The World Health Organization recognizes the highest possible standard of health as a fundamental human right. Health disparities should therefore be studied and addressed to ensure that everyone, at all levels of society, has the same opportunities to enjoy good health and a long life. Individuals with higher levels of education tend to have better health, and the benefits of education may also spill over to the health of close others, such as spouses or partners. So, is having a highly educated partner associated with lower mortality? Has this association changed across generations? And does the distinction between marriage and cohabitation matter? 

The answers to these questions are particularly timely given the major societal changes over the past century, which underscore the importance of considering the educational resources of both partners in a couple. Women’s educational attainment and workforce participation have increased, while traditional marriage has ceded ground to more informal living arrangements, such as cohabitation. As a result, more couples now share similar educational backgrounds, and a growing number are choosing to live together without marrying (Schwartz 2013).

The Finnish case

In a recent study (Potente, Palumbo and Jalovaara 2025) we assessed how patterns of individual and partner educational attainment relate to mortality among men and women in Finland, and whether these relationships differ between married and cohabiting couples over time. Our analysis is based on Finland’s comprehensive population data, covering individuals born since 1932. We focused on heterosexual couples aged 50 and above, born between 1932 and 1970, and compared outcomes across various combinations of partners’ educational attainment. Finland stands out for its high rates of women’s education and full-time employment, as well as its pioneering embrace of non-marital cohabitation, although this form of partnership remains less associated with affluence and stability than marriage.

Why living with a partner can boost survival

Individuals in coresidential partnerships, whether married or not, tend to have longer survival rates than single individuals, whether previously partnered or never partnered. A key theoretical framework for understanding this phenomenon is the life-course theory, especially the “linked lives” principle, which highlights the interdependence of individual life paths (Carr 2018). People’s lives are shaped through their social ties, especially close family relationships such as partners, children, and siblings. 

In a coresidential partnership, partners exchange support and share resources and stresses, meaning that one partner’s socioeconomic resources, such as education, can also shape the other partner’s survival chances. This makes mortality risk partly relational rather than just individual. However, both coresidential partnership and individual experience may change such expected relationships, given the different levels of commitment and financial participation of each partner (Lindmarker, 2025). Marriage is likely to be more strongly associated with male-breadwinner equilibria than cohabitation, although these differences would have been more pronounced among earlier birth cohorts.  

The educational composition of couples and men’s and women’s mortality 

Our findings reveal that higher levels of education, both of ego and of his/her partner, are linked to lower mortality. Couples where both partners are in the high (tertiary) education group enjoy the greatest longevity, while those comprising two low-educated partners (both having only elementary schooling) fare the worst. Mixed-education couples fall somewhere in between.

Gender plays an important role. Men do best in terms of survival when both partners are highly educated and worst when both are low educated, with mixed-education couples in between. For women, the picture is more complex and varies by birth cohort. Among those born before 1950, longevity is similar for both low- and highly educated women, provided their male partners are highly educated. Surprisingly, we find a similar pattern for married and cohabiting women in the oldest cohort: in both union types, women partnered with a highly educated man have survival levels close to those of women in couples where both partners are highly educated, even when the woman’s own education is low. For women born after 1950, survival differences vary according to the couple’s educational makeup, increasingly resembling the pattern observed among men.

Couple mortality disparities have increased over time

Our study highlights how the gap in survival between high- and low-educated couples has grown wider across generations. 
Longevity has increased particularly among married couples where both partners are highly educated (Figure 1). By contrast, those with low levels of education have missed out on these gains and, in many cases, have fallen further behind, among cohabiting couples especially (Figure 2). As a result, the health divide linked to education is increasingly apparent, not only among individuals but also between different types of couples, with the least educated emerging as the most vulnerable group. These trends could reflect changes in how education, including the resources and opportunities it brings, is distributed within relationships, as well as changes in who chooses to marry or cohabit.

Takeaway message

Our research highlights that the biggest risks show up in particular types of couples, especially low-educated married and cohabiting couples. The results suggest that prevention and support need to better reach low-educated couples, who seem less likely to benefit from the improvements over time seen among highly educated married couples. These are important findings to consider in order to prevent a further widening of longevity gaps at the couple level , and a worsening of health inequalities.

References

Carr, D. (2018). The Linked Lives Principle in Life Course Studies: Classic Approaches and Contemporary Advances. In D. F. Alwin, D. H. Felmlee, & D. A. Kreager (Eds.), Social Networks and the Life Course (pp. 41–63). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71544-5_3

Lindmarker, J., Kolk, M., & Drefahl, S. (2025). Cohabitation and mortality across the life course: A longitudinal cohort study with Swedish register-based sibling comparisons. European Journal of Population, 41(1), 2. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-024-09722-6

Potente, C., Palumbo, L., & Jalovaara, M. (2025). Partner’s Education and Mortality in Finland: A Study of Married and Cohabiting Unions Among Cohorts Born Between 1932 and 1970. European Journal of Population, 41(1), 29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-025-09752-8

Schwartz, C. R. (2013). Trends and variation in assortative mating: causes and consequences. Annual Review of Sociology, 39(1), 451–470. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145544

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Marriage isn’t a guarantee of a “happily ever after,” even for older adults who have been married for decades. Rates of “gray divorce” – or divorce among people aged 50 and older – have risen dramatically throughout Europe and the United States over the past four decades. And it’s not just gray divorce that’s on the rise – older adults in long-term cohabiting unions also are ending their relationships in unprecedented numbers (Alderotti et al., 2022; Vignoli et al., 2025). But these “silver splits” don’t necessarily bring heartbreak and depression. Rather, new research shows that close ties with adult children can be the key to healing and guard against depression before, during, and after the union dissolves. But for the nearly 10 percent of older adults in Europe who are “disconnected” from their adult children – meaning that they’ve had no contact with at least one child in the past year – the emotional pain of the silver split can linger for years (Jessee & Carr, 2025a). 

What are “silver splits” and why are they so common?

• Ever-rising numbers of adults in their 50s, 60s, and 70s are leaving (or are being left by) their long-term romantic partners. Experts point to four main reasons behind this uptick in rates of “gray divorce” and “silver splits.” First, older adults are living longer than ever before; people in their 50s and 60s know that they have several decades ahead, and some are realizing that they don’t want to spend their “golden years” in a loveless or unfulfilling union.

• Second, at midlife, people often look back at their lives and decide to make a change – fixing those things that aren’t working and taking steps to find personal fulfillment and happiness in the future.

• Third, with the onset of health problems and caregiving demands in midlife and older age, some couples are seeing their marital quality dip under the stress. In the process, they discover that they may lack the love, understanding, or patience needed to grapple with the challenges that come with age.

• Finally, when children leave the family home and parents are left in their “empty nest,” some spouses or partners recognize that their children were the glue holding them together, and that their relationship has become distant, boring, or worse (Alderotti et al., 2022; Vignoli et al., 2025).

How parent-child relationships help (or hurt) couples

Besides spouses and partners, adult children are among the most important people in the lives of older adults. Just as the “empty nest” stage can hasten a break-up, close ties with adult children can provide a powerful emotional resource as older adults manage the strain of divorce. Yet the absence of ties with children can make coping with the divorce or split all the more difficult, as our recent research has shown (Jessee & Carr, 2025a).

We tracked more than 500 adults aged 50+ over time, and examined how their symptoms of depression (i.e., feeling sad, pessimistic, or despondent) changed before, during, and after the dissolution of their marriage or cohabiting union. What we found was surprising – and counters the widespread notion that depression is inevitable when romantic relationships end. We found that among older adults who had regular contact with one or more of their adult children, their number of depressive symptoms was low throughout the entire study period, either when married, when going through their break-up, or in the years that followed. Even more encouraging, their already low number of depression symptoms fell considerably in the longer term. Four years after their union ended, they showed an uptick in their emotional well-being, revealing the psychological resilience of those who end a potentially unsatisfying union, and who have emotional support from their children.

In stark contrast, a much less rosy picture emerged for the small yet rarely studied population of older adults who are “disconnected” from one child (or more), i.e., those who had a complete lack of contact with at least one adult child in the 12-months preceding their split. Researchers have shown that severely strained or distant ties with even one child (regardless of ties with other children) can be a critical source of stress and duress for older adults (Fingerman et al., 2012; Jessee & Carr, 2025b). Fortunately, disconnectedness is rare in Europe; only 10 percent of parents who experience a silver split are disconnected, with higher rates for men than women. 

Regardless of the reason for parent-child disconnectedness, these severed ties sting – and the sting is particularly painful for those who have recently ended a marriage, as our study shows. As Figure 1 illustrates, “silver splitters” disconnected from an adult child experienced a stark and steady increase in depressive symptoms during their split and in the following years. Their depressive symptoms jumped sharply upon dissolution, and were still increasing four years after the transition. Parents who were disconnected from one or more children had significantly more depressive symptoms than their connected counterparts at every stage of the dissolution process, an observation that likely reflects the added strain and lack of support at the core of disconnectedness.

Conclusions

Divorce and silver splits don’t need to be stressful. Older adults should feel encouraged to end unions that are unsatisfying or distressing. Those who have sufficient emotional support can withstand the transition without adverse effects on their mental health. However, we need to pay attention to those growing old with strained or distant intergenerational social ties. Older men and women who are disconnected from a child are more vulnerable to the emotional pains of silver splits and other stressors, and also may lack the practical support needed to manage the challenges of aging – especially as their health worsens. We encourage practitioners to talk to their midlife and older patients about the sources of support they can rely on, rather than presuming that merely having adult children or a former spouse is protective. With the proper support from trusted family or friends, older adults will be better equipped to manage the inevitable ups and downs of life.

References

Alderotti, G., Tomassini, C., & Vignoli, D. (2022). ‘Silver splits’ in Europe. Demographic Research, 46, 619-652.

Fingerman, K. L., Cheng, Y. P., Birditt, K., & Zarit, S. (2012). Only as happy as the least happy child: multiple grown children’s problems and successes and middle-aged parents’ well-being. Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 67(2), 184-193.

Jessee, L., & Carr, D. (2025a). Silver Splits and Parent–Child Disconnectedness: Mental Health Consequences for European Older Adults. European Journal of Population, 41(1), 1-20.

Jessee, L., & Carr, D. (2025b). Parent–Child Disconnectedness and Older European Adults’ Mental Health: Do Patterns Differ by Marital Status and Gender?. The Journals of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 80(6), gbaf024.

Vignoli, D., Alderotti, G., & Tomassini, C. (2025). Partners’ health and silver splits in Europe: A gendered pattern?. Journal of Marriage and Family, 87(4), 1639-1663.

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In a recently published article (Abbasi-Shavazi and Hosseini-Chavoshi 2025), we showed that the average age at marriage is rising across the MENA region. In countries like Tunisia and Lebanon, women increasingly marry in their mid-to-late 20s, a marked shift from previous decades. In other countries in the region such as Iran, the average age at marriage for women rose by about four years over three decades, from 19.7 years in 1976 to 23.4 in 2011. However, it declined slightly thereafter, due to the period increase in the number of marriages for a large number of post-revolutionary baby-boom cohorts entering the marriage market (Hosseini-Chavoshi et al. 2024).

Nevertheless, the increase in age at marriage in the region coexists with persistent child marriage. The UNICEF global database reports that, still recently, about 15% of women aged 20–24 across the MENA region had married before age 18, and 2% before age 15. Country-level disparities are stark: while only 2% of women in Tunisia marry before age 18, the figure rises to 32% for women in Yemen (Figure 1).

The contradiction between increasing legal age at marriage and actual underage unions reflects the limited impact of legislation (Rashad, 2015) when cultural norms, poverty, and insecurity dominate. In conflict-affected areas such as Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, fears for girls’ safety and family honor often drive early marriage.

From cousins to companions: evolving marriage patterns

Historically, arranged marriages and consanguineous marriages have been hallmarks of the MENA family formation system. In some countries, up to half of all marriages were between first cousins. These unions reinforced family ties, simplified dowry negotiations, and increased marriage stability (El Goundali et al. 2022).

But change is underway. Increasing levels of education, particularly for females, and the movement of younger generations from hometowns to big cities for higher education and work have provided the opportunity for both young women and men to find partners outside of their kin network and to adopt modern types of marriage arrangements. Rising female education (Figure 2), urban migration, and development of new ideas through media and social networks are challenging traditional norms. Many young people now choose their own partners. In capital cities like Tehran, “white marriages” (cohabitation without official registration) are quietly spreading despite strong religious disapproval and legal obstacles (Golchin and Safari 2017). 

These trends suggest that education acts as both a structural and ideational force (Yount and Rashad 2008), empowering women to delay marriage, reject kinship-based arrangements, and seek different life course trajectories.

Fragile marriages: the rise of divorce

Divorce has traditionally been uncommon in Islamic countries and in the MENA region, but available information (Table 1) shows that divorce rates are on the rise across the region. In Egypt, the rate increased from 0.9 to 2.3 per 1,000 population between 2004 and 2020, and it almost doubled over the same period in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Notably, many divorces occur within the first few years of marriage. In Palestine and Qatar, more than half of divorces happen in the first two years. Marrying young, economic stress, limited spousal choice, and incompatibility are key factors. As arranged marriages decline and individualism rises, expectations for emotional intimacy and autonomy may take precedence over traditional support systems.

What lies ahead?

Marriage in the MENA region remains nearly universal, but the meaning and structure of marriage are shifting. Later marriage, rising divorce, singlehood, and the emergence of new partnership forms point to a demographic transition in the family life course. Labor migration and restrictive reunification policies have fostered long-distance unions and altered traditional marriage norms.

Yet these changes are uneven. Political and religious institutions continue to shape family formation, often resisting change. Meanwhile, women’s higher education has not always translated into greater labor market participation and economic independence, with ambiguous effects on age at marriage (Krafft and Assaad, 2020).

Governments in Iran and the Arab countries of Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have responded with pro-marriage campaigns and financial incentives. But such efforts may have limited success if they fail to address deeper social and economic transformations. As younger generations seek greater agency in family life, the future of partnering in the MENA region will likely diverge further from traditional scripts.

References

Abbasi-Shavazi, MJ., Hosseini-Chavoshi, M. 2025. Family change and partnering in the Middle East and North Africa, In D. Mortelmans, L. Bernardi & B. Perelli-Harris (Eds.), Research Handbook on Partnering across the Life Course, Series “Research Handbooks in Sociology” (Edward Elgar Publishing), pp: 316-331.

El Goundali K, Chebabe M, Zahra Laamiri F, Hilali A. 2022. The Determinants of Consanguineous Marriages among the Arab Population: A Systematic Review. Iranian Journal of Public Health, 51(2): 253-265. doi: 10.18502/ijph.v51i2.8679.

Golchin, M., and Safari, S. 2017. Tehran metropolis and the emergence of symptoms of new form of the male-female relationships: The Study of the contexts, processes, and consequences of cohabitation. Iranian Cultural Research Quarterly, 10(1): pp. 29-57. doi: 10.22631/ijcr.2017.332

Hosseini-Chavoshi, M., McDonald, P., Abbasi-Shavazi, MJ. 2024. Explaining recent fertility trends in Iran: The predominance of marriage and the economy, Asian Population Studies, doi: 10.1080/17441730.2024.2437354

Krafft, C., and Assaad, R. 2020. Employment’s Role in Enabling and Constraining Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa. Demography, 57(6): 2297–2325. doi: 10.1007/s13524-020-00932-1

Rashad, H. 2015. The tempo and intensity of marriage in the Arab region: Key challenges and their implications. DIFI Family Research and proceedings, 2. http://doi.org/10.5339/difi.2015.2

Yount, K., Hoda R. (eds). 2008. Family in the Middle East-Ideational Changes in Egypt, Iran and Tunisia, Routledge, London and New York. 

Sources figures

Source figure 1 – UNICEF global databases, 2022, based on DHS, MICS, and other national surveys. Updated MAY 2022.

Source figure 2 – Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (2023). Wittgenstein Centre Data Explorer Version 3.0 

Source table 1 – Euromonitor International (2014)

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Why do some people live longer than others? This question has long motivated research in public health, demography, and sociology. One consistent finding is that married individuals tend to outlive those who remain single, divorced, or widowed (Rendall et al. 2011). However, as family structures evolve – with non-marital cohabitation becoming increasingly common worldwide, and most notably in Sweden (Ohlsson-Wijk, Turunen, and Andersson 2020) – the question arises: does cohabitation offer the same longevity benefits as marriage, or is there something unique about marital unions?

The link between marriage and longevity is based on well-established social and economic advantages (Carr and Springer 2010). Given that long-term cohabitation is more commonly accepted and often resembles marriage in daily life, it is essential to determine if these protective advantages also apply to non-marital relationships.

In a recent study (Lindmarker, Kolk, and Drefahl 2025), we examined Swedish register data (2012–2017) to assess the effects of cohabitation and marriage on mortality throughout life. The findings indicate that cohabitation is less protective than marriage, but its effects differ based on age and previous marital status.

Why would a partner extend life?

The link between longevity and partnership status arises from both selection processes and protective factors. Healthier individuals are more likely to partner and remain with a partner, suggesting that part of the marriage advantage is due to selection effects (Lillard and Panis 1996). Beyond selection, partnerships confer substantial protective benefits. Social support plays a crucial role: a partner not only provides companionship, but also monitors health, encourages adherence to medications, and offers emotional comfort that counteracts the negative effects of stress. This effect is especially apparent among men, whose health behaviors are most positively affected by their partners (Umberson 1987).

Economic stability is another significant advantage. By pooling resources, couples experience reduced financial stress and improved access to healthcare. In addition, partnership tends to promote healthy habits, from maintaining regular meals and routines to avoiding risky behaviors. Caregiving and companionship provided by spouses are particularly critical in later life, when support can mitigate the risks associated with social isolation.

Cohabitation and mortality: divergent risks by age and marital history

Our study shows that married individuals generally experience the lowest risk of mortality. Cohabiters have lower mortality than unpartnered individuals, including singles, divorcees, or widow(er)s. However, their death risks vary significantly by marital history and age.

• Never-married cohabiters: At ages 30–49, never-married cohabiters have mortality risks comparable to those of married individuals. This suggests that in early adulthood, cohabitation provides protective benefits similar to marriage. However, in older age groups (50+), never-married cohabiters begin to experience higher mortality risks than married individuals. This may be due to both selection effects, as healthier individuals tend to transition into marriage, and the reduced long-term benefits of cohabitation relative to marriage.

• Divorced/Widowed cohabiters: For those who cohabit after a previous marriage, the pattern is reversed. In younger age groups, divorced or widowed cohabiters face significantly higher mortality risks than their married counterparts, likely reflecting negative selection, where union dissolution at younger ages is linked to poorer health and socioeconomic challenges. However, in older age groups, excess mortality among divorced cohabiters decreases, probably because of the increasing prevalence, in this group, of those who re-partner later in life after long marriages, carrying forward financial, social, and health advantages from their previous unions. This “double advantage” from both past stable marriages and new partnerships helps reduce the risk of mortality compared to younger divorced cohabiters.

Why do these patterns emerge?

Several factors help explain the longevity differences between cohabitation and marriage. Selection effects matter: long-term cohabiters may differ from married individuals in ways that influence health and longevity. Social support is key: while cohabitation offers companionship, it may not always provide the same level of long-term caregiving as marriage, especially later in life. Economic factors also play a role, since marriage traditionally provides greater financial security and better access to healthcare. Finally, the cumulative benefits of marriage, including reinforced healthy behaviors, legal protections, and social support, appear to confer an enduring advantage in promoting longevity.

Although cohabitation offers significant health benefits, it does not fully replicate the long-term advantages of marriage, but it is still unclear whether these differences arise from selection processes, socio-economic factors, or the distinct ways in which marriage and cohabitation shape life outcomes.

References

Carr, Deborah, and Kristen W. Springer. 2010. “Advances in Families and Health Research in the 21st Century.” Journal of Marriage and the Family. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2010.00728.x.

Lillard, Lee A., and Constantijn W. A. Panis. 1996. “Marital Status and Mortality: The Role of Health.” Demography. https://doi.org/https://doi-org.ezp.sub.su.se/10.2307/2061764.

Lindmarker, Jesper, Martin Kolk, and Sven Drefahl. 2025. “Cohabitation and Mortality Across the Life Course: A Longitudinal Cohort Study with Swedish Register-Based Sibling Comparisons.” European Journal of Population 41 (1): 2. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-024-09722-6.

Ohlsson-Wijk, Sofi, Jani Turunen, and Gunnar Andersson. 2020. “Family Forerunners? An Overview of Family Demographic Change in Sweden.” In International Handbook on the Demography of Marriage and the Family, edited by D. Nicole Farris and A. J. J. Bourque, 7:65–77. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35079-6_5.

Rendall, Michael S., Margaret M. Weden, Melissa M. Favreault, and Hilary Waldron. 2011. “The Protective Effect of Marriage for Survival: A Review and Update.” Demography 48 (2): 481–506. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-011-0032-5.

Umberson, Debra. 1987. “Family Status and Health Behaviors: Social Control as a Dimension of Social Integration.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 28 (3): 306–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/2136848.

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Child support, in which a noncustodial parent (with whom the child does not primarily live) provides financial support towards raising a child, is crucial for the approximately 3.8 million U.S. custodial-parent families, often on low incomes, who have a child support agreement (Grall 2020). Child support’s reach and potential have motivated substantial interest in the child support program, which administers policies governing the establishment and enforcement of child support agreements.

Fewer and fewer agreements 

The Child Support Supplement (CSS) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) shows that the proportion of custodial-parent families with such agreements increased slightly from 57% in 1993 to 60% in 2003, but then declined, and has been stable at about 50% since 2009 (Grall 2020). The growing share of custodial fathers, who are less likely to have agreements than custodial mothers, has contributed to this decline, but the share of custodial mothers with agreements has also fallen sharply, from a high of 64% in 2003 to 51% in 2017 (Grall 2020). This downtrend raises questions about whether child support policy has become less effective.

A key limitation of the dominant empirical approach to studying trends in child support is that it examines the stock of all custodial parents. To evaluate policy changes, flow measures, categorizing parents by when they enter the system, are more appropriate than stock measures, because the latter can be distorted by compositional variations and other issues. Indeed, previous demographic work from a variety of policy realms shows notable differences in stock and flow outcomes (e.g., Abramowitz 2016; Bitler et al. 2004; Herbst 2011; Klerman & Haider 2004).

We use CPS-CSS data on child support agreements from 1994 through 2018, differentiating between snapshots of custodial mothers in various survey years (the stock) from our estimates of outcomes for mothers who are new to child support in various years, either because they were recently divorced or had a nonmarital birth (the flow).  We are primarily interested in legal agreements (rather than informal agreements) about child support, both those that do and do not impose support payments (a child support order). 

Stocks 1993-2018 

Never-married and ever-married custodial mothers have different outcomes, in part because divorce requires a legal act, so legal child support agreements may be more frequent among ever-married parents. The proportion of never-married custodial mothers with legal agreements peaked in 2003 at around 46% and the proportion having a legal agreement with support order peaked at 41% in 2001 (Figure 1a). Both proportions then declined through 2013, with just one-third of mothers reporting a legal agreement with a support order in that year. Although both proportions increased somewhat in 2015, they again declined in 2017. The proportions of never-married mothers with pending agreements and informal agreements were relatively small and showed no consistent trends. 

Ever-married custodial mothers more often have agreements than never-married mothers, but their trends have been similar (Figure 1b). After a peak in 2003 (65% with legal agreements, 60% with an amount due), the proportions began to decline steadily, though not substantially after 2011. For ever-married mothers, in 2017 just over half reported a legal agreement, and just under half reported a support order. The proportions with pending legal agreements and informal agreements were both small. 

Thus, using the stock of cases, we see the prevailing understanding: the proportion of custodial mothers with legal agreements and the proportion with a child support order increased early in this period but appear to have declined more recently for both never- and ever-married mothers. 

Trends 1994-2018 

Trends as measured by the flow of child support cases, however, provide a different picture. For never-married mothers (Figure 2a), the proportion with legal agreements was relatively stable, between 41% and 44% over this period. However, the relative stability in the proportion with legal agreements masks more fluctuation in the proportion with a support order, which declined to 35% at the end of the period. Moreover, the proportion with informal agreements rose, from around 6% in the early cohorts to 14% in the most recent cohort. For never-married mothers, then, the simplest outcome measure (the proportion with legal agreements) shows some modest differences: stock measures show a decline since the mid-2000s and flow measures suggest relative stability. 

For ever-married mothers, the stock and flow comparisons are quite different. Whereas the stock suggests a slight increase in agreements for ever-married mothers through the mid-2000s followed by a decline, the flow indicates a decline in the prevalence of legal agreements among mothers entering the system in the first years of our analysis followed by a substantial increase for those entering in 2010 and beyond (Figure 2b). Similar to never-married mothers, there is some increase in the proportion with legal agreements without a support order. These increases in legal agreements, combined with an increase in informal agreements in the same period, results in a lower level of recent ever-married mothers with no agreement; beginning in 2010, fewer than 20% of all ever-married mothers have no agreement in place. These simple descriptive trends substantially hold in multivariate analyses that control for race, ethnicity and education. 

Conclusions

Our findings reinforce the importance of understanding differences in stock and flow measures and why these may matter for our understanding of a variety of policy-relevant outcomes. To assess policy effectiveness, flow measures are preferable, because they focus on the variable of interest, while stock measures may give a distorted picture due to changes in population demographics. 

The prevailing narrative, that child support orders and agreements are becoming less prevalent, is the result of looking only at the stock. Looking at the flow shows that legal agreements for ever-married mothers are actually becoming more prevalent, and that the share is essentially stable (or perhaps even increasing) for never-married mothers. Our analysis also suggests increases in informal agreements and in legal agreements with no support order. Calls to reform the child support program because of presumed declines in agreements are not based on the whole picture.

References

Abramowitz, J. (2016). Saying, “I don’t”: The effect of the affordable care act young adult provision on marriage. Journal of Human Resources, 51(4), 933-960.

Bitler, M. P., Gelbach, J. B., Hoynes, H. W., & Zavodny, M. (2004). The impact of welfare reform on marriage and divorce. Demography, 41(2), 213-236. 

Cancian, M., Costanzo, M. A., & Meyer, D. R. (2023). A research note on trends in the stock and flow of child support agreements. Demography online in advance of print, https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-11075477 

Grall, T. S. (2020). Custodial mothers and fathers and their child support: 2017 (P60-279). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Census Bureau.

Herbst, C. M. (2011). The impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on marriage and divorce: Evidence from flow data. Population research and Policy review, 30(1), 101-128.

Klerman, J. A., & Haider, S. J. (2004). A stock-flow analysis of the welfare caseload. Journal of Human Resources, 39(4), 865-886.

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Women in the kitchen, men in the yard

Women today are more highly educated than men and increasingly present in the labour market; yet they continue to perform most of the household labour (Zamberlan, Gioachin, and Gritti 2021, 2022). Analysing Italian data from the Social Condition and Integration of Foreigners (SCIF) survey (ISTAT 2011–2012), this holds true for immigrant couples as well. Figure 1 shows the extent to which couples with an immigrant background and residing in Italy divide different domestic and childcare duties. The overwhelming majority of tasks such as preparing meals, laying the table, doing the dishes, keeping the house clean, or caring for children, are performed by women. Men do more than women only when it comes to typically male activities, such as doing repairs and dealing with administrative matters.

Looking for an explanation

Why is there still a gender gap in domestic work? While the time available to partners and individual resources such as education and income are key determinants of the unequal division of unpaid work, the relevance of cultural aspects is still a matter of debate. Traditional gender roles, inherited from the family or from the wider context of origin, could have a bearing on the behaviour of men and women by crystallizing gender inequality even within the home. The study of immigrant families in Italy offers an opportunity to tease out the role of cultural aspects. Upon moving to the same host country, immigrants share a common institutional and cultural environment while having different cultural heritages from their origin countries and different perceptions of gender equity. If the culture of origin matters, domestic and childcare tasks should be more (less) equally shared among couples coming from more (less) gender-egalitarian countries.

Culture matters

The World Bank’s Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) provides a useful indicator for measuring and comparing gender equality across countries. A value of 1 indicates a country with the highest possible score of gender equality, while a value of 0 indicates a country with the lowest possible score. Figure 2 shows the correlation between the GGI score of the female partner’s origin country and the share of male participation in household chores and childcare in the host country. Men assume a larger share of housework and, even more so, of childcare in couples where the woman comes from a more egalitarian country. Arriving from a context with a more egalitarian gender culture goes along with a more equitable division of household duties in the destination country.

A fading heritage?

The families under investigation have different migration histories. As more time is spent in Italy, the gender culture inherited from the context of origin could lose relevance as a result of prolonged contact with a different institutional and cultural context. Figure 3 confirms this expectation, but only with regard to childcare activities. Indeed, the relationship between GGI and male participation in housework is positive but close to 0 and independent of the number of years spent in Italy. Conversely, the association between GGI and fathers’ involvement in childcare is positive at the beginning, but it gradually diminishes as time spent in the destination country (Italy) increases.

Conclusions

Studying how immigrant families divide housework and childcare tasks is informative for understanding the cultural component of gender inequality. While it is true that the culture of origin influences the behaviour of partners even in a different socioeconomic context, there are substantial differences based on the type of activity and the time spent in the host country. Cultural heritage is mainly relevant for explaining gender differences in childcare activities, while the role of culture is marginal with regard to other domestic tasks. In addition, the influence of culture weakens considerably, and eventually disappears as time spent in the destination country increases. The disappearance of cultural effects may suggest the presence of a cultural assimilation mechanism, although in the absence of longitudinal data, this can only be inferred.

References

Brini, E., Zamberlan, A. and Barbieri, P. (2022). Culture portability from origin to destination country: The gender division of domestic work among migrants in Italy. Demographic Research, (47)20, 577–614

Zamberlan, A., Gioachin, F., and Gritti, D. (2021). Work less, help out more? The persistence of gender inequality in housework and childcare during UK COVID- 19. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 73: 100583. Zamberlan, A., Gioachin, F., and Gritti, D. (2022). Gender inequality in domestic chores over ten months of the UK COVID-19 pandemic: Heterogeneous adjustments to partners’ changes in working hours. Demographic Research 46(19): 565–580.

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Better to stick with your own kind? 

What we know from the literature on couple formation and dissolution is that people are more likely to choose a partner who belongs to the same origin group (Kalmijn, 1998) and that, upon marriage, these endogamous couples are also less likely to divorce. Higher divorce risks for exogamous couples are generally explained by differing preferences, values, norms and communication styles that make it harder to take joint decisions, such as spending free time, buying a home, and raising children. In addition, family and the broader community may sanction people who choose a partner outside their (origin) group, for instance by withholding support. Exogamous couples are also more likely to face discrimination and public disapproval, which may affect the quality of their life, undermining the stability of their relationship. 

However, the literature that links endogamy to lower divorce risks has focused almost solely on married couples, ignoring unmarried cohabitation. This is scarcely justifiable in contexts such as the European one, where unmarried cohabitation has risen both as a living arrangement that precedes marriage and as an alternative to it (Billari & Liefbroer, 2010). In addition, both the prevalence and the perception of unmarried cohabitation can differ strongly between majority and minority groups. In the case of Belgium, for instance, unmarried cohabitation is widely accepted among natives, but it is often regarded as unstable and unreliable among couples with a Turkish or Moroccan background. 

Couple dissolution, with and without unmarried cohabitation

With regard to Belgium, we investigated the matter in a recent publication. Using data from the Belgian Social Security Register between 1998 and 2013, we analyzed the four largest immigration communities (from Southern Europe, Morocco, Turkey and Congo/Burundi/Rwanda, respectively), although in what follows, for reasons of space, we will briefly discuss only the Moroccan and the Turkish cases (Van den Berg & Mortelmans, 2022).

We found support to previous studies showing that, among marriages without a period of premarital cohabitation, endogamy goes along with lower divorce risks. However, we also found that couples that have been involved in unmarried cohabitation show substantially different patterns. Among the couples who married after premarital cohabitation or remained unmarried throughout the observation period, dissolution risks of exogamous couples barely differ from endogamous Southern European, Turkish, and Moroccan couples (the three most relevant immigrant communities in Belgium), and may even prove more resilient.

While more can be found in our original article, illustrative evidence for the couples with at least one partner of Moroccan or Turkish origin can be found in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. All types of couples are less resilient than endogamous Belgian ones, but the “advantage” of endogamy emerges only in the case of direct marriage. 

Conclusion

In short, unmarried cohabitation matters and it should not be disregarded when studying the dissolution of endogamous and exogamous relationships. Although the literature states that crossing group boundaries generally results in higher divorce rates compared to forming a relationship within one’s own origin group, this does not always appear to be the case for marriages formed after a period of unmarried cohabitation, or at least not in Belgium in the period under study (1998‒2013).

This may be in part the result of selection: cohabitation may be a sort of “trial marriage” where partners test their compatibility, the absence of which precludes marriage, later on. However, panels C of Figures 1 and 2 suggest that also among cohabiting couples who do not “evolve” into a marriage, all of whom are comparatively more fragile than others, endogamy is not a protecting factor.

As exogamous couples cross an important symbolic boundary, they are likely to be tested more severely. Compared to their endogamous equivalent, they may experience a stronger social burden and may benefit from less social and family support. Unmarried cohabitation may therefore offer a less visible alternative to marriage for mixed couples, who can experiment with their relationship while minimizing the pressure and possible social sanctions from family and the broader community. This can provide an opportunity to navigate more easily the specific challenges associated with exogamy.

References

Billari, F. C., & Liefbroer, A. C. (2010). Towards a new pattern of transition to adulthood? Advances in Life Course Research, 15(2-3), 59‒75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.alcr.2010.10.003 

Kalmijn, M. (1998). Intermarriage and homogamy: Causes, patterns, trends. Annual review of sociology, 395-421. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.395 

Van den Berg, L., & Mortelmans, D. (2022). Endogamy and relationship dissolution: Does unmarried cohabitation matter? Demographic Research, 47, 489‒528. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2022.47.17

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In most societies, women typically spend more time on domestic labour than men. Consequently, women bear the greater burden of balancing work and family duties as they become more engaged in paid employment. This conflict between work and family may increase their stress and decrease their desire for having children, resulting in lower overall fertility rates.

Declining fertility and increasing female labour force participation in Taiwan

In Taiwan, with the increase in female labour force participation rates over the last two decades, fertility rates have declined (Figure 1). These trends reflect the first stage of the gender revolution in which progress in female education and employment outpaces progress in gender equity within households (Goldscheider, Bernhard & Lappegård 2015). This dual burden of paid labour and household responsibilities for women leads to lower fertility. Conversely, the second stage of the gender revolution, when the male contribution to domestic chores increases, easing the burden on women, can go hand in hand with a somewhat higher fertility rate.

More dual-earner than sole-earner families

In a recent study (Tan 2022), I investigated the impact of different configurations of paid and unpaid labour among couples on childbearing outcomes. I used data on 1,969 heterosexual, married or cohabiting couples with an average age of 31.1 years for female partners and 33.8 years for male partners at baseline. About 32% of the couples had no children when first observed, and 68% had children. The analysis controls for child parity and examines parity progression between observations. Given that the data come from a panel study (2003-2012), attrition may be an issue, as couples who dropped out of the study (488 couples) may have different characteristics from those who remained (1,969 couples). Indeed, the couples who dropped out are more likely to be younger, childless, dual earners with an equal division of labour, co-residing with their parents, not employing any domestic help, and residing in metropolitan areas. Given the association between the propensity of nonresponse and the observed data, full information maximum likelihood estimation was applied to account for the attrition.

To provide an overview of the gendered landscape in Taiwan, let us first look at the range of labour arrangements that couples might deploy. Four indicators measuring couples’ employment status, proportion of income, proportion of time spent on paid work, and proportion of time spent on housework are jointly used to capture the division of labour within couples. The use of proportional contribution of labour demonstrates how much an individual contributes to paid and unpaid work relative to their partner.

For example, consider two dual-earner couples reporting similar paid work arrangements and relative income contributions. One reports that the male partner does not contribute to household chores, whereas the other reports that both partners contribute equally. The first case would indicate a more traditional division of domestic labour, and the second a more egalitarian arrangement. This example illustrates how different configurations of paid and unpaid labour among couples can provide important information on the varying degrees of gender equality within each couple. In another example, consider two dual-earner couples with an unequal division of domestic labour, where the female partner takes on a larger proportion of housework. One of them reports that the female partner contributes the larger share of household income, while the other reports that the female partner contributes only a small fraction of household income. In this instance, the female partner in the first case would likely have greater bargaining power to negotiate better sharing of domestic labour than the female partner in the second case. 

Between 2003 and 2012, based on the nationally representative longitudinal survey, four main division of labour arrangements can be identified (Figure 2):

1) traditional male breadwinner (30.3%), 

2) inegalitarian dual-earners (31.1%), 

3) egalitarian dual-earners (32.2%), and 

4) female breadwinner (6.4%).

There is a higher proportion of dual-earner than sole-earner families in Taiwan, with roughly equal proportions of dual-earner couples adopting egalitarian or inegalitarian arrangements.

Division of labour arrangements and fertility

As each couple-wave observation is assigned a division of labour type based on the highest probability of group membership, the labour division variable is time-varying. Tracking the same couples over time, I examined the association between the different division of labour arrangements and the likelihood of giving birth by the next observation, adjusting for all other covariates. The one-year lag between couples’ division of labour and the birth of a child allows for an examination of the influence of labour division on fertility.

In the years 2003–2012, compared to couples who adopt the traditional male breadwinner arrangement, the odds of having a child are reduced by 28% for egalitarian dual-earner couples, 31% for inegalitarian dual-earner couples, and 47% for female-breadwinner couples. As the one-year lag between labour division and fertility may not be long enough for fertility to adapt, a two-year lag was also tested, leading basically to the same results (Figure 3). In the two-year lag model, the odds are reduced by 30%, 56% and 63%, respectively.

In short, among dual-earner couples, those with a more egalitarian division of labour are more likely to give birth compared to couples with a less egalitarian arrangement. The female breadwinner arrangement results in the lowest likelihood of childbearing. In fact, the fertility of full-time working women is probably even lower than it seems here, where I focused on couples, and on lasting ones on top of that. If women who are financially independent are less willing than others to form a partnership, or to remain partnered, they are not well represented in this panel, and their fertility is presumably very low, if not zero.

Making a case for the second gender revolution

While the male breadwinner arrangement leads to the highest likelihood of childbearing, it is important to improve gender equity in household responsibilities as the percentage of dual-earner families continues to rise. Taiwan has made great strides towards the first half of the gender revolution by welcoming women into the workplace, but it is now important to complete the second half of the revolution, improving women’s position in both the private and public spheres. More significant household contributions by men will not only alleviate women’s dual burden, they can also foster greater connection to the family and facilitate childbearing.

References

Goldscheider, F., Bernhardt, E., & Lappegård, T. (2015). The Gender Revolution: A Framework for Understanding Changing Family and Demographic Behavior. Population and Development Review 41 (2): 207–239. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00045.x. 

Tan, J. (2022). Couples’ Division of Labour in Taiwan. Chinese Sociological Review. doi:10.1080/21620555.2022.2084066.

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Over the last 50 years, there have been dramatic changes in social attitudes and legislation toward same-sex relationships (Roseneil et al 2013). Within this short time frame, many countries have moved from criminalization to robust institutional support – enabling same-sex couples to be formally recognized, marry, and adopt children. Despite these developments, same-sex parenting remains a highly controversial and politicized issue, and one that is tightly intertwined with discussions around same-sex marriage.

Data from the most recent wave of the World Values Survey, a large cross-national survey of public opinion, confirms that support for same-sex parenting is far from unanimous. A sizable share of the population across multiple countries still believes that same-sex parents cannot raise children as well as different-sex parents (Figure 1).

These beliefs are often bolstered by “common wisdom” arguments that are rarely backed up by robust empirical evidence. For example, some commentators maintain that children need both male and female parental role models to thrive, that non-biological parents invest less effort in parenting their children, and that children in same-sex-parented families may be subjected to shame and bullying.

However, these beliefs have also been fueled by questionable academic studies examining the comparative outcomes of these children.

Prior research

Mark Regnerus’s,  a sociologist and professor at the University of Texas at Austin conducted a controversial study in 2012 that serves as a cautionary tale about the negative and far-reaching consequences that poor data and unsuitable analytical methods can exert on research findings in this field.

The Regnerus (2012) study claimed that people raised by same-sex parents experienced worse health and socioeconomic outcomes in adulthood than people raised by different-sex parents. Yet subsequent re-analyses of the same data by several leading researchers demonstrated that such associations emerged almost entirely due to an array of misclassification, mismeasurement and other analytic problems (Cheng and Powell 2015, Rosenfeld 2015).

The damage of the Regnerus study was however done, with its spurious findings receiving intense international media coverage and becoming a ‘go-to’ resource for activist groups lobbying against same-sex marriage. Such findings not only permeated the public debate on same-sex parenting, but were also presented in court in attempts to prevent the introduction of same-sex marriage legislation across US states.

Nevertheless, the Regnerus study constitutes an outlier in the broader literature on same-sex parenting. A large majority of studies on the topic have found that same-sex parents are able to provide their children with as healthy and nurturing home environments as different-sex parents. Yet these studies have also been often called into question, with critics pointing out that they are typically based on suboptimal data and methods (Allen 2015).

The most common criticism is that the studies tend to rely on ‘convenience’ samples. These are small and selective samples of same-sex-parented families, who may be approached at LGBT events or recruited through mailing campaigns. Critics (rightfully) argue that the outcomes of such families may differ from those of the broader population of same-sex families, and that this can distort the reliability of the studies and their conclusions.

Our new study

In our study, we were able to move beyond the vast majority of research conducted in this space. We did this by analyzing data covering the full population of children living in the Netherlands (more than 1.4 million children in total), comparing the academic outcomes of all children raised by same-sex couples with all children raised by different-sex couples. We conducted the study in the Netherlands because it is one of only a few countries in the world that allows researchers to link together life-long anonymized data from multiple population registers, containing high-quality administrative information on children and their families (Kabátek and Ribar 2020).

Thanks to these data, we were able to statistically account for various pre-existing characteristics that may differ between same-sex- and different-sex-parented families—for example, the higher average education attainment of individuals in same-sex couples, or their lower average incomes. This means that our analyses compared children in same-sex- and different-sex-parented families that are similar in all observable characteristics except for their parents’ sex.

Our key findings go counter to those reported by Regnerus (2012). Children in same-sex-parented families attain higher scores on national standardized tests than children in different-sex-parented families. Their advantage amounts to 13 per cent of a standard deviation, which is comparable to the advantage associated with both parents being employed as opposed to being out of work. We also find that children in same-sex-parented families are slightly more likely (1.5 per cent) to graduate from high school, and much more likely (11.2 per cent) to enroll in college than children in different-sex-parented families.

Our results thus challenge “common wisdom” arguments against same-sex parenting, and lend preliminary support to other scholarly perspectives that emphasize the possible benefits of same-sex parenthood. For example, same-sex parents are likely to face substantive barriers to parenthood (including social scrutiny, greater costs of conceiving a child, and legislative hurdles) and overcoming these barriers may strengthen their commitment to parental roles. Combined with the fact that same-sex couples face minimal odds of becoming parents through ‘accidental’ pregnancies, this can result in more positive parenting practices in same-sex-parented families.

Implications for other countries

The Netherlands features high levels of public approval of same-sex relations and provides robust legislative protection to sexual minorities. Therefore, we argue that the Dutch institutional context represents a ‘best-case scenario’ concerning the achievement of children in same-sex-parented families.

Same-sex-parented families in other countries may be subject to environmental hurdles that remain beyond the control of parents and that may negatively affect their children. These may include a lack of access to the social institution of marriage and more profound experiences of stigma and discrimination (Perales and Todd 2018).

By undertaking our analyses in the Netherlands, we were able to retrieve findings that are more likely to reflect the influence of same-sex parenting itself, and less likely to reflect external influences stemming from non-inclusive institutional environments. Therefore, our findings portray a viable scenario of what could happen in countries with more restrictive institutional environments, should they direct comparable efforts towards the inclusion of sexual minorities.

Altogether, the message stemming from our findings is clear: being raised by same-sex parents bears no independent detrimental effect on children’s outcomes. In socio-political environments that provide high levels of legislative and public support, children in same-sex-parented families thrive.

*Source figure 1 – worldvaluessurvey.org

References

Allen Doug (2015) More Heat Than Light: A Critical Assessment of the Same-Sex Parenting Literature, 1995–2013, Marriage & Family Review, 51(2): 154-182. doi.org/10.1080/01494929.2015.1033317

Cheng Simon, Powell Brian (2015) Measurement, methods, and divergent patterns: Reassessing the effects of same-sex parents. Social Science Research, 52, July, 615-626. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2015.04.005.

Kabátek Jan, Perales Francisco (2021) Academic Achievement of Children in Same- and Different-Sex-Parented Families: A Population-Level Analysis of Linked Administrative Data From the Netherlands. Demography. doi.org/10.1215/00703370-8994569

Kabátek Jan, Ribar David C (2020) Daughters and Divorce. The Economic Journal, December. doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa140

Perales Francisco, Todd Abram (2018) Structural stigma and the health and wellbeing of Australian LGB populations: Exploiting geographic variation in the results of the 2017 same-sex marriage plebiscite. Social Science & Medicine, 208: 190-199. doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.05.015

Regnerus Mark (2012) How different are the adult children of parents who have same-sex relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures Study. Social Science Research, 41(4): 752-770.

Roseneil Sasha, Crowhurst Isabel, Hellesund Tone, Santos Ana Cristina, Stoilova Mariya (2013) Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity: The Regulation and Normalization of Same-Sex Sexualities in Europe. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 20(2): 165–199. doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxt006

Rosenfeld Michael J. (2015) Revisiting the Data from the New Family Structure Study: Taking Family Instability into Account. Sociological Science, September, DOI 10.15195/v2.a23.

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