professionals, business executives and the self-employed, may welcome working to age 75. However, most Americans say they plan to retire at around 65 to 67 years old and, on average, actually retire at around 61 years.

Recommendations

Increasing the legal retirement age for Social Security benefits cannot be done overnight. It needs to be rolled out gradually, with initial increases taking effect years in the future and likely coupled with elimination of the early retirement option to ensure full benefits in later years of retirement.

Although Americans count on Social Security in their retirement, they are not confident about its future. Of those not yet receiving benefits, nearly 70 percent are not confident that they will receive their earned benefits at retirement.

It is well past the time for Congress to address Social Security’s financing problem, which it last did nearly forty years ago with a combination of tax increases and benefit reductions (U.S. Congressional Research Service 2020). Continued delays by lawmakers will make it more difficult to address Social Security Trust Funds projected insolvency in 2035. In short, it’s time to resolve America’s retirement riddle.

References

Arias Elizabeth, Tejada-Vera Betzaida, and Ahmad Farida. 2021. Provisional Life Expectancy Estimates for January through June, 2020. Vital Statistics Rapid Release, Report No. 10 (US National Vital Statistics System)

Brandon Emily. 2019. The History of Your Social Security Payments, US News.

Burtless Gary (1998) Increasing the Eligibility Age for Social Security Pensions, Brookings

Coleman David (2002) Replacement migration, or why everyone is going to have to live in Korea: a fable for our times from the United Nations. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 357(1420): 583–598.

UN (2001) Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Aging Populations? United Nations, Population Division.

https.un.org

UN (2019) World Population Prospects: 2019. United Nations, Population Division. New York, NY.

U.S. Congressional Research Service (2019) “Poverty among Americans Aged 65 and Older” Washington, D.C., July 1.

U.S. Congressional Research Service (2020) “Social Security: What Would Happen If the Trust Funds Ran Out?”. Washington, D.C., July 29.

U.S. Social Security Administration (2021) “Retirement Benefits”. Washington, D.C.

https.ssa.go

The post America’s retirement riddle appeared first on N-IUSSP.

One year after being declared a global pandemic on 11 March 2020, the effect of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus on world population is considerable. In addition to its far reaching social, economic and political consequences, the pandemic has greatly impacted the key components of world demographics: mortality, fertility and migration. The coronavirus continues to challenge governments worldwide, and several worrisome concerns are emerging during the second year of the pandemic.

Mortality

By mid-March 2021, the reported number of COVID-19 deaths worldwide is approaching 3 million, while around 120 million people have been infected. In both cases, these numbers are likely to be grossly underestimated.

Just five countries account for about half of all reported deaths. The U.S., with 4% of the world’s population, is in the lead position with well over half a million fatalities, representing 21% of all COVID-19 deaths. Next come Brazil, Mexico, India and the U.K. with 10%, 7%, 6%, and 5% of total deaths, respectively.

The ten countries with the highest COVID-19 death rates – all above 1,600 per million population – are all in Europe, except for the United States (Figure 1).

The diversity of COVID-19 death rates among countries is particularly noteworthy. The U.S. rate of more than 1,600 per million far exceeds the rates of Germany (887), Israel (658), Canada (593), Denmark (413), Japan (69), and Australia (35). Men tend to have higher COVID-19 case fatality rates than women, but in some cases, such as India, Nepal and Vietnam, the reverse is true.

The risk of severe illness and death from COVID-19 increases with age, with the elderly being at the highest risk: about 80% of the victims in the U.S. are aged 65 years and older.

Provisional data for several hard-hit countries indicate that life expectancy at birth has declined as a result of the pandemic. In the United States, for the first half of 2020, life expectancy at birth declined by 1.2 years for males and 0.9 years for females.

Importantly, significant differences in life expectancy decline are also observed across major U.S. socio-economic groups (Figure 2). The largest decline in life expectancy at birth was 3 years for non-Hispanic black males and the smallest was 0.7 years for non-Hispanic white females.

Fertility

The coronavirus pandemic has influenced fertility in many countries, but in very different ways. Some developing countries, including India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Uganda, report the beginnings of a baby boom, believed to be largely due to women being unable to access modern contraceptives.

In contrast, many other countries, including China, Italy, Germany, France, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, are facing declines in births pointing to a baby bust. In China, it is estimated that fewer babies were born in 2020 than in any year since 1961, when China experienced mass starvation. In the United States, around 300,000 fewer births are expected in 2021.

Migration

As a result of travel bans, restrictions and lockdowns, migration across international borders came to a virtual standstill in early 2020. In just a matter of several months, the world experienced the biggest and most rapid decline in global human mobility in modern times.

Many migrant workers were unable to travel in search of work and many returned to their home countries. Due to border closures, some migrant workers were stranded abroad and unable to return to their homes.

As well as curtailing the movements of migrants, business travelers and tourists, border closing significantly limited the entry and processing of refugees and asylum seekers. Despite the restrictions, however, many men, women and children continued to cross borders illegally.

The pandemic has also influenced internal migration (World Economic Forum 2020). In many countries, the coronavirus has caused a reverse migration from cities to less populated places and rural areas. High coronavirus infection rates closely linked to high-density urban living, combined with prolonged urban lockdowns, are causing people to rethink their residential choices. In various developing countries, including India, Kenya, Peru and South Africa, many urban dwellers are returning to their rural villages.

Concerns

Among the worrisome concerns about the pandemic in the near term is the emergence of more contagious and possibly more lethal variants of the coronavirus. Variants of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus first detected in China have already been reported in Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Another serious concern is the formidable challenge of ensuring global availability and access to COVID-19 vaccines, especially among low-income nations. While about 225 million doses of vaccines had been administered by the end of February, most of them were in high-income countries.

Somewhat ironically, there is also a concern about refusal to take the COVID-19 vaccine. Based on more than a dozen country surveys, it is estimated that approximately a fifth of people across the world would refuse to be vaccinated. High levels of vaccine refusal would threaten the goal of achieving herd immunity. This also raises the contentious issue of what activities might be prohibited for unvaccinated people (Wouters et al. 2021).

Numerous aspects of the coronavirus remain unclear, unresolved and puzzling. One thing, however, appears certain for the second year of the pandemic: many more people will have an Appointment in Samarra.¹

References

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2021) “Provisional Life Expectancy Estimates for January through June, 2020”. Vital Statistics Rapid Release, February

World Economic Forum. (2020) “How COVID-19 will impact our cities in the long term”. 20 November

Wouters O.J., et al. (2021) “Challenges in ensuring global access to COVID-19 vaccines: production, affordability, allocation, and deployment”. The Lancet, 12 February

Note

¹ Those who have not read John O’Hara’s 1934 novel may like to know that an ancient Mesopotamian tale appears as an epigraph for the novel: A merchant in Baghdad sends his servant to the marketplace for provisions. Soon afterwards, the servant comes home white and trembling and tells him that in the marketplace, he was jostled by a woman, whom he recognized as Death, who made a threatening gesture. Borrowing the merchant’s horse, he flees at great speed to Samarra, a distance of about 75 miles (125 km), where he believes Death will not find him. The merchant then goes to the marketplace and finds Death, and asks why she made the threatening gesture to his servant. She replies, “That was not a threatening gesture, it was only a start of surprise. I was astonished to see him in Baghdad, for I have an appointment with him tonight in Samarra.” (Source: Wikipedia)

The post COVID-19 pandemic: demographic highlights appeared first on N-IUSSP.