National identity, defined as attachment to the nation, shapes behaviour. As fertility declines, childbearing may become a national issue. If the nation is important to individuals, are they more likely to have children? According to Dávid Erát, the answer is in the positive, albeit with qualifications.
It is a common observation that developed nations have sub-replacement fertility, meaning that the total fertility rate (TFR) – the total number of children a woman is expected to have – is below 2.1. Both scientific and public discourse often highlight this as a potential long-term issue for nations. Extreme political voices, particularly in low fertility contexts such as Europe, even frame it as a threat to national survival (Goetz et al. 2022).
While most developed nations experience low TFR, Israel is an outlier, as it has a very high TFR and overall low levels of childlessness. Previous studies note that this may be due to the unique combination of traditionalism, family-centred values, and nationalist sentiment originating from the presence of constant threat (Anson and Meir 1996). This suggests a possible association between national identity and fertility.
National identity and fertility
But what exactly is the concept of national identity? Social psychology points to two important components: an awareness of belonging to the nation, and the emotional importance attached to this belonging (Tajfel 1981). A stronger national identity makes the nation more important in people’s lives, making them more likely to follow its norms, pay attention to its needs, and prioritize its survival. The latter is especially important, as threats to the nation – whether perceived or real – bring national identity to the forefront and modify individual behaviour (Stephan et al. 2009).
At individual level, a strong feeling of national identity may stimulate fertility, because children may be seen as a personal contribution to the continuation of the nation, especially when there is the general perception that children are needed. Besides, childbearing is a long-term commitment and individuals with a stronger national identity may place greater trust in the prospects of the nation, increasing their sense of control over the future and making them more likely to invest in it.
Results
In a recent study (Erát, 2026), using data from childless 15–29-year-olds from the Hungarian Youth 2020 survey (6,312 respondents in total), I created a measure of national identity based on responses to eight questions such as “I feel that I am Hungarian” or “I am proud to be Hungarian”, where respondents rated their answers on a 1 to 5 scale (5 = total agreement). After controlling for common socioeconomic characteristics (age, gender, education, parental education, financial situation, living arrangement, partnership status, region, residence type, ethnicity) and attitude-related factors (religiosity, political position), I estimated the probability of specific childbearing intentions (Figure 2).
Compared to individuals with average national identity strength, those with a much weaker attachment to the nation were more likely to want no children. While intentions to have one child were not substantially affected, intentions to have a relatively large family (two or more children) were also associated with national identity. However, stronger national identity was also associated with a higher likelihood of non-response or uncertain answers.
How can we interpret these results? First, the broader context must be considered. While Hungary has long been a family-centric country, the political and social climate changed after 2010. During its self-described “demographic governance”, the government introduced selective childbearing support targeting middle- and upper-class families, promoted rhetoric that framed “others” (migrants and minorities) as threats to the nation, and began an “anti-gender” campaign aimed at returning to more traditional gender roles, particularly emphasizing childbearing as a woman’s duty (Waterbury 2020; Barát 2022; Melegh, 2016). While this did not achieve above-replacement fertility, it created an environment in which national threats, childbearing and traditional expectations were constantly overemphasized. This may have particularly affected the attitudes and intentions of the studied 15-29 age group.
Considering this context, the results point towards a relatively clear association between national identity and fertility intentions, particularly in the case of childlessness and intentions to have two or more children. A stronger attachment to the nation increases the probability of responding to the nation’s needs and conforming to its expectations, which in the Hungarian case means having more children. But what about the non-response or uncertain answers, which became visibly more likely with stronger national identity? While no definitive explanation can be provided, perhaps these individuals feel a strong attachment to the nation without intending to have children, or at least not as many as the nation “prescribes”. Refraining from answering the question or expressing uncertainty may be a way to avoid directly stating something that goes against the expressed needs of the nation.
References
Barát, E. (2022). “Paradoxes of the Right-Wing Sexual/Gender Politics in Hungary: Right-Wing Populism and the Ban of Gender Studies.” In Paradoxical Right-Wing Sexual Politics in Europe, edited by Cornelia Möser, Jennifer Ramme, and Judit Takács, 173–99. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Erát, D. (2026). “National Identity and Fertility Intentions: Evidence from Hungary.” Population and Development Review, 52: 135–166. https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.70051
Goetz, J., Oláh, L., and Pető, A. (2022). Discourses On Demography in the EU Institutions. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Gunda-Werner-Institut. Online: https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Demography_EU_institutions_FIN_web.pdf
Melegh, A. (2016). On the East-West Slope: Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Eastern Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press.
Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., and Morrison, K. R. (2009). “Intergroup Threat Theory.” In Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination, edited by Todd D. Nelson, 43–59. New York: Routledge.
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waterbury, M. A. (2020). “Populist Nationalism and the Challenges of Divided Nationhood: The Politics of Migration, Mobility, and Demography in post-2010 Hungary.” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 34(4), 962–983. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325419897772