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	<title>India Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
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	<title>India Archives - N-IUSSP</title>
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	<item>
		<title>Gone and forgotten? Omissions of birth histories in an Indian survey</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/gone-and-forgotten-omissions-of-birth-histories-in-an-indian-survey/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharan Sharma]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 08:09:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=11110</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Sharan Sharma, Debasis Barik, Om Prakash Sharma and Sonalde Desai note that about 4% of all live births reported in wave 1 of a large-scale panel survey in India (2004–2005) ... <a title="Gone and forgotten? Omissions of birth histories in an Indian survey" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/gone-and-forgotten-omissions-of-birth-histories-in-an-indian-survey/" aria-label="Read more about Gone and forgotten? Omissions of birth histories in an Indian survey">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/gone-and-forgotten-omissions-of-birth-histories-in-an-indian-survey/">Gone and forgotten? Omissions of birth histories in an Indian survey</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Sharan Sharma, Debasis Barik, Om Prakash Sharma and Sonalde Desai note that about 4% of all live births reported in wave 1 of a large-scale panel survey in India (2004</em>–<em>2005) were omitted in the second wave reports, seven years later. Children who died in infancy are most at risk of omission. Among children who are alive, daughters tend to be omitted more than sons.&nbsp;</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">An average woman worldwide now has fewer than half as many children as in 1950 (Bloom et al. 2025). This sharp decline in fertility rates has attracted much recent attention from researchers and policymakers as well as the general public. In many low and middle-income countries, where robust birth registry systems are not always available, these fertility estimates come from demographic survey data. These surveys typically interview “eligible women”, usually ever-married women aged 15 to 49 years in a randomly selected sample of households, and ask them to report all live births. These data are then statistically extrapolated to estimate birth rates for the broader population.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Fertility rates and errors of omission&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The accuracy of these estimates depends on whether respondents provide complete birth histories. However, several factors can lead to omitted births. Birth-history questions are often just one component of a long questionnaire that includes many other topics. Depending on where the question appears, respondents may become tired and skip reporting some births. This may be especially true in low- and middle-income countries where women have a relatively higher average number of children than women in higher-income countries.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Respondents may also misinterpret the birth history question. For example, rather than reporting all live births, the respondent may think she only needs to report children who are still alive. Or she may feel that she needs to report only children who live with her currently, thus omitting daughters who have married and moved away.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Questions about deceased children can be emotionally sensitive. Some mothers may have suppressed those painful memories, and even if they remember, they may not want to relive them by talking about them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Collecting birth histories, therefore, is more complex than meets the eye. It also takes a well-trained interviewer who understands the intent of the birth history questions, administers them carefully, and is attentive enough to probe the respondent when needed.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Estimating omitted births: the role of sex and survival status</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Given these issues, in a recent article we estimated the proportion of missing births and the factors associated with those omissions (Sharma et al., 2024). We used data from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS). The IHDS is a large-scale panel survey that follows the same households over time, allowing us to compare births reported by the same respondent across two waves.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We tracked births reported by the same 25,474 women in the first and second survey waves, conducted in 2004–2005 and 2011–2012, respectively. Ideally, all 73,408 births reported in the first wave should also have been reported in the second wave. But this was not the case. We found that 2,913 births (4% of births reported in wave 1) were not reported in wave 2. Moreover, these were not random omissions; they followed a clear pattern, as shown in Figure 1.&nbsp;</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity is-style-dots"/>



<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1: Survival status and sex of children reported in wave 1 (2004–2005) but not reported in wave 2 (2011–2012) of the India Human Development Survey</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Figure-1-Survival-status-and-sex-of-children-reported-in-wave.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="446" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Figure-1-Survival-status-and-sex-of-children-reported-in-wave-1024x446.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-11111" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Figure-1-Survival-status-and-sex-of-children-reported-in-wave-1024x446.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Figure-1-Survival-status-and-sex-of-children-reported-in-wave-300x131.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Figure-1-Survival-status-and-sex-of-children-reported-in-wave-768x335.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Figure-1-Survival-status-and-sex-of-children-reported-in-wave.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Percentages add up to 100%. Base: 2,913 births reported in wave 1 but not in wave 2.<br>Source: Sharma et al. (2024).</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity is-style-dots"/>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Approximately three-quarters of all omitted births were children reported as dead (solid areas in Figure 1) in wave 1, with male and female children contributing almost equally to the omissions. However, among the 27% of children who were reported alive in wave 1 (horizontal-line areas in Figure 1), girls were disproportionately more likely to be missing in wave 2.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Looking at these data from another angle, Table 1 shows the stark contrast in omission rates by children’s survival status recorded in wave 1. Nearly one-third of children reported as deceased in wave 1 were not reported in wave 2. In contrast, only a little more than 1% of children reported alive in wave 1 were omitted in wave 2.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity is-style-dots"/>



<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Table 1: Births omitted in wave 2, by the child’s survival status recorded in wave 1 (India, 2004–2005 and 2011–2012)</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table><tbody><tr><td><strong>Child&#8217;s survival status in wave 1</strong></td><td><strong>Births reported in wave 1</strong></td><td><strong>Wave 1 births omitted in wave 2</strong></td><td><strong>Omission rate (%)</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Alive</td><td>66,646</td><td>800</td><td>1.2</td></tr><tr><td>Dead</td><td>6,762</td><td>2,113</td><td>31.2</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>73,408</td><td>2,913</td><td>3.9</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Source: Sharma et al. (2024).</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity is-style-dots"/>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What are the probable factors behind births omissions?&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1 and Table 1 clearly show that mothers are much more likely to omit dead children. This is understandable, given the emotional sensitivity of these memories and the difficulty of asking and answering questions about deceased children.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To explore other factors associated with omitted births, we analyzed relationships between omissions and several geographic, maternal, child, and interviewer-level characteristics. Table 2 displays an excerpt of the results from this analysis, conducted separately for omissions among children who had died and children who were alive. What emerges is that birth omissions are a complex function of several survey variables.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity is-style-dots"/>



<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Table 2: Relationship of different characteristics with birth omissions, analyzed separately for deceased and alive children </p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table><tbody><tr><td>&nbsp;</td><td colspan="2"><strong>Relationship of different variables with omissions of…</strong></td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;</td><td><strong>Deceased children</strong></td><td><strong>Children reported alive</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1. Geography</td><td>Births reported by urban women are associated with a greater omission risk than those reported by rural women.</td><td>‒</td></tr><tr><td>2. Child&#8217;s Sex</td><td>‒</td><td>Daughters are more likely to be omitted than sons.</td></tr><tr><td>3. Child&#8217;s Age<sup>°</sup></td><td>Children who died in infancy have a much higher omission risk. However, a longer time since death is associated with lower omission risk.</td><td>Older children are more likely to be omitted.</td></tr><tr><td>4. Mother&#8217;s Age</td><td>‒</td><td>Older women are associated with lower omission risk.</td></tr><tr><td>5. Mother&#8217;s Education</td><td>‒</td><td>‒</td></tr><tr><td>6. Interviewer</td><td colspan="2">The higher the interviewer’s workload, the lower the risk of omission.</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p class="has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Notes: ‒ : no evidence of an association of the variable with birth omission or no clear story.<br>°:&nbsp; Child&#8217;s age for dead children is the purported child age at the time of interview.<br>Source: Sharma et al. (2024).</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity is-style-dots"/>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What can we do</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Birth omissions are large enough to matter. Given the importance of fertility estimates to public debate and policy making, it is critical to ensure that demographic surveys collect accurate birth history data.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our analysis shows that birth omissions do not occur at random. This is, in fact, good news: if we can identify which births are most likely to be omitted, we can improve how fertility data are collected. For example, since we know that dead children have an elevated risk of omission (especially in urban areas), interviewers should be trained to administer these questions with care, to be aware of cues that suggest that the respondent is hesitant, and then probe such respondents sensitively. With the availability of Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI), survey instruments can be programmed to dynamically alert interviewers to those combinations of characteristics that are prone to omissions.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Respondents need to be reminded that the survey is collecting data on all live births and not only on the children who are currently living with her. The data also show that interviewers with a higher workload tend to have lower omissions, both for alive and dead children. Whether this is because IHDS recruited better interviewers as the survey proceeded or because interviewers became better at collecting fertility data as they gained survey experience is a topic of future research.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bloom, D.E., Kuhn, M., Prettner, K. (2025). The Debate over Falling Fertility. Finance &amp; Development Magazine, June 2025, International Monetary Fund,&nbsp; Washington, DC, USA. Accessed at: <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom">https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom</a>&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sharma, S., Desai, S., Barik, D., &amp; Sharma, O. P. (2024). Gone and forgotten? Predictors of birth history omissions in India. <em>Demographic Research</em>, <em>50</em>, 929.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/gone-and-forgotten-omissions-of-birth-histories-in-an-indian-survey/">Gone and forgotten? Omissions of birth histories in an Indian survey</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Debasis Barik]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Om Prakash Sharma]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sonalde Desai]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>India&#8217;s Population Debate</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/video/indias-population-debate/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[N-IUSSP]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 May 2025 07:44:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Video]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[video]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=10020</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>India&#8217;s population of 142.86 crore is the world&#8217;s largest, comprising 17.78% of global population. Fertility rates have declined from 6.18 children per woman in 1950 to 2.01 in 2022. Punjab ... <a title="India&#8217;s Population Debate" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/video/indias-population-debate/" aria-label="Read more about India&#8217;s Population Debate">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/video/indias-population-debate/">India&#8217;s Population Debate</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">India&#8217;s population of 142.86 crore is the world&#8217;s largest, comprising 17.78% of global population. Fertility rates have declined from 6.18 children per woman in 1950 to 2.01 in 2022. Punjab and southern states have the lowest rates, while Bihar leads with the highest. Comparatively, South Korea&#8217;s rate is 0.78, and China&#8217;s is 1.18. India&#8217;s rate is projected to fall to 1.29 by 2050, raising concerns about an ageing population. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@indiatoday" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">India Today</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/video/indias-population-debate/">India&#8217;s Population Debate</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Why and where are deaths under-reported in India?</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/why-and-where-are-deaths-under-reported-in-india/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Krishna Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Apr 2023 08:04:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Health and mortality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[covid-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mortality]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8350</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of accurately counting deaths, classifying them by age, sex, place of residence and cause. Although formally mandatory since 1969, death registration ... <a title="Why and where are deaths under-reported in India?" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/why-and-where-are-deaths-under-reported-in-india/" aria-label="Read more about Why and where are deaths under-reported in India?">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/why-and-where-are-deaths-under-reported-in-india/">Why and where are deaths under-reported in India?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of accurately counting deaths, classifying them by age, sex, place of residence and cause. Although formally mandatory since 1969, death registration is still deficient in India, especially among certain groups, as Krishna Kumar and Nandita Saikia illustrate.</em></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Introduction</strong></h3>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">The Covid-19 pandemic has once again highlighted the importance of accurately counting deaths, and of classifying them by age, sex, place of residence and cause, so that health officials and decision-makers can identify health threats and high-risk populations (Sakia et al., 2023; Sankoh et al., 2020).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India, the second most populated country of the world, enacted its Registration of Birth and Death (RBD) act in 1969, mandating universal registration within 21 days of a birth or death. Today, however, things are still far from perfect. For instance, in 2020, there were around 5.6 million and 4.6 million deaths, respectively, among Indian males and females according to United Nations estimates (United Nations, 2022), but the Office of Registrar General of India (2022) “missed” some 6% of female deaths in that year.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This calls for an understanding of the determinants of death registration in India. This is the topic of our recent study (Saikia et al., 2023) based on 84,390 individuals interviewed during the National Family Health Survey, 2019-21 (NFHS-5) (IIPS &amp; ICF, 2021). Note, however, that we relied on interviewees’ reports of family deaths and their registration in the previous year, without checking death certificates: errors of various types are therefore possible. Besides, part of the data collection took place in the post-Covid period. Due to the government compensation scheme for Covid-related deaths, higher-than-normal death registration is likely to have occurred.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Death registration level varies by place of residence, region, state and district</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Between 2019 and 2021, according to our sample data, slightly less than 71% of deaths were registered, on average, with higher rates in urban than in rural areas (83% vs 66%, respectively). In the latter, most adults are employed in informal sectors such as farming, construction work and fishing, which seldom provide social security (e.g. survivor’s pension). Low registration levels may reflect a lack of motivation, few incentives and poor access to death registration services.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Death registration coverage varies geographically, and is particularly low in the Northeast (64%), East (57%), and Central (56%) Indian regions (Figure 1).&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-1.-Death-registration-levels-by-gender-and-district.-India-2019-21.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="606" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-1.-Death-registration-levels-by-gender-and-district.-India-2019-21.--1024x606.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8354" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-1.-Death-registration-levels-by-gender-and-district.-India-2019-21.--1024x606.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-1.-Death-registration-levels-by-gender-and-district.-India-2019-21.--300x178.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-1.-Death-registration-levels-by-gender-and-district.-India-2019-21.--768x454.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-1.-Death-registration-levels-by-gender-and-district.-India-2019-21.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Death registration level vary by demographic and socioeconomic characteristics</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Registration levels are higher for deaths at older ages, e.g. about 78% at 50-64 years, and 72% at 65-98 years (Figures 2 and 3). Conversely, they are very low for children: merely 35% at 0-4 years. Sex differences are large: around 74% of male deaths are registered versus 66% of female deaths. This difference is linked, among other things, to two factors:&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1) a lower proportion of women employed in the formal sector (see above) and</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2) a higher proportion of accidental deaths among males. These are usually subject to police investigation, which increases the likelihood of registration (Adair et al., 2021).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Death registration was lower:&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1) among the low-educated: 63% and 71% when the household head was, respectively, illiterate or had just primary education,</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2) among Muslims (65%) than Hindus (71%),</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">3) among scheduled castes (or STs: 67%) than other castes (77%),</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">4) among poorer households (52% in the first income quintile; 87% in the fifth).&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-deceased-India-2019-21.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="549" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-deceased-India-2019-21.--1024x549.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8355" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-deceased-India-2019-21.--1024x549.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-deceased-India-2019-21.--300x161.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-deceased-India-2019-21.--768x412.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-deceased-India-2019-21.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-3.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-household-India-2019-21.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="549" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-3.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-household-India-2019-21.--1024x549.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8356" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-3.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-household-India-2019-21.--1024x549.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-3.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-household-India-2019-21.--300x161.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-3.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-household-India-2019-21.--768x412.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Figure-3.-Percentage-of-registered-deaths-by-selected-demographic-and-socioeconomic-characteristics-of-the-household-India-2019-21.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusion&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Death registration levels vary considerably by sex, age, place of residence and regions in India, and are influenced by socioeconomic variables. Periodic awareness programs may therefore be needed among vulnerable subgroups and in disadvantaged districts. Providing financial assistance for funeral rites, education loans to orphans, and social security to the deceased’s family members after reporting a death to a civil authority would probably prove helpful in increasing death registration coverage.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Adair T, Gamage USH, Mikkelsen L, Joshi R. 2021. Are there sex differences in completeness of death registration and quality of cause of death statistics? Results from a global analysis. <em>BMJ Glob Health</em>. 6(10):e006660. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2021-006660</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ICF 2021. <em>National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), 2019-21</em>. IIPS: Mumbai, India.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Niti Aayog &#8211;  <a href="https://sdgindiaindex.niti.gov.in/assets/Files/SDG3.0_Final_04.03.2021_Web_Spreads.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>SDG India Index. 2021</em>.; 2021</a>. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Saikia N, Kumar K, Das B. 2023. Death registration coverage 2019–2021, India. <em>Bulletin of the World Health Organization</em>. Feb 1; 101(2):102-10. doi: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.22.288889" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.22.288889</a>&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sankoh O, Dickson KE, Faniran S, et al. 2020. Births and deaths must be registered in Africa. <em>Lancet Glob Health</em>. 8(1):e33-e34. doi:10.1016/S2214-109X(19)30442-5.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Setel PW, Macfarlane SB, Szreter S, et al. 2007. A scandal of invisibility: making everyone count by counting everyone. <em>The Lancet</em>. 370(9598):1569-1577. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(07)61307-5</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2022. <em>World Population Prospect</em>. 2022.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Source fugure 1:</strong> <a href="https://figshare.com/articles/figure/Death_Registration_Level_by_Sex/21724049" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://figshare.com/articles/figure/Death_Registration_Level_by_Sex/21724049</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/why-and-where-are-deaths-under-reported-in-india/">Why and where are deaths under-reported in India?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nandita Saikia]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/reproductive-burden-and-womens-employment-in-india/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chhavi Tiwari]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2023 09:09:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Education, work, economy (socio-economic differences)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gender issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[woman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8217</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Low and declining female labour force participation in India has been a puzzle and a key policy question in the recent past. Chhavi Tiwari and Srinivas Goli argue that it ... <a title="Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/reproductive-burden-and-womens-employment-in-india/" aria-label="Read more about Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/reproductive-burden-and-womens-employment-in-india/">Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Low and declining female labour force participation in India has been a puzzle and a key policy question in the recent past. Chhavi Tiwari and Srinivas Goli argue that it depends on a particularly strong motherhood penalty. India needs more effective work</em>&#8211;<em>family reconciliation policies if female economic activity is to be sustained.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">India’s female labour-force participation (FLFP) is low and has declined over time. It was just 20% in 2019, down from 25% in 2011 and 32% in 2005 (ILO, 2022). This has negative consequences both at the individual level (e.g., for women’s autonomy and households’ wellbeing) and at the macro level, as it slows down economic growth and cancels out the potential advantages of India’s current favourable age structure (the demographic “window of opportunity”; James &amp; Goli, 2016; Goli et al., 2021).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lack of appropriate data has made it difficult for researchers to understand the complex dynamics of the labour market, and to solve the puzzle of the low and declining female participation. In a recent article (Tiwari, Goli and Rammohan 2022), we used a panel dataset covering seven years to better investigate the issue. We focused, in particular, on the number of children “at home”, aged 0-14 years, because caring responsibilities tend to fall disproportionately on women, in India as elsewhere (Francavilla and Giannelli, 2011).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>How do children influence women’s labour force participation?&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">FLFP in India has traditionally been higher among the poor, because women work out of necessity to contribute to household income. Things may be changing, however, as FLFP did not increase in this group between 2004–05 and 2011–12 (Figure 1). Conversely, it increased among non-poor women by 8%, reaching 28.1% in 2011–12. Across fertility levels, FLFP increased among childless women especially, from 19.6% to 35.5%, but much less among women with three or more children.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="512" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics--1024x512.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8222" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics--1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics--300x150.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics--768x384.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1.-Female-labour-force-participation-rates-in-India-2004–05-and-2011–12-by-selected-female-characteristics-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Children’s influence on FLFP can be better understood by relating women’s transition into and out of the labour market to their fertility transition. Having, and remaining at, a small number of children leads to greater labour market participation, as shown in Figure 1, with more women entering than leaving the labour market, both among the poor and the non-poor (Figure 2).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="532" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between-1024x532.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8223" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between-1024x532.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between-300x156.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between-768x399.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2-Percentage-of-women-entering-and-exiting-the-labour-market-between.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In our scientific article (Tiwari, Goli and Rammohan 2022), we estimated the net effect of the reproductive burden on labour market participation. Each (subsequent) child reduces the probability of working, but the effect is strongest for high parities, from the third child onwards. Note that this is not merely an association: there seems to be a truly causal effect of reproductive burden on labour market outcomes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the same analysis, we also found that living in larger household positively affects labour market participation among women with a large progeny, because other family members (especially elder women) can take care of young children. We also found that the motherhood penalty is highest for women belonging to Scheduled Castes / Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) and for women with no formal education.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In India, women’s entry into, or exit from, the labor market is sensitive to changes in the number of their offspring, which suggests the need for stronger work-family reconciliation policies. India’s 2017 Maternity (Amendment) Bill tried to address this problem, by increasing the length of paid maternity leave for working women from 12 weeks to 26 weeks. However, its effects are limited, because this provision only covers mothers who work in the formal labour market, while approximately 84% of the female labour force is in the informal sector, with no access to maternity leave provisions (Williams, 2017).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Several policies to sustain and improve women’s labour supply and reduce the motherhood penalty, are already in place. These include the <em>Anganwadi </em>set up under the<em> Integrated Child Development Services programme</em> launched in 1975, that provide free services such as basic health care and pre-school activities for children in rural areas (Maity, 2006). Such initiatives need to be expanded and extended to urban areas, where declining labor supply has been a concern among economists.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The question of paternity leaves must also be addressed, to promote gender balance in childcare responsibility. In short, India needs stronger and better “work-family” policies, to enable women to reconcile the tension between maternity/childcare and employment.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Foot note</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><sup>1</sup>These are people who live in “absolute poverty” (below the so-called Tendulkar poverty line), which is based on (purchasing-power-adjusted) monthly per-capita consumption expenditure, and varies across states (Desai et al., 2010).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Desai, S. B., Dubey, A., Joshi, B. L., Sen, M., Shariff, A., &amp; Vanneman, R. (2010). Human development in India. New York: Oxford University.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Francavilla, F., &amp; Giannelli, G. C. (2011). Does family planning help the employment of women? The case of India. Journal of Asian Economics, 22(5), 412–426.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Goli, S., James, K. S., Singh, D., Srinivasan, V., Mishra, R., Rana, M. J., &amp; Reddy, U. S. (2021). Economic returns of family planning and fertility decline in India, 1991–2061. Journal of Demographic Economics, 1–33. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2021.3" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2021.3</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT database. Data as of June 2022. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=IN%20" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=IN</a>&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">James, K. S., &amp; Goli, S. (2016). Demographic changes in India: Is the country prepared for the challenge.&nbsp;Brown J. World Aff.,&nbsp;23, 169.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Maity, B. (2016). Interstate Differences in the Performance of&#8221; Anganwadi&#8221; Centres under ICDS.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tiwari, C., Goli, S., &amp; Rammohan, A. (2022). Reproductive burden and its impact on female labor market outcomes in India: Evidence from longitudinal analyses.&nbsp;Population Research and Policy Review, 1–37. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-022-09730-6" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-022-09730-6</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Williams, C. C. (2017). Reclassifying economies by the degree and intensity of informalization: The implications for India. In&nbsp;Critical perspectives on work and employment in globalizing India&nbsp;(pp. 113–129). Springer, Singapore.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/reproductive-burden-and-womens-employment-in-india/">Reproductive burden and women’s employment in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas Goli]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Labour force participation among older adults in India</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/labour-force-participation-among-older-adults-in-india/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aparajita Chattopadhyay]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2023 08:44:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Education, work, economy (socio-economic differences)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Old age]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[population ageing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Work]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8173</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>India’s economic sector faces a reckoning with its ageing population. Aparajita Chattopadhyay and David E. Bloom‘s analysis, based on the Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI), indicates that health is ... <a title="Labour force participation among older adults in India" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/labour-force-participation-among-older-adults-in-india/" aria-label="Read more about Labour force participation among older adults in India">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/labour-force-participation-among-older-adults-in-india/">Labour force participation among older adults in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>India’s economic sector faces a reckoning with its ageing population. Aparajita Chattopadhyay and David E. Bloom‘s analysis, based on the Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI), indicates that health is the main determinant of working into old age, making healthy aging a priority for the future of the country.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">India’s population is getting older. Adults aged 60 years and above will outnumber children under 10 years of age by 2030, and will likely reach some 340 million (about 20% of the population) by 2050. India must therefore start to face the economic and health issues that accompany population ageing: among these, monitoring and possibly increasing labour market participation at mature ages. Unfortunately, until recently, due to the paucity of nationally representative data for the 60+ population, little was known about the work characteristics and the determinants of work among older adults in India: only that it is mainly in the informal labour market, with low social security coverage and low female participation.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Work characteristics of older adults in India</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To learn more about this population subgroup, the Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI) was launched in 2017, interviewing over 73,000 respondents aged 45 and above, and their spouses regardless of age. Questions were asked about health, healthcare access and utilization, work status, family and social support, social insurance coverage, retirement pension, and economic situation across 36 states and union territories of India (IIPS 2020). In a recently published paper, we analysed these data (except for the State of Sikkim), and found several interesting results (Chattopadhyay et al., 2022). For instance, only some 36% of older adults (here defined as those aged 60 years and over) are engaged in income-generating activities (50% if they are men), 38% have worked in the past but then stopped, and the remaining 26% have never worked (almost 50% if they are women).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Among older adults who are working, a mere 5% have full-time jobs, and only 25% have documentary evidence of their current work, indicating a predominance of the informal sector in the Indian economy. Approximately 33% of older women are agricultural labourers, as opposed to 16% of older men, while in all the types of work that indicate “ownership of wealth” (i.e., farm owner, own business, own-account worker), men prevail (Figure 1) (Chattopadhyay et al., 2022).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1A.-Gender-difference-in-type-of-work-among-people-aged-60-years-and-over-and-working-India-2017-18-respondents-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="444" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1A.-Gender-difference-in-type-of-work-among-people-aged-60-years-and-over-and-working-India-2017-18-respondents--1024x444.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8189" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1A.-Gender-difference-in-type-of-work-among-people-aged-60-years-and-over-and-working-India-2017-18-respondents--1024x444.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1A.-Gender-difference-in-type-of-work-among-people-aged-60-years-and-over-and-working-India-2017-18-respondents--300x130.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1A.-Gender-difference-in-type-of-work-among-people-aged-60-years-and-over-and-working-India-2017-18-respondents--768x333.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-1A.-Gender-difference-in-type-of-work-among-people-aged-60-years-and-over-and-working-India-2017-18-respondents-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pension coverage is rare: it benefits only about 12% of older men and 3% of older women, among those who are working or worked previously.&nbsp;Contrary to the popular belief that workforce participation starts to decline beyond age 60, LASI data reveal that this happens much earlier in India, especially for women (Figure 2).&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-male-and-female-working-older-adults-by-age-in-India-2017-18-Moving-averages-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="444" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-male-and-female-working-older-adults-by-age-in-India-2017-18-Moving-averages--1024x444.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8179" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-male-and-female-working-older-adults-by-age-in-India-2017-18-Moving-averages--1024x444.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-male-and-female-working-older-adults-by-age-in-India-2017-18-Moving-averages--300x130.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-male-and-female-working-older-adults-by-age-in-India-2017-18-Moving-averages--768x333.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-2.-Percentage-of-male-and-female-working-older-adults-by-age-in-India-2017-18-Moving-averages-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Gender, wealth, education, and work&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In India, women are less likely to work than men, in part for health reasons (Chattopadhyay &amp; Roy, 2005) but most importantly because they are traditionally in charge of household chores. Contrary to expectations, female work participation is lower among educated women and in urban areas: this may indicate lack of opportunities (Vyas, 2020), mismatch between workers’ skills and job requirements, and increased family (female) responsibilities in urban areas, where support from kin and neighbours is rarer.&nbsp;<br>However, poor, rural, and divorced/separated/deserted older women are significantly more likely to work than men in similar conditions, evidently because their economic conditions are less favourable (Figure 3).&nbsp;<br>Labour force participation among Indian older adults is lowest among the richest and the poorest, but for different reasons. The former, mainly engaged in white collar, well-paid jobs in their adult years, benefit from better pension/health insurance coverage and do not need to work. The latter, instead, must frequently stop working because of poor health.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-3a.-Odds-ratios-of-the-chances-of-working-among-60-population-in-India-2017-18-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="655" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-3a.-Odds-ratios-of-the-chances-of-working-among-60-population-in-India-2017-18--1024x655.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8182" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-3a.-Odds-ratios-of-the-chances-of-working-among-60-population-in-India-2017-18--1024x655.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-3a.-Odds-ratios-of-the-chances-of-working-among-60-population-in-India-2017-18--300x192.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-3a.-Odds-ratios-of-the-chances-of-working-among-60-population-in-India-2017-18--768x492.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Figure-3a.-Odds-ratios-of-the-chances-of-working-among-60-population-in-India-2017-18-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Family, residence, health and work&nbsp;</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Older adults who live with&nbsp;their (adult) children are less likely to work beyond age 60. This is largely because they are either in need of care from close kin or, if they are healthy, they provide care themselves, to their grandchildren: about 25% provide childcare, as compared to a mere 10% of older adults who do not live with their children (IIPS, 2020).<br>In general, rural older adults are more likely to work than their urban counterparts (Figure 3), due in part to the opportunity to engage in farming and allied activities, and in part to the lack of social security benefits, as their past earnings were low and insufficient to generate significant savings or pension contributions.&nbsp;<br>Health is a stronger predictor of work status in rural than in urban areas. Rural older adults with chronic ailments are 43% less likely to work than their healthy rural counterparts, whereas urban older adults with chronic ailments are “only” 31% less likely to work than their healthy urban counterparts. This may be due to the rural population’s limited access to health facilities, resulting in untreated ailments that prevent older adults from engaging in agricultural and other labour-intensive work. In urban settings, better access to health services and medication may lessen the effect of health on work participation at older ages (Jana &amp; Chattopadhyay, 2022).&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A key question when considering older adult employment in India is whether work in old age indicates deprivation. The answer is mixed. The affirmative response corresponds to the engagement of older&nbsp;Indian adults in part-time jobs, in agriculture and in the informal sector with relatively lower income. In addition, with educational attainment, familial support, and better social security coverage, people are generally less likely to work in old age, indicating that financial insecurity may be the reason why Indian older adults continue to work.<br>However, it should also be noted that healthy older Indians are likely to work beyond the age of 60, possibly indicating a desire to remain active in the labour market.<br>Elder employment has positive effects on youth employment, on the wellbeing of older workers, and on economies and societies in multiplicative ways (Jasmin &amp; Rahman, 2021). This practice is in tune with the healthy and active aging initiative promoted by the World Health Organization, and it should therefore be encouraged. India’s 1999 National Policy for Older Persons made positive steps in this direction, but the time has probably come to renew and relaunch that programme.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Acknowledgements</strong>&nbsp;</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We thank Arunika Agarwal, Research Associate, Harvard T.H Chan School of Public health and Priya Maurya, PhD scholar of IIPS for their useful comments, and the funders of the Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI), i.e. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, India and National Institute on Aging, US.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chattopadhyay, A., Khan, J., Bloom, D. E., Sinha, D., Nayak, I., Gupta, S., Lee, J., &amp; Perianayagam, A. (2022). Insights into Labor Force Participation among Older Adults: Evidence from the Longitudinal Ageing Study in India. <em>Journal of Population Ageing</em>, 15(1), 39–59. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12062-022-09357-7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1007/s12062-022-09357-7</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chattopadhyay, A., &amp; Roy, T. K. (2005). Does retirement affect healthy ageing? A study of two groups of pensioners in Mumbai, India. <em>Asia-Pacific Population Journal</em>, 20(1), 89–115. <a href="https://doi.org/10.18356/0ef4333e-en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.18356/0ef4333e-en</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS), National Programme for, Health Care of Elderly (NPHCE), MoHFW, &amp; Public Health (HSPH) and the University of Southern California (USC). (2020). Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI) Wave 1, 2017-18, India Report. International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai. <a href="https://www.iipsindia.ac.in/lasi/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.iipsindia.ac.in/lasi/</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jana, A., &amp; Chattopadhyay, A. (2022). Prevalence and potential determinants of chronic disease among elderly in India: Rural-urban perspectives. <em>PLOS ONE</em>, 17(3), e0264937. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0264937" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0264937</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jasmin, A. F., &amp; Abdur Rahman, A. (2021). Does Elderly Employment Reduce Job Opportunities for Youth? [Brief]. World Bank. <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36170" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36170</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vyas, M. (2020). Impact of Lockdown on Labour in India. <em>The Indian Journal of Labour Economics</em>, 63(1), 73–77. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s41027-020-00259-w" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1007/s41027-020-00259-w</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/labour-force-participation-among-older-adults-in-india/">Labour force participation among older adults in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[David E. Bloom]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Child survival in India: Hindus now catching up with Muslims</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/child-survival-in-india-hindus-now-catching-up-with-muslims/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dibyasree Ganguly]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 08:01:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Health and mortality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[child mortality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=8104</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Until recently, child survival in India was lower among Muslims than among Hindus, despite the lower average socio-economic status of the former. Dibyasree Ganguly and Srinivas Goli note that this ... <a title="Child survival in India: Hindus now catching up with Muslims" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/child-survival-in-india-hindus-now-catching-up-with-muslims/" aria-label="Read more about Child survival in India: Hindus now catching up with Muslims">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/child-survival-in-india-hindus-now-catching-up-with-muslims/">Child survival in India: Hindus now catching up with Muslims</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Until recently, child survival in India was lower among Muslims than among Hindus, despite the lower average socio-economic status of the former. Dibyasree Ganguly and Srinivas Goli note that this was due to a compositional effect (more Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes among Hindus) and that the gap has now virtually disappeared.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Despite being socially and economically disadvantaged (e.g., in terms of education and wealth), for decades, Muslims in India experienced lower child mortality than Hindus. This “paradox”, long discussed in the specialized literature (e.g. Bhalotra et al., 2010; Guillot &amp; Allendorf, 2010), has been attributed to various socio-economic and religion-specific cultural factors, such as better sanitation practices and a higher percentage urban among Muslims, and son preference among Hindus. However, we argue below that this is, at best, only part of the explanation.&nbsp;<br>This child-mortality gap between Hindus and Muslims has shrunk over time, and is barely noticeable today (IIPS &amp; ORC Macro, 1995; IIPS &amp; ICF, 2017).&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why are Hindus catching up with Muslims?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 1992-93, under-5 (or child) survival was markedly lower among Hindus than among Muslims and other religions (Figure 1). Over time, however, as child survival improved for all religions, Hindus (in blue) progressively caught up with other groups, and notably with Muslims (in brown), from whom they were virtually indistinguishable by 2015-16.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-1.-Under-five-child-survival-chances-by-religion-in-India-1992-93-to-2015-16.-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="561" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-1.-Under-five-child-survival-chances-by-religion-in-India-1992-93-to-2015-16.--1024x561.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8108" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-1.-Under-five-child-survival-chances-by-religion-in-India-1992-93-to-2015-16.--1024x561.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-1.-Under-five-child-survival-chances-by-religion-in-India-1992-93-to-2015-16.--300x165.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-1.-Under-five-child-survival-chances-by-religion-in-India-1992-93-to-2015-16.--768x421.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-1.-Under-five-child-survival-chances-by-religion-in-India-1992-93-to-2015-16.-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Part of the explanation must be sought in the caste system, a hierarchical social division of Indian society. People affiliated to lower caste groups such as Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) have historically been oppressed, and forced to live in socio-economically and geographically marginalized locations. Not surprisingly, child mortality is higher among lower caste children (Dommaraju et al., 2008). <br>Fortunately, under-five mortality has declined markedly among all Indian groups and castes in the past 30 years or so, and within-group differences have declined very strongly (Figure 2). The trend has been more favourable for Hindus than for Muslims, both within the General castes (also called Upper or Other castes) and within in the others (SCs/STs). Hindus lagged behind in 1992-93, but their situation is now comparable (SCs/STs) or even better (General castes) than that of Muslims. </p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-2.-Trends-in-under-five-mortality-among-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="504" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-2.-Trends-in-under-five-mortality-among-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016--1024x504.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8109" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-2.-Trends-in-under-five-mortality-among-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016--1024x504.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-2.-Trends-in-under-five-mortality-among-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016--300x148.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-2.-Trends-in-under-five-mortality-among-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016--768x378.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-2.-Trends-in-under-five-mortality-among-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, the structural composition of the two religious groups is markedly different. Among Hindus, SCs/STs represent a large and increasing share of the population (39% at the end of the period). Conversely, among Muslims they represent a mere 6%. The two factors (differential mortality by caste and different structural caste composition of the two religious groups) explain both the initial difference in child mortality between Hindus and Muslims, and its evolution over time.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-3.-Share-of-population-by-caste-among-Hindus-H-and-Muslims-M.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="504" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-3.-Share-of-population-by-caste-among-Hindus-H-and-Muslims-M.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-1024x504.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8111" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-3.-Share-of-population-by-caste-among-Hindus-H-and-Muslims-M.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-1024x504.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-3.-Share-of-population-by-caste-among-Hindus-H-and-Muslims-M.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-300x148.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-3.-Share-of-population-by-caste-among-Hindus-H-and-Muslims-M.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-768x378.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Figure-3.-Share-of-population-by-caste-among-Hindus-H-and-Muslims-M.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Maternal and child health programmes have played a key role in improving in child survival in India, especially among SCs/STs, and, for structural reasons, this has benefited Hindus in particular (Goli et al. 2020; Ganguly, Goli, &amp; Rammohan 2022).&nbsp;<br>A few key maternal and child health indicators, for instance, while evolving favourably for all groups, have progressed most notably for SCs/STs, especially among the Hindus, whose internal differences in this respect have considerably shrunk. For instance, the gap between SC/STs and other castes in the share of pregnant women receiving at least four antenatal visits declined from 12.6% to 3.3% among Hindus between 1992 and 2021, but not among Muslims. During the same period, the caste-wise gap in births in a health facility fell more than three-fold among Hindus, but much less so among Muslims, and the same holds for full child immunization (Table 1).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Table-1.-Key-maternal-and-child-health-indicators-for-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-percentage-values-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-3" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="504" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Table-1.-Key-maternal-and-child-health-indicators-for-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-percentage-values--1024x504.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-8110" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Table-1.-Key-maternal-and-child-health-indicators-for-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-percentage-values--1024x504.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Table-1.-Key-maternal-and-child-health-indicators-for-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-percentage-values--300x148.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Table-1.-Key-maternal-and-child-health-indicators-for-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-percentage-values--768x378.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Table-1.-Key-maternal-and-child-health-indicators-for-Hindus-and-Muslims-by-caste.-India-1992–1993-to-2015–2016-percentage-values-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>To conclude</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Progress in socio-economic and demographic factors, and in maternal and child health care utilization in India, especially after the launch of the Reproductive and Child Health programme in the mid-1990s, has been the driving force in closing the gap between Hindu and Muslim child survival. From a policy perspective, two important conclusions emerge.&nbsp;<br>First, in comparing child survival across different socio-economic or religious groups, the structural composition of these groups, e.g. in terms of castes, must be taken into account. Second, both socio-economic and maternal and child health care policies play a key role not only in improving standards of living on average, but also in closing the gaps across subpopulations.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bhalotra, S., Valente, C., &amp; Soest, A. V. (2010). The puzzle of Muslim advantage in child survival in India. Journal of Health Economics, 29(2): 191–204.<br><br>Dommaraju, P., Agadjanian, V., &amp; Yabiku, S. (2008). The pervasive and persistent influence of caste on child mortality in India. Population Research and Policy Review, 27(4): 477–495.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ganguly, D., Goli, S., &amp; Rammohan, A. (2022). Explaining the diminishing of Muslim advantage in child survival in India. Genus, 78(1): 1–42.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Goli, S, Moradhvaj, James KS, Singh D, Srinivasan V. Road to family planning and RMNCHN related SDGs: Tracing the role of public health spending in India (2020.) <em>Glob Public Health.</em> Apr;16(4): 546–562.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Guillot, M., &amp; Allendorf, K. (2010). Hindu-Muslim differentials in child mortality in India. Genus, 66(2).&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ORC Macro. (1995). National Family Health Survey (NFHS-1), 1992–1993, IIPS, Mumbai, India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ICF. (2017). National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 2015–2016, IIPS, Mumbai, India.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/child-survival-in-india-hindus-now-catching-up-with-muslims/">Child survival in India: Hindus now catching up with Muslims</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas Goli]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Sex-selective abortion in India: an ongoing problem</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/sex-selective-abortion-in-india-an-ongoing-problem/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Claus C. Pörtner]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Aug 2022 07:44:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sex-selection]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=7888</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In India, the percentage of male births has increased since the mid-1980s. Claus Pörtner ties the continuously growing use of prenatal sex selection to India’s falling fertility among highly-educated women. ... <a title="Sex-selective abortion in India: an ongoing problem" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/sex-selective-abortion-in-india-an-ongoing-problem/" aria-label="Read more about Sex-selective abortion in India: an ongoing problem">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/sex-selective-abortion-in-india-an-ongoing-problem/">Sex-selective abortion in India: an ongoing problem</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>In India, the percentage of male births has increased since the mid-1980s. Claus Pörtner ties the continuously growing use of prenatal sex selection to India’s falling fertility among highly-educated women. He shows how sex selection substantially lengthens birth intervals, which, in turn, is responsible for a significant downward bias in the total fertility rate compared to predicted cohort fertility. Less-educated women still have relatively high fertility and short birth intervals when they have no sons, negatively affecting girls’ survival chances.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">With the introduction of ultrasound in the mid-1980s, use of sex-selective abortion spread rapidly in India, as shown by the steadily increasing percentage of boys in Figure 1. However, access to pre-natal sex determination does not necessarily lead to sex selection. Rather, in India, the practice is driven by the combination of declining fertility (also shown in Figure 1) and the particular Hindu preference for a son. However, once that son is secured, there is no clear son preference for subsequent births (Jayachandran, 2017; Pörtner, 2015). If a family is willing to have up to six children, there is a 99% probability of achieving the goal of one son. But if the desire is for one son <em>and</em> a maximum of two children, about 25 percent of families must use sex selection to achieve both targets.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-1.-Percentage-of-boys-at-birth-and-total-fertility-rate-in-India-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="575" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-1.-Percentage-of-boys-at-birth-and-total-fertility-rate-in-India--1024x575.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7892" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-1.-Percentage-of-boys-at-birth-and-total-fertility-rate-in-India--1024x575.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-1.-Percentage-of-boys-at-birth-and-total-fertility-rate-in-India--300x169.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-1.-Percentage-of-boys-at-birth-and-total-fertility-rate-in-India--768x431.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-1.-Percentage-of-boys-at-birth-and-total-fertility-rate-in-India-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Three critical aspects</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As striking as these overall numbers are, they obscure three critical aspects of the changes in India:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>• </strong>first, the massive differences in use of sex-selective abortion across education levels that followed the availability of pre-natal sex determination;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>• </strong>second, significant differences in use of sex selection by parity;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>• </strong>third, the increase in birth intervals brought about by sex selection, which, in turn, has led to substantial overestimation of the rate of fertility decline in India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent paper, I use data from India from 1972 to 2016 to examine how fertility, sex ratio, and birth spacing changed by education level with the spread of sex selection (Pörtner, 2022). The data comes from the first four National Family and Health Surveys. I focus on Hindu women because Hindus constitute about 80% of India’s population and have shown stronger son preference and higher use of sex selection than Muslims.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To illustrate some of the results, Figures 2 to 4 show the probability of a third birth, the percentage of boys among third births, and the 75th percentile birth intervals after the second child for rural women with no education and urban women with 12 or more years of education. These two groups represent the extremes in India and exemplify the divergent behaviors in response to son preference. Currently, the two groups constitute approximately 15% and 20% of the female Hindu population, respectively. The graphs for the other groups are available in Pörtner (2022). The analyses cover four periods: 1972–1984, 1985–1994, 1995–2004, and 2005–2016.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Fertility is falling, but son preference still affects the likelihood of a subsequent birth</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, consistent with declining overall fertility, the likelihood of a subsequent birth has decreased over time for all parities. However, the probability of having another child remained higher for women without sons than for women with one or more sons, showing that son preference remains strong in India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consistent with these general trends, both groups of women shown in Figure 2 are less likely to have a third child, but are more likely to do so if they already have two daughters than if they have one or two sons. However, more than 75% of rural women with no education still have a third birth whatever the sex of their prior children. This contrasts with highly educated urban women, among whom less than 20% have a third child if they already have a boy, while more than 50% have a third child if they have only daughters.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-2.-Two-examples-of-fertility-after-the-first-two-births-by-the-sex-of-prior-children-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="575" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-2.-Two-examples-of-fertility-after-the-first-two-births-by-the-sex-of-prior-children--1024x575.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7893" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-2.-Two-examples-of-fertility-after-the-first-two-births-by-the-sex-of-prior-children--1024x575.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-2.-Two-examples-of-fertility-after-the-first-two-births-by-the-sex-of-prior-children--300x169.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-2.-Two-examples-of-fertility-after-the-first-two-births-by-the-sex-of-prior-children--768x431.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-2.-Two-examples-of-fertility-after-the-first-two-births-by-the-sex-of-prior-children-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The use of sex selection is not declining</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, despite predictions that sex selection will eventually decline in India, there is no clear evidence to support this idea. The most likely users of sex selection—more highly educated women with no sons—continue to show substantial male-biased births. More worryingly, increasingly male-biased births among less-educated mothers suggest that sex selection is spreading as the fertility of this group declines.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The highly educated urban women in Figure 3 illustrate how the percentage of boys at birth increased for mothers with no sons as access to sex selection spread. For this group, we are fast approaching a situation where 80% of third births are boys, reflecting the fact that, as desired fertility declines, more and more women use sex selection to secure a boy before they stop childbearing.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-3.-Two-examples-of-percentage-boys-born-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="575" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-3.-Two-examples-of-percentage-boys-born-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children--1024x575.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7894" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-3.-Two-examples-of-percentage-boys-born-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children--1024x575.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-3.-Two-examples-of-percentage-boys-born-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children--300x169.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-3.-Two-examples-of-percentage-boys-born-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children--768x431.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-3.-Two-examples-of-percentage-boys-born-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The situation is very different for rural women with no education. Their fertility is still high, and the chance of having a son without sex selection is correspondingly high. Hence, there is still no evidence of sex selection for this group, although this might change in the future as fertility declines further.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Modest increases in birth intervals, except with sex selection</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Based on the percentage of boys at birth, we can split Hindu births into two broad groups. The first group, without evidence of sex selection, includes births to highly educated mothers with at least one son and all less-educated mothers whether or not they have a son. The second, with evidence of sex selection, includes births to more highly educated mothers with no sons.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-4.-Two-examples-of-birth-intervals-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-3" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="575" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-4.-Two-examples-of-birth-intervals-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children--1024x575.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7898" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-4.-Two-examples-of-birth-intervals-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children--1024x575.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-4.-Two-examples-of-birth-intervals-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children--300x169.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-4.-Two-examples-of-birth-intervals-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children--768x431.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Figure-4.-Two-examples-of-birth-intervals-after-the-first-two-births-by-sex-of-prior-children-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For births where sex selection is not used, median birth intervals have increased relatively little—by only three to six months over the four decades—compared to around 3.5 months <em>per decade</em> in other countries with declining fertility (Casterline &amp; Odden, 2016). Despite the absence of sex selection, there is still strong evidence of son preference, as illustrated by the shorter birth intervals when rural women with no education have only daughters than when they have at least one son.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What is more, a remarkably high proportion of birth intervals are still very short. Except among the most educated women, 25% or more have their second child within 24 months of their first, and a similar proportion have their third child within 24 months of their second. These intervals are substantially below the WHO recommended 24 months between pregnancies, resulting in significantly higher child mortality risk, especially for less-educated mothers (Bocquier et al., 2021; Pörtner, 2022).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The story is very different when sex selection is used. Highly educated mothers with no sons have substantial lengthening of birth intervals, further evidence of very significant use of sex-selective abortion. For example, among highly educated urban mothers with only daughters, the 75th percentile birth interval length is now nearly 70 months, a 21-month increase over four decades. Strikingly, more than 70% of this increase occurred in the first decade after the introduction of sex selection. Therefore, some mothers with no sons now have <em>longer</em> birth intervals than those with sons, reversing India’s traditional spacing pattern.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Spread of sex selection led to overestimation of fertility decline</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the unappreciated effects of the rapid expansion of sex selection and the associated increases in birth intervals is that it makes the TFR a downward-biased estimate of cohort fertility (Bongaarts, 1999; Hotz et al., 1997; Nı́ Bhrolcháin, 2011). That is precisely what appears to have happened in India. The period fertility rate substantially overestimated the speed of cohort fertility decline in the 1990s and early 2000s, as spacing increased with the spread of sex selection. For example, the TFR for urban women with 12 or more years of education went from 2.1 to around 1.6 with the introduction of ultrasound sex determination, but predicted cohort fertility declined only from 2.3 to 2.1. Although the two fertility measures have recently partly converged, predicted cohort fertility is still 10-20% higher than the period fertility rate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These results paint a less rosy picture of India’s prospects for a continued reduction in population growth than generally accepted. With predicted cohort fertility still substantially higher than the period fertility rate, India’s TFR will likely stabilize or even increase as birth intervals lengthen more slowly. Perversely, the more successful our attempts at combatting sex selection, the greater the likelihood of an increase in the TFR. This increase stems partly from the shortening of birth intervals if sex-selective abortions are unavailable and partly from families needing more births to have at least one son.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bocquier, P., Ginsburg, C., Menashe-Oren, A., Compaoré, Y., &amp; Collinson, M. (2021). <a href="https://www.niussp.org/health-and-mortality/closely-spaced-births-reduce-survival-chances-of-existing-and-future-children/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Closely spaced births reduce survival chances of existing and future children</em>.</a> N-IUSSP. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bongaarts, J. (1999). The fertility impact of changes in the timing of childbearing in the developing world. <em>Population Studies</em>, <em>53</em>(3), 277–289. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00324720308088" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1080/00324720308088</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Casterline, J. B., &amp; Odden, C. (2016). Trends in inter-birth intervals in developing countries 1965–2014. <em>Population and Development Review</em>, <em>42</em>(2), 173–194. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2016.00134.x" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2016.00134.x</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Hotz, V. J., Klerman, J. A., &amp; Willis, R. J. (1997). The economics of fertility in developed countries. In M. R. Rosenzweig &amp; O. Stark (Eds.), <em>Handbook of population and family economics</em> (pp. 275–347). Elsevier B.V.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jayachandran, S. (2017). Fertility decline and missing women. <em>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</em>, <em>9</em>(1), 118–139. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150576" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150576</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nı́ Bhrolcháin, M. (2011). Tempo and the TFR. <em>Demography</em>, <em>48</em>(3), 841–861. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-011-0033-4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-011-0033-4</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pörtner, C. C. (2022). Birth Spacing and Fertility in the Presence of Son Preference and Sex-Selective Abortions: India’s Experience Over Four Decades. <em>Demography</em>, <em>59</em>(1), 61–88. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-9580703" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-9580703</a> Pörtner, C. C. (2015). <a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21451" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Sex-selective abortions, fertility, and birth spacing</em></a> (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7189). World Bank. </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/sex-selective-abortion-in-india-an-ongoing-problem/">Sex-selective abortion in India: an ongoing problem</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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		<title>Increasing childlessness driven by higher female education in India</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/increasing-childlessness-driven-by-higher-female-education-in-india/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Koyel Sarkar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 May 2022 07:29:26 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Fertility and reproduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=7473</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>While still low, childlessness in India is on the rise. Trends in childlessness are linked to the opposing factors of poverty and opportunity-driven causes of childlessness, which Koyel Sarkar and ... <a title="Increasing childlessness driven by higher female education in India" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/increasing-childlessness-driven-by-higher-female-education-in-india/" aria-label="Read more about Increasing childlessness driven by higher female education in India">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/increasing-childlessness-driven-by-higher-female-education-in-india/">Increasing childlessness driven by higher female education in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>While still low, childlessness in India is on the rise. Trends in childlessness are linked to the opposing factors of poverty and opportunity-driven causes of childlessness, which Koyel Sarkar and Thomas Baudin capture via educational variations among married women. With development, childlessness may increase further, driven by economic opportunities much more than by poverty.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">Childlessness has been extensively analyzed both in the developed and in the developing world, along with its correlates, starting with education (e.g. Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2017, Verkroost and Monden 2022). However, studies are rarer in some countries and the characteristics of the phenomenon poorly understood.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a rapidly developing and diversely populated society like India, for instance, the fertility transition is accompanied by rising childlessness, a phenomenon generally attributed to infertility and sterility. This attitude stems from the implicit assumption that India is a broadly pronatalist and patriarchal society: children are considered integral to marriage and their absence often comes with social stigma. However, natural sterility is more or less a biological constant (Leridon 2008), which means that rising childlessness must find a different explanation.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Childlessness and women’s education</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India is a high fertility country where, despite an ongoing demographic transition, the total fertility rate remains above 2 children per women (2.2 in 2020 according to the World Bank). It lies between China with a TFR of 1.7 and Pakistan with 3.45.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indian childlessness has increased from about 2.5% among women born in the 1940s to about 4% among women born in the 1970s (Figure 1). If we include slightly younger groups, i.e., 35-49 years of age, these figures increase further to about 5% among women born in the late 1970s. These rates are comparable to those prevailing in Pakistan (5% among all women having finished their reproductive life, data from NIPS, 2013) and China (4.6% among women aged 65+, data from Zhang and Liu, 2007). However, a doubling of childlessness rates over a couple of decades may indicate the existence of a more nuanced picture than that captured in the literature so far.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-1-Childless-women-aged-40-49-years-and-35-49-years-in-India.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="582" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-1-Childless-women-aged-40-49-years-and-35-49-years-in-India-1024x582.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7479" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-1-Childless-women-aged-40-49-years-and-35-49-years-in-India-1024x582.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-1-Childless-women-aged-40-49-years-and-35-49-years-in-India-300x171.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-1-Childless-women-aged-40-49-years-and-35-49-years-in-India-768x436.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-1-Childless-women-aged-40-49-years-and-35-49-years-in-India.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 2 shows that the overall rise in childlessness is mainly driven by university- and secondary-educated women. In recent birth cohorts, as many as 4.6% of secondary-educated and about 8% of higher-educated women have remained childless, and this across all districts (Figure 3), excepting some central and northern parts of India. These figures challenge the general argument that childlessness is a physiological constraint in India, suggesting that it has much more to do with higher education and opportunity.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-2-Childlessness-by-education-levels-among-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years-.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="556" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-2-Childlessness-by-education-levels-among-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years--1024x556.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7480" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-2-Childlessness-by-education-levels-among-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years--1024x556.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-2-Childlessness-by-education-levels-among-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years--300x163.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-2-Childlessness-by-education-levels-among-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years--768x417.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-2-Childlessness-by-education-levels-among-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years-.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-3Childlessness-in-India-in-2011.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="919" height="1024" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-3Childlessness-in-India-in-2011-919x1024.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7486" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-3Childlessness-in-India-in-2011-919x1024.jpg 919w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-3Childlessness-in-India-in-2011-269x300.jpg 269w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-3Childlessness-in-India-in-2011-768x856.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-3Childlessness-in-India-in-2011.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 919px) 100vw, 919px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent study we use micro level data from all the three rounds of District Level Health Survey (1998-99; 2002-04 and 2007-08) to decompose childlessness into its poverty and opportunity drivers (Baudin and Sarkar 2021). Poverty concerns women who cannot have children because of their precarious living conditions that expose them to sexually transmitted diseases, malnutrition, etc. Opportunity driven childlessness refers instead to women who have delayed motherhood to the point where childbearing has become either unfeasible or undesirable. Opportunity drivers are a leading cause of childlessness among women in developed countries where childbearing has a time cost and obliges mothers to abandon personal aspirations, both of which are positively associated with education. However, women facing opportunity-driven childlessness do not necessarily want to have no children at all. Most of them look for both economic success and reproduction, but cannot get both. First birth postponement due to economic opportunities may imply an absence of the right partner at the right moment, reduced fecundity at later ages, lack of family support due to economic migration, etc.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Baudin et al (2015 and 2020) showed that both the poverty and opportunity drivers of childlessness can be measured (or at least proxied) by educational achievement. Drawing from this education-opportunity-poverty model, we show that childlessness exhibits a U-shaped relationship with education in India (Baudin and Sarkar 2021). Women with no education are about 10% more likely (and women with university education about 40% more likely) to be childless than women with primary or secondary education, our reference category (Figure 4, left panel). We conclude that childlessness in India reflects both poverty and opportunity. This result is robust to the introduction of a wide set of socioeconomic covariates, such as husband’s education, religion, caste, marriage age, state development level and state and cohort fixed effects. It also holds when we use the latest Demographic and Health Survey dataset (2015-16) with different covariates such as wealth, occupational categories, etc. (for a complete analysis see Baudin and Sarkar 2021).</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-4-Binary-logistic-regression-model-for-childlessness-among-currently-married-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-3" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="577" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-4-Binary-logistic-regression-model-for-childlessness-among-currently-married-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years-1024x577.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-7482" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-4-Binary-logistic-regression-model-for-childlessness-among-currently-married-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years-1024x577.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-4-Binary-logistic-regression-model-for-childlessness-among-currently-married-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years-300x169.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-4-Binary-logistic-regression-model-for-childlessness-among-currently-married-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years-768x433.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Figure-4-Binary-logistic-regression-model-for-childlessness-among-currently-married-Indian-women-aged-40-49-years.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Husbands and societies tend to hinder progress</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Interestingly, the probability of remaining childless declines with the husband’s education. This could be the result of three factors. First, the higher the husband’s education, the lower the risk of falling into poverty. Second, this means that the opportunity cost of childbearing is also lower – especially for men, who spend comparatively little time on childcare. Third, as fertility decisions are negotiated between partners, more educated men have stronger leverage over their wives, whose (possible) desire to remain childless is therefore unlikely to prevail (Figure 4, central panel).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another important finding is the effect of development at state level, proxied by average educational level. We find that the probabilities of remaining childlessness are lowest in the least developed states (Odds Ratio=0.8, which means that they are roughly 20% lower), followed by intermediate states (OR=0.9) as against the most developed states (reference category). Thus, at the micro level, education itself has an impact on the probability of being childless, and this effect is reinforced by a macro effect of development at the state level.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Increasing childlessness in a generally patriarchal and pronatalist country like India suggests that Indian women are becoming increasingly conscious of their individual preferences, and capable of pursuing them, especially when their own cultural background and the context (both proxied by education) so permit. On the other hand, the persistence of poverty, traditional values, and cultural habits (child marriage, caste division, persistence of very high marriage rates, etc.) continue to block the overall emancipation of women in their fertility choices. The U-shape relationship of education with childlessness derives, we believe, from the complexity of the underlying processes.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our results may prefigure the future of childlessness in India: with increasing education and development, childlessness will increase. While its poverty-related component will shrink further, this will be more than offset by the increase in its opportunity-related component.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Baudin, Thomas, David De La Croix, and Paula E. Gobbi (2015) &#8220;Fertility and childlessness in the United States.&#8221;&nbsp;<em>American Economic Review</em>&nbsp;105.6: 1852-82.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Baudin, Thomas, David De la Croix, and Paula Gobbi (2020) &#8220;Endogenous childlessness and stages of development.&#8221;&nbsp;<em>Journal of the European Economic Association</em>&nbsp;18.1: 83-133.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Baudin, Thomas, and Koyel Sarkar (2021) &#8220;Education and childlessness in India.&#8221;&nbsp;<em>Population</em>&nbsp;76.3 (2021): 461-486. https://www.cairn-int.info/revue-population-2021-3-page-461.htm</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kreyenfeld, Michaela, and Dirk Konietzka (2017)&nbsp;<em>Childlessness in Europe: Contexts, causes, and consequences</em>. Springer Nature.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Leridon, Henri (2008). A new estimate of permanent sterility by age: sterility defined as the inability to conceive.&nbsp;<em>Population studies</em>,&nbsp;<em>62</em>(1), 15-24</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">NIPS &#8211; National Institute of Population Studies [Pakistan] and ICF International. (2013) Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2012-13. Islamabad, Pakistan, and Calverton, Maryland, USA: NIPS and ICF International.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Verkroost, Florianne CJ, and Christiaan WS Monden (2022) &#8220;Childlessness and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Is There Evidence for a U-shaped Pattern?.&#8221;&nbsp;<em>European Journal of Population</em>: 1-34</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Zhang, Weiguo, and Guiping Liu (2007) &#8220;Childlessness, psychological well-being, and life satisfaction among the elderly in China.&#8221;&nbsp;<em>Journal of cross-cultural gerontology</em>&nbsp;22.2: 185-203.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/fertility-and-reproduction/increasing-childlessness-driven-by-higher-female-education-in-india/">Increasing childlessness driven by higher female education in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Baudin]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Educating children in India may help keep their parents healthy</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/educating-children-in-india-may-help-keep-their-parents-healthy/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Berenike Thoma]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Oct 2021 09:20:26 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Education, work, economy (socio-economic differences)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Education]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Health]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Old age]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=6756</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A strong positive association exists between children’s education and parental health in India. Berenike Thoma and Jan-Walter De Neve explain that this positive relationship persists when controlling for a wide ... <a title="Educating children in India may help keep their parents healthy" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/educating-children-in-india-may-help-keep-their-parents-healthy/" aria-label="Read more about Educating children in India may help keep their parents healthy">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/educating-children-in-india-may-help-keep-their-parents-healthy/">Educating children in India may help keep their parents healthy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>A strong positive association exists between children’s education and parental health in India. Berenike Thoma and Jan-Walter De Neve explain that this positive relationship persists when controlling for a wide range of factors, including socio-economic characteristics, although its strength differs between groups and subnational administrative units in India.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">According to the latest round of global population estimates and projections by the United Nations, the proportion of the population aged 60 years and older in India is expected to double by 2050 (United Nations, 2019). India’s older population is particularly vulnerable to poor health due to high rates of illiteracy and economic dependency. Co-residence between older parents and their adult children is among the highest in the world and the majority of economically dependent parents report being financially supported by their adult children (Thoma et al, 2021). In parallel, given the substantial progress made in primary school enrolment in recent decades, a large gap in educational attainment has emerged between older parents and their adult children in many low- and middle-income countries, including India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this context, the increased resources of adult children – such as educational attainment and income – may be advantageous not only for the health of those individuals themselves, and for their own children, but also for the older generations. Indeed, previous research has documented substantial health benefits of increased children’s resources for their parents. In China, for instance, a study exploiting a compulsory education law as a “natural experiment” found that increasing children’s years of schooling lead to improved cognitive function and higher survival expectations among their older parents (Ma, 2019). In Tanzania, each additional year of children’s primary education reduced the probabilities of maternal and paternal death by 3.7 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively (De Neve and Fink 2018).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To our knowledge, however, no study had examined the relationship between children’s education and the health of their mothers and fathers in India, where there is substantial variation in socio-economic conditions across subnational administrative units.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Children’s education and parental health in India</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent paper, we examined the relationship between adult children’s education and parental health using nationally representative data from the Indian National Sample Survey of 2014 (Thoma et al 2021). Although several longitudinal data collection efforts are under way in India, the NSS data provided the most recent nationally representative data on the health of older Indians. The survey, from which we drew a subsample of nearly 14,000 older parents, collected comprehensive information on health and socioeconomic characteristics.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Figure 1, we show the predicted probability of parents reporting poor health by children’s educational attainment. We find that parents of children with tertiary education had the lowest probability of reporting poor health. The strong positive relationship between children’s education and parental health held up when controlling for a wide range of socio-demographic factors, including parental age, education, and social group. More specifically, the probability of reporting poor health was 5.4 percentage points lower, relative to a baseline of 25.9% among parents whose children had completed less than primary education. To put these results into perspective, parents’ <em>own tertiary education</em> was associated with a reduction of 5.9 percentage points in reporting poor health. If these results are confirmed in future studies, policies targeting old-age care in India should consider the potential of increasing children’s education to further improve the health of the older generations.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Predicted-probability-of-parents-reporting-poor-health-by-childrens-education_2-1.jpg" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="550" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Predicted-probability-of-parents-reporting-poor-health-by-childrens-education_2-1-1024x550.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-6778" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Predicted-probability-of-parents-reporting-poor-health-by-childrens-education_2-1-1024x550.jpg 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Predicted-probability-of-parents-reporting-poor-health-by-childrens-education_2-1-300x161.jpg 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Predicted-probability-of-parents-reporting-poor-health-by-childrens-education_2-1-768x413.jpg 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Predicted-probability-of-parents-reporting-poor-health-by-childrens-education_2-1.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>But how does it work?</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A number of mechanisms may explain the observed relationship between children’s education and parental health identified by our analysis. Previous research has suggested that adult children may ‘repay’ their older parents for investments received in childhood, especially in settings where public wealth transfers are limited (De Neve &amp; Kawachi 2017). Given the strong relationship between increased education and income, children with additional education may share their increased economic resources with older parents, positively affecting their health outcomes. Children with more education may also share their health knowledge, skills, and behaviors with older family members. In China, for example, an education program delivered to schoolchildren as part of the school curriculum reduced cardiovascular risk factors among their parents (He et al. 2015), and a similar program in Bangladesh reduced smoking among parents (Siddiqi et al., 2019).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our results persisted when controlling for a wide range of covariates, such as economic factors, suggesting that other mechanisms may play an important role in India. These may include, for instance, knowledge transfers or skills that shape health behaviors, the provision of help with household tasks, or increased emotional closeness between children and their parents.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Subnational heterogeneity</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The strong positive relationship between children’s education and parental health differed considerably between groups and subnational administrative units across India. The association between children’s education and parental health was more pronounced among economically dependent parents, and those living in the North and West regions of India. Additionally, we found that the association between children’s education and parental health was somewhat more pronounced for the parental age group 65–69 years, low-educated parents (primary education or less), households with daughters rather than sons, and biological children compared with children-in-law. Interestingly, the strength of the relationship between children’s education and parental health was similar for mothers and fathers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Given the observational nature of our study, caution is required in interpreting its results. For instance, children’s education may not be a “cause” of the mothers’ and fathers’ good or poor health, but rather a marker (proxy) for the household’s socioeconomic status, despite our efforts to keep this variable under control. Greater specificity to defining children’s education and its mediating components, across subgroups and contexts, would be useful to improve our understanding of the observed relationship between children’s education and their parents’ health in India.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">De Neve JW, Fink G. 2018. Children&#8217;s education and parental old age survival &#8211; Quasi-experimental evidence on the intergenerational effects of human capital investment.<em> Journal of Health Economics</em>. 58:76-89.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">De Neve JW, Kawachi I. 2017. Spillovers between siblings and from offspring to parents are understudied: A review and future directions for research. <em>Social Science &amp; Medicine</em>. 183:56-61.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He FJ, Wu Y, Feng XX, Ma J, Ma Y, Wang H, Zhang J, Yuan J, Lin CP, Nowson C, MacGregor GA. 2015. School based education programme to reduce salt intake in children and their families (School-EduSalt): cluster randomised controlled trial. <em>BMJ</em>. 18;350:h770.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ma M. 2019. Does children&#8217;s education matter for parents&#8217; health and cognition? Evidence from China. <em>Journal of Health Economics</em>. 66:222-240</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Siddiqi K, Huque R, Kanaan M, Ahmed F, Ferdous T, Shah S, Jackson C, Parrott S, Ahluwalia JS, Sheikh A. 2019. Children Learning About Secondhand Smoke (CLASS II): A Pilot Cluster Randomized Controlled Trial. <em>Nicotine Tob Res</em>. 21(5):670-677.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thoma B, Sudharsanan N, Karlsson O, Joe W, Subramanian SV, De Neve JW. 2021. Children&#8217;s education and parental old-age health: Evidence from a population-based, nationally representative study in India. <em>Population Studies</em>. 75(1):51-66.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2019. <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">World Population Prospects 2019: Data Booklet </a>(ST/ESA/SER.A/424. New York: United Nations. </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/education-work-economy/educating-children-in-india-may-help-keep-their-parents-healthy/">Educating children in India may help keep their parents healthy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jan-Walter De Neve]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>Demography and development in the maze of Indian districts</title>
		<link>https://www.niussp.org/environment-and-development/demography-and-development-in-the-maze-of-indian-districts-demographie-et-developpement-des-districts-indiens/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sanjay K. Mohanty]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Jan 2020 08:20:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Environment and development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Children]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[population]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[population growth]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.niussp.org/?p=4168</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A striking contrast in demographic and development indicators emerges from a recent analysis of the 640 districts of India, which Sanjay K. Mohanty, Udaya S. Mishra, Rajesh K. Chauhan and ... <a title="Demography and development in the maze of Indian districts" class="read-more" href="https://www.niussp.org/environment-and-development/demography-and-development-in-the-maze-of-indian-districts-demographie-et-developpement-des-districts-indiens/" aria-label="Read more about Demography and development in the maze of Indian districts">Read more</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/environment-and-development/demography-and-development-in-the-maze-of-indian-districts-demographie-et-developpement-des-districts-indiens/">Demography and development in the maze of Indian districts</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>A striking contrast in demographic and development indicators emerges from a recent analysis of the 640 districts of India, which Sanjay K. Mohanty, Udaya S. Mishra, Rajesh K. Chauhan and Sayantani Chatterjee summarize for N-IUSSP.<br>Population growth, child sex ratio, ageing and educational achievement respond to local levels of development, although not always in a linear manner. Gender disparities in education, which persist beyond primary level, are spread across the country.</em></p>



<p class="has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph">India is probably known to most N-IUSSP readers for its macro characteristics, which are often compared to those of other large developing countries, as in Table 1. The picture that emerges is mixed: a synthetic measure like the human development index (HDI) indicates that India occupies an intermediate position, behind Brazil, China, and Indonesia, but ahead of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nigeria.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.26.46.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-0" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="456" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.26.46-1024x456.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4172" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.26.46-1024x456.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.26.46-300x134.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.26.46-768x342.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.26.46.png 1992w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This article, however, does not set out to compare India internationally; rather, it focuses on its internal heterogeneity, which is extremely high – higher than what most N-IUSSP readers probably imagine. Indeed, the famous north-south dichotomy is not limited to demography but concerns several key domains of human development, education, health and income. Regional differences and disparities with respect to each of these domains are analysed in depth in a recent book (Mohanty, Mishra and Chauhan 2019); here we highlight a few of the most interesting features that emerge.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>640 Indian realities</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our unit of analysis are the 640 Indian districts. These are reasonably large (some 2 million inhabitants each, on average) and at different stages of their demographic transition, with wide differences in terms of growth rate, age and sex structure, fertility, mortality, and migration. Not surprisingly, they also exhibit huge disparities in socio-economic development, which is here measured with the district development index (DDI), a composite indicator ranging between 0 and 1, which is analogous to the more famous HDI, and combines social, health and economic variables (Mohanty et al 2019).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Figure 1, illustrating the mean level of the DDI in 2011 across a range of population growth rates between 2001 and 2011, displays a very distinct U shape. Moderate population growth is associated with higher development; however, robust population growth rates characterize not only relatively backward areas (with high fertility), but also highly dynamic and urbanized districts, on the right of the scale, because they attract migrants.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.27.35.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-1" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="661" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.27.35-1024x661.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4176" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.27.35-1024x661.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.27.35-300x194.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.27.35-768x495.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.27.35.png 1696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Child sex ratio and level of development</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Child sex ratio (CSR), defined as the number of girls per 1,000 boys aged 0-6, has been declining in India over the last two decades, and this is a major concern to both national and state governments. Figure 2 plots the CSR by DDI for the Indian districts in 2011. This indicator is very frequently below, sometimes largely below, its “expected” value of 952 (horizontal violet line). It is generally higher in less developed districts (DDI below 0.4), and tends to decrease in the more developed one (DDI above 0.6), although the trend is slightly masked by an increase in the variability of the phenomenon (right part of Figure 2). Son preference (which often translates into sex-selective abortion) is surely the main cause of this pattern: low fertility levels in a good number of the more developed districts are associated with (and lead to) low CSRs.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.10.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-2" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="807" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.10-1024x807.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4175" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.10-1024x807.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.10-300x236.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.10-768x605.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.10.png 1568w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Changing age structure and level of development</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Along with fertility transition and rising longevity, the size and share of the older population (e.g., aged 60 and over) is increasing in India. On average, districts with higher level of development have higher proportion of older adults (Figure 3). Districts where this share exceeds 10% (the horizontal line) typically have medium or high levels of development. Deviations from this pattern are probably caused by migration to the more developed districts, because migrants are typically of young working ages. Even here, however, declining fertility and improved survival will eventually lead to ageing: provision of healthcare, pensions and social support to the elderly will be a formidable challenge in the coming years.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.42.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-3" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="651" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.42-1024x651.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4174" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.42-1024x651.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.42-300x191.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.42-768x488.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.28.42.png 1382w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Gender differentials in educational progression</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The conventional educational indicators fail to capture the geographical variations and gender gap in educational progress in India. For instance, while gender gaps in literacy and primary enrolment are narrowing, they remain disparate at higher educational levels. This is clearly shown by a gendered analysis of the Educational Progression Ratio (EPR), the probability of attaining higher secondary level by those who completed their junior secondary education (Chatterjee and Mishra, 2019).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As Figure 4 shows, inter-district variations in EPR are extremely large and responsive to the differential levels of development across districts. However, at all levels of DDI, EPRs are consistently lower for females than for males.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image"><a href="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.29.21.png" data-rel="lightbox-image-4" data-rl_title="" data-rl_caption="" title=""><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="732" src="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.29.21-1024x732.png" alt="" class="wp-image-4173" srcset="https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.29.21-1024x732.png 1024w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.29.21-300x214.png 300w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.29.21-768x549.png 768w, https://www.niussp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Schermata-2020-01-06-alle-18.29.21.png 1716w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></a></figure>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Districts of India remain highly heterogeneous in both demographic and development terms, with no apparent signs of convergence, yet. As the divergence is not limited to the few dimensions illustrated here, the need for policy intervention arises. In our opinion, the key dimensions on which to intervene, among the many that are needed, are:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1) arrest population increase, especially in rapidly growing districts,</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2) put special emphasis on gender equity, and</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">3) identify districts with an urgent need for development intervention, within and across states.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Without these, or similar, policy actions, there are reasons to fear that the already existing, profound inequalities of the country will soon grow even larger.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>References</strong></h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chatterjee S., &amp; Mishra U.S.(2019). Educational Development and Disparities in India: District-Level Analyses. In <em>The Demographic and Development Divide in India </em>(pp. 259-328). Springer, Singapore.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mohanty S. K., Mishra U.S. &amp; Chauhan R.K. (2019). <em>The Demographic and Development Divide in India</em>. Springer, Singapore.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mohanty S.K., Dehury B., Mishra U.S., Dash A. &amp; Singh R.R. (2019). Spatial Pattern of Development in Districts of India. In <em>The Demographic and Development Divide in India </em>(pp. 509-551). Springer, Singapore.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.niussp.org/environment-and-development/demography-and-development-in-the-maze-of-indian-districts-demographie-et-developpement-des-districts-indiens/">Demography and development in the maze of Indian districts</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.niussp.org">N-IUSSP</a>.</p>
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				<dc:creator><![CDATA[Udaya S. Mishra]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rajesh K. Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sayantani Chatterjee]]></dc:creator>
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