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	<title>migrant Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
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	<title>migrant Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
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	<item>
		<title>Slow growth  of the U.S. unauthorized foreign-born population during the 2010s</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/slow-growth-of-the-u-s-unauthorized-foreign-born-population-during-the-2010s/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jennifer Van Hook]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2025 08:47:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigrants]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[migrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9764</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Despite a&#160; large number of unauthorized immigrants entering the United States across the U.S.-Mexico border, the size of the undocumented foreign-born population remained almost constant at around 11 million between ... <a title="Slow growth  of the U.S. unauthorized foreign-born population during the 2010s" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/slow-growth-of-the-u-s-unauthorized-foreign-born-population-during-the-2010s/" aria-label="Read more about Slow growth  of the U.S. unauthorized foreign-born population during the 2010s">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/slow-growth-of-the-u-s-unauthorized-foreign-born-population-during-the-2010s/">Slow growth  of the U.S. unauthorized foreign-born population during the 2010s</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Despite a&nbsp; large number of unauthorized immigrants entering the United States across the U.S.-Mexico border, the size of the undocumented foreign-born population remained almost constant at around 11 million between 2010 and 2020. Jennifer Van Hook</em><strong><em> </em></strong><em>tells us why.</em>&nbsp;</p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Between 2010 and 2020, large numbers of unauthorized immigrants crossed the border into the U.S. each year. This steady inflow appeared to challenge demographic estimates showing slow growth in the population of unauthorized immigrants, whose number hovered around 11 million throughout the decade. Why did these estimates remain almost the same year after year despite the nearly continuous influx of new arrivals?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reason is that migration is a two-way process. Just as new undocumented immigrants enter the U.S. each year, others leave, die, or legalize their status. In a recent article, I show that outflows among unauthorized migrants have been substantial (Van Hook 2024).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Inflows are offset by outflows</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Populations grow only when inflows outpace outflows. Figure 1 shows the number of unauthorized migrant inflows (blue) and outflows (orange) per 1,000 U.S. population. During the economic boom years of 2000 to 2006, inflows far exceeded outflows, and the unauthorized population grew by over half a million per year. This period was marked by rapid economic growth and high demand for foreign labor from Mexico and Central America in the construction and service sectors.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-1.-Inflows-and-outflows-among-unauthorized-migrants-U.S.-2000‒2022-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-1.-Inflows-and-outflows-among-unauthorized-migrants-U.S.-2000‒2022--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9767" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-1.-Inflows-and-outflows-among-unauthorized-migrants-U.S.-2000‒2022--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-1.-Inflows-and-outflows-among-unauthorized-migrants-U.S.-2000‒2022--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-1.-Inflows-and-outflows-among-unauthorized-migrants-U.S.-2000‒2022--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-1.-Inflows-and-outflows-among-unauthorized-migrants-U.S.-2000‒2022-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the onset of the Great Recession, however, work opportunities evaporated. Many people lost their jobs, including unauthorized immigrants, and some went back to their home countries. At the same time, many would-be migrants opted to stay home. In-migration dropped, out-migration spiked, and the unauthorized population declined by 1.5 million in the space of just two years.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since about 2010, inflows have been more closely balanced by outflows. Between 2010 and 2020, 5.6 million unauthorized immigrants entered the country or overstayed a visa, while 5.1 million died, legalized or emigrated. The close correspondence between inflows and outflows helps explain why the overall number of unauthorized immigrants during this period grew by less than half a million during the decade, from 10.6 million in 2010 to 11.0 million in 2020.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Duration of stay</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To understand why outflows occur, it is helpful to consider the trajectory of the average migrant. Using a common demographic technique, the life table, I found that the average migrant is likely to remain in an unauthorized legal status for 16 years. This is a long time but not a lifetime. Fully <em>one-third</em> are no longer unauthorized migrants within ten years of entering the country.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Most of these outflows take the form of out-migration. At least 23 percent of unauthorized migrants appear to leave the country within ten years. In contrast, only 11 percent find ways to legalize, and 1 percent die. The 11 percent who legalize is an upper-bound estimate. It is based on the information available to the public from the Department of Homeland Security on <em>all</em> immigrant adjustments and not just those who adjust from an unauthorized to a legal immigration status.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The time migrants spend living with an unauthorized migration status varies across groups (Figure 2). Mexicans and Central Americans spend the longest time. They can expect to live undocumented in the United States for an average of 22 years. After ten years of residence, roughly 20 percent will have returned home and only 6 percent of Mexicans and 3 percent of Central Americans will have legalized. These low legalization rates reflect their limited options under U.S. immigration law. As poor labor migrants with low levels of education, their chances of legalizing under employment-based classes of admission are slim. Additionally, many crossed the U.S.-Mexico border without inspection (by evading immigration checkpoints or being smuggled into the country), so are subject to laws that forbid them from adjusting status without first leaving the U.S. for many years.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-2.-Share-of-unauthorized-migrants-who-legalized-died-or-left-the-U.S.-within-10-years-of-U.S.-residence-2015‒2022-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="562" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-2.-Share-of-unauthorized-migrants-who-legalized-died-or-left-the-U.S.-within-10-years-of-U.S.-residence-2015‒2022--1024x562.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9768" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-2.-Share-of-unauthorized-migrants-who-legalized-died-or-left-the-U.S.-within-10-years-of-U.S.-residence-2015‒2022--1024x562.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-2.-Share-of-unauthorized-migrants-who-legalized-died-or-left-the-U.S.-within-10-years-of-U.S.-residence-2015‒2022--300x165.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-2.-Share-of-unauthorized-migrants-who-legalized-died-or-left-the-U.S.-within-10-years-of-U.S.-residence-2015‒2022--768x422.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Figure-2.-Share-of-unauthorized-migrants-who-legalized-died-or-left-the-U.S.-within-10-years-of-U.S.-residence-2015‒2022-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This contrasts with migrants from other parts of Latin America, Asia, Europe, and Africa. On average, they can expect to spend 11 years in unauthorized status before leaving, adjusting to legal permanent residence status, or dying, half the average duration of Mexicans and Central Americans. Europeans, Canadians and Oceanians stand out, with 25 percent leaving the country and up to 25 percent legalizing within 10 years. A large share of these migrants overstayed a student or work visa and are highly educated. They may not want to stay in the U.S. because they have opportunities elsewhere, and those who do stay may be able to legalize through employment or family visas.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Declines in duration</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The duration spent in unauthorized status has been declining over the last two decades. Between 2000 and 2006, the average was 22 years. With the onset of the Great Recession, however, return migration rates rose three-fold. The average duration declined to 16 years and remains at this level today.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These changes happened because groups that spend a long time in unauthorized status (Mexicans and Central Americans) are gradually being replaced by groups with shorter durations. Between 2007 and 2022, the number of Mexican-born unauthorized immigrants dropped from 7.7 to 5.1 million. At the same time, the share from all other regions increased, and these newer groups tend to spend less time in an unauthorized status than Mexicans.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Looking ahead</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The latest estimates of the unauthorized population do not extend beyond 2022 and do not fully capture recent increases in entries at the U.S.-Mexico border. Encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border surged more than four-fold from 401,000 in 2020 to 1.7 million in 2021, and then further increased to 2.4 million in 2022 and 2.5 million in 2023. As more data become available, we expect to see growth in the unauthorized foreign-born population, but it remains unclear <em>how much</em> growth. That will depend on how long new arrivals remain in the country in an unauthorized status. Despite these uncertainties, the overarching trend is clear. Large shares of unauthorized immigrants leave the country or legalize, and they are less “permanent” now than two decades ago.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Van Hook Jennifer (2024) Beyond Stocks and Surges: The Demographic Impact of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population in the United States. <em>Population and Development Review</em>, online first, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12683">https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12683</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/slow-growth-of-the-u-s-unauthorized-foreign-born-population-during-the-2010s/">Slow growth  of the U.S. unauthorized foreign-born population during the 2010s</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>On the move. The new reality for China&#8217;s migrant children</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/on-the-move-the-new-reality-for-chinas-migrant-children/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lidan Lyu（corresponding author）]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Oct 2024 09:37:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[migrant]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=9586</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Massive internal migration in China has transformed the landscape of childhood for millions. Analyzing census data from 2000 to 2020, Mengyao Cheng, Yu Chen, Lidan Lyu, and Yu Bai find ... <a title="On the move. The new reality for China&#8217;s migrant children" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/on-the-move-the-new-reality-for-chinas-migrant-children/" aria-label="Read more about On the move. The new reality for China&#8217;s migrant children">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/on-the-move-the-new-reality-for-chinas-migrant-children/">On the move. The new reality for China&#8217;s migrant children</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Massive internal migration in China has transformed the landscape of childhood for millions. Analyzing census data from 2000 to 2020, Mengyao Cheng, Yu Chen, Lidan Lyu, and Yu Bai find that nearly half of China&#8217;s children are now in migrant families, with more joining parents in cities than ever before. This shift in child migration patterns is reshaping family structures and challenging urban policies.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">China&#8217;s economic growth has been driven by massive rural-to-urban migration. Since the economic reforms began, the migrant population has surged from less than seven million in 1982 to 376 million in 2020. Increased intra-provincial (short-range) migration, coupled with improved urban educational systems has encouraged family migration as opposed to adults moving alone (Lyu et al. 2015; NBSC et al. 2023). However, behind this evolving narrative lies a less-told story of the children (0–17 years) in family structures affected by migration, which we unveiled in a recent study (Cheng et al. 2024). We reveal how, at a time of massive internal migration, children in China navigate the complexities of family separation or relocation, facing unique challenges linked to the <em>hukou</em> system of household registration.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The urban migrant child boom</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The population of children in migrant families, a group that includes both left-behind children and migrant children, has undergone huge changes. The proportion of children in migrant families surged from 14.5% in 2000 to 46.4% in 2020, with nearly one in every two children in China now living in family structures affected by migration (Figures 1 and 2).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-1.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="498" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-1.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020.--1024x498.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9603" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-1.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020.--1024x498.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-1.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020.--300x146.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-1.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020.--768x374.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-1.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-2.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="498" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-2.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020-1024x498.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9604" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-2.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020-1024x498.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-2.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020-300x146.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-2.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020-768x374.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Figure-2.-Children-by-family-migration-status.-China-2000-2010-and-2020.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2000, left-behind children far outnumbered migrant children, but things changed rapidly and by 2020, migrant children constituted 51.5% of all children in migrant families, reaching 71.1 million and accounting for 23.9% percent of China&#8217;s total child population.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Family ties in flux</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This urban migrant child boom brought with it a kaleidoscope of new family living arrangements, including, for instance, a trend towards family reunification in cities. The percentage of migrant children living with both parents at their destination increased from 25.0% to 31.8% between in 2010 and 2020 (Table 1), which indicates that more parents are now able to bring their children with them when they migrate, leading to more intact families in urban areas.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Table-1.-Living-arrangements-of-children-in-China-in-2000-2010-and-2020-1-1.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="634" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Table-1.-Living-arrangements-of-children-in-China-in-2000-2010-and-2020-1-1-1024x634.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-9608" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Table-1.-Living-arrangements-of-children-in-China-in-2000-2010-and-2020-1-1-1024x634.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Table-1.-Living-arrangements-of-children-in-China-in-2000-2010-and-2020-1-1-300x186.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Table-1.-Living-arrangements-of-children-in-China-in-2000-2010-and-2020-1-1-768x476.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Table-1.-Living-arrangements-of-children-in-China-in-2000-2010-and-2020-1-1.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, challenges and complexities remain. While the trend towards family reunification is evident, there is also a rise in non-traditional living arrangements among migrant children. The percentage of migrant children in two-parent families living with one or no parents increased from 2.0% in 2000 to 7.5% in 2020, indicating more complex family separations. These living arrangements vary significantly across different age groups. While 79.5% of migrant children aged 0-14 lived with both parents in 2020, a significant 10.9 million did not. The picture changes for older teens: only 24% of migrant children aged 15-17 lived with both parents, with the majority living independently or with non-parental adults.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The emergence of “left-behind child migrants”</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our most intriguing finding is the identification of a new group within the migrant children population, which we term “left-behind child migrants” (<em>liuliu ertong</em> &#8211; 流留儿童 &#8211; in Chinese), who have migrated across townships within a county but do not live with both parents. The move, primarily driven by the availability of schools at destination, leads to challenging family dynamics, such as separations, as parents continue to work elsewhere to finance their children’s education.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2020, some 14.2 million children fell into this category, a dramatic increase from just 3.4 million in 2000. In 2020, over half (57.1%) of these “left-behind child migrants” still lived with unrelated individuals or alone. This phenomenon blurs the traditional urban-rural divide. Its prevalence highlights the extent of the problems linked to the lack of stable family environments for these children, and reflects the tension between the drive for better education and the obstacles to family migration in larger cities. Moreover, it exposes the uneven rural-urban distribution of educational resources in China&#8217;s urbanization process, forcing rural families to make difficult choices.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Discussion: education as a great equalizer?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The changing pattern of child migration in China raises pressing questions about unequal access to educational resources. While policies have improved to accommodate migrant children in urban public schools, significant hurdles remain. Our findings suggest that educational aspirations are a key driver of child migration, particularly for the group of left-behind child migrants.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As China continues its rapid urbanization, the well-being of these millions of children in families affected by migration will be crucial to its social and economic future. Understanding these evolving migration patterns is the first step towards creating inclusive policies that grant all children, regardless of their migration status, equal opportunities to thrive in China&#8217;s cities.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Reference</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cheng M., Chen Y., Lyu L., Bai Y. 2024. “Children on the Move in China: Insights from the Census Data 2000–2020.” <em>Population and Development Review</em>, online first, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/padr.12653</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lyu L., Cheng M., Tan Y., Duan C.. 2018. “The Development and Challenges of Migrant Children Population in China: 2000–2015.” Qingnian Yanjiu [Youth Studies], (4), 1–12, 94. [in Chinese].</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), UNFPA China, and UNICEF China. 2023. “What the 2020 Census Can Tell Us About Children in China.” United Nations Children’s Fund China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/on-the-move-the-new-reality-for-chinas-migrant-children/">On the move. The new reality for China&#8217;s migrant children</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mengyao Cheng]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Yu Chen]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Yu Bai]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>Did you know?</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-28/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[N-IUSSP]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 May 2023 08:14:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Graphics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emigrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[migrant]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8425</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Attractiveness of OECD countries for potential migrants: highly skilled workers. New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, and Norway are the most attractive countries for highly skilled migrants in 2023. The United ... <a title="Did you know?" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-28/" aria-label="Read more about Did you know?">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-28/">Did you know?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Attractiveness of OECD countries for potential migrants: highly skilled workers</strong>.</p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, and Norway are the most attractive countries for highly skilled migrants in 2023. The United States would have been ranked second if visa policies were not considered.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Note: </strong>Values closer to 1(0) represent higher (lower) attractiveness. <br><strong>Source: </strong>OECD, <em>Migration Policy Debates</em>, N°29, March 2023.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-28/">Did you know?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Who is an Internally Displaced Person?</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/video/who-is-an-internally-displaced-person/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[N-IUSSP]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Sep 2021 08:08:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Video]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[migrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Migration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[refugee]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unhcr]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[video]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=6600</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>unhcr.org/internally-displaced-people Internally displaced people (IDPs) have not crossed a border to find safety. Unlike refugees, they are on the run at home. IDPs stay within their own country and remain ... <a title="Who is an Internally Displaced Person?" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/video/who-is-an-internally-displaced-person/" aria-label="Read more about Who is an Internally Displaced Person?">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/video/who-is-an-internally-displaced-person/">Who is an Internally Displaced Person?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.unhcr.org/internally-displaced-people" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>unhcr.org/internally-displaced-people</strong></a> <br>Internally displaced people (IDPs) have not crossed a border to find safety. Unlike refugees, they are on the run at home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">IDPs stay within their own country and remain under the protection of its government, even if that government is the reason for&nbsp;their displacement. They often move to areas where it is difficult for us to deliver humanitarian assistance and as a result, these people are among&nbsp;the most vulnerable in the world. </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/video/who-is-an-internally-displaced-person/">Who is an Internally Displaced Person?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Did you know?</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-17/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[N-IUSSP]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Jul 2021 07:59:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Graphics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Did you know]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[graphics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[migrant]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=6500</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Most international migrants originate from middle-income countries. In 2020, nearly 177 million international migrants, about 63 per cent of the total, came from a middle-income country. The number of migrants ... <a title="Did you know?" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-17/" aria-label="Read more about Did you know?">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-17/">Did you know?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Most international migrants originate from middle-income countries. In 2020, nearly 177 million international migrants, about 63 per cent of the total, came from a middle-income country. The number of migrants originating from low-income countries, while small compared to other income groups, grew rapidly between 2000 and 2020. Much of this increase was driven by humanitarian crises.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/graphics/did-you-know-17/">Did you know?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Migrant children’s schooling in urban China</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/migrant-childrens-schooling-in-urban-chinascolarite-des-enfants-migrants-en-chine-urbaine/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Yuanfei Li]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Dec 2020 08:16:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Education]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigrants]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[migrant]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=4977</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Massive internal migration in China has led to a rise in the population of migrant children. Yuanfei Li, Zai Liang and Zhongshan Yue examine schooling choices for migrant children in ... <a title="Migrant children’s schooling in urban China" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/migrant-childrens-schooling-in-urban-chinascolarite-des-enfants-migrants-en-chine-urbaine/" aria-label="Read more about Migrant children’s schooling in urban China">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/migrant-childrens-schooling-in-urban-chinascolarite-des-enfants-migrants-en-chine-urbaine/">Migrant children’s schooling in urban China</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Massive internal migration in China has led to a rise in the population of migrant children. Yuanfei Li, Zai Liang and Zhongshan Yue examine schooling choices for migrant children in urban China and find that they still face significant obstacles in accessing public schools, with (illegal) extra fees often being imposed upon their parents.&nbsp;</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Before China’s transition to a market-oriented economy in the late 1970s, internal migration was strictly controlled by a <em>hukou</em> system (household registration system). As a result, migration within China was minimal and urbanization low. However, during the last few decades, urbanization in China has developed at an unprecedented pace: the percentage urban rose from less than 18% in 1978, to more than 57% in 2016 (Figure 1).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_fig1.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="642" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_fig1-1024x642.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-4997" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_fig1-1024x642.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_fig1-300x188.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_fig1-768x481.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_fig1.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This trend has been driven mainly by massive internal migration following the relaxation of restrictive migration policies, and China’s reform and opening-up in the late 1970s (Liang, Van Luong, and Chen 2008). More than 100 million children are affected by internal migration in contemporary China. The majority are the so-called left-behind children (looked after by relatives in rural areas while their parents move to the city), but more than a third are migrant children who move with their parents (Duan et al. 2013). Although recent changes in government policies have improved educational opportunities for migrant children (Table 1), their choices in the city are still limited in subtle ways. Using data from a nationally representative survey, in a recent study we examined the continuing challenges faced by migrant families in getting their children (aged 6-12) enrolled in urban public schools (Liang et al. 2020).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab1.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="601" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab1-1024x601.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-4980" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab1-1024x601.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab1-300x176.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab1-768x451.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab1.jpg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Schooling options for migrant children in urban China</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For public school education, children’s opportunities in Chinese cities are closely related to their <em>hukou</em> status. Migrant children, who lack a local <em>hukou</em> in destination cities, are not on an equal footing with their resident peers. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, many migrant parents have had to pay large amounts of money for “education endorsement fees” to local public schools in order to enroll their children. While changes in education policy eventually banned such practices (in 2004), there are still schools that charge extra money to migrant parents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As a result, many migrant families, especially the most socioeconomically disadvantaged ones, have no choice but to register their children in schools for migrant children organized by migrant parents or migrant entrepreneurs. Their affordable tuition, flexible payment schedule, and physical proximity make these migrant schools very attractive to migrant families. However, they often have poor infrastructure and less qualified teachers, and in some cases they do not even meet safety standards, so are exposed to the risk of government intervention and shutdown. As such, migrant children attending these schools face multiple uncertainties and their education may suffer in the long run.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Private schools are a third, and better, option but as is the case in most developed countries, they often charge very high tuition fees and are thus out of reach for ordinary migrant families. Overall, like their local counterparts, most migrant parents would prefer to enroll their children in local public schools. Given the more favorable outcomes for migrant children attending public schools (versus migrant schools), education policies also now require city government to accommodate migrant children’s education in the local public education system.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Ongoing challenges for migrant children</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We examined two questions related to migrant children’s education using data from the 2012 China National Migration Population Dynamics Monitoring Survey and findings from our fieldwork in selected cities in China:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1) Do migrant parents enroll their children in public or migrant schools?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2) Do migrant parents pay any fees for public school enrollment?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As shown in Table 2, the majority of migrant children are enrolled in local public schools, but a non-negligible share (6.8%) are still attending special migrant schools. Despite government policy explicitly prohibiting public schools from charging enrollment fees, about 20% of migrant families paid such fees in 2012. While adaptation in the destination city can help migrant families navigate the local public school system, our fieldwork shows that they also face other more subtle hurdles. Even though some migrant families can afford to get their children enrolled, they often have to rely on some special “social capital” to do so. In nearly all cases, migrant parents have to find a “broker” , often a local resident, to make contact with school officials and facilitate the enrollment of their child in a public school.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab2b.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1021" height="627" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab2b.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-4985" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab2b.jpg 1021w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab2b-300x184.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/li_migrazione_cina_tab2b-768x472.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1021px) 100vw, 1021px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moreover, we also find significant differences across regions. Compared to children moving to other parts of China, migrant children residing in eastern China, which is more socioeconomically developed, are less likely to be enrolled in public schools and, when they are, their parents are more likely to pay for their education. However paradoxical these patterns may seem at first glance, they actually reflect a sad reality: large cities in eastern China, especially Beijing and Shanghai, are ignoring policies ensuring equality of educational opportunity and have begun to use a new strategy to control and discourage immigration.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Apart from these findings, there are other major concerns for both scholars and policy makers. For instance, among all the 6 to 12-year-old migrant children in our study, around 11% were not enrolled in school when the survey was conducted. While this could be due to disruption during initial settlement of migrant children, especially for the youngest among them, it also shows that more effort is needed to grant these children the same educational opportunities as their urban (resident) peers.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Duan, Chengrong, Lidan Lv, Jing Guo, and Zongping Wang. 2013. “Left behind Children in Rural China: Evidence from the 2010 Chinese Population Census.” Population Journal 35(3):37–49.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Liang, Zai, Hy Van Luong, and Yiu Por Chen. 2008. “Urbanization in China in the 1990s: Patterns and Regional Variations.” Pp. 205-225 in John R. Logan (ed.) Urban China in Transition. Blackwell.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Liang, Zai, Zhongshan Yue, Yuanfei Li, Qiao Li, and Aihua Zhou. 2020. “Choices or Constraints: Education of Migrant Children in Urban China.” Population Research and Policy Review 39(4):671–90.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/migrant-childrens-schooling-in-urban-chinascolarite-des-enfants-migrants-en-chine-urbaine/">Migrant children’s schooling in urban China</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zai Liang]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zhongshan Yue]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>Why has migrant fertility in Norway declined?</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/why-has-migrant-fertility-in-norway-declinedcomment-expliquer-le-recul-de-la-fecondite-des-migrants-en-norvege/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marianne Tønnessen]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2020 08:49:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emigrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[migrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Migration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[refugee]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=4382</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Fertility among immigrants has declined in many Western countries. In Norway, Marianne Tønnessen finds that the successful integration of immigrants is not the main driver of the decline since 2000, ... <a title="Why has migrant fertility in Norway declined?" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/why-has-migrant-fertility-in-norway-declinedcomment-expliquer-le-recul-de-la-fecondite-des-migrants-en-norvege/" aria-label="Read more about Why has migrant fertility in Norway declined?">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/why-has-migrant-fertility-in-norway-declinedcomment-expliquer-le-recul-de-la-fecondite-des-migrants-en-norvege/">Why has migrant fertility in Norway declined?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Fertility among immigrants has declined in many Western countries. In Norway, Marianne Tønnessen finds that the successful integration of immigrants is not the main driver of the decline since 2000, but rather decreased fertility in origin areas.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">In many Western countries, the total fertility rate (TFR) of immigrant women has declined over the last decades (Figure 1). In Norway, for instance, immigrant TFR fell from 2.6 children per women in 2000 to less than 2.0 in 2017. This may be due to several factors, such as immigrants’ adaptation to the fertility norms at destination, changing composition of immigrant women by area of origin, and other factors.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Fig1_tommasen.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="909" height="489" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Fig1_tommasen.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-4390" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Fig1_tommasen.jpg 909w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Fig1_tommasen-300x161.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Fig1_tommasen-768x413.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 909px) 100vw, 909px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent study, I try to disentangle the different possible causes of this decline (Tønnessen, 2019). Like many other Northern European countries, Norway has relatively high fertility (ranging between 1.98 and 1.62 in the study period) and an increasing share of immigrants (from 5.3 per cent in 2000 to 13.8% in 2017) from all over the world and, in the last decade, from Eastern EU countries like Poland and Lithuania in particular (Statistics Norway 2020a,b).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Newly arrived family migrants explain a lot</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The results show that in line with findings from many other countries (see for instance Sobotka 2008), immigrant women from regions with high fertility (such as Africa and parts of Asia) often have higher fertility in Norway than women from low fertility countries. Also, immigrant women’s fertility often declines with time since arrival in the destination country, probably because of integration, so that, everything else equal,&nbsp;women who have been living in Norway for a long time have lower fertility than those who arrived only recently. For instance, in 2000, newly arrived immigrants (0-2 years since migration), from Africa and Asia had a TFR above 4 children per women, while women from the same regions who had entered the country more than ten years earlier had a TFR of around 2. These trends are not particularly surprising, of course, nor is the considerably lower fertility – about 2 children per woman – of women from the European Union or the US.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, the decline in immigrant TFR in Norway from 2000 is due neither to an increased share of immigrant women from low fertility countries, nor to an increased share of women with long duration of stay. It is linked, instead, to the fact that the fertility of recent immigrants to Norway is considerably lower than it was 20 years ago. For instance, while in 2000 the fertility of newly arrived women from Eastern and South Eastern Asia was above 4 children per women, in 2017 it was below 2. The same holds for newly arrived women from Latin America (from 3.5 in 2000 to 2.0 in 2017) and from Western and Southern Asia (4.5 to 3.5).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Decomposition methods make it possible to quantify the effect of changes in composition by duration of stay and area of origin, and the effect of changing fertility within subgroups (by duration of stay and reason for migration). The results (Table 1) show that lower fertility among newly arrived immigrants explains 93% of the overall decline, and that this is mainly driven by women from Asia.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/tab1_tommasen.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="909" height="568" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/tab1_tommasen.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-4391" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/tab1_tommasen.jpg 909w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/tab1_tommasen-300x187.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/tab1_tommasen-768x480.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 909px) 100vw, 909px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I further analyzed this fertility decline among newly arrived women by reason for migration. Women who migrate for family reasons appear to provide a key: their share among all newly arrived immigrant women declined in this period – for instance, from above 80% in 2000 to 55% in 2017 among women from Eastern and Southern Asia – and so did their fertility (see Figure 2). Among newly arrived family migrants from Asia, TFR fell by more than two births per woman from 2000 to 2017.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Schermata-2020-03-22-alle-12.17.42.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="553" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Schermata-2020-03-22-alle-12.17.42-1024x553.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4385" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Schermata-2020-03-22-alle-12.17.42-1024x553.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Schermata-2020-03-22-alle-12.17.42-300x162.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Schermata-2020-03-22-alle-12.17.42-768x414.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Schermata-2020-03-22-alle-12.17.42.png 1790w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Further decompositions show that the lower TFR of newly arrived family migrants accounts for a large share of the total TFR decline among all immigrants in Norway. Among newly arrived immigrants from Western and Southern Asia only, lower fertility among family migrants accounts for 10% of the overall TFR decline, and among those from Eastern and South East Asia it accounts for 8%. Hence, decreased fertility among these two groups alone accounts for 18% of the TFR decrease of all immigrant women in Norway. This is a large effect from a relatively small group; at end-2017, they represented just 3% of all immigrant women of childbearing age (5% in 2000).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A large part of this fertility decline among newly arrived family migrants from non-western parts of the world may reflect fertility declines in origin due to factors such as family planning programs or more education for women. Such factors may, in turn, affect both the share of women who migrate for family reasons and the fertility of the family migrants. And although migrant women may be a select group compared to those who remain in origin, they may have been affected by the same secular changes in fertility norms and behaviors.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Fertility has declined in many origin areas</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fertility has declined substantially in many non-western countries. Such origin area trends are sometimes overlooked in studies of immigrant fertility. Although the newly arrived immigrant women grew up in the same origin areas as those who moved to Norway one or two decades ago, they grew up in a different time, with different fertility norms and patterns.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The fact that the decreased immigrant TFR in Norway is mainly driven by lower fertility among newly arrived women, possibly reflecting declining fertility trends in their countries of origin, may remind migration researchers to look for explanations of changes in immigrant fertility beyond the destination country and the characteristics of individual migrants.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This can also be a reminder for policy makers and others not to draw too hasty conclusions about the effect of domestic policies by looking at trends in immigrant TFR. Although an immigrant woman’s fertility often declines with her duration of stay, thanks to successful integration for instance, this does not necessarily translate into a declining TFR for all immigrants, unless the share with long duration of stay increases.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The results of my research also point to the future: if fertility change in origin areas is a driver of fertility decline among many non-western newly arrived migrants, and if fertility continues to fall in important origin areas – as projected by the United Nations for high-fertility parts of the world (United Nations 2019) – we may expect further fertility declines among immigrants from these areas. Moreover, policies affecting fertility preferences in high-fertility parts of the world may, in turn, affect the fertility of Western countries’ own immigrant populations.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sobotka, T. (2008). The rising importance of migrants for childbearing in Europe. Overview Chapter 7. <em>Childbearing Trends and Policies in Europe. Demographic Research, Special Collection,</em> 7, 225-248.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Statistics Norway (2020a). <a href="http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/fodte" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Births. Statistics from retrieved February 2020.</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Statistics Norway (2020b). <a href="https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvbef" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents. Statistics from retrieved February 2020.</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tønnessen, M. (2019). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-019-09541-0" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Declined Total Fertility Rate Among Immigrants and the Role of Newly Arrived Women in Norway. <em>European Journal of Population</em>.</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">United Nations (2019). <em>World population prospects: The 2019 revision</em>. New York: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/why-has-migrant-fertility-in-norway-declinedcomment-expliquer-le-recul-de-la-fecondite-des-migrants-en-norvege/">Why has migrant fertility in Norway declined?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Migrant mortality advantage and the selection hypothesis</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/migrant-mortality-advantage-and-the-selection-hypothesis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Wallace]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Feb 2020 10:01:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobility, migration and foreigners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emigrant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigrant]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>We frequently hear that international migrants are a selected subgroup of their origin populations. The veracity of this statement is generally just assumed or inferred from comparison on some specific ... <a title="Migrant mortality advantage and the selection hypothesis" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/migrant-mortality-advantage-and-the-selection-hypothesis/" aria-label="Read more about Migrant mortality advantage and the selection hypothesis">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/migrant-mortality-advantage-and-the-selection-hypothesis/">Migrant mortality advantage and the selection hypothesis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>We frequently hear that international migrants are a selected subgroup of their origin populations. The veracity of this statement is generally just assumed or inferred from comparison on some specific characteristics (e.g. survival) with the destination population.<br>Matthew Wallace and Ben Wilson take a step further and compare migrants with the populations they come from. The selection hypothesis is confirmed and qualified in several respects.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">When we study the social outcomes of international migrants – such as fertility, health or education – we typically compare them with three reference groups: (i) non-migrants in the destination country, (ii) non-migrants in the origin country (iii) and immigrants from the same origin country living in different destinations. Although there is more than one potential comparison group, migration scholars almost always compare immigrants with non-migrants in the countries they move to. This focus on destination comparisons is understandable; they are easier because they only require a single data source. Comparisons with origin, on the other hand, require <em>at least</em> two harmonized data sources containing similar information and of requisite quality; one source for immigrant outcomes in the destination country and another for non-migrant outcomes in the origin country.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Destination comparisons also reflect a greater interest in where immigrants are living now, how their lives change after arrival, and the links between migration, integration and inequality. Nevertheless, comparisons with non-migrants in the destination only tell us part of the story about immigrants’ lives. If we additionally make comparisons with non-migrants in origin countries, then this can help us to understand <em>why </em>the outcomes of immigrants differ from non-migrants in the destination country. Often, immigrants are said to be “selected” from their origin populations. This might mean that those who leave a country are, for example, more highly educated or healthier than those who stay behind. These two factors are not independent. If some people are more highly educated than others, then they are probably healthier too, and vice versa. Although destination comparisons can tell us a lot about the experiences of immigrants in their new country, they say little about selection unless we compare them with the population they are selected from.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Comparing immigrants with their origin country: mortality&#8230;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent study (Wallace and Wilson 2019), we compared the mortality of immigrants in the United Kingdom (UK) with non-migrants in their origin countries. Our analysis is framed around the <em>migrant mortality advantage</em> – a term used to describe the frequently observed situation in which immigrants have lower overall mortality than non-migrant populations at destination. It is considered advantageous because immigrants, on average, will live longer than non-migrants. Researchers often suspect that selection plays a big role in the advantage. For example, if we find that immigrants from India – a country that ranks around 130<sup>th</sup> in the world life expectancy rankings – have lower mortality than non-migrants in the UK – a country that ranks around 30<sup>th</sup> in the world – then it’s likely that the immigrants have, on average, lower mortality than non-migrants in India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In our study, we estimated relative mortality, versus origin, of immigrants from the 35 countries with the largest immigrant populations in the United Kingdom, by age and sex. We analysed data on deaths and population sizes from the Office for National Statistics (in the UK) alongside equivalent data for origin countries from the Human Mortality Database and the <em>United Nations World Population Prospects</em>. We also analysed equivalent data on the educational attainment – of immigrants versus their country of birth – as a more widely accepted measure of selection (Feliciano and Lanuza 2017) and a characteristic that remains quite stable with time (unlike mortality, which is directly affected by people’s experiences in the destination country (Ichou and Wallace 2018).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1 shows the age-specific mortality of immigrants relative to the population in their countries of birth. The far-left panel shows the “average” for all immigrants living in the UK plotted in black, with individual immigrant groups plotted in light grey. The red line indicates mortality in origin countries at a given age. Values below the red line indicate a mortality advantage, whereas those above the red line indicate excess mortality among immigrants. The other panels show four examples of immigrant groups from countries with different levels of the Human Development Index (HDI), ranging from low (Nigeria) to very high (the United States). These examples are fairly typical of the averages for each HDI category that we show in the full paper, and they illustrate three key findings. First of all, there is a common shape across panels, in which the advantage is largest at young adult ages and decreases with age. Second, the advantage at young adult ages is largest among immigrants from poorer countries and diminishes as we move up HDI categories. Third, we find that substantial mortality advantages exist at older ages (65+) for countries in the low and medium HDI categories, but not for groups in the high and very high categories.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.39.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="775" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.39-1024x775.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4294" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.39-1024x775.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.39-300x227.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.39-768x582.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.39.png 1986w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>&#8230; and education</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 2 shows an almost identical analysis, but with a focus on education. Here, the far-left panel shows that immigrants almost always have higher rates of tertiary education than average members of the population in their country of birth. There are only a few exceptions (i.e. the light grey line is below the red line), with the clearest case being Lithuania (not singled out here). Generally, the size of the differentials falls as we move up HDI categories. For example, Nigerian immigrants are much more highly educated than their Nigerian origin population, whereas immigrants from the US are only somewhat more highly educated than the US average. Variation over age is likely to reflect cohort differences in migration, as well as cohort trends in the origin countries, including factors such as educational expansion.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.24.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="727" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.24-1024x727.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4295" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.24-1024x727.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.24-300x213.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.24-768x545.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Schermata-2020-02-14-alle-11.40.24.png 1998w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions: selective selection at work (but weakening over time)</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So, what do these findings tell us? We think that the patterns provide evidence consistent with selection. Immigrants have lower mortality than the population in their country of origin, on average. The lower the level of development in the origin country, the larger this advantage tends to be. This suggests that immigrants from poor countries need to be more strongly selected than immigrants from rich countries in order to generate a similar mortality advantage vs. the same destination population. Next, the advantage is largest at young adult ages and diminishes with age. Since the majority of immigrants arrive at young adult ages, this finding is consistent with the idea that selection effects are strongest shortly after immigrants arrive and weaken over time. In absence of data on duration of residence, it is at young adult ages that we come closest to capturing the extent of selection effects among immigrants, as these are the ages where the selection has just taken place (and exposure to life at destination is minimised). With time and a growing influence of destination-specific risk factors that affect mortality, the role of selection diminishes. Last, immigrants are also more highly educated, on average, than their origin populations. Given that education is a more stable measure of selection (because it is unlikely to change from young adulthood onwards), this result adds further support for our conclusions on mortality.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Overall, our findings represent an important reference point in the re-conceptualization of immigrant outcomes relative to origin country populations. We are not the first to make such comparisons (Marmot, Adelstein, and Bulusu 1984; Gadd et al. 2006), but our study is the first to do so for such a diverse array of countries and in such detail (i.e. by age, sex and origin country), even considering comparisons to destination. Given that selection seems to be an important explanation of the migrant mortality advantage, we should consider how the flows of selected people between countries – often from poor to rich countries – impacts positively on national mortality metrics in rich countries, negatively on national mortality in poor countries and potentially inflates the size of health inequalities between them.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Bibliography</strong></h4>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Feliciano, C., and Y. R. Lanuza. 2017. &#8220;An immigrant paradox? Contextual attainment and intergenerational educational mobility.&#8221; <em>Am Sociol Rev</em> 82 (1):211-241.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gadd, M., S. E. Johansson, J. Sundquist, and P. Wandell. 2006. &#8220;Are there differences in all-cause and coronary heart disease mortality between immigrants in Sweden and in their country of birth? A follow-up study of total populations.&#8221; <em>BMC Public Health</em> 6:102. doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-6-102.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ichou, M., and M. Wallace. 2018. &#8220;The Healthy Migrant Effect: The role of educational selectivity in the good health of migrants.&#8221; <em>Demographic Research</em> 40 (4):61-94. doi: 10.4054/DemRes.2019.40.4.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Marmot, M.G., A.M. Adelstein, and L. Bulusu. 1984. &#8220;Lessons from the study of immigrant mortality.&#8221; <em>The Lancet</em> 323 (8392):1455-1457. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(84)91943-3.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Wallace, M., and B. Wilson. 2019. &#8220;Migrant Mortality Advantage Versus Origin and the Selection Hypothesis.&#8221; <em>Population and Development Review</em> 45 (4):767-+. doi: 10.1111/padr.12298.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/migration-and-foreigners/migrant-mortality-advantage-and-the-selection-hypothesis/">Migrant mortality advantage and the selection hypothesis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Wilson]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>Open doors for the American dream. Reagan’s last speech as president (1989).</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/video/open-doors-for-the-american-dream-reagans-last-speech-as-president-1989/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[N-IUSSP]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2019 10:09:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Video]]></category>
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		<title>Migrant People’s Health</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/video/migrant-peoples-health/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[N-IUSSP]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:06:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Video]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=5945</guid>

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